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Martin J. McMahon, Jr.*
Bruce A. McGovern**
Ira B. Shepard***
This recent developments outline discusses, and provides context to
understand the significance of, the most important judicial decisions and
administrative rulings and regulations promulgated by the Internal Revenue
Service and Treasury Department during 2014—and sometimes a little farther
back in time if we find the item particularly humorous or outrageous. Most
Treasury Regulations, however, are so complex that they cannot be discussed
in detail and, anyway, only a devout masochist would read them all the way
through; just the basic topic and fundamental principles are highlighted—
unless one of us decides to go nuts and spend several pages writing one up.
This is the reason that the outline is getting to be as long as it is. Amendments
to the Internal Revenue Code generally are not discussed except to the extent
that (1) they are of major significance, (2) they have led to administrative
rulings and regulations, (3) they have affected previously issued rulings and
regulations otherwise covered by the outline, or (4) they provide an
opportunity to mock our elected representatives; again, sometimes at least one
of us goes nuts and writes up the most trivial of legislative changes. The outline
focuses primarily on topics of broad general interest (to us, at least)—income
tax accounting rules, determination of gross income, allowable deductions,
treatment of capital gains and losses, corporate and partnership taxation,
exempt organizations, and procedure and penalties. It deals summarily with
qualified pension and profit sharing plans, and generally does not deal with
international taxation or specialized industries, such as banking, insurance,
and financial services.
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The Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-295, colloquially
called the “Extenders Bill,” was signed by the President on 12/19/14. The Tax
Increase Prevention Act [hereinafter TIPA] retroactively extended through
12/31/14 a myriad of deductions, credits, and special benefit provisions that
had expired at the end of 2013. It did not address extension of these provisions,
or any other expired provisions, to 2015. This outline mentions some of the
more important provisions that were extended, but does not attempt
comprehensively to list the extenders or to explain them in detail. TIPA also
made miscellaneous technical corrections, none of which are discussed herein,
and encompassed The Achieving a Better Life Experience (ABLE) Act of
2014.
I.

ACCOUNTING
A.

Accounting Methods

1.
The Tax Court sides with the taxpayer on
application of the completed contract method of accounting to
development of planned residential communities. Shea Homes, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 142 T.C. 60 (2/12/14). The taxpayer was a home builder using
the completed contract method allowed by § 460(e) (which provides an
exception to the percentage-of-completion method otherwise required); the
taxpayer developed large, planned residential communities. The question was
whether the subject matter of the contracts consisted only of the houses and
the lots on which the houses were built, as argued by the IRS, or the homes
and the larger development, including amenities and other common
improvements, as argued by the taxpayer. The contracts were home
construction contracts under § 460(e)(6) because Reg. § 1.460-3(b)(2)(iii)
provides that the cost of the dwelling units includes “their allocable share of
the cost that the taxpayer reasonably expects to incur for any common
improvements (e.g., sewers, roads, clubhouses) that benefit the dwelling units
and that the taxpayer is contractually obligated, or required by law, to construct
within the tract or tracts of land that contain the dwelling units.” More
specifically, the taxpayer’s position was that the contracts were completed
when they met the test under Reg. § 1.460-1(c)(3)(i)(A) that the property was
used by the customer for its intended purpose and 95 percent of the costs of
the development had been incurred. Under this argument, final completion and
acceptance pursuant to Reg. § 1.460-1(c)(3)(B) did not occur (excluding
secondary items, if any, pursuant to Reg. § 1.460-1(c)(3)(B)(ii)) until the last
road was paved and the final bond was released. The Tax Court (Judge
Wherry) upheld the taxpayer’s position. Judge Wherry rejected the IRS’s
argument that the common improvements were “secondary items.” A key
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element in the holding was that the taxpayer was required by the contracts and
by state law to complete common improvements, and that the obligation was
secured by “hefty performance bonds.”
 The decision might be narrower than it
appears on its face. Footnote 24 of the opinion states as follows:
We are cognizant that our Opinion today could lead taxpayers
to believe that large developments may qualify for extremely
long, almost unlimited deferral periods. We would caution
those taxpayers a determination of the subject matter of the
contract is based on all the facts and circumstances. If
Vistancia, for example, attempted to apply the contract
completion tests by looking at all contemplated phases, it is
unlikely that the subject matter as contemplated by the
contracting parties could be stretched that far. Further, sec.
1.460-1(c)(3)(iv)(A), Income Tax Regs., may prohibit
taxpayers from inserting language in their contracts that
would unreasonably delay completion until such a super
development is completed.
a.
Howard Hughes may have died nearly 40
years ago, but his successors are still trying to fly the Spruce Goose.
Howard Hughes Co., LLC v. Commissioner, 142 T.C. No. 20 (6/2/14). The
taxpayer was in the residential land development business. The taxpayer
generally sold land through bulk sales, pad sales, finished lot sales, and custom
lot sales. In bulk sales, it developed raw land into villages and sold an entire
village to a builder. In pad sales, it developed villages into parcels and sold the
parcels to builders. In finished lot sales, it developed parcels into lots and sold
whole parcels of finished lots to builders. In custom lot sales, it sold individual
lots to individual purchasers or custom home builders, who then constructed
homes. The taxpayer never constructed any residential dwelling units on the
land it sold. The taxpayer reported income from purchase and sale agreements
under the § 460 completed contract method of accounting—generally when it
had incurred 95 percent of the estimated costs allocable to each sales
agreement. The IRS took the position that the land sales contracts were not
home construction contracts within the meaning of § 460(e) and that the bulk
sale and custom lot contracts were not long-term construction contracts
eligible for the percentage of completion method of accounting under § 460.
(The IRS conceded that the other contracts were long-term construction
contracts.) The Tax Court (Judge Wherry) held that the bulk sale and custom
lot contracts were long-term construction contracts under § 460(f)(1), and that
the taxpayer could report gain or loss from those contracts on the appropriate
long-term method of accounting to the extent it had not completed the
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contracts within a year of entering into them. The contracts included more than
just the sale of lots. The costs incurred for a custom lot contract are not really
different from the costs for the finished lot sales. The contracts included
development of things such as water service, traffic signals, landscaping, and
construction of parks, which did not necessarily occur prior to the closing.
Completion of the contracts thus occurred upon final completion and
acceptance of the improvements, the cost of which was allocable to the custom
lot contracts. However, none of the contracts qualified as home construction
contracts eligible for the completed contract reporting method under § 460(e).
In relevant part, § 460(e)(6) defines a home construction contract as follows:
(A) Home construction contract—The term “home
construction contract” means any construction contract if 80
percent or more of the estimated total contract costs (as of the
close of the taxable year in which the contract was entered
into) are reasonably expected to be attributable to activities
referred to in paragraph (4) with respect to —
(i) dwelling units (as defined in section
168(e)(2)(A)(ii)) contained in buildings
containing 4 or fewer dwelling units (as so
defined), and
(ii) improvements to real property directly
related to such dwelling units and located on
the site of such dwelling units.
The taxpayer argued that the costs met the “80 percent test” applied to
determine whether the land sales contracts met the definition in § 460(e)(6).
At the end of a long analysis of the statutory language, the regulations, and the
legislative history, Judge Wherry concluded that the contracts did not qualify
as home construction contracts. The taxpayer’s costs were, if anything,
common improvement costs. The taxpayer did not incur any costs with respect
to any home’s “structural, physical construction.” The costs were not “costs
for improvements ‘located on’ or ‘located at’ the site of the homes.”
Accordingly, the costs could not be included in testing whether 80 percent of
their allocable contract costs are attributable to the dwelling units and real
property improvements directly related to, and located on, the site of the yet
to be constructed dwelling units.
Our Opinion today draws a bright line. A taxpayer’s
contract can qualify as a home construction contract only if
the taxpayer builds, constructs, reconstructs, rehabilitates, or
installs integral components to dwelling units or real property
improvements directly related to and located on the site of
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such dwelling units. It is not enough for the taxpayer to merely
pave the road leading to the home, though that may be
necessary to the ultimate sale and use of a home. If we allow
taxpayers who have construction costs that merely benefit a
home that may or may not be built, to use the completed
contract method of accounting, then there is no telling how
attenuated the costs may be and how long deferral of income
may last.
2.
It turns out that 6666, not 666, is the mark of the
devil for the IRS. Burnett Ranches, Ltd. v. United States, 753 F.3d 143 (5th
Cir. 5/22/14). Burnett Ranches operated two cattle and horse breeding
operations and reported on the cash method. The principal owner, beneficial
owner, and the manager of Burnett Ranches, Anne Burnett Windfohr Marion,
interposed an S corporation between herself and one of the two major ranch
properties (6666, the Four Sixes) and had a direct interest in, and was a
beneficiary of, a trust that held an interest in the other major ranch property
(Dixon Creek). The IRS took the position that Burnett Ranches was a “farming
syndicate” required by § 464 to use the accrual method of accounting.
Speaking generally, § 464 requires farming partnerships to use the accrual
method if either (1) they are syndicated or (2) more than 35 percent of losses
are attributable to limited partners. But because it is targeted at late twentieth
century tax shelters, it has a number of exceptions that cover “family farms.”
The taxpayer maintained that the exception in § 464(c)(2)(A) for active
management by an individual holding an interest (even if as a limited partner)
applied. The government conceded that (1) Ms. Marion did “actively
participate” in the management of Burnett Ranches’ agricultural business for
not less than five years previously, and (2) her interest in Burnett Ranches was
“attributable to” her active participation, but argued that the interposition of
the S corporation between the entity owning the ranch and Ms. Marion
rendered the exception inapplicable. The District Court granted judgment in
favor of the taxpayer, and, in an opinion by Judge Wiener, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed. The court rejected the government’s argument that the interest of the
individual actively managing the farm or ranch had to be held by direct legal
title for the exception to apply, focusing on the language of § 464(c)(2)(A),
which describes the excepted interest as “in the case of any individual who has
actively participated (for a period of not less than five years) in the
management of any trade or business of farming, any interest in a partnership
or other enterprise which is attributable to such active participation.” The court
reasoned that by using the language “interest . . . attributable to such active
participation,” “Congress did not restrict sub-subsection (A)’s particular
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exception to interests of which such an actively participating manager holds
legal title in his or her name.”
B.

Inventories
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2014.
C.

Installment Method

1.
Beginning to updating regulations only thirty-four
years after the Code section number was changed. REG-109187-11,
Nonrecognition of Gain or Loss on Certain Dispositions of Installment
Obligations, 79 F.R. 76928 (12/23/14). The Treasury Department and IRS
have published proposed amendments to Regs. §§ 1.351-1(a), 1.361-1,
1.453B-1, and 1.721-1(a) to provide that a transferor does not recognize gain
under § 453B or otherwise (or loss) on the transfer of an installment obligation
if gain or loss is not recognized on the disposition under any of §§ 351, 361,
or 721. However, the proposed regulations provide that this general rule does
not apply to the satisfaction of an installment obligation. For example, an
installment obligation of an issuer, such as a corporation or partnership, is
satisfied when the holder transfers the obligation to the issuer for an equity
interest in the issuer. These proposed amendments reflect the replacement in
1980 of former § 453(d) with § 453B, and the proposed amendments replace
current Reg. § 1.452-9(c)(2), issued under former § 453(d). With respect to a
satisfaction transfer, the proposed regulations incorporate the holding of Rev.
Rul. 73-423, 1973-2 C.B. 161, which held that in such a case involving a
corporation as the obligor, the transferor recognizes gain or loss on the
satisfaction of the obligation to the extent of the difference between the
transferor’s basis in the obligation and the fair market value of the stock
received, even though gain or loss generally is not recognized on § 351
transfers.
 The proposed amendments will be
effective upon publication of final amended regulations.
D.

Year of Inclusion or Deduction

1.
This Eagle’s wings got clipped. Giant Eagle, Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-146 (7/23/14). The taxpayer owned and
operated supermarkets and gas stations. It offered a customer loyalty program
by which customers making qualifying purchases at the supermarket could
earn “fuelperks!” that were redeemable for a discount against the purchase
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price of gas at the gas stations. The taxpayer, which used the accrual method,
claimed deductions for certain unredeemed fuelperks! for the years at issue.
The Tax Court (Judge Haines) disallowed the deductions because the “all
events” test of § 461 had not been satisfied. The redemption of fuelperks! was
structured as a discount against the purchase price of gas, and the purchase of
gas was necessarily a condition precedent to the redemption of fuelperks! The
court declined to analogize the fuelperks! to trading stamps or premium
coupons “redeemable in merchandise, cash, or other property” issued by a
retailer, which under Reg. § 1.451-4(a)(1) can offset income in the year issued,
applying instead Rev. Rul. 78-212, 1978-1 C.B. 139, in which the IRS ruled
that a taxpayer using the accrual method of accounting who and with the sale
of products issued coupons that could be redeemed for a discount on the sale
prices of products purchased in the future could not apply Reg. § 1.4514(a)(1); those coupons were not “redeemable in merchandise, cash, or other
property” because the redemption of the coupons was conditioned on an
additional purchase of the retailer’s product by the consumer.
II.

BUSINESS INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A.

Income

1.
The IRS says that for some purposes pledging
ownership of a disregarded LLC is the same thing as mortgaging the
LLC’s real property. Rev. Proc. 2014-20, 2014-9 I.R.B. 614 (2/5/14). This
revenue procedure provides a safe harbor under which the IRS will treat
indebtedness that is secured by 100 percent of the ownership interest in a
disregarded entity holding real property as indebtedness that is secured by real
property for purposes of § 108(c)(3)(A). Section 108(a)(1)(D) allows
noncorporate taxpayers to elect to exclude income arising from cancellation
of “qualified real property business indebtedness.” Section 108(c)(3)(A)
defines qualified real property business indebtedness as indebtedness incurred
in connection with, and secured by, real property used in a trade or business.
The exclusion is limited to the amount by which qualified real property
business indebtedness exceeds the fair market value of property secured by the
debt, which limits the exclusion under § 108(a)(1)(D) to so-called “phantom
gain.” Section 108(c)(2)(B) further limits the amount of the exclusion to the
aggregate adjusted basis of depreciable real property held by the taxpayer
immediately before the cancellation. “Qualified real property business
indebtedness” includes only (1) debt incurred or assumed by the taxpayer
before 1993 “in connection with” real property used by the taxpayer in a trade
or business and secured by the real property, and (2) debt incurred or assumed
after 1992 to acquire, construct, reconstruct, or substantially improve the
property secured by the debt or to refinance qualifying pre-1993 indebtedness
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to the extent the refinancing does not exceed the original debt. This revenue
procedure provides that as long as the indebtedness meets the other
requirements of § 108(c)(3), the IRS will treat such indebtedness as secured
by real property for purposes of § 108(c)(3)(A), and thus as “qualified real
property business indebtedness,” eligible for exclusion from gross income
pursuant to § 108(a)(1)(D), subject to the limitations provided in § 108(c), any
indebtedness that meets the following conditions: (1) the taxpayer or a wholly
owned disregarded entity of the taxpayer incurs indebtedness, (2) the taxpayer
borrower directly or indirectly owns 100 percent of the ownership interest in
a disregarded entity owning real property, (3) the taxpayer borrower pledges
to the lender a first priority security interest in the borrower’s ownership
interest in the disregarded entity; any further encumbrance on the pledged
ownership interest must be subordinate to the lender’s security interest, (4) at
least 90 percent of the fair market value of the total assets (immediately before
the discharge) directly owned by the disregarded entity must be real property
used in a trade or business, and any other assets held by the disregarded entity
must be incidental to the entity’s acquisition, ownership, and operation of the
real property, and (5) upon default and foreclosure on the indebtedness, the
lender will replace the borrower as the sole member of the disregarded entity
owning the property.
B.

Deductible Expenses versus Capitalization

1.
Those fancy Pyrex® and Oneida® branded
kitchen products are made by Robinson Knife Manufacturing, which is
required to capitalize license fees. Robinson Knife Manufacturing Co. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-9 (1/14/09). The taxpayer designs and
produces kitchen tools for sale to large retail chains. To enhance its marketing,
the taxpayer paid license fees to Corning for use of the Pyrex trademark and
Oneida for use of the Oneida trademark on kitchen tools designed and
produced by the taxpayer. The taxpayer’s production of kitchen tools bearing
the licensed trademarks was subject to review and quality control by Corning
or Oneida. The IRS asserted that the taxpayer’s licensing fees were subject to
capitalization into inventory under § 263A under Reg. § 1.263A1(e)(3)(ii)(Uu), which expressly includes licensing and franchise fees as
indirect costs that must be allocated to produced property. Agreeing with the
IRS, the court (Judge Marvel) rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the
licensing fees, incurred to enhance the marketability of its produced products,
were deductible as marketing, selling, or advertising costs excluded from the
capitalization requirements by Reg. § 1.263A-1(e)(3)(iii)(A). The court noted
that the design approval and quality control elements of the licensing
agreements benefited the taxpayer in the development and production of
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kitchen tools marketed with the licensed trademarks. The court rejected the
taxpayer’s argument that Rev. Rul. 2000-4, 2000-1 C.B. 331, which allowed
a current deduction for costs incurred in obtaining ISO 9000 certification as
an assurance of quality processes in providing goods and services, was
applicable to the quality control element of the license agreements. The court
noted that although the trademarks permitted the taxpayer to produce kitchen
tools that were more marketable than the taxpayer’s other products, the
royalties directly benefited or were incurred, or both, by reason of the
taxpayer’s production activities. The court also upheld the IRS’s application
of the simplified production method of Reg. § 1.263A-2(b) to allocate the
license fees between cost of goods sold and ending inventory as consistent
with the taxpayer’s use of the simplified production method for allocating
other indirect costs.
a.
But the Second Circuit disagrees.
Robinson Knife Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 600 F.3d 121 (2d Cir.
3/19/10). Like the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals rejected Robinson’s
arguments that the royalty payments were deductible as marketing, selling,
advertising, or distribution costs under Reg. § 1.263-1(e)(3)(iii)(A), or that the
royalty payments were deductible as not having been incurred in securing the
contractual right to use a trademark, corporate plan, manufacturing procedure,
special recipe, or other similar right associated with property produced under
Reg. § 1.263A-1(e)(3)(ii)(U). The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that
“royalty payments which are (1) calculated as a percentage of sales revenue
from certain inventory, and (2) incurred only upon sale of such inventory, are
not required to be capitalized under the § 263A regulations.” The court held
that the royalties were neither incurred in, nor directly benefited, the
performance of production activities under Reg. § 1.263A-1(e)(3)(i). Unlike
license agreements, the court concluded that Robinson could have
manufactured the products, and did, without paying the royalty costs. The
royalties were not, therefore, incurred by reason of the production process. The
court also concluded that since the royalties were incurred for kitchen tools
that have been sold, “it is necessarily true that the royalty costs and the income
from sale of the inventory items are incurred simultaneously.” The court noted
further that had Robinson’s licensing agreements provided for non-sales based
royalties, then capitalization would have been required.
b.
Proposed regulations make you wonder
why the IRS ever litigated Robinson Knife. REG-149335-08, Sales-Based
Royalties and Vendor Allowances, 75 F.R. 78940 (12/17/10). The IRS has
proposed regulations under § 263A that generally provide the taxpayerfavorable result reached by the Second Circuit in Robinson Knife. The
proposed regulations provide that sales-based royalties must be capitalized,
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but also provide that sales-based royalties required to be capitalized are
allocable only to property that a taxpayer has sold, rather to closing inventory.
The preamble asserts that the Second Circuit in Robinson Knife misconstrued
the nature of costs required to be capitalized and that the costs of securing
rights to use intellectual property directly benefits, or are incurred by reason
of, production processes requiring that the costs be capitalized even if payable
only on the basis of the number of units sold or as a percentage of revenue.
Nonetheless, the proposed regulations are consistent with the holding of
Robinson Knife where they provide that sales-based royalties are related only
to units that are sold during the taxable year. Thus, Prop. Reg. § 1.263A3(d)(3)(i)(C)(3) would provide that sales-based costs would not be included in
ending inventory under § 471.
 However, in light of the generous
treatment of sales-based royalties, the proposed § 263A regulations, along with
proposed amendments to Reg. § 1.471-3(e), require that sales-based vendor
allowances (which are rebates or discounts from a vendor as a result of selling
the vendor’s merchandise) must be taken into account as an adjustment to the
cost of merchandise sold, effectively requiring that such allowances be included
in gross income immediately, and would not be taken into account in ending
inventory.
 The formulas allocating additional indirect
costs to ending inventory under the simplified production and resale methods
would be modified to remove capitalized sales-based royalties and vendor
allowances allocable to property that has been sold.
c.
But the IRS still disagrees with the Second
Circuit. AOD 2011-01, 2011-9 I.R.B. 526 (2/8/11), corrected by Ann. 201132, 2011-22 I.R.B. 836 (5/31/11). The IRS disagrees with the Second Circuit
analysis stating that the court “confused the timing with the purpose of the
payments.” The IRS opines that Robinson incurred the royalty expenses first
to produce then to sell the trademarked items, adding that in order to sell the
items it first had to produce them.
d.
Final Sales-Based Royalty and Vendor
Allowance regulations. T.D. 9652, Sales-Based Royalties and Vendor
Allowances, 79 F.R. 2094 (1/13/14). The final regulations follow the proposed
regulations on sales-based royalties with the modification of permitting
taxpayers to either (1) allocate sales-based royalties entirely to property sold,
or (2) to allocate these royalties between cost of goods sold and ending
inventory using either (a) a facts-and-circumstances cost allocation method,
(b) the simplified production method, or (c) the simplified resale method.
Sales-based vendor chargebacks will still reduce cost of goods sold (as in the

2015]

Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation

109

proposed regulations) but the treatment of sales-based vendor allowances
other than chargebacks is reserved in the final regulations.
e.
And detailed procedures for changing
methods of accounting based on the above final regulations. Rev. Proc.
2014-33, 2014-22 I.R.B. 1060 (5/6/14), modifying Rev. Proc. 2011-14, 20112 C.B. 330. This revenue procedure provides the exclusive procedures by
which a taxpayer obtains consent under § 446(e) to (1) change its method of
accounting for royalties, (2) change its method of accounting for sales-based
vendor chargebacks, or (3) change its simplified production method or
simplified resale method for costs allocated only to inventory property that has
been sold, to comply with the T.D. 9652 final regulations. The detailed
procedures are contained in new section 11.11 of the APPENDIX to Rev. Proc.
2011-14.
2.
Accounting method changes are coming and the
IRS wants to make it easy. Rev. Proc. 2014-16, 2014-9 I.R.B. 606 (2/24/14).
This revenue procedure modifies the procedures for obtaining the automatic
consent of the IRS for certain changes in methods of accounting for amounts
paid to acquire, produce, or improve tangible property. In particular, it
provides procedures for obtaining automatic consent to change to (1) a
reasonable method described in Reg. § 1.263A-1(f)(4) for self-constructed
assets, and (2) a permissible method under § 263A(b)(2) and Reg. § 1.263A3(a)(1) for certain costs related to real property acquired through a foreclosure
or similar transaction. Rev. Proc. 2011-14 is modified and clarified, and Rev.
Proc. 2012-19 is modified and superseded.
3.
Protecting directors from cement shoes in a
shareholder class-action arising from a merger subject to capitalization.
Why apply modern regulations when old case law will do the trick? Ash
Grove Cement Co. v. United States, 111 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-767 (D. Kan.
2/6/13). The taxpayer settled a class action lawsuit by minority shareholders
against itself and its directors arising out of the acquisition of another
corporation in a reorganization. The District Court (Judge Murguia) granted
summary judgment for the government, holding that both the settlement
payment and litigation expenses incurred by the taxpayer in resolving the class
action lawsuit were capital expenditures under § 263. The origin of the claim
for which the taxpayer incurred the expenses arose from a capital transaction.
Even though the payments related to the taxpayer’s 2005 return, the court
applied the case law based “origin of the claim” test, e.g., Woodward v.
Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970), rather than Reg. § 1.263(a)-5, which was
promulgated in 2003. The court held that the litigation expenses arose out of
the acquisition transactions and were thus capital expenses under the origin of
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the claim test. The court rejected the taxpayer’s argument that expenses
incurred to indemnify directors from legal claims were deductible. The court
pointed out that under the taxpayer’s approach, “companies could always
deduct litigation expenses any time a director acting in good faith is sued in
connection with a capital transaction so long as the company has an indemnity
obligation.”
a.
Affirmed on the same case law grounds.
Ash Grove Cement Co. v. United States, 562 F. App’x 697 (10th Cir. 4/22/14),
aff’g 111 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-767 (D. Kan. 2/6/13). The Tenth Circuit (Judge
Lucero) affirmed on the ground that “[c]ourts have repeatedly concluded that
litigation costs arising out of corporate reorganizations are capital
expenditures.” He refused to distinguish the Woodward line of cases on the
grounds that the litigation here “did not involve the purchase of a capital asset
or setting the price of a capital asset” by noting that the litigation concerned
the purchase price for the acquisition of another corporation in the
reorganization and the settlement payment was a capital expense. As to the
deductibility of the legal expenses, he concluded that the “Supreme Court has
previously determined that a variation in state law that changed the
relationship between parties involved in a suit regarding capital expanses did
not alter the deductibility of expenditures,” citing United States v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580, 583–84 (1970).
4.
What is “insurance”? Rev. Rul. 2014–15, 2014-24
I.R.B. 1095 (5/8/14). This revenue ruling provides that a particularly described
arrangement under which an employer funds retiree health benefits through a
wholly owned subsidiary is insurance for federal income tax purposes. The
subsidiary is an insurance company under Subchapter L.
5.
In the Sixth Circuit, even if not necessarily in the
rest of the country, lease termination expenses are deductible and not
capitalized into the basis of an acquired building. ABC Beverage Corp. v.
United States, 756 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 6/13/14), aff’g 577 F. Supp. 2d 935
(W.D. Mich. 8/27/08). The taxpayer operated a bottling facility in a leased
building. Because it considered the rent to be excessive, it exercised an option
to purchase the property. Appraisals valued the property without the lease at
$2.75 million, but the taxpayer determined that the fair market value of the
property with the lease would be at least $9 million and it eventually bought
the property for more than $9 million. The taxpayer treated $2.75 million as
its cost of acquiring the property and deducted $6.25 million as a business
expense for terminating the lease. Applying Cleveland Allerton Hotel, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 166 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1948), the Sixth Circuit, in an opinion
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by Judge Cole, upheld the deduction, rejecting the government’s argument that
the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions in Woodward v. Commissioner, 397
U.S. 572 (1970), Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974), and
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992), had overruled
Cleveland Allerton Hotel, Inc. Further, the court held that § 167(c)(2), which
was enacted after Cleveland Allerton Hotel, Inc. was decided, did not apply.
Section 167(c)(2) provides that “[i]f any property is acquired subject to a
lease,” the taxpayer is prohibited from allocating any part of the property’s
cost to the leasehold interest and is required to capitalize the entire cost of the
property. The court concluded that “the phrase ‘acquired subject to a lease’ is
best understood to encompass only those acquisitions in which the lease
continues after the purchase.” In so doing, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that
in Union Carbide Foreign Sales Corp. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 423 (1993),
the Tax Court had reached the opposite conclusion regarding the ambit of
§ 167(c)(2), but disagreed with the Tax Court’s conclusion.
6.
Research to eliminate uncertainty
is deductible under final regulations. What about the uncertainty of tax
advice? T.D. 9680, Research Expenditures, 79 F.R. 42193 (7/21/14). The
Treasury Department has finalized, with minor revisions, amendments to Reg.
§ 1.174-2 proposed in REG-124148-05, Research Expenditures, 78 F.R.
54796 (9/6/13). Section 174 allows either deduction or 60 month amortization
of research and experimental expenditures, but under § 174(c) the § 174
deduction is not applicable to expenditures for the acquisition or improvement
of land or depreciable property. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1) defines research and
experimental expenditures as expenditures that represent “research and
development costs in the experimental or laboratory sense” and provide in
§ 1.174-2(b)(1) that depreciation allowances on depreciable property used in
research are § 174 expenditures. The final regulations provide that
expenditures may qualify under § 174 regardless of whether a resulting
product is sold or used in the taxpayer’s trade or business and that the
depreciable property rule is an application of the general definition of research
and experimental expenditures.
 Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1) provides that the
ultimate success, failure, sale, or use of a product is not relevant to a
determination of eligibility of expenditures as research or experimental
expenditures under § 174.
 Reg. § 1.174-2(b)(4), as interpreted by the
preamble to the proposed and final regulations, makes clear that, as an application
of the general definition of research expenditures, the depreciable property rule
should not be applied to exclude otherwise eligible expenditures.
 Under Reg. § 1.174-(a)(2), research
expenditures to develop a product include development of a pilot model. Reg.
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§ 1.174-2(a)(4) defines a pilot model as “any representation or model of a product
that is produced to evaluate and resolve uncertainty concerning the product.”
 The regulations amend Reg. § 1.1742(a)(1) to “clarify” that production costs after uncertainty is eliminated are not
eligible under § 174 by providing that “[c]osts may be eligible under section 174
if paid or incurred after production begins but before uncertainty concerning the
development or improvement of the product is eliminated.”
 Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(5) adopts a “shrinking
back rule” that provides that research and experimental expenditures for the
improvement of a component of a larger design may be eligible under § 174, but
uncertainty with respect to components does not necessarily indicate uncertainty
with respect to the product as a whole.
 The amendments to Reg. § 1.174-2 apply
to tax years ending on or after 7/21/14, but taxpayers can apply these amendments
to tax years for which the period of limitations on assessment of tax has not
expired.
C.

Reasonable Compensation

1.
A circular cash flow is not respected, particularly
where there are insufficient funds in the bank to back up the rubber
check. Vanney Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-184
(9/11/14). The Tax Court (Judge Buch) upheld the disallowance of deductions
for a cash method corporation that paid its sole shareholder employee a yearend bonus (on Dec. 30) by a check that the corporation did not have sufficient
funds to honor and which was immediately endorsed back to the corporation
as a loan.
D.

Miscellaneous Deductions

1.
A partner’s unreimbursed reimbursable expenses
incurred on behalf of the partnership are not deductible on his own
return. McLauchlan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-289 (12/19/11). The
taxpayer was a partner in a law firm and he paid various expenses, such as
advertising, home office, automobile, travel, meals, entertainment, cell phone,
professional organizations, continuing legal education, state bar membership,
supplies, interest, banking fees, and legal support services in connection with
his law practice. The partnership reimbursed him for over $60,000 of the
expenses in each year in question, but he claimed more than $100,000 of
additional expense on Schedule C in each year. The Tax Court (Judge Kroupa)
articulated the principal issue as whether a partner can deduct unreimbursed
expenses incurred in furtherance of the partnership’s business. She then
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articulated the relevant legal principle as prohibiting a partner from deducting
on his own return expenses of the partnership, even if the expenses were
incurred by the partner in furtherance of partnership business, unless there is
an agreement among partners, or a routine practice equal to an agreement, that
requires a partner to use his or her own funds to pay a partnership expense,
citing Cropland Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 288, 295 (1980), aff’d
without published opinion, 665 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1981). In the instant case,
the partnership agreement required petitioner to pay “indirect partnership
expenses” that were unreimbursable, but there was no routine practice that
required petitioner to pay any other partnership expenses. Thus, expenses at
issue were deductible only if they were unreimbursable indirect partnership
expenses that were actually incurred. Turning to the facts, Judge Kroupa found
that all of the claimed expenses were either reimbursable under the partnership
agreement or not properly substantiated. Accordingly, all of the claimed
deductions were disallowed and § 6662 accuracy related penalties were
upheld.
a.
And it appears to be black letter law to the
Fifth Circuit. McLauchlan v. Commissioner, 558 F. App’x 374 (5th Cir.
3/6/14)). The Fifth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the Tax Court.
First, the court restated what it considered to be the black letter law:
Generally, a partner may not deduct the expenses of the
partnership on his individual return, even if the expenses were
incurred by the partner in furtherance of partnership business.
Cropland Chem. Corp. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 288, 295 (1980),
affd., 665 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1981) (unpublished table
decision). The exception to this rule is where “under a
partnership agreement, a partner has been required to pay
certain partnership expenses out of his own funds, he is
entitled to deduct the amount thereof from his individual gross
income.” Klein v. Comm’r, 25 T.C. 1045, 1052 acq., 1956-2
C.B. 4 (1956).
In light of this law, the Court of Appeals found that the Tax Court record did
not establish that the partnership had a routine practice requiring partners to
pay any of its expenses outside the terms of the partnership agreement.
Accordingly, “expenses McLauchlan claimed as deductions beyond those
identified in the partnership agreement, such as for advertising, contract labor,
home insurance, interest, office supplies, utilities, and wages, were expenses
McLauchlan chose to incur, rather than ones called for by AR’s partnership
agreement. They therefore were not deductible on McLauchlan’s individual
tax return.” Presumably, the court found these expenses not to have been
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“necessary” in the strictest sense of the word. Next, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the expenses McLauchlan was required by the partnership
agreement to incur, except automobile expenses, were reimbursable by the
partnership, but McLauchlan failed to seek reimbursement. The court cited
Occhipinti v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1969-190, aff’d sub nom. Bayou
Verret Land Co. v. Commissioner, 450 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1971), for the
proposition that if a partner has a right to reimbursement and does not pursue
it, the partner is not entitled to deduct the expenses. Thus, he was “not required
to pay, without reimbursement, any of the claimed expenses at issue and thus
they were not properly deductible as unreimbursed partnership expenses.”
2.
Cash value life-insurance through off-shore
insurance companies and LLCs don’t produce deductible premiums.
Salty Brine I, Ltd. v. United States, 111 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-2308 (N.D. Tex.
5/16/13). In a marketed insurance tax shelter arrangement that even Jenkens
& Gilchrist would not bless with an opinion, the court denied § 162 deductions
for premiums paid for business protection insurance issued by off-shore
affiliates of Fidelity and Citadel Insurance companies. The policies included
cash value life insurance and related annuities that the court found did not
protect the business from risk and merely represented an attempt to funnel cash
from the businesses to families of the owners. Section 6662 penalties were
upheld.
a.
Affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. Salty Brine
I, Ltd. v. United States, 761 F.3d 484 (5th Cir. 7/31/14). The Fifth Circuit
(Judge Davis) affirmed the district court, finding that the arrangement was an
invalid attempt to assign income, so the alleged insurance premiums were not
deductible. He also found that the arrangement lacked economic substance,
based on it failing the first of the three factors of the “multi-factor test for when
a transaction must be honored as legitimate for tax purposes.” This test
requires that the transaction satisfy all three of the following factors; i.e., if it:
“(1) has economic substance compelled by business or regulatory realities,
(2) is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and (3) is not shaped
totally by tax-avoidance features.”
3.
A judge lets the jury decide how much of
$126,796,262 of a $385,147,334 settlement payment under the False
Claims Act is compensatory and how much is a nondeductible penalty.
Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 111 A.F.T.R.2d 20131938 (D. Mass. 5/9/13). The taxpayer deducted the full amount of a
$385,147,334 settlement with the government under the False Claims Act (for
Medicare and Medicaid fraud), which provides for a penalty of not less than
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$5,000 and not more than $10,000 plus three times the amount of damages the
government sustains. The settlement agreement was silent regarding the
allocation of the payment between compensatory and punitive amounts,
although it did allocate $65,800,555 to qui tam relators’ awards. The
agreement expressly disclaimed any resolution of the tax treatment of the
payment. The IRS allowed a portion of the deduction but disallowed as a fine
or similar penalty, which is nondeductible under § 162(f), $126,796,262 of the
claimed deduction. The District Court denied cross motions for summary
judgment because “real disputes remained about the purpose of the payments,”
and on a motion for entry of judgment held that the jury properly determined
that $95,000,000 of the disputed amount of the settlement paid to the
government was compensatory and therefore deductible. The court explained
that “a manifest agreement is not necessary for [the taxpayer] to establish that
all or some portion of the payments at issue were made in settlement of nonpunitive FCA liability.” It concluded that “to determine whether the payments
made by [the taxpayer] to the government in excess of the amount already
deemed deductible by the IRS were compensatory damages, it was necessary
to consider both the language of the settlement agreements and noncontractual evidence regarding the purpose and application of the payments.”
a.
And the First Circuit says to the
government ♪♫”that’s ok, that’s alright, I’m gonna do something you
don’t like.”♫♪ Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 763
F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 8/13/14). In an opinion by Judge Selya, the First Circuit
affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Court of Appeals rejected the
government’s argument that “the absence of an agreement between the parties
as to whether the payments will be deductible defeats Fresenius’s claim of
deductibility,” characterizing the government’s argument as “assign[ing]
talismanic significance to the presence or absence of a tax characterization
agreement between the settling parties.” Rather, the court held that in
determining the tax treatment of a False Claims Act civil settlement, a court
may consider factors beyond the mere presence or absence of a tax
characterization agreement between the government and the settling party.
The court reasoned as follows:
The government’s proposed rule is also in serious tension
with yet another fundamental tenet of tax law. This tenet holds
that amounts paid or received in settlement should receive the
same tax treatment, to the extent practicable, as would have
applied had the dispute been litigated and reduced to
judgment. See, e.g., Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 196; Freda
v. Comm’r, 656 F.3d 570, 574 (7th Cir. 2011); Alexander v.
IRS, 72 F.3d 938, 942 (1sst Cir. 1995). The government’s
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position here inters that tenet in the graveyard of forgotten
canons.
When an FCA claim is tried rather than settled, there will
perforce be no characterization agreement available to guide
the tax treatment of awarded damages. Nevertheless, some
portion of the award beyond single damages may
subsequently be found to have a compensatory purpose. See
Chandler, 538 U.S. at 130–31; Bornstein, 423 U.S. at 315.
Hence, that portion of the award will be deductible. See 26
C.F.R. §1.162-21(b). The same result logically should obtain
in the settlement context. Thus, a rule that requires a tax
characterization agreement as a precondition to deductibility
would produce an infelicitous asymmetry.
The First Circuit acknowledged that its holding was somewhat at odds with
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Talley Industries Inc. v. Commissioner, 116
F.3d 382 (1997), but it described Talley Industries as “distinguishable on its
facts,” and said “its message is unclear,” concluding that “generally accepted
principles of tax law compel us to part company with the Ninth Circuit.”
4.
The Tax Court shows some more love for captive
insurance companies. Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Commissioner, 142 T.C. 1
(1/14/14). The parent of an affiliated group of domestic corporations (RAC)
conducted its business through stores owned and operated by its subsidiaries.
The parent established a Bermudian insurance company (Legacy) and the
operating subsidiaries entered into insurance contracts with Legacy pursuant
to which each subsidiary paid Legacy an amount, determined by actuarial
calculations and an allocation formula, relating to workers’ compensation,
automobile, and general liability risks. Legacy, in turn, reimbursed a portion
of each subsidiary’s claims relating to these risks. Although the parent
corporation was a listed policyholder, no premium was attributable to it
because it did not own stores, have employees, or operate vehicles. RAC paid
the premiums relating to each policy. The operating subsidiaries deducted, as
insurance expenses, the payments to Legacy. In addition, in a complex
arrangement, RAC guaranteed up to $25 million of Legacy’s liabilities, and
the guaranty was treated as an asset of Legacy by the Bermudian insurance
regulators. The IRS issued a deficiency notice based on the position that the
payments by the operating subsidiaries to Legacy were not deductible as
insurance premiums. The Tax Court, in a reviewed opinion (7-3-6) by Judge
Foley, held that the payments were deductible as insurance premiums. First,
in forming Legacy, RAC “made a business decision premised on a myriad of
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significant and legitimate nontax considerations.” Second, the flow of funds
was not circular. Third, Legacy was not a “sham,” but “was a bona fide
insurance company.” Legacy “charged actuarially determined premiums; was
subject to the BMA’s regulatory control; met Bermuda’s minimum statutory
requirements; paid claims from its separately maintained account; and, as
respondent’s expert readily admitted, was adequately capitalized.” Finally, the
payments were insurance premiums because the policies shifted risk between
RAC’s operating subsidiaries and Legacy. Under the principles of Humana
Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1989), aff’g in part,
rev’g in part and remanding, 88 T.C. 197 (1987), because the subsidiaries
owned no stock in the captive insurance company, risk was shifted and
distributed. The court expressly rejected adoption of the IRS’s “economic
family theory,” see Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, as have other courts
that have examined the issue.
 Judge Foley found RAC’s guarantee of up
to $25 million of Legacy’s liabilities not to be relevant. Legacy’s guaranty did
not affect the balance sheets or net worth of the operating subsidiaries insured by
Legacy.
 In a dissenting opinion, Judge Halpern,
joined by Judge Lauber, discussed the lack of clarity in Judge Foley’s opinion
concerning whether the court has overruled its prior decision in Humana, in
which the Tax Court concluded that a brother-sister captive insurance
arrangement was not insurance for federal tax purposes. He emphasized that, to
overrule a prior decision, the Tax Court’s Conference Procedures require an
affirmative vote of a majority of judges entitled to vote and that, although the
votes of the three judges who concurred in the result count as affirmative votes,
“[w]hether the Court has in fact overruled a portion of Humana undoubtedly will
be unclear to many readers of this report.” Judge Halpern stated that, to the extent
the court’s prior decision in Humana stands for the proposition that a captive
insurance arrangement between brother-sister corporations cannot be insurance
a matter of law, it was unnecessary for the court to revisit Humana in light of the
IRS’s position, expressed in Rev. Rul. 2001-31, 2001 C.B. 1348, that it would no
longer invoke the “economic family” theory with respect to captive insurance
transactions and instead would assess such transactions based on the facts and
circumstances of each case.
 Judge Lauber wrote a dissenting opinion
in which five judges joined. Judge Lauber, for the same reasons expressed by
Judge Halpern, saw “no need for the Court to reconsider Humana, which in a
practical sense may be water under the bridge.” He agreed with the majority that
the deductibility of the insurance premiums should be assessed taking into
account the facts and circumstances of the case, but concluded that “the
undisputed facts of the entire record warrant the opposite conclusion from that
reached by the majority and justify a ruling that the Rent-A-Center arrangements
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do not constitute ‘insurance’ for Federal income tax purposes.” As the basis for
his conclusion, Judge Lauber focused on (1) the lack of risk shifting, evidenced
by the combination of RAC’s guaranty of Legacy’s liabilities and Legacy’s
inadequate capitalization, and (2) several factors demonstrating that RAC,
Legacy and the operating subsidiaries had failed to “conduct themselves in a
manner consistent with accepted insurance industry norms.
a.
Another big hug from the Tax Court for
captive insurance companies. Securitas Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2014-225 (10/29/14). Securitas AB, a public, Swedish company
that provides guarding and security services throughout Europe and other
markets, operates in the U.S. through an affiliated group of corporations of
which the parent is Securitas Holdings, Inc. (SHI). SHI acquired a U.S. captive
insurance company, Protectors Insurance Company of Vermont (Protectors).
During 2003 and 2004, the operating subsidiaries of SHI maintained their
coverage with third-party insurers for various insurable risks, including
workers’ compensation, automobile, employment practices, general, and
fidelity liabilities. Protectors insured most of the operating subsidiaries up to
the deductible or self-insured retentions of the third-party policies. SHI
guaranteed the performance of Protectors with respect to these risks. SHI did
so to preserve the tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(15) of another subsidiary
and took the position that Protectors did not qualify as an insurance company
for federal income tax purposes during the years in issue. SHI never paid any
amounts on the guaranty. Protectors requested certain relief from the Vermont
insurance regulators, including permission to lend all but $1 million of its
capital to SHI. The risks insured under the policies issued by Protectors were
reinsured by a newly-formed captive insurance company formed by Securitas
AB in Ireland. The Tax Court (Judge Buch) held that the premiums paid by
the operating subsidiaries were deductible under § 162. The court examined
four criteria commonly used by courts to determine whether an arrangement
constitutes insurance for federal tax purposes and concluded that the captive
arrangement was insurance because it: (1) shifted risk from the operating
subsidiaries to Protectors and ultimately to the Irish captive reinsurance
company; (2) distributed risk by insuring a large pool of differing risks; and
(3) constituted insurance in the commonly accepted sense. (The IRS conceded
that the arrangement involved insurable risks, which is the fourth criterion.) In
reaching these conclusions, the court rejected several arguments made by the
government. The court held that SHI’s guaranty did not negate risk shifting
based on its prior holding in Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Commissioner, 142 T.C.
No. 1 (1/14/14) and its conclusion that SHI’s captive arrangement was
distinguishable from the one in Hospital Corp. of America v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1997-482. The court also rejected the government’s argument that
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the group’s manner of paying claims and premiums through journal entries
that tracked amounts receivable and payable prevented risk from shifting.
5.
“[T]he dissipation, in recent times, of the historical
moral opposition to gambling does not undercut the ‘rational basis’ for
treating professional gambling losses differently from other businessrelated losses.” Lakhani v. Commissioner, 142 T.C. No. 8 (3/11/14). The Tax
Court (Judge Halpern) held that a professional gambler could not deduct under
§§ 162, 212, or 165 that portion of each bet equal to the takeout percentage
that applies to the pari-mutuel pool formed to receive that bet. Section 165(d)
disallowed the loss.
6.
A self-employed truck driver lacking receipts for
travel expenses gets to sing ♬♪Yankee Doodle Dandy.♬♪ Baker v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-122 (6/18/14). The taxpayer was a selfemployed trucker who used his own truck tractor to haul tank trailers from a
pickup site to designated destinations. He failed to file a tax return and the IRS
prepared a substitute return, based on third-party payors’ information returns,
that allowed no deductions. In disputing the deficiency, the taxpayer claimed
that various expenses of operating his trucking business should have been
allowed notwithstanding that he had no records. Because the truck was used
in the business of transporting property, pursuant to § 280F(d)(4)(C) it was not
listed property. Accordingly, the taxpayer’s claimed expenses for fuel,
maintenance, insurance, oil changes, storage fees, license plates, and heavy
highway use taxes, incurred with respect to the truck, were not subject to the
§ 274(d) substantiation requirements and some of the claimed expenses were
allowed under Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930) because
the Tax Court (Judge Ruwe) found that the taxpayer had credibly testified
about his business and the expenses. However, only a very small portion of
the claimed expenses were allowed.
7.
Intention to operate a rental business doesn’t
establish its operation. Hume v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-135
(7/7/14). The taxpayers claimed mortgage interest deductions on Schedule C
for a residential property they owned and had acquired with an intention
eventually to rent out, but in which they resided in the years in question. The
Tax Court (Judge Wherry) upheld the IRS’s determination that the taxpayers
were not entitled to Schedule C deductions because the property was a
personal residence. Although nothing in the record contradicted the taxpayer’s
testimony that he purchased the property with the purpose of renting it out for
profit, and the record arguably reflected “that he may have regularly and
actively engaged in efforts to further and promote the activity,” his testimony
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that he never was able to get the property into a “condition to be able to” rent
it, and the fact that he was residing in it, contradicted any argument that the
taxpayers were renting out or able to rent out the property for the years in
question. The taxpayers were able to deduct the mortgage interest payments
only as qualified residence interest on Schedule A, Itemized Deductions,
subject to the $1.1 million § 163(h) limitation. The remaining mortgage
interest paid was not deductible.
8.
Price-fixing in the E.U. results in an increased U.S.
income tax liability. Guardian Industries Corp. v. Commissioner, 143 T.C.
No. 1 (7/17/14). The Tax Court (Judge Lauber) sustained the IRS’s
determination that § 162(f) disallowed a deduction for a €20 million penalty
paid to the Commission of the European Community (EC) as a result of the
Commission’s determination that the taxpayer participated in prohibited price
fixing. The phrase “government of a foreign country,” as used in Reg. § 1.16221(a), refers both to the government of a single foreign country and to the
governments of two or more foreign countries, and the Commission was an
entity serving as an instrumentality of the EC member states within the
meaning of Reg. § 1.162-21(a). The court rejected the taxpayer’s argument
that “an agency or instrumentality must be below a government,” finding that
“[t]he fact that the Commission is not subordinate to, or subject to the control
of, any individual member state thus has little relevance in deciding whether
it is an ‘agency or instrumentality’ of the member states collectively.”
9.
So, maybe not reporting that barter rental income
wasn’t such a bright idea after all. Meinhardt v. Commissioner, 766 F.3d
917 (8th Cir. 9/10/14). The taxpayers owned 140 acres of farmland in rural
Minnesota and an eighty-year-old farmhouse in need of substantial repair and
renovation. At times they farmed the land themselves, but they regularly
rented the farmland to neighboring farmers for cash rent. They never rented
out the farmhouse for cash, but “rented” it to people who performed services
on the property or allowed relatives who performed services to use it free of
cash rent. They never reported any barter income and had no records of the
value of the services received. However, they deducted substantial expenses
relating to the farmhouse and its outbuildings, which were disallowed by the
IRS, because the farmland was the only part of the property that was leased
and from which income was derived. The Tax Court upheld the disallowance
of the deductions because the farmhouse expenses “were [not] tied to a real
estate property rental business” (I.R.C. § 162) or related to “property held for
the production of income” (I.R.C. § 212). The Court of Appeals, in a decision
by Judge Loken, affirmed.
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[E]vidence the Meinhardts made no changes in their efforts to
rent the property, despite thirty unsuccessful years,
undermined their assertion that they sought to profit by
renting the property. The lack of evidence of a rental property
business strategy, and evidence they allowed relatives to live
in the house rent-free, supported a finding that the Meinhardts
held the property as an alternative residence for the personal
use of their extended family.
The court also rejected the taxpayer’s argument that “the entire farm was ‘a
single rental business involving multiple related undertakings’ and therefore
all expenses of that single business, including the farmhouse expenses, were
deductible,” relying on Reg. § 1.183-1(d)(1), which deals with the scope of an
“activity” for purposes of the “hobby loss” rules. The Tax Court’s fact finding
that the taxpayer “differentiated the farmland from the farmhouse and rented
out the farmland separately,” and “did not abandon all personal use of the
farmhouse,” was not clearly erroneous. There was no evidence they ever tried
to rent or lease the farmhouse and farmland together. Nor did the taxpayer hold
the farmhouse for the production of income under § 212. “[T]hey ‘did nothing
to generate revenue during the years in issue [and] had no credible plan for
operating it profitably in the future.’”
10.
Don Draper likely would have tried to take
advantage of this rule had it been around when he was renting hotel
rooms in NYC. T.D. 9696, Local Lodging Expenses, 79 F.R. 59112 (10/1/14).
The Treasury Department has promulgated Reg. § 1.162-32 (proposed as Reg.
§ 1.162-31 in REG-137589-07, Local Lodging Expenses, 77 F.R. 24657
(4/25/12)) with minor clarifications. Reg. § 1.162-32 allows a deduction for
local lodging—i.e., lodging while the taxpayer is not away from home—in
carrying on a taxpayer’s trade or business (whether or not as an employee)
under a “facts and circumstances” test. One factor is whether the taxpayer
incurs the expense because of a bona fide condition or requirement of
employment imposed by the taxpayer’s employer. To the extent an employer
reimburses an employee for local lodging expenses, the reimbursement may
be excluded from the employee’s gross income if the expense allowance
arrangement satisfies the requirements of an accountable plan under § 62(c)
and the applicable regulations. The regulations provide a safe harbor for local
lodging at business meetings and conferences. A taxpayer’s local lodging
expenses that do not satisfy the safe harbor nevertheless may be deductible
depending on the taxpayer’s facts and circumstances. The examples indicate
that there must be a bona fide business reason for the overnight stay, and, if
provided by an employer, there must be a substantial noncompensatory reason.
The regulations apply to expenses paid or incurred after 9/30/13, but taxpayers
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may apply the regulations to expenses paid or incurred in taxable years ending
before 10/1/14, for which the period of limitation on credit or refund under
§ 6511 has not expired.
 We foresee a deluge of future Tax Court
cases involving deductions claimed for nights (or mid-day stays) at a host of notell motels.
11.
Wouldn’t it be better to increase teachers’ pay?
TIPA retroactively extended through 2014 the § 62(a)(2)(D) above-the-line
deduction for up to $250 of teachers’ classroom supplies expenses.
E.

Depreciation & Amortization

1.
New accounting and disposition rules for MACRS
property. T.D. 9564, Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of
Expenditures Related to Tangible Property, 76 F.R. 81060 (12/27/11), and
REG-168745-03, Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of
Expenditures Related to Tangible Property, 76 F.R. 81128 (12/27/11). The
capitalization and repair regulations (discussed above) provide significant new
rules for the maintenance of multiple asset accounts and disposition of
property from MACRS single and multiple asset accounts.
 Accounting for MACRS Property.
Consistent with prior rules under Reg. § 1.167-7, Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-7T
allows taxpayers to account for MACRS property in a single asset account or by
combining multiple assets in a multiple asset account. Assets in a multiple asset
account must have been placed in service in the same taxable year and have the
same recovery period and convention. Assets that are subject to different
recovery rules or special limitations, such as automobiles, assets subject to
additional first year recovery, or property used partly for personal purposes, may
not be combined with assets subject to different recovery provisions. Assets with
the same recovery periods and conventions may be combined in a multiple asset
account even if the assets have different uses. In addition, the taxpayer is
permitted to use as many single and multiple asset accounts as the taxpayer may
choose.
 Dispositions. Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-8T(d)
defines a disposition of MACRS property as occurring when the asset is
transferred or permanently withdrawn from use in the taxpayer’s trade or
business or from the production of income. Thus, a disposition includes the sale,
exchange, retirement, abandonment, or destruction of an asset. Significantly, the
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definition of disposition is expanded in the temporary regulation to include the
retirement of a structural component of a building.
 Gain or Loss. Gain or loss on the sale,
exchange, or conversion of an asset is determined under applicable tax principles.
Loss on abandonment is determined from the “adjusted depreciable basis” of the
asset (basis adjusted for depreciation). Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-8T(d). Recognized
loss on other dispositions is the excess of the adjusted depreciable basis of the
asset over fair market value. Identification of the asset disposed of from a
multiple asset account, and its basis, is generally determined from the taxpayer’s
records. Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-8T(e), (f). The temporary regulations provide
rules for identifying assets if the taxpayer’s records do not do so; a first-in firstout (FIFO) method, a modified FIFO method, a mortality dispersion table
method, or any other method designated by the IRS. The asset cannot be larger
than a unit of property. In the case of a disposition of a structural component of
a building, the structural component is the asset disposed of. An improvement
placed in service after the asset is treated as a separate asset provided that it is not
larger than the unit of property. Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-8T(c)(4)(ii)(E).
Disposition of an asset in a single asset account terminates depreciation for the
asset as of the time of the disposition. Disposition of an asset in a multiple asset
account removes the asset from the account as of the beginning of the year of
disposition, requires separate depreciation for the asset in the year of disposition
and reduction of the depreciation reserve of the multiple asset account by the
unadjusted basis of the disposed asset as of the first day of the taxable year of the
disposition. Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-8T(g).
 General Asset Accounts. Consistent with
prior Reg. § 1.168(i)-1, the temporary regulations provide for an election to group
assets into one or more general asset accounts. Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-1T(c)(2)
provides for grouping assets in a general asset account as long as the assets have
been placed in service in the same taxable year and have the same recovery period
and convention. Assets that are subject to different recovery rules or special
limitations, such as automobiles, assets subject to first year recovery, or property
used partly for personal purposes, may not be combined with assets subject to
different recovery provisions. The temporary regulations do not include the
requirement of prior regulations that general asset accounts include only assets
in the same asset class. Assets eligible for additional first year depreciation
deductions must be grouped with assets eligible for the same first year
depreciation deductions and may not be grouped with assets not eligible for
additional first year depreciation. Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-1T(c)(2)(ii)(D), (E). The
temporary regulations expand existing rules for dispositions of assets from a
general asset account to encompass as a disposition the retirement of a structural
component of a building. As under existing rules, the temporary regulations treat
the basis of any asset disposed of from a general asset account as zero, and any
amount realized results in ordinary gain. The taxpayer continues to depreciate
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assets in the general asset account as if no disposition occurred. Temp. Reg.
§ 1.168(i)-1T(e)(2). However, consistent with existing regulations, the temporary
regulations allow a taxpayer to elect to terminate general asset account treatment
on disposition of an asset in a qualifying disposition, in which case gain or loss
is recognized under the rules of Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-8T. The list of qualifying
dispositions is expanded generally to include any disposition. Temp. Reg.
§ 1.168(i)-1T(e)(3). In addition, general asset accounts are terminated in certain
nonrecognition dispositions and on termination of a partnership under
§ 708(b)(1)(B). Gain or loss may also be recognized on disposition of all of the
assets, or the last asset, in a general asset account. Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)1T(e)(3)(ii).
a.
IRS specifies the procedures for adopting
new accounting methods under the Temporary Regulations relating to
depreciation of tangible property. Rev. Proc. 2012-20, 2012-14 I.R.B. 700
(3/7/12), modifying Rev. Proc. 2011-14, 2011-1 C.B. 330. The IRS has
provided lengthy and detailed rules regarding automatic changes in methods
of accounting under Temp. Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-4T (amortizing or depreciating
leasehold improvements), 1.168(i)-1T (rules for general asset accounts),
1.168(i)-7T (accounting for MACRS property), and 1.168(i)-8T (dispositions
of MACRS property), all added by T.D. 9564, Guidance Regarding Deduction
and Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible Property, 76 F.R.
81060 (12/27/11). The automatic change of accounting method of Rev. Proc.
2011-14, 2011-1 C.B. 330, is applicable to property placed in service in a
taxable year ending after 12/29/03. With respect to assets placed in service in
a taxable year ending before 12/30/03, adopting the methods of the temporary
regulations requires an amended return for open years, including the placed in
service years and all subsequent years. No § 481 adjustment is required or
permitted with respect to the amended returns.
b.
LB&I provides guidance under Rev. Proc.
2012-20. LB&I-4-0312-004 (3/15/12). This directive to the field applies to
taxpayers who adopted a method of accounting relating to the conversion of
capitalized assets to repair expense under § 263(a).
c.
Have your clients been wasting time trying
to comply with the Temporary Regulations in 2012? Yes, they have.
Further guidance announced that pending final regulations will apply
only in years beginning in 2014 and thereafter. Notice 2012-73, 2012-51
I.R.B. 713 (11/20/12). The IRS announced that pending final regulations will
apply to taxable years beginning on or after 1/1/14, but that taxpayers will be
permitted to apply the final regulations to taxable years beginning on or after
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1/1/12. The notice also indicates that the temporary regulations may be revised
with respect to the de minimis rule of § 1.263(a)-2T(g), dispositions under
§§ 1.168(i)-1T and 1.168(i)-8T, and the Safe Harbor for Routine Maintenance
under § 1.263(a)-3T(g).
d.
Technical amendments so revise the
Temporary Regulations. More important, the effective date of the
12/27/11 temporary regulations is delayed to years beginning on or after
1/1/14, with optional retroactive applicability. T.D. 9564, Guidance
Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible
Property, 77 F.R. 74583 (12/17/12).
e.
New, new rules relating to accounting for
MACRS property. T.D. 9636, Guidance Regarding Deduction and
Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible Property, 78 F.R. 57686
(9/19/13). The Treasury Department and IRS have promulgated final
regulations under § 168 for the maintenance of multiple asset accounts that
were proposed in REG-168745-03, Guidance Regarding Deduction and
Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible Property, 76 F.R. 81128
(12/27/11), and replaced the temporary regulations promulgated in T.D. 9564,
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures Related to
Tangible Property, 76 F.R. 81060 (12/27/11). Consistent with prior rules under
Reg. § 1.167-7 and Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-7T, final Reg. § 1.168(i)-7 allows
taxpayers to account for MACRS property in a single asset account or by
combining multiple assets in a multiple asset account. Assets in a multiple
asset account must have been placed in service in the same taxable year and
have the same recovery period and convention. Assets that are subject to
different recovery rules or special limitations, such as automobiles, assets
subject to additional first year recovery, or property used partly for personal
purposes, may not be combined with assets subject to different recovery
provisions. Assets with the same recovery periods and conventions may be
combined in a multiple asset account even if the assets have different uses. In
addition, the taxpayer is permitted to use as many single and multiple asset
accounts as the taxpayer may choose. The new provisions are effective for
years beginning after 1/1/14, with an election to apply them retroactively to
years beginning on or after 1//1/12. A taxpayer may choose to apply Temp.
Reg. § 1.168(i)-7T to taxable years beginning on or after 1/1/12, and before
1/1/14.
 Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-1T(c), dealing with
general asset accounts, and Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-8T(d), dealing with
dispositions, both of which were promulgated in T.D. 9564 (12/27/11) and
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proposed in REG-168745-03 (12/27/11), have not been replaced by final
regulations.
f.
IRS specifies the procedures for changes
in methods of accounting for dispositions of tangible depreciable
property. Rev. Proc. 2014-17, 2014-12 I.R.B. 661 (3/17/14). In a revenue
procedure that supersedes Rev. Proc. 2012-20, the IRS has provided lengthy
and detailed rules regarding certain changes in methods of accounting for
dispositions of tangible depreciable property. The revenue procedure provides
the procedures by which a taxpayer can obtain automatic consent to change to
the methods of accounting provided in the regulations related to amortizing or
depreciating leasehold improvements (Reg. § 1.167(a)-4 and Temp. Reg.
§ 1.167(a)-4T), accounting for MACRS property (Reg. § 1.168(i)-7, Temp.
Reg. § 1.168(i)-7T, and Prop. Reg. 1.168(i)-7), dispositions of MACRS
property (Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-8T and Prop. Reg. 1.168(i)-8), and general
asset accounts (Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-1T and Prop. Reg. § 1.168(i)-1). The
revenue procedure also modifies Rev. Proc. 2011-14 by adding new
accounting method changes to the Appendix of Rev. Proc. 2011-14, which
provides the procedures by which a taxpayer can obtain automatic consent to
a change in method of accounting.
g.
Final accounting and disposition rules for
MACRS property. T.D. 9689, Guidance Regarding Dispositions of Tangible
Depreciable Property, 79 F.R. 48661 (8/18/14). The Treasury Department has
finalized regulations proposed in REG-168745-03, Guidance Regarding
Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible Property,
76 F.R. 81128 (12/27/11), and removed corresponding temporary regulations
(T.D. 9564, Guidance Regarding Dispositions of Tangible Depreciable
Property, 76 F.R. 81060 (12/27/11)).
 Multiple asset accounts for MACRS
property. Consistent with prior rules under Reg. § 1.167-7, Reg. § 1.168(i)-7, as
finalized in 2013, allows taxpayers to account for MACRS property in a single
asset account or by combining multiple assets in a multiple asset account. Assets
in a multiple asset account must have been placed in service in the same taxable
year, have the same recovery period, and have the same convention. Assets that
are subject to different recovery rules or special limitations, such as automobiles,
assets subject to additional first year recovery, or property used partly for
personal purposes, may not be combined with assets subject to different recovery
provisions. Assets with the same recovery periods and conventions may be
combined in a multiple asset account even if the assets have different uses. In
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addition, the taxpayer is permitted to use as many single and multiple asset
accounts as the taxpayer may choose.
 General asset accounts. Consistent with
prior Reg. § 1.168(i)-1, as amended by this T.D., Reg. § 1.168(i)-1 allows
taxpayers to account for MACRS property in a single asset account or by
combining multiple assets in general asset accounts as long as the assets have
been placed in service in the same taxable year and have the same recovery period
and convention. Assets that are subject to different recovery rules or special
limitations, such as automobiles, assets subject to first year recovery, or property
used partly for personal purposes, may not be combined with assets subject to
different recovery provisions. The regulations, like the temporary regulations, do
not include the requirement of prior regulations that general asset accounts
include only assets in the same asset class. Assets with the same recovery periods
and conventions may be combined in a general asset account even if the assets
have different uses. Assets eligible for additional first year depreciation
deductions must be grouped with assets eligible for the same first year
depreciation deductions and may not be grouped with assets not eligible for
additional first year depreciation. Reg. § 1.168(i)-1(c)(2)(ii)(D), (E). A taxpayer
is permitted to use as many single and general asset accounts as the taxpayer may
choose. A taxpayer must account for an asset in a single asset account if the
taxpayer uses the asset both in a trade or business, for the production of income
and in a personal activity, or if the taxpayer places in service and disposes of the
asset during the same taxable year. Reg. § 1.168-7(b).
 Dispositions. Reg. § 1.168(i)-8(b)(2)
defines a disposition of MACRS property as occurring when the asset is
transferred or permanently withdrawn from use in the taxpayer’s trade or
business or from the production of income. Thus, a disposition includes the sale,
exchange, retirement, abandonment, or destruction of an asset. Significantly, the
definition of disposition includes the retirement of a structural component of a
building. A disposition includes a disposition of a portion of an asset as a result
of a casualty event (§ 165), a disposition of a portion of an asset for which gain
is not recognized in whole or in part under § 1031 or § 1033, a transfer of a
portion of an asset in a §§ 332, 351, 361, 721, or 731 transaction, or a sale of a
portion of an asset. Reg. § 1.168-8(d).
 Gain or loss. Gain or loss on the sale,
exchange, or conversion of an asset is determined under applicable tax principles.
Loss on abandonment is determined from the “adjusted depreciable basis” of the
asset (basis adjusted for depreciation). Reg. § 1.168(i)-8(e). Recognized loss on
other dispositions is the excess of the adjusted depreciable basis of the asset over
fair market value. Disposition of an asset in a single asset account terminates
depreciation for the asset as of the time of the disposition. If the taxpayer accounts
for the asset disposed of in a multiple asset account or pool and it is impracticable
from the taxpayer’s records to determine the unadjusted depreciable basis of the
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asset disposed of, the taxpayer may use any reasonable method that is
consistently applied to all assets in the same multiple asset account. Reg. § 1.1688(e). Identification of the asset disposed of from a multiple asset account, and its
basis, is generally determined from the taxpayer’s records. Reg. § 1.168(i)-8(f),
(g). If the taxpayer’s records do not identify assets, a first-in first-out method, a
modified FIFO method, a mortality dispersion table method, or any other method
designated by the IRS may be used. The asset cannot be larger than a unit of
property. In the case of a disposition of a structural component of a building, the
structural component is the asset disposed of. An improvement placed in service
after the asset is treated as a separate asset. Reg. § 1.168(i)-8(e)(4).
 Disposition of an asset in a general asset
account. Upon disposition of an asset in a general asset account, the asset’s basis
is deemed to be zero, no loss is allowed, and the amount realized is treated as
ordinary income. The unadjusted depreciable basis and the depreciation reserve
of the general asset account are not affected as a result of a disposition of an asset
(or a portion of an asset) from the general asset account. Reg. § 1.168(i)-8(e)(2).
Consistent with prior regulations, the regulations allow an election to terminate
general asset account treatment of an asset disposed of in certain qualifying
dispositions, in which case a loss may be realized upon disposition of an asset (or
a portion of an asset) previously included in the general asset account. Reg.
§ 1.168-1(e)(3)(iii). A qualifying disposition is a disposition that does not involve
all the assets, the last asset, or the remaining portion of the last asset, remaining
in a general asset account and that is: (1) a direct result of a fire, storm, shipwreck,
or other casualty, or from theft; (2) a charitable contribution for which a
deduction is allowable under § 170; (3) a direct result of a cessation, termination,
or disposition of a business, manufacturing, or other income producing process,
operation, facility, plant, or other unit (other than by transfer to a supplies, scrap,
or similar account); or (4) generally a transaction to which a nonrecognition
section applies. In addition, general asset accounts are terminated on termination
of a partnership under § 708(b)(1)(B). Gain or loss may also be recognized on
disposition of all of the assets, or the last asset, in a general asset account. Reg.
§ 1.168(i)-1(e)(3)(ii).
 Effective date. The final regulations
generally apply to tax years beginning after 12/31/14. A taxpayer may apply them
to tax years beginning after 12/31/11, or may apply the temporary regulations to
tax years beginning after 12/31/12 and before 1/1/14.
2.
“[F. Scott] Fitzgerald asserted that ‘the very rich
* * * are different from you and me.’” Brown v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2013-275 (12/3/13). On December 30, 2003, the taxpayer, an extraordinarily
successful insurance salesman, took ownership of a $22 million airplane in
Portland, Oregon. He flew from there to Seattle to Chicago for what he
claimed were business meetings, and then back to Portland. The taxpayer
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argued that these flights put the plane in service in 2003, thereby entitling him
to 50 percent bonus-depreciation under § 168(k)(4), as enacted in the Jobs and
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 201, 117
Stat. at 756, which was available for certain qualified property placed in
service before January 1, 2004. However, a few days later he had the airplane
flown to a plant in Illinois where it underwent modifications costing more than
$500,000—including the installation of a conference table and equipment for
PowerPoint presentations—that were completed about a month later. The IRS
disallowed the claimed depreciation deductions on the ground that as a result
of the additional modifications, the airplane had not been put into service until
2004. The Tax Court (Judge Holmes) evaluated the evidence introduced to
support the taxpayer’s claim that the Seattle trip resulted in the airplane being
placed in service in 2003, and the evaluation is best summarized by the
statement that “we sense something doesn’t smell quite right with the whole
Seattle visit.” Among other things, the flight logs indicated a trip of much
shorter duration than claimed in the taxpayer’s testimony, and a letter from the
client with whom the taxpayer claimed to have met thanking him for the visit
appeared to have been prepared by one of the taxpayer’s employees and
presented to the client for his signature after the audit had commenced. More
importantly, turning to the question of what “placed in service” means, Judge
Holmes concluded that because the taxpayer wanted an airplane on which
business meetings could be held, and not merely for transportation, the
modifications made in 2004 were necessary for full operation of the airplane
in the taxpayer’s insurance business on a regular basis—the taxpayer testified
that the “modifications were ‘necessary’ and ‘required’”—the airplane had not
been placed in service until 2004. Thus, it did not qualify for bonus
depreciation. Although Judge Holmes declined to uphold the IRS’s assessment
of a civil fraud penalty, he did uphold a § 6662 substantial understatement
penalty.
3.
2014 depreciation tables for business autos, light
trucks. Rev. Proc. 2014-21, 2014-11 I.R.B. 641 (3/10/14). The IRS published
depreciation tables with the depreciation limits for business use of small
vehicles. (There no longer is any § 168(k) first year recovery; it expired.):
Passenger Automobiles:
1st Tax Year
$3,160
2nd Tax Year
$5,100
3rd Tax Year
$3,050
Each Succeeding Year
$1,875
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$3,460
$5,400
$3,350
$1,975

a. And the IRS claims a mulligan when bonus
depreciation is retroactively extended to 2014 by TIPA Rev. Proc. 201519, 2015-8 I.R.B. 656 (2/6/15). The IRS has published depreciation tables with
the depreciation limits for business use of small vehicles:
2014 Passenger Automobiles with § 168(k) first year recovery,
1st Tax Year
$11,160
2nd Tax Year
$ 5,100
3rd Tax Year
$ 3,050
Each Succeeding Year
$ 1,875
2014 Trucks and Vans with § 168(k) first year recovery,
1st Tax Year
2nd Tax Year
3rd Tax Year
Each Succeeding Year

$11,460
$ 5,500
$ 3,550
$ 1,975

2015 Passenger Automobiles (no § 168(k) first year recovery),
1st Tax Year
$
2nd Tax Year
$
3rd Tax Year
$
Each Succeeding Year
$

3,160
5,100
3,050
1,875

2015 Trucks and Vans (no § 168(k) first year recovery),
1st Tax Year
2nd Tax Year
3rd Tax Year
Each Succeeding Year

3,460
5,400
3,350
1,975



$
$
$
$

The revenue procedure also has tables for

leased vehicles.
4.
Tangible assets used in converting corn to fuel
grade ethanol are in asset class 49.5 and therefore have a recovery period
of seven years under the general depreciation system. Rev. Rul. 2014-17,
2014-24 I.R.B. 1093 (5/20/14). This ruling addresses the proper asset class
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under Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674, as clarified and modified by Rev.
Proc. 88-22, 1988-1 C.B. 785, for the depreciation of tangible assets that are
used in converting corn to fuel grade ethanol. The ruling concludes that,
subject to certain exceptions, such assets are in asset class 49.5, Waste
Reduction and Resource Recovery Plants. These assets have a class life of ten
years under Rev. Proc. 87-56 and, therefore, under § 168(c) and (e), have a
recovery period of seven years under the general depreciation system. (The
ruling rejects placing such assets in asset class 28.0, Manufacture of Chemicals
and Allied Products, which would have provided a recovery period of five
years under the general depreciation system.) The IRS states in the ruling that
it “will not apply the holding in this revenue ruling to tangible assets that are
used in converting biomass to a liquid fuel such as fuel grade ethanol that a
taxpayer places in service before June 9, 2014.”
5.

Certain depreciation and amortization provisions

of TIPA:
a.
Enacting an incentive after the
expenditure was either made or not made. Only our Congress could find
this logical. TIPA retroactively extended through 12/31/14 § 168(k)(2) bonus
depreciation for MACRS property with a recovery period of 20 years or less,
computer software (other than computer software subject to § 197), qualified
leasehold improvement property, and certain water utility property the original
use of which commenced with the taxpayer. It also extended through 12/31/14
the § 168(k)(4) election to increase the AMT limitation in lieu of claiming
bonus depreciation.
b.
Special interests rule! TIPA retroactively
extended through 12/31/14 §§ 168(e)(3)(E)(iv), 168(e)(3)(E)(v), and
168(e)(3)(E)(ix), which treat as 15-year property qualified leasehold
improvement property, qualified restaurant property, and qualified retail
improvement property, respectively. Qualified retail improvement property
and qualified restaurant property also are eligible for § 168(k) 50-percent
bonus first-year depreciation if they also meet the definition of qualified
leasehold improvement property.
c.
Really narrow special interests rule. TIPA
retroactively extended through 12/31/14 the § 168(i) 7-year straight line cost
recovery period for motorsports entertainment complexes.
d.
Do we see Mitch McConnell’s fingerprints
here? TIPA retroactively extended through 12/31/14 the classification of
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certain race horses as 3-year MACRS property. It also extended the election
under § 179E to treat 50 percent of the cost of any qualified mine safety
equipment as an expense in the tax year in which the equipment is placed in
service.
e.
Why not just permanently repeal
capitalization of machinery and equipment for small businesses? TIPA
retroactively extended through 12/31/14 the increased $500,000 maximum
amount that can be expensed under § 179 and the increased $2 million
expenditure ceiling phase-out amount. For years beginning after 2014, the
maximum amount is again scheduled to drop to $25,000 and the phase-out
ceiling is scheduled to drop to $200,000. It also extended through 2014 the
eligibility for § 179 expensing of off-the-shelf computer software, qualified
leasehold improvement property, qualified restaurant property, and qualified
retail improvement property. The latter three categories are subject to a
$250,000 limit on the amount that can be expensed.
f.
Of course we need better tax treatment of
luxury cars—Let’s incentivize purchases of Mercedes, BMWs, and
Lexuses to boost the American auto industry. What, they’re not
American? Surely you jest! TIPA retroactively extended through 12/31/14
the $8,000 increase in the first-year § 280F ceiling on depreciation deductions
with respect to automobiles, light trucks, vans, and SUVs that are rated at not
more than 6,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.
F.

Credits

1.
With “a little song, a little dance,” the Fifth Circuit
holds that the Cohan rule permits courts to estimate qualified research
expenditures. United States v. McFerrin, 570 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 6/9/09).
Through a clerical error, the IRS granted the taxpayer’s claim for a refund that
was based on § 41 research credits previously unclaimed on taxpayer’s return,
but claimed on an amended return prepared by alliantgroup. In the IRS suit to
recover the refund, the burden of proof fell on the IRS. Reversing the District
Court, the Fifth Circuit held that under the rule of Cohan v. Commissioner, 39
F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930), if the taxpayer can demonstrate that his activities were
qualified research, then the trial court can estimate the expenses associated
with those activities. In addition, the court held that the District Court erred in
not reviewing the claimed research activities under the 2003 final regulations
defining “discovery.” The taxpayer’s claim for refund was based on language
of regulations proposed in 2001, the preamble to which indicated that
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taxpayers could rely on the test of the proposed regulations. The case was
remanded to the District Court for reconsideration under the 2003 regulations.
 Former IRS Commissioner Mark Everson
has joined alliantgroup as vice chair.
a.
The Fifth Circuit again sided with a
taxpayer, this time on the application of the Reg. § 1.41-3(d)(1)
consistency rule. Trinity Industries, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.3d 400 (5th
Cir. 7/2/14), aff’g in part, vacating, and remanding in part 691 F. Supp. 2d
688 (N.D. Tex. 1/29/10). The Fifth Circuit (Judge Owen) remanded this
research credit case to the District Court for a determination of whether it
violated the Reg. § 1.41-3(d)(1) consistency rule by including in base period
“qualified research expenses” (QREs) amounts that were attributable to four
vessels whose construction expenses would not have constituted QREs under
the standard articulated in this case by the District Court for the claim years.
2.
The Tax Court just says “no” to R&D credits
claimed with 20/20 hindsight provided by alliantgroup. Shami v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-78 (3/21/12). The taxpayer’s S corporation
hired alliantgroup to conduct § 41 research tax credit studies covering the years
in question. The research and development department staff ranged in number
from 18 to 27, and included chemists, technicians, and a vice president of
research and development who supervised the department. The alliantgroup
concluded that the corporation was entitled to claim the § 41 research credit
based in part on wages paid to two individuals who were, respectively, its
chairman of the board, chief executive officer, president, and secretary
(Shami), and its executive vice president and the sole member of its sales and
marketing committee (McCall), neither of whom had formal education or
training in any physical or biological science or in engineering. The only issue
in the case involved credits based on wages paid to the two executives. The
taxpayers “failed to provide any documentation that establishe[d] how much
time, if any, Mr. Shami or Mr. McCall spent performing research and
development services during the relevant years,” but argued that the court
“must estimate the amount of wages allocable to qualified services if [it found]
either Mr. Shami or Mr. McCall performed qualified services.” The Tax Court
(Judge Kroupa) rejected the taxpayer’s argument, on the basis that the Cohan
rule (Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543–44 (2d Cir. 1930)) applies
only if there is a reasonable basis on which the court can make an estimate,
and that in this case, the taxpayer failed to satisfy the court that there was
sufficient evidence to estimate the appropriate allocation of wages between
qualified services and nonqualified services. Judge Kroupa found United
States v. McFerrin, 570 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2009), which did apply the Cohan
rule in determining the § 41 research credit, to be inapposite, stating that in
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McFerrin “the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not overrule, or even
address, the basic requirement under Cohan that a court must have a
reasonable basis upon which to make an estimate.”
a.
And the Fifth Circuit says that the Tax
Court got it mostly correct. Shami v. Commissioner, 741 F.3d 560 (5th Cir.
1/23/14). In an opinion by Judge Owen, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
disallowance of credits with respect to the wages paid to Shami and McCall.
The court reasoned that
Cohan did not compel the Tax Court to make an estimate
in this case. . . . [T]he Cohan rule is not implicated unless the
taxpayer proves that he is entitled to some amount of tax
benefit. In the context of the § 41 credit, a taxpayer would do
so by proving that its employee performed some qualified
services. In this case, a careful reading of the Tax Court’s
opinion reveals that the Tax Court made no such finding.
 However, the Court of Appeals vacated
the Tax Court decision to the extent that it disallowed the credit with respect to
certain supplies, reasoning that the IRS had conceded this issue in a series of
statements at trial and in post-trial briefs, and that the Tax Court improperly failed
to take the concession into account in determining the deficiency.
3.
Taxpayers now can make the alternative
simplified research credit election on an amended return. T.D. 9666,
Alternative Simplified Credit Election, 79 F.R. 31863 (6/3/14). Section
41(c)(5) provides a “simplified” research credit of 14 percent of so much of
the qualified research expenses as exceeds 50 percent of the average qualified
research expenses for the three preceding taxable years, or, if the taxpayer has
no qualified research expenses in any of the three prior years, the simplified
credit is 6 percent of qualified research expenses for the year. (The regular
credit under § 41(a)(1) generally is 20 percent of qualified research expenses
over a base.) Final regulations as amended in 2011 require that an election for
the alternative simplified credit (ASC) be made with the return filed for the
year to which the election applies, provide that the election may not be made
on an amended return, and state that the IRS will not grant an extension of
time to file the election under Reg. § 301.9100-3. T.D. 9528, Alternative
Simplified Credit Election, 76 F.R. 33994 (6/10/11). In response to taxpayer
requests, Treasury and the IRS have removed from the final regulations the
rule in Reg. § 1.41-9(b)(2) that prohibits a taxpayer from making an ASC
election for a tax year on an amended return. In place of this rule, temporary
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regulations provide that taxpayers can make an ASC election for a tax year on
an amended return. However, because of concerns that permitting changes
from the regular credit to the ASC on amended returns could result in more
than one audit of a taxpayer’s research credit for a tax year, the temporary
regulations provide that a taxpayer that previously claimed, on an original or
amended return, a § 41 credit for a tax year may not make an ASC election for
that tax year on an amended return. A taxpayer that is a member of a controlled
group in a tax year may not make an ASC election for that tax year on an
amended return if any member of the controlled group for that year previously
claimed the research credit using a method other than the ASC on an original
or amended return for that tax year. The regulations generally apply to
elections with respect to tax years ending on or after 6/3/14, but taxpayers can
rely on the temporary regulations to make elections for prior tax years if the
election is made before the period of limitations for assessment of tax has
expired for that year.
4.
More work for tax professionals provided by
Obamacare. T.D. 9672, Tax Credit for Employee Health Insurance Expenses
of Small Employers, 79 F.R. 36640 (6/30/14). The Treasury Department has
promulgated final regulations (Regs. §§ 1.45R-0 through 1.45R-5) providing
guidance under § 45R, added by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, which provides a tax credit to certain small employers that offer health
insurance coverage to their employees. The final regulations are effective on
6/30/14 for taxable years beginning after 2013. Alternatively, employers may
rely on the proposed regulations (REG-113792-13, Tax Credit for Employee
Health Insurance Expenses of Small Employers, 78 F.R. 52719 (8/26/13)) for
taxable years beginning after 2013 and before 2015.
5.

Certain credit provisions of TIPA:

a.
If the research credit first enacted in
ERTA 1981 is such a great idea, why not make it permanent? TIPA
retroactively extended through 12/31/14 the § 41 research credit.
b.
We need to promote energy efficiency in
the USA because all the Keystone Pipeline oil from Canada is destined for
export. TIPA retroactively extended through 12/31/14 the § 45L credit of
$2,000 or $1,000 (depending on the projected level of fuel consumption) an
eligible contractor can claim for each qualified new energy efficient home
constructed by the contractor and acquired by a person from the contractor for
use as a residence during the tax year.
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c.
Extenders, extenders, can’t get enough of
those extenders. Other business credits TIPA retroactively extended through
12/31/14 include: (1) the § 51 Work Opportunity Credit; (2) the § 45 credit for
electricity produced from certain renewable resources; (3) the § 45G railroad
track maintenance credit; (4) the § 45P differential wage credit; (5) the § 45A
Indian Employment Credit and the § 45(e)(10) Indian Coal Production Credit;
(6) the § 45D New Markets Credit; (7) the § 45N mine rescue team training
credit; and (8) a number of others that we have missed or did not care enough
about to include.
G.

Natural Resources Deductions & Credits
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2014.
H.

Loss Transactions, Bad Debts, and NOLs

1.
Another case of a doc not understanding tax law.
Dargie v. United States, 742 F.3d 243 (6th Cir. 2/5/14). The Sixth Circuit, in
an opinion by Judge Siler, held that repayment of a conditional grant to fund
medical degree education was not deductible. The medical education enabled
him to meet the prerequisites for working as a physician. Therefore, a
deduction was disallowed by Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2), which categorizes as
nondeductible “expenditures made by an individual for education which is
required of him in order to meet the minimum educational requirements for
qualification in his employment or other trade or business.”
2.
Seventy months in the slammer, a $19 million fine,
and a $44 million forfeiture for insider trading was penalty enough.
Nacchio v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 195 (3/12/14). The taxpayer was the
CEO of Qwest Communications International when he realized profits of
approximately $44 million trading Qwest stock. He was convicted of insider
trading, paid a fine of $19 million, and forfeited $44 million that was paid over
to victims of his securities fraud scheme. (He also was sentenced to 70 months
in prison.) On a motion for summary judgment, the Court of Claims (Judge
Williams) held that the $44 million forfeiture was deductible under § 165.
Because the forfeiture served to compensate victims of the taxpayer’s
securities fraud, the payment was not a “fine or similar penalty” that is not
deductible pursuant to § 162(f). The court rejected the government’s argument
that allowing a deduction under § 165 would frustrate public policy, reasoning
that “[a]llowing the deduction would not increase the odds in favor of insider
trading or destroy the effectiveness of the securities laws.” Furthermore,
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“[d]isallowing the deduction would result in a ‘double sting’ by requiring the
taxpayers to both make restitution and pay taxes on income they did not
retain.” However, whether § 1341 applied required further proceedings
because there was a material question of fact whether Nacchio, who did not
plead guilty, believed that he had an unrestricted right to the profits in the year
he realized them.
I.

At-Risk and Passive Activity Losses

1.
The Tax Court continues to be hard-nosed
regarding contemporaneous records of hours devoted to activities to
avoid § 469. Bartlett v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-182 (8/8/13). The
Tax Court (Judge Kerrigan) rejected a “guesstimate” of hours worked on a
ranch. The lack of any contemporaneous records or other records and
documentation regarding what the taxpayer specifically did day-to-day and
how much time he spent on matters relating to the activity was not cured by
estimates made years after the fact in writing or by testimony.
2.
A credible taxpayer establishes material
participation in an activity conducted in another state, with a little bit of
help from IRS stipulations. Tolin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-65
(4/9/14). The taxpayer, who lived in Minnesota, established that he had
devoted sufficient hours to a thoroughbred breeding and racing activity based
in Louisiana, through a combination of: (1) credible testimony of his
employees and agents regarding the time they spent annually in telephone calls
with the taxpayer, coupled with the taxpayer’s telephone records establishing
that the calls had been made (300 hours); (2) the amount of time that the IRS
stipulated that the taxpayer had spent in Louisiana, coupled with the taxpayer’s
testimony and the testimony of third-party witnesses regarding the taxpayer’s
workday activities, even though credit card records showed that he engaged in
some nonbusiness activity while in Louisiana (150-180 hours); and (3) his
preparation and mailing of the promotional breeding packages (the
voluminous contents of which were stipulated by the parties) and the
miscellaneous administrative tasks he completed (enough hours to reach 500).
Thus, the Tax Court (Judge Gale) held that the breeding and racing activity
was not a passive activity, and the taxpayer’s deductions for losses related to
the activity were not limited by § 469.
3.
Who needs a log book? Material participation
established under the “facts and circumstances” test without counting
hours—quality is more important that quantity. Wade v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2014-169 (8/20/14). The husband and wife taxpayers owned
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stock in two S corporations that passed through to them losses. The IRS
disallowed the losses as passive activity losses subject to § 469. The record
established that Mr. Wade spent “over 100 hours participating in TSI and
Paragon during 2008, and his participation consisted primarily of
nonmanagement and noninvestment activities,” while his son managed the
day-to-day operations of the companies. Mr. Wade focused on product
development and customer retention. The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) found that
Mr. Wade’s “efforts were continuous, regular, and substantial . . . Mr. Wade
brought something to [the companies] that no one else could have, and they
could not have continued to operate without his contacts and expertise.”
Accordingly, pursuant to the “facts and circumstances” test in Reg. § 1.4695T(a)(7), which requires participation on a “regular, continuous, and
substantial basis” during the year, Mr. Wade materially participated in the
companies’ activities. That the record did not establish that Mrs. Wade
actively participated in the companies was irrelevant because Reg. § 1.4695T(f)(3) provides that participation by a married taxpayer is treated as
participation by his or her spouse. Thus, Mr. Wade’s material participation in
the companies was sufficient to establish material participation for Mrs. Wade.
4.
Some questions about whether a trust can be a real
estate professional have been answered; others have not. Frank Aragona
Trust v. Commissioner, 142 T.C. No. 9 (3/27/14). The taxpayer trust owned a
single-member LLC that was a disregarded entity conducting an extensive
rental real estate business. Three of the six trustees were full time employees
of the LLC; three of the trustees had little or no involvement in the real estate
business. The rental real estate business incurred substantial losses, which the
trust deducted against income and gains from non-passive activities. The IRS
disallowed the losses as passive activity losses, but the trust argued that it
qualified as a real estate professional under § 469(c)(7). The Tax Court (Judge
Morrison) rejected the IRS’s argument that, except as expressly provided for
closely held C corporations in § 469(c)(7)(D)(i), § 469(c)(7) applies only to
individual taxpayers. He reasoned that notwithstanding language in Reg.
§ 1.469-9(b)(4), which deals with § 469(c)(7), that defines “[p]ersonal
services” as “work performed by an individual in connection with a trade or
business,” the definition of “material participation” in § 469(h) is not so
limited. Even though the statute does not provide any rule for how material
participation by a trust is determined, and no regulations doing so have been
promulgated, nothing in the statute or legislative history limited the
application of § 469(c)(7) to individuals and closely held corporations. The
IRS further argued that even if § 469(c)(7) could apply to trusts, (1) in
determining whether a trust is materially participating in an activity, only the
activities of the trustees can be considered and the activities of that trust’s
employees must be disregarded, and (2) neither the participation by the
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trustees in their capacity as employees of the LLC nor the work of 20 or so
non-trustee employees counted toward material participation. Judge Morrison
also rejected these arguments. Even if the activities of the trust’s non-trustee
employees were disregarded, the activities of the trustees were properly
considered in determining whether the trust materially participated in the realestate operations, including their activities as employees of the LLC. On all of
the facts, including that two of the trustees “were involved in managing the
day-to-day operations of the trust’s various real-estate businesses,” the trust
materially participated in its real-estate operations. Finally, because the IRS
limited its arguments to (1) trusts are categorically barred from qualifying
under the § 469(c)(7) exception, and (2) the trust did not materially participate
in real-property trades or businesses, the court expressly did not address
whether (1) more than one-half of the personal services performed in trades or
businesses by the trust were performed in real-property trades or businesses,
and (2) the trustees performed more than 750 hours of services during the year
in the real-property trades or businesses. Accordingly, the trust’s rental
activities were not passive activities.
5.
An LLC member guarantees debt of the LLC
incurred in connection with an aircraft leasing activity and successfully
flies around the at risk and passive activity loss rules. Moreno v. United
States, 113 A.F.T.R.2d 2014-2149 (W.D. La. 5/19/14). The taxpayer claimed
a $4.7 million loss arising from the acquisition and leasing of a Learjet aircraft
by a disregarded LLC of which he was the sole member. The LLC acquired
the aircraft with a loan secured by the aircraft. The loan was guaranteed by
both the taxpayer and Dynamic Industries, Inc. (Dynamic), a wholly owned
subsidiary of a corporation of which the taxpayer held 98 percent of the stock.
The LLC leased the aircraft to six lessees during the tax year in question. The
government argued that the taxpayer was not at risk with respect to the aircraft
leasing activity. The government conceded that the taxpayer’s personal
guaranty satisfied § 465(b)(2)(A), which states that a taxpayer is at risk for
amounts borrowed for use in an activity to the extent the taxpayer “is
personally liable for the repayment of such amounts.” Instead, the government
argued that the taxpayer was not at risk by virtue of § 465(b)(4), which
provides that “a taxpayer shall not be considered at risk with respect to
amounts protected against loss through nonrecourse financing, guarantees,
stop loss agreements, or other similar arrangements.” The court (Judge
Doherty) observed that the Fifth Circuit, to which this case is appealable, has
not addressed the applicable standard for determining whether a taxpayer is
protected against loss within the meaning of § 465(b)(4) and that the majority
of Circuits (the Second, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh) have adopted an
“economic realities” test, while the Sixth Circuit has adopted a “payor of last
resort” test. The court concluded that, under either test, the taxpayer was not
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protected against loss within the meaning of § 465(b)(4) and was at risk.
“Simply put,” the court reasoned, “the failure of [the LLC] to meet the terms
of its loan agreement would trigger a demand for payment by [the lender]
against Dynamic and/or Moreno.” In reaching this conclusion, the court
rejected the government’s arguments that: (1) the taxpayer did not have
sufficient liquidity to pay the loan in the event of the LLC’s default (“the
government has cited no legal authority ‘that a guarantor must have
unencumbered cash or marketable resources to satisfy a claim under a
guaranty to be at risk’”); (2) the lender’s internal documents showed that it
relied on Dynamic, rather than the taxpayer, to pay the loan upon the LLC’s
default (“the government has cited no legal authority in support of its position
that where a lender’s internal loan documents purportedly show the lender is
relying upon the financial strength of one surety over another surety, the latter
surety is no longer to be given ‘at risk’ treatment under section 465, because
the foregoing scenario constitutes protection from loss under either the payor
of last resort test or the economic reality test”); (3) the taxpayer, as the ultimate
controlling shareholder of Dynamic, would ensure that Dynamic paid the loan
(“the government’s speculative assertion . . . is insufficient to show Moreno
engaged in a prohibited loss-limiting arrangement”); (4) the taxpayer was
protected by an indemnity provision in his employment agreement with the
parent corporation of Dynamic (“the indemnity provision . . . is [not]
sufficiently broad in scope, such that it applies to Moreno’s personal guaranty
of the [LLC’s] loan”); and (5) if Dynamic were to pay the loan, it would have
no right to recover any of its payment from the taxpayer. However, in
addressing the government’s fifth argument, the court concluded that the
taxpayer and Dynamic each would have a right of contribution against the
other if they paid the loan, and therefore the taxpayer was at risk for only 50
percent of the amount guaranteed.
 The government also asserted that the
aircraft leasing activity was a passive activity for the taxpayer pursuant to
§ 469(c)(2), which provides as a general rule that any rental activity is a passive
activity. An exception in Reg. § 1.469-1T(e)(3)(ii)(A) provides that “an activity
involving the use of tangible property is not a rental activity for a taxable year if
for such taxable year—(A) The average period of customer use for such property
is seven days or less[.]” For this purpose, the average period of customer use for
a year is calculated by dividing the aggregate number of days in all periods of
customer use by the number of periods of customer use. Reg. § 1.4691(e)(3)(iii)(C). In Reg. § 1.469-1(e)(3)(iii)(D), a period of customer use is defined
as follows:
Each period during which a customer has a continuous or
recurring right to use an item of property held in connection
with the activity (without regard to whether the customer uses

2015]

Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation

141

the property for the entire period or whether the right to use
the property is pursuant to a single agreement or to renewals
thereof) is treated for purposes of this paragraph (e)(3)(iii) as
a separate period of customer use.
The LLC leased the aircraft to six different lessees during the year under a
Non-Exclusive Aircraft Leasing Agreement. The government argued that
“each lessee had a continuous and recurring right to use the aircraft from the
time each agreement was entered into, through the end of taxable year 2005,”
and therefore there were six periods of customer use during the year. After
closely analyzing the terms of the lease, however, the court concluded that
“[b]ecause the agreement clearly stated a potential lessee’s request [to use the
aircraft] could be granted or denied in the owner’s sole discretion, there was
no ‘continuous or recurring right’ to use the aircraft, except when the aircraft
was in the actual possession of a lessee.” Thus, each period when a lessee was
in actual possession of the aircraft was a separate period of customer use.
Using this approach, the average period of customer use for the aircraft during
the year was “seven days or less” and therefore the aircraft leasing activity was
not a rental activity.
6.
It ain’t over till it’s over. Herwig v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2014-95 (5/20/14). The taxpayers were partners in a partnership
that owned two rental real properties that concededly were passive activities.
Prior to 2008 they had passive activity losses, the deductions for which were
deferred by § 469. In 2008, the mortgagee bank judicially foreclosed on the
properties, which were sold to the mortgagee bank in 2008. The bank’s claim
for deficiency judgments and the taxpayer’s counterclaims against the bank
were settled in 2011. The taxpayers claimed their suspended passive activity
losses under § 469(g) in 2008, claiming that by virtue of the foreclosure they
had terminated their entire interest in the activities. The Tax Court (Special
Trial Judge Guy) held that the taxpayers had not completely terminated their
entire interest in the activities in 2008. Section “469(g) contemplates that the
taxpayer must dispose of his or her entire interest in a passive activity in a
transaction with an unrelated party under which all gain or loss realized on
such disposition is recognized.” Although the bank foreclosed in 2008, the
partnership continued to list the properties as assets on its partnership returns
for 2009 and 2010, and the bank’s motion for entry of deficiency judgments
and the taxpayers’ counterclaim against the bank were pending in the
foreclosure litigation until both matters were settled in 2011, when the
taxpayers recognized COD income. In light of the uncertainties inherent in the
ongoing litigation, the cumulative economic effect of the taxpayers’
investment in the passive activity—”a final accounting of the gain or loss
realized on the disposition of the passive activity and recognition of any gain
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or loss for tax purposes”—could not be determined in 2008. Thus, they did not
dispose of their entire interests in the passive activity within the meaning of
§ 469(g) as a result of the 2008 foreclosure, and their suspended passive losses
were not eligible to be treated as nonpassive losses for that year.
7.
Sky King this guy ain’t. Williams v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2014-158 (8/5/14). For purposes of § 469, the taxpayer attempted
to group under Reg. § 1.469-4(c) an airplane rental activity with a “telephone
skills training business” to avoid the application of § 469 to losses incurred
with respect to the airplane activity. The Tax Court (Judge Buch) held the
grouping to be improper: (1) there were no similarities between the business
of renting an airplane and that of telephone sales training; (2) there was no
apparent nexus between the businesses; (3) common control and ownership
and geographic location were not particularly relevant; (4) although the
airplane was housed at two airports close to the telephone skills training
business, those locations were convenient to the taxpayer; and (5) there was
no interdependence of the activities. The taxpayer’s claim that the activities
were interdependent because ownership of the airplane helped avoid “the
notorious pat downs and searches and baggage claim and lost baggage with
the airlines,” was rejected because the taxpayer would rent another airplane
for travel because he could earn more from renting his own airplane to other
pilots or pilot trainees than he would pay if he rented another airplane for a
trip; most of the airplane’s use and income came from renting it out, which
had no effect on the telephone skills training business; and there was no
indication that the airplane activity depended on the telephone skills training
business, which was only an occasional user of the airplane. There was no
evidence that the telephone skills training business and the airplane activity
had any of the same customers or that the two activities were integrated in any
meaningful way. The taxpayer was unable to establish that he materially
participated in the airplane activity separately from the telephone skills
training business. The court sustained a 20-percent accuracy related penalty.
III.

INVESTMENT GAIN AND INCOME
A.

Gains and Losses

1.
Just because you’re a good guy who helps the
government recover tens of millions of dollars of fraudulent Medicare
claims doesn’t punch your ticket to the promised land of capital gains.
Patrick v. Commissioner, 142 T.C. 124 (2/24/14). The taxpayer filed several
qui tam complaints under the False Claims Act, alleging that his employer
defrauded the government by improperly marketing medical equipment as
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requiring in-patient rather than out-patient treatment and that certain medical
providers billed treatments under Medicare as in-patient expenses. The cases
were settled for over $75 million and the government intervened. The taxpayer
received a relator’s share totaling over $6.8 million, which he reported as
capital gain. The IRS treated the relator’s awards as ordinary income. The Tax
Court (Judge Kroupa) sustained the deficiency, rejecting the taxpayer’s
argument that the FCA gives rise to a contract under which the relator sells
information to the government in exchange for a share of the recovery. First,
there was no sale or exchange of information. “The Government does not
purchase information from a relator under the FCA. Rather, it permits the
person to advance a claim on behalf of the Government. The award is a reward
for doing so. No contractual right exists.” Second, the information provided to
the government was not a capital asset. “The ordinary income doctrine
excludes from the definition of a capital asset ‘property representing income
items or accretions to the value of a capital asset themselves properly
attributable to income.’” The taxpayer “did not receive a right to the relator’s
share in exchange for an underlying investment of capital.” The right to
income was a reward, which is ordinary income. Finally, the information the
taxpayer gave to the government was not a capital asset because it was not
property. The information could not be property because the taxpayer did not
have a legal right to exclude others from its use and enjoyment. The False
Claims Act obligated him to turn over all supporting documentation to the
government, and the taxpayer had no right to prevent his employer or medical
providers from using or disclosing the information.
2.
“Bitcoin is not a currency.” “No surprise” says
Professor Omri Marian.1 Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938 (3/25/14).
This notice “describes how existing general tax principles apply to
transactions using virtual currency.” The notice has two main components:
(1) a substantive part (i.e., how Bitcoin transactions should be taxed), and
(2) an information reporting part (i.e., how income on Bitcoin transactions
should be reported and how tax can be collected).
Substance. The substantive part of the Notice provides very few
surprises. The most important conclusions are as follows.
(1)
Bitcoin is not a currency for tax
1. This discussion of Notice 2014-21 is adapted, with permission, from a
TaxProf Blog op-ed by Omri Y. Marian, Assistant Professor of Law, University of
Florida Levin College of Law, on March 26, 2014, available at
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2014/03/marian-bitcoin.html. We thank
Prof. Marian for granting us permission to include his work in this outline. See also
Omri Y. Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies ‘Super’ Tax Havens?, 112 MICH. L. REV.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 38 (2013).

144

Florida Tax Review

[Vol. 17:3

purposes; it is property. As such, gain and losses on the disposition of Bitcoins
can never be “exchange gain or loss.” I.R.C. § 988. This may come as a
disappointment to taxpayers who lost money in Bitcoin investments and may
have hoped to have the losses classified as exchange-losses, and, as such, as
ordinary losses. On the other hand, taxpayers who have disposed of
appreciated investment positions in Bitcoins may enjoy capital gains
treatment. Taxpayers who hold Bitcoin as inventory will be subject to ordinary
gains and losses upon disposition.
(2)
The receipt of Bitcoins in exchange
for goods and services is taxable at the time of receipt. The amount realized is
the U.S. dollar value of the Bitcoins received. The disposition of Bitcoins in
exchange for goods and services is a realization and recognition event to the
extent the value of Bitcoin has changed since the time it was acquired. Thus,
if a taxpayer bought one Bitcoin for $500, and later used one Bitcoin to
purchase a TV when Bitcoin was trading at $600, the taxpayer has a taxable
gain of $100.
This part of the Notice has attracted some criticism from several
commentators. A New York Times article summarized this critique,
noting that characterizing Bitcoin as property could discourage the use
of Bitcoin as a payment method. If a user buys a product or service with
Bitcoin, for example, the IRS will expect the individual to calculate the
change in value from the date the user acquired a Bitcoin to the date it
was spent. That would give the person a basis to calculate the gains—or
losses—on what the IRS is now calling property.
 This criticism is partially justified,
although the result would have generally been the same had the IRS decided to
classify Bitcoin as a foreign currency. Under current law, U.S. taxpayers whose
functional currency is the U.S. dollar (practically all U.S. taxpayers), must track
their basis in any foreign currency they hold, and recognize exchange gain or loss
as soon as they dispose of the currency, but only to the extent their exchange gain
or loss exceeds $200. Thus, the criticism might have some merit, as capital gains
or losses are taxed from the first dollar, while exchange gain or losses are subject
to the $200 threshold. I.R.C. § 988(e). This could be corrected if a de minimis
threshold would be made applicable to Bitcoin transactions as well, but it is not
clear that there is any legal basis for the IRS to do so. The only way to completely
avoid taxation upon disposition of Bitcoin is to characterize it as a functional
currency, which could only conceivably happen if the U.S. adopts Bitcoin as a
legal tender. This is much to ask for and certainly not within the power of the IRS
to decide.
(3)
Since taxes are paid in U.S. Dollars
and not in Bitcoins, the Bitcoin value must be converted to U.S. dollars for
purposes of determining gains and losses. Fair market value is determined by
reference to the BTC/USD price quoted in an online exchange if “the exchange
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rate is established by market supply and demand.” The problem with this
determination is that there are multiple such exchanges, and the BTC/USD
spot price may vary significantly among such exchanges. In March, 2013, the
price difference between various exchanges varied by as much as $100, for an
average trading price across exchanges of about $575. Taxpayers could
cherry-pick their BTC/USD exchange rate and reduce tax gains or increase tax
losses. The Notice prescribes that BTC to USD conversion must be made “in
a reasonable manner that is consistently applied.” It is not clear what
“consistency” means in this context and more guidance on this issue is needed.
(4)
Mined Bitcoins are includable in gross income, and thus
taxed, upon receipt. Bitcoins come into existence by a mining process.
“Miners” use their computing resources to validate Bitcoin transactions, and
in return are compensated with newly created Bitcoin. Unsurprisingly, the IRS
concluded that such income is taxable upon receipt.
 The IRS did not explicitly rule on the character of mining income,
but it is most likely ordinary, under several possible theories. First, it is income
from services—miners are paid in newly generated Bitcoin for handling the
bookkeeping of the Bitcoin public ledger. The IRS describes mining income as
income received from using “computer resources to validate Bitcoin transactions
and maintain the public Bitcoin transaction ledger.” This may imply that the IRS
views mining income as income from the provision of services. Second, it is
wagering income—from a technical point of view mining is guessing the correct
answer to a complex cryptographing problem. Third, mining pools—most miners
mine through mining pools, where multiple individual miners pool together their
computing resources in order to generate Bitcoins. Mining pools might be
classified as partnerships for tax purposes. If the mining pool is a partnership, the
mining pool itself is clearly in the business of mining Bitcoins. Any income from
a trade or business of the partnership (the pool) passes through as ordinary
income to the partners (the miners). If the mining pool is not a partnership, miners
essentially rent out their computing capacity to the mining pool’s operator. Rental
income is ordinary income.
Information reporting and backup withholding. The Notice, as
expected, also concludes that payments in Bitcoins are subject to information
reporting and backup withholding. Thus, a person who in the course of trade
or business makes Bitcoin payments in excess of $600 to a non-exempt U.S.
person, must report such payments to the IRS and to the recipient on the
applicable Form 1099. The payments are also subject to backup withholding
to the extent the payor is unable to solicit the requisite tax information from
the payee.
 This interpretation is perfectly reasonable, but its practical
significance is left to be seen. The U.S. information reporting system is built,
among others, on the assumption that parties to a taxable transaction know each
other (or can reasonably obtain information about one another and send
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information to each other). As such, for example, taxpayers can send Forms 1099
to each other. The operation of Bitcoin defeats this assumption. Bitcoin is
specifically designed to allow for exchange of value without having the parties
to a transaction ever know each other. In fact, a Bitcoin payor is not always in a
position to know whether payments he or she makes are made to the same person,
or to different people. Payors may have a hard time even deciding whether the
$600 threshold is met. The default is backup withholding. It is not clear, however,
how the IRS can enforce reporting and withholding requirements when both
parties to a transaction are anonymous both to the IRS and to each other. The
ramifications may be significant. Consider, for example, mining pools. In order
to be in compliance, U.S.-based mining pools would have to identify their
participants by name (rather than by anonymous address), a result that the Bitcoin
community is all but certain to dislike. The alternative—backup withholding by
the pool operator in respect of the Bitcoin mined—would probably drive Bitcoin
miners to mining pools operated by non-U.S. taxpayers. It will be interesting to
see how these requirements pan out.
Unaddressed issues. The IRS is well aware of the limited breadth of
the Notice and it has solicited comments from taxpayers. Some specific issues
not addressed by the Notice that may be of significance are as follows:
(1) Whether Bitcoin and Bitcoin-wallets are financial assets and financial
accounts, respectively, for purposes of FATCA and FBAR reporting
requirements. This may not be of immediate relevance to most taxpayers due
to the dollar amount thresholds applicable in such contexts, but as Bitcoin
grows in popularity, such issues may become relevant. (2) Whether Bitcoin
service providers (such as wallet service providers, Bitcoin exchanges, Bitcoin
mining pools and so on) are financial institutions for reporting, withholding,
and FATCA purposes. (3) Whether Bitcoin mining pools are entities for tax
purposes. Some Bitcoin mining pools may conceivably be classified as entities
separate from their owners for tax purposes, and as such may qualify as
partnerships. This may carry with it significant tax consequences to Bitcoin
miners. (4) Can Bitcoin be classified as a commodity for purposes of § 475(e),
allowing dealers to elect mark-to-market accounting?
Summary. The IRS guidance is clear, concise, and correct on the law.
While some obscurities remain, most major interpretative issues are addressed.
The Notice does an excellent job explaining how transactions involving
Bitcoin are taxed. It got all of the substantive issues right. In the context of
information reporting, however, the Notice exposes the limitations of current
tax law when it comes to collecting tax on Bitcoin transactions. While the IRS
got the information reporting part right as well, the practical ability of the IRS
to enforce such requirements may be limited in certain contexts. The main
challenge remains in the area of collection. Time will tell whether the arsenal
at the disposal of the IRS is enough to deal with tax evasion through Bitcoin,
or whether Congress will have to supply the IRS with additional ammo.
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a.
Are virtual currency accounts reportable
on the FBAR? In an IRS webinar broadcast on 6/4/14 (available at
http://www.irsvideos.gov/ElectronicFBAR/), a senior program analyst in the
Small Business/Self Employed Division stated that the IRS and the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCen) have “been closely monitoring
developments around virtual currencies” such as Bitcoin. However, “for right
now, FinCen has said that virtual currency is not going to be reportable on the
FBAR, at least for this filing season. That could change in the future, as we
monitor what’s happening with virtual currencies . . . .” See also Virtual
Currency May Be Reportable on FBAR in Future, 2014 TAX NOTES TODAY
108-2 (6/5/14).
3.
In complex transactions involving securities and
money market mutual fund shares, the taxpayer was not required to show
an “actual economic loss” to deduct losses, but was required to allocate
basis between income interests and residual interests to calculate gain or
loss on the interests sold. Principal Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 116
Fed. Cl. 82 (5/9/14). The taxpayer engaged in two types of transactions. First,
the taxpayer purchased residual interests in money market mutual fund shares
from six separate sellers in eight separate transactions. In each transaction, the
selling financial institution retained a carved-out income interest in the
underlying money market shares, which constituted all dividends paid in
connection with the money market shares for a period of between 20 and 23
years. The transaction was actually more complex and both the taxpayer and
the sellers held their beneficial interests through trusts. In the second set of
transactions, the taxpayer purchased a portfolio of eight to ten perpetual
floating-rate securities from third parties in the secondary market and sold the
residual interests, while retaining carved-out income interests. It transferred
the residual interests to a trust and allocated all of its tax basis in each
underlying perpetual security to the corresponding Principal Certificate—even
though the Interest Certificate reflected 80 percent of the cost of the overall
security. The taxpayer then claimed a loss on the sale of the residual interests.
The IRS disallowed the loss on the second set of transactions and included in
the taxpayer’s income the current interest income on the first set of
transactions. The taxpayer paid and pursued a refund. The Court of Claims
(Judge Allegra) granted the government’s motion for partial summary
judgment and denied the taxpayer’s claim, although it rejected the
government’s argument that the loss was disallowed because § 165(a)
“requires that there be an ‘actual economic loss’ before a deduction is
permitted,” rejecting the government’s reasoning that such was the import of
Reg. § 1.165-1(b), which states that “[o]nly a bona fide loss is allowable.”
Instead, the court held that the basis apportionment rule of Reg. § 1.61-6(a)
applied to allocate basis between the retained income interests and the
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transferred residual interests, rejecting the taxpayer’s argument that case law
provided an exception to Reg. § 1.61-6(a) for carved out income interests.
Because the loss deduction was based upon a basis allocation that was
erroneous as a matter of law, and since the taxpayer offered no alternative to
its failed argument, summary judgment for the government was entered on the
loss issue. Alternatively, the loss was disallowed on the ground that the
complex transaction—which defies a summary description—by which the
residual interests were transferred to the trust was a transfer to a partnership
(relying on Reg. § 301.7701-4(c)(1), dealing with investment “trusts” in which
there is a power to vary the interests of the beneficial owners) in exchange for
a partnership interest to which § 721 applied. As for the first set of transactions,
the court again found the trusts actually to be partnerships under Reg.
§ 301.7701-4(c)(1) and that a portion of the partnership income should have
been allocated to the taxpayer as a partner. Although the return position was
erroneous, factual issues remained for trial.
 The opinion did not discuss the possible
applicability of § 1286(b)(3) to require basis apportionment.
4.
You can’t have your cake and eat it too! Debough
v. Commissioner, 142 T.C. No. 17 (5/19/14). This case involves the interplay
between §§ 121 and 1038, which provides rules for computing gain when a
seller repossesses real property in satisfaction of a debt secured by that real
property. The taxpayer and his wife sold their primary residence in 2006
pursuant to an installment sale agreement. The buyers’ debt was secured by a
mortgage on the home. The price was $1,400,000 and the taxpayers recognized
a gain of $657,796. The taxpayers properly excluded $500,000 in gain on the
sale. They calculated the gain reportable in each year by (1) excluding
$500,000 of gain pursuant to § 121, (2) calculating their gross profit
percentage by dividing the $157,796 in remaining gain ($657,796–$500,000
= $157,796) by the $1,400,000 sale price exclusive of commissions and other
costs of sale, and (3) multiplying the gross profit percentage by the amount of
money received. In total, the taxpayer (his wife having died in 2006) received
payments of $505,000 and reported $56,920 in gain over the course of 2006,
2007, and 2008. In 2009, the buyers defaulted and the taxpayer reacquired the
property. He treated his reacquisition of the property in 2009 as a reacquisition
of property in full satisfaction of indebtedness under § 1038 and recognized
$97,153 in the form of long-term capital gains related to the reacquisition of
the property. The IRS asserted that the long-term capital gain the taxpayer was
required to recognize on the reacquisition of the property included the
$500,000 that he had previously excluded under § 121. The Tax Court (Judge
Nega) agreed with the IRS, holding that the gain recognized on the
reacquisition of the property included gain previously excluded under § 121.
Generally speaking, under § 1038, if the seller of real property receives the
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buyer’s purchase money debt obligation and the seller reacquires the property
in partial or full satisfaction of the buyer’s debt, the seller does not recognize
gain or loss upon the reacquisition, except, as provided in § 1038(b), to the
extent he has received money or other property that exceeds the amount of
gain reported before the reacquisition. (The special exception to the general
rule in § 1038(e) was inapplicable because the taxpayer had not resold the
residence within one year after its reacquisition.) Because the taxpayer had
received $505,000 in cash before the reacquisition and had both the cash and
the house as a result of the reacquisition, he was “actually in a better position
than he was before the sale by virtue of having ownership over both the
property and $505,000.”
5.
There is no unconditional “one bite” at capital
gains rule. Allen v. United States, 113 A.F.T.R.2d 2014-2262 (N.D. Cal.
5/28/14). The taxpayer was a full-time civil engineer who worked primarily
for developers. As a one-time venture, he purchased 2.63 acres of undeveloped
land that he admitted he tried, unsuccessfully, to develop between 1987 and
1995. In 1998, when he had been unable to develop the property, he sold the
land for (1) a lump-sum payment and (2)(a) 22 percent of the buyer’s profits
plus (b) a set fee whenever the purchaser sold a developed unit. On a motion
for summary judgment, the District Court (Judge Orrick) held that the
taxpayer’s gains were ordinary income, not capital gain. First, the taxpayer at
all times intended to develop the property and undertook substantial efforts to
do so; there were no specific facts to support the taxpayer’s declaration that
prior to the sale his purpose in holding the property changed from development
to “investment.” The court rejected the taxpayer’s argument that he was
entitled to “one bite” at capital gains, citing Cottle v. Commissioner, 89 T.C.
467 (1987).
6.
What! You mean my money market fund might
lose money—an exception from the wash sale rules for money market
fund losses. Rev. Proc. 2014-45, 2014-34 I.R.B. 388 (7/23/14). This revenue
procedure (proposed as a de minimis rule in Notice 2013-48, 2013-31 I.R.B.
120 (7/3/13)) provides a complete exception to the § 1091 wash sale rules for
certain redemptions of shares of money market funds (MMFs) that, under SEC
regulations, do not maintain a constant share price. It applies to a redemption
of one or more shares in an investment company registered under the 1940 Act
if: (1) the investment company is regulated as an MMF under SEC Rule 2a–7
and holds itself out to investors as an MMF; and (2) at the time of the
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redemption, the investment company is a floating-NAV2 MMF. If a
redemption of shares in an MMF to which the revenue ruling applies results
in a loss, the IRS will not treat the redemption as part of a wash sale. Section
1091(a) will not disallow the deduction for the resulting loss in the year
realized and § 1091(d) will not cause the basis of any property to be
determined by reference to the basis of the redeemed shares. In the revenue
procedure previously proposed in Notice 2013-48, a loss was not subject to
the wash sale rules if a taxpayer realized a loss upon a redemption of shares in
a floating-NAV MMF and the amount of the loss was not more than 0.5
percent of the taxpayer’s basis in the shares; in contrast, this revenue procedure
completely exempts floating-NAV MMFs from the wash sale rules of § 1091.
a.
A simplified method of accounting for
gains and losses in shares of money market funds that do not maintain a
constant share price. REG-107012-14, Method of Accounting for Gains and
Losses on Shares in Certain Money Market Funds; Broker Returns With
Respect to Sales of Shares in Money Market Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 43694
(7/28/14). These proposed regulations provide a simplified method of
accounting for gains and losses on shares of floating-NAV MMFs. Under this
method, gain or loss is based on the change in the aggregate value of the shares
in the floating-NAV MMF during a computation period (which may be the
taxpayer’s taxable year or certain shorter periods) and the net amount of the
purchases and redemptions during the period. For example, if the MMF shares
held by a calendar-year individual have a value of $1 million on January 1, a
closing value on December 31 of $1.1 million, and if during the year the
taxpayer purchases additional shares for $50,000 and has shares redeemed for
$40,000, the taxpayer’s gain for the year would be $90,000 ($100,000 change
in value minus $10,000 net amount of purchases and redemptions). The
character of the taxpayer’s gain or loss depends on the character of the
underlying MMF shares in the taxpayer’s hands. The simplified method of
accounting does not change the tax treatment of dividends received. A
taxpayer that adopts the simplified method of accounting will not need to take
advantage of the exception from the wash sale rules provided in Rev. Proc.
2014-45, 2014-34 I.R.B. 388 (7/23/14), because under the simplified method
net gain or loss is determined for each computation period, and no gain or loss
is determined for any particular redemption of a taxpayer’s shares in a floatingNAV MMF. Once a taxpayer has adopted a method of accounting for gains
and losses on shares in floating-NAV MMFs, any change from that method
(including a change to or from the simplified method) is a change in method
2. An MMF that uses market factors to value its securities and uses basis
point rounding to price its shares for purposes of distribution, redemption, and
repurchase.
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of accounting to which the provisions of § 446 and the accompanying
regulations apply. The proposed regulations concerning the simplified method
are proposed to apply to taxable years ending on or after the date final
regulations are published in the Federal Register, but shareholders of floatingNAV MMFs can rely on the proposed regulations for taxable years ending on
or after 7/28/14 and beginning before the date final regulations are published
in the Federal Register.
7.
“A ‘transferor’s acts . . . speak louder than his
words in establishing whether a sale of a patent has occurred.’” Cooper v.
Commissioner, 143 T.C. No. 10 (9/23/14). The taxpayer was an engineerinventor who transferred several patents to a corporation in which he owned
24 percent of the stock. His wife’s sister and a friend owned the remaining
stock. The corporation and its shareholders entered into a stock restriction
agreement providing that shares could not be sold, assigned, or transferred
except according to the terms of the stock restriction agreement. Under the
agreement, the taxpayer was permitted to transfer shares to his issue or any
trust for their benefit. The two other shareholders were permitted to transfer
shares only to another shareholder. In consideration of the transfer, the
taxpayer received a royalty, and he claimed that the royalty receipts were
entitled to capital gain treatment under § 1235. Section 1235(a) provides that
a transfer (other than by gift, inheritance, or devise) of all substantial rights to
a patent by any holder will be treated as the sale or exchange of a capital asset
held for more than one year, regardless of whether the payments in
consideration of such transfer are contingent on the productivity, use, or
disposition of the property transferred. Based on the record, the Tax Court
(Judge Marvel) found that substantially all of the corporation’s decisions
regarding licensing, patent infringement, and patent transfers were made either
by the taxpayer or at his direction. The taxpayer controlled the corporation in
all material respects. The other two shareholders acted in their capacities as
directors and officers at the taxpayer’s direction. They did not make
independent decisions in accordance with their fiduciary duties or act in their
best interests as shareholders. The court upheld the IRS’s treatment of the
royalty as ordinary income, even though § 1235(d) did not apply to deny
capital gain treatment. (Under § 1235(d), transfers between related persons, as
defined in § 267(b), are not eligible for capital gain treatment, and for purposes
of § 1235, a corporation and an individual owning 25 percent or more of the
stock of such corporation directly or indirectly are related persons.) Neither
the Code nor regulations address whether § 1235 “applies to transfers to a
corporation that is not related to the holder but is indirectly controlled by the
holder,” and “[w]hether a holder’s control over a corporate transferee that is
unrelated (within the meaning of section 1235(d)) defeats capital gain
treatment” was an issue of first impression for the Tax Court. However,
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Charlson v. United States, 525 F.2d 1046 (Ct. Cl. 1975), considered this issue
and concluded that such control could prohibit the transfer of substantially all
rights in a patent and therefore precluded capital gain treatment under § 1235.
The Tax Court agreed with the holding of Charlson, “that retention of control
places the holder in essentially the same position as if the patent had not been
transferred, thereby precluding the application of section 1235,” and “that
Congress intended for a ‘transferor’s acts to speak louder than his words in
establishing whether a sale of a patent has occurred.’” Accordingly, it held that
“retention of control by a holder over an unrelated corporation can defeat
capital gain treatment under section 1235 because the retention prevents the
transfer of ‘all substantial rights’ in the patent.” Analyzing the record, the court
concluded that the corporation was not independent of the taxpayer, and thus
the taxpayer had not transferred all substantial rights in the patents to the
corporation as required to obtain capital gain treatment under § 1235(a).
 With respect to other issues in the case, the
taxpayer was denied a bad debt deduction for a debt from another corporation
from which he had made no reasonable attempt to collect the debt and with
respect to which he did not identify specific events “that made recovery of the
debt futile in the future.” But he secured a minor victory in being allowed to
deduct certain professional engineering fees that he paid in an attempt to
determine how certain products were designed and manufactured and whether
any of the products infringed on his patents. The court rejected the IRS’s
argument that the expenses properly were expenses of one or the other of two
corporations. Rather, the court concluded, the expenditures “were proximately
related to Mr. Cooper’s business as an inventor and their payment by him was
ordinary and necessary.”
 Section 6662 accuracy related penalties
were upheld with respect to both the bad debt deduction and the taxpayer’s
treatment of the royalties as capital gain. The taxpayer claimed a good faith
reliance defense based on the advice of a tax lawyer with respect to the royalties.
The lawyer testified that he advised the taxpayer that he could not indirectly
control the corporation. Moreover, he did not provide the advice before the
taxpayer filed his tax return and did not provide advice regarding whether the
taxpayer controlled the corporation. The taxpayer did not follow the lawyer’s
advice to ensure that he did not indirectly control the corporation. Consequently,
the taxpayer could not claim reliance on professional advice to negate the penalty
with respect to the erroneous capital gain treatment of the royalty payments.
8.
It’s alchemy—a frustrated intent to earn ordinary
income magically turns into capital gain. Long v. Commissioner, 772 F.3d
670 (11th Cir. 11/20/14), aff’g in part and rev’g in part, T.C. Memo 2013233. The taxpayer owned the stock of a corporation (LOTC), which had the
right to purchase land from another party under a purchase and sale agreement.

2015]

Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation

153

The taxpayer, through his corporation, planned to build a condominium on the
land. The seller refused to perform, and LOTC sued the seller and obtained a
court order for specific performance. Rather than LOTC purchasing the
property, the taxpayer (not LOTC) “sold his position as plaintiff” in the suit
for $5,750,000. (The IRS and the taxpayer stipulated that notwithstanding the
interposition of LOTC, which had no employees, no TIN, and never filed a tax
return, the taxpayer was at all times acting as an unincorporated sole
proprietor.) The Tax Court held that the proceeds of the sale of the contract
were ordinary income, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed on this issue, holding
that the proceeds were capital gain. According to the Court of Appeals, the
Tax Court erred by treating the land itself, which the taxpayer intended to
develop and sell in the ordinary course of business, as the property that the
taxpayer sold (which is indeed what the Tax Court did), when it was clear that
he “did not sell the land itself, but rather his right to purchase the land, which
is a distinct contractual right that may be a capital asset.” Thus, “[t]he
dispositive inquiry [was] not ‘whether Long intended to sell the land to
customers in the ordinary course of his business,’ but whether Long held the
exclusive right to purchase the property ‘primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of his trade or business.’” Because there was no evidence that
the taxpayer had any “intent to assign his contractual rights in the ordinary
course of business,” or to obtain the judgment for the purpose of selling it in
ordinary course of business, the gain was capital gain. Furthermore, the gain
was long term capital-gain because the “property” that was sold was the right
to purchase the land, which originally arose from the purchase contract, not
the state court judgment in the specific performance suit. Finally, the court
rejected the IRS’s argument that the sales proceeds were ordinary income
under the “substitute for ordinary income” doctrine. The court reasoned as
follows:
It cannot be said that the profit Long received from selling
the right to attempt to finish developing a large residential
project that was far from complete was a substitute for what
he would have received had he completed the project himself.
Long did not have a future right to income that he already
earned. By selling his position in the litigation, Long
effectively sold Ferris his right to finish the project and earn
the income that Long had hoped to earn when he started the
project years prior. Taxing the sale of a right to create—and
thereby profit—at the highest rate would discourage many
transfers of property that are beneficial to economic
development.
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Long possessed a “bundle of rights [that] reflected
something more than an opportunity...to obtain periodic
receipts of income.” Comm’r v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125, 130–
31 (2d Cir.1962) ... . Long’s profit was not “simply the
amount [he] would have received eventually, discounted to
present value.” Womack, 510 F.3d at 1301. Rather, Long’s
rights in the LORH property represented the potential to earn
income in the future based on the owner’s actions in using it,
not entitlement to the income merely by owning the property.
... We have already held that selling a right to earn future
undetermined income, as opposed to selling a right to earned
income, is a critical feature of a capital asset. United States v.
Dresser Indus., Inc., 324 F.2d 56, 59 (5th Cir. 1963). The fact
that the income earned from developing the project would
otherwise be considered ordinary income is immaterial.
(The Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court’s holdings on other issues.)
9.
Extended tax-free capital gains for “small” C
corporation stock. This one’s exclusively lagniappe. TIPA extended
benefits on the sale of qualified small business stock. Under § 1202, gain
realized on a sale or exchange of qualified small business stock, which was
acquired after the date of enactment of the 2010 Small Business Act (9/27/10)
and before 1/1/11 (subsequently extended to “before 1/1/12”), was subject to
100 percent exclusion from gross income. The 2012 Extenders Act extended
the 100 percent exclusion to stock acquired before 1/1/14, and TIPA extended
the 100 percent exclusion to stock acquired before 1/1/15. Gain attributable to
qualified small business stock acquired between 9/27/10 and 1/1/15 is not
treated as an AMT preference item. The exclusion is applicable to
noncorporate shareholders who acquire stock at original issue and hold the
stock for a minimum of five years. Under the former 50 percent and 75 percent
exclusions, included gain was subject to tax at the 28 percent capital gains
rates. The amount of excluded gain attributable to any one corporation is
limited to the greater of ten times the taxpayer’s basis in a corporation’s stock
sold during the taxable year or $10 million reduced by gain attributable to the
corporation’s stock excluded in prior years. Qualified small business stock is
stock issued by a C corporation engaged in the active conduct of a trade or
business with gross assets (cash plus adjusted basis of assets) not in excess of
$50 million.
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Interest, Dividends, and Other Current Income
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2014.
C.

Profit-Seeking Individual Deductions
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2014.
D.

Section 121
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2014.
E.

Section 1031

1.
Keeping things all in the family was a meathead
move in an attempted deferred like-kind exchange. Blangiardo v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-110 (6/9/14). The taxpayer attempted a
deferred like-kind exchange using his lawyer-son as an intermediary. The Tax
Court (Judge Jacobs) granted summary judgment for the IRS that the exchange
did not qualify under § 1031. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(g) provides a safe harbor for
the use of a “qualified intermediary,” but pursuant to Regs. §§ 1.1031(k)1(g)(4)(iii)(A) and 1.1031(k)-1(k)(3), the taxpayer’s son was not a qualified
intermediary because the taxpayer and his son were related as defined in
§ 267(b). It was not relevant that: (1) the son was an attorney; (2) the funds
from the sale of the relinquished property were held in an attorney trust
account; and (3) the real estate documents referred to the transaction as a
§ 1031 exchange.
F.

Section 1033

1.
“How dry I am.” Notice 2014–60, 2014-43 I.R.B.
741 (9/30/14). This notice contains a list of the counties that experienced
exceptional, extreme, or severe drought during the preceding 12-month period
ending August 31, 2014, which triggers the 4-year replacement period under
§ 1033(e)(2) for livestock sold on account of drought. A lot of counties in a
lot of states make the list.
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Section 1035
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2014.
H.

Miscellaneous
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2014.
IV.

COMPENSATION ISSUES
A.

Fringe Benefits

1.
“White House suspends [individual] mandate
penalty for those with cancelled health plans.” Individuals whose health
insurance plans were cancelled by insurers because they did not meet the
requirements of the Affordable Care Act will be eligible for an exemption from
the individual mandate penalty under § 5000A that takes effect in 2014, the
Department of Health and Human Services said late December 19. White
House Suspends Mandate Penalty for Those With Canceled Health Plans,
2013 TAX NOTES TODAY 246-5 (12/23/13). The mandate requires everyone to
have health insurance or face a tax penalty, the greater of $95 or 1 percent of
income in 2014. The administration will also allow those consumers to sign
up for catastrophic coverage. Those bare-bones plans are available to people
who are under 30 or qualify for a “hardship exemption.” HHS Secretary
Kathleen Sebelius said in a letter to Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., that the
administration is granting a “hardship exemption” to Americans whose plans
were canceled and “might be having difficulty” paying for standard coverage.
a.
Based on the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, the Supreme Court strikes down the application of
Obamacare’s contraceptive mandate to closely held businesses owned by
persons who claim their Christian beliefs would be violated by compliance
with that mandate Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(6/30/14) (5-4), aff’g Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sibelius, 723 F.3d 1114
(10th Cir. 6/27/13) (en banc). Justice Alito’s majority opinion was based upon
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which requires that requirements of
general applicability that substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion
must: (1) be in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and (2) be

2015]

Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation

157

the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
The other four male Catholic justices joined in this opinion.
 Justice Ginsburg dissented on the grounds
that (1) having to pay for abortifacients does not affect the owners’ exercise of
their religion, and (2) commercial enterprises operating in corporate form do not
have religious rights. Justice Sotomayor joined in the dissenting opinion, and
Justices Breyer and Kagan joined as to the first ground but not the second.
2.
The IRS provides guidance on the application of
the Affordable Care Act’s market reforms to HRAs, EPPs, FSAs, and
EAPs—it’s the bee’s knees! Notice 2013-54, 2013-40 I.R.B. 287 (9/13/13).
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act amended the Public Health
Service Act to implement certain market reforms for group health plans,
including requirements that: (1) group health plans not establish any annual
limit on the dollar amount of benefits for any individual; and (2) nongrandfathered group health plans provide certain preventive services without
imposing any cost-sharing requirements for the services. The notice provides
guidance, in Q&A format, on the application of these market reforms to:
(1) health reimbursement arrangements (including HRAs integrated with
group health plans); (2) group health plans under which employers reimburse
employees for premium expenses incurred for an individual health insurance
policy (referred to in the notice as “employer payment plans”); and (3) health
flexible spending arrangements. The notice also provides guidance on employee
assistance programs and on § 125(f)(3), which generally provides that a qualified
health plan offered through a health insurance exchange established under the
Affordable Care Act is not a qualified benefit that can be offered through a
cafeteria plan. The notice applies for plan years beginning on and after 1/1/14,
but taxpayers can apply the guidance provided in the notice for all prior periods.
The Department of Labor has issued guidance in substantially identical form
(Technical Release 2013-03) and the Department of Health and Human Services
is issuing guidance indicating that it concurs.
a.
The obvious solution has a great big catch
in it. In a Q&A issued on 5/13/14, available on the IRS’s web site
(http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Employer-Health-Care-Arrangements),
the IRS states:
Q1. What are the consequences to the employer if the
employer does not establish a health insurance plan for its
own employees, but reimburses those employees for
premiums they pay for health insurance (either through a
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qualified health plan in the Marketplace or outside the
Marketplace)?
[A1]. Under IRS Notice 2013-54, such arrangements are
described as employer payment plans. An employer payment
plan, as the term is used in this notice, generally does not
include an arrangement under which an employee may have
an after-tax amount applied toward health coverage or take
that amount in cash compensation. As explained in Notice
2013-54, these employer payment plans are considered to be
group health plans subject to the market reforms, including
the prohibition on annual limits for essential health benefits
and the requirement to provide certain preventive care
without cost sharing. Notice 2013-54 clarifies that such
arrangements cannot be integrated with individual policies to
satisfy the market reforms. Consequently, such an
arrangement fails to satisfy the market reforms and may be
subject to a $100/day excise tax per applicable employee
(which is $36,500 per year, per employee) under section
4980D of the Internal Revenue Code.
3.
Guidance on the Affordable Care
Act’s employer shared responsibility payment. T.D. 9655, Shared
Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 F.R. 8544
(2/12/14). Section 4980H was enacted by the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act and amended by the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010 and the Department of Defense and Full-Year
Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011. Under § 4980H, an applicable large
employer is subject to an assessable payment for a month if a full-time
employee enrolls for that month through a health insurance exchange in a
qualified health plan for which the employee receives a premium tax credit
and the employer either fails to offer its full-time employees (and their
dependents) the opportunity to enroll in minimum essential coverage under an
eligible employer-sponsored plan or offers coverage that is not affordable or
does not provide minimum value. The IRS and Treasury have promulgated
Regs. §§ 54.4980H-0 through 54.4980H-6 providing comprehensive guidance
regarding the § 4980H assessable payment, commonly known as the
“employer shared responsibility payment.” The regulations provide extensive
guidance on determining an employer’s status as an “applicable large
employer,” which is defined by statute as an employer that “employed an
average of at least 50 full-time employees on business days during the
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preceding calendar year.” The regulations generally are effective 2/12/14 and
are applicable for periods after 12/31/14.
 The preamble to the regulations extends
previously granted transition relief. Although § 4980H applies to months
beginning after 12/31/13, the IRS announced in Notice 2013-45, 2013-31 I.R.B.
116 (7/29/13), that no employer shared responsibility payments would be
assessed for 2014. The preamble to the regulations extends this relief through
2015 for applicable large employers that employ fewer than 100 full-time
employees. (This transition relief is not available, however, to employers that
reduce the size of their workforce or the overall hours of service of their
employees in order to fall below the 100 full-time employee threshold.) Thus, in
2015, only employers that employ 100 or more full-time employees are subject
to the shared responsibility payment. Further, in 2015, an applicable large
employer that offers coverage for a month to at least 70 percent of its full-time
employees (and, to the extent required, their dependents) will be treated as
offering coverage for that month to its full-time employees (and dependents). The
effect of this rule is that, if the coverage offered is affordable coverage and
provides minimum value, the employer will not be subject to an assessable
payment under § 4980H. The required percentage of full-time employees to
whom coverage must be offered increases to 95 percent in 2016.
 See also Treasury and IRS Issue Final
Regulations Implementing Employer Shared Responsibility Under the
Affordable Care Act for 2015, 2014 TAX NOTES TODAY 28-21 (2/10/14).
4.
Providers of minimum essential
health coverage and employers subject to the Affordable Care Act’s
shared responsibility payment must submit information returns for 2015
and are encouraged to submit returns for 2014. T.D. 9660, Information
Reporting of Minimum Essential Coverage, 79 F.R. 13220 (3/10/14); T.D.
9661, Information Reporting by Applicable Large Employers on Health
Insurance Coverage Offered Under Employer-Sponsored Plans, 79 F.R. 13231
(3/10/14). Sections 6055 and 6056 were added to the Code by the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act. Section 6055 requires annual information
reporting by health insurance issuers, self-insuring employers, government
agencies, and other providers of health coverage and requires the provider to
furnish a related statement to each individual whose information is reported.
Section 6056 requires annual information reporting by applicable large
employers relating to the health insurance that the employer offers (or does
not offer) to its full-time employees and requires the employer to furnish
related statements to employees that employees may use to determine whether,
for each month of the calendar year, they may claim on their individual tax
returns a premium tax credit under § 36B. The IRS and Treasury have issued
final regulations implementing these reporting requirements. The required
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statements generally must be furnished to individuals or employees for a
calendar year on or before January 31 of the succeeding year, and the
information returns for a calendar year generally must be filed on or before
February 28 of the succeeding year (March 31 if filed electronically). The
regulations generally apply for calendar years beginning after 12/31/14.
 Although §§ 6055 and 6056 apply to
months beginning after 12/31/13, the IRS announced in Notice 2013-45, 201331 I.R.B. 116 (7/29/13), that reporting is not required with respect to 2014.
Reporting for 2014 is optional and no penalties will be applied for failure to
comply with the information reporting provisions for 2014. Accordingly, the first
year for which reporting is required is 2015. (All applicable large employers,
including those that are not subject to the shared responsibility payment of
§ 4980H for 2015 because they have fewer than 100 full-time employees, must
report for 2015.) This reporting will take place in early 2016. Nevertheless,
providers and employers subject to the information reporting requirements are
encouraged to voluntarily comply with the information reporting provisions for
2014.
 Most employers that sponsor self-insured
group health plans are applicable large employers that are required to report
under both § 6056 and § 6055. The regulations provide that such applicable large
employers will file a single information return that combines reporting under
§§ 6055 and 6056.
 See also FACT SHEET: Final Regulations
Implementing Information Reporting for Employers and Insurers under the
Affordable Care Act (ACA), 2014 TAX NOTES TODAY 44-30 (3/5/14).
5.
Although married taxpayers must file a joint
return to be eligible for the § 36B premium tax credit, married taxpayers
who cannot file a joint return because they are victims of domestic abuse
can still be eligible for the credit. Notice 2014-23, 2014-16 I.R.B. 942
(3/26/14). Beginning in 2014, individuals who meet certain eligibility
requirements and purchase coverage under a qualified health plan through an
Affordable Insurance Exchange are allowed a premium tax credit under § 36B.
One eligibility requirement is that individuals must file a joint return if married
within the meaning of § 7703. See I.R.C. § 36B(c)(1)(C). Married individuals
who live apart can be treated as not married if they meet the requirements of
§ 7703(b), but victims of domestic abuse might not meet those requirements.
Accordingly, absent relief, victims of domestic abuse who are married and do
not file a joint return for reasons related to the abuse (e.g., risk of injury arising
from contacting the other spouse or a restraining order that prohibits contact
with the other spouse) would be precluded from claiming the premium tax
credit. The preamble to the final regulations issued under § 36B (T.D. 9590,
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77 F.R. 30377 (5/23/12)) provided that Treasury and the IRS would propose
regulations addressing domestic abuse and similar circumstances that create
obstacles to filing a joint return. These proposed regulations have not yet been
issued. The notice provides that, for calendar year 2014, a married taxpayer
will satisfy the joint filing requirement of § 36B(c)(1)(C) if he or she uses a
filing status of married filing separately and meets three requirements: (1) at
the time the individual files the return, the individual lives apart from his or
her spouse; (2) the individual is unable to file a joint return because he or she
is a victim of domestic abuse; and (3) the individual indicates on the return in
accordance with instructions that he or she meets the first two requirements.
6.
Final regulations on the Affordable Care Act’s
requirement that health insurance exchanges report information related
to the § 36B premium tax credit. T.D. 9663, Information Reporting for
Affordable Insurance Exchanges, 79 F.R. 26113 (5/7/14). An individual who
enrolls in coverage through a health insurance exchange can seek advance
payment of the premium tax credit authorized by § 36B. The exchange makes
an advance determination of eligibility for the credit and, if approved, the
credit is paid monthly to the health insurance issuer. An individual who
receives advance credit payments is required by § 36B(f)(1) to reconcile the
amount of the advance payments with the premium tax credit calculated on the
individual’s income tax return for the year. Health insurance exchanges are
required by § 36B(f)(3) to report to the IRS and to taxpayers certain
information required to reconcile the premium tax credit with advance credit
payments and to administer the premium tax credit generally. The IRS and
Treasury have issued final regulations implementing this reporting
requirement. A health insurance exchange must annually report to the IRS and
furnish statements to individuals by January 31 of the year following the
calendar year of coverage. In addition, an exchange must report monthly to the
IRS on or before the 15th day following each month of coverage. The initial
monthly report will be due on a date to be established by the IRS, but no earlier
than June 15, 2014. The regulations generally apply for taxable years ending
after 12/31/13.
7.
Thousands of dollars of tax breaks for buying
luxury cars, pennies for taking the bus. TIPA retroactively extended
through 12/31/14 the one year parity provision requiring that the monthly
dollar limitation for transit passes and transportation in a commuter highway
vehicle under § 132(f)(2) be applied as if it were the same as the dollar
limitation for that month for employer-provided parking. Thus, for 2014, it
increases the monthly exclusion for employer-provided transit and van-pool
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benefits to $250—the amount of the maximum exclusion for employerprovided parking benefits.
B.

Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans

1.
Relief for certain closed defined benefit pension
plans. Notice 2014-5, 2014-2 I.R.B. 276 (12/13/13). This notice provides
temporary nondiscrimination relief for certain “closed” defined benefit
pension plans (i.e., those that provide ongoing accruals but that have been
amended to limit those accruals to some or all of the employees who
participated in the plan on a specified date). Typically, new hires are offered
only a defined contribution plan, and the closed defined benefit plan has an
increased proportion of highly compensated employees.
2.
“♬♪Roll me over . . . And do it again.♬♪” Rev. Rul.
2014-9, 2014-17 I.R.B. 975 (4/3/14). This revenue ruling presents two
situations where the administrator of a qualified plan may reasonably conclude
that a potential rollover contribution from another plan, or from an IRA, is a
valid rollover contribution under Reg. § 1.401(a)(31)-1, Q&A-14(b)(2).
3.
How does the IRS spell relief for plan
administrators who fail to timely file Form 5500-EZ for plans not subject
to Title I of ERISA, i.e., one-participant plans and certain foreign plans?
Rev. Proc. 2014-32, 2014-23 I.R.B. 1073 (5/9/14). This revenue procedure
spells out the requirements for, and the details of, a pilot program that is
effective between 6/2/14 and 6/2/15. The submission must be made on “a
signed, filled-out paper version of the applicable Form 5500 Series return
[including all schedules] for the specific plan year that is delinquent.”
4.
A payment from a qualified plan for an accident
or health insurance premium generally constitutes a distribution under
§ 402(a) that is taxable to the distributee under § 72. T.D. 9665, Tax
Treatment of Qualified Retirement Plan Payment of Accident or Health
Insurance Premiums, 79 F.R. 26838 (5/12/14). These final regulations under
§ 402(a) clarify the rules on the tax treatment of payments by qualified
retirement plans for accident or health insurance, explaining that generally
amounts held in a qualified plan that are used to pay accident or health
insurance premiums are taxable distributions under § 72 in the taxable year in
which the premium is paid. They are effective on 5/12/14, and generally apply
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for taxable years that begin on or after 1/1/15, but retroactive applicability is
available at the taxpayer’s election.
 This provision is taxpayer-favorable
because insurance benefits received may generally be excluded from income
only if the taxpayer himself paid the insurance premiums with non-deductible
dollars.
5.
Final regulations on longevity annuity contracts.
T.D. 9673, Longevity Annuity Contracts, 79 F.R. 37633 (7/2/14). Final
regulations under Reg. §§ 1.401(a)(9)-5 and -6, with respect to the role that
deferred annuity contracts may play under the required minimum distribution
rules. In general, these contracts are limited to a total premium that does not
exceed $125,000 and is not in excess of 25 percent of the amount that is in the
plan, with annuity payouts required to begin no later than age 85.
6.
Some inflation adjusted numbers
for 2015. I.R. 2014-99 (10/23/14).
 Elective deferral in §§ 401(k), 403(b), and
457 plans, increases (from $17,500) to $18,000 with a catch-up provision for
employees aged 50 or older of $6,000 (increased from $5,500).
 The limit on contributions to an IRA will
be unchanged at $5,500. The AGI phase out range for contributions to a
traditional IRA by employees covered by a workplace retirement plan is
increased to $61,000-$71,000 for single filers and heads of household, to
$98,000-$118,000 for married couples filing jointly in which the spouse who
makes the IRA contribution is covered by a workplace retirement plan, and to
$183,000-$193,000 for an IRA contributor who is not covered by a workplace
retirement plan and is married to someone who is covered. The phase-out range
for contributions to a Roth IRA is increased to $183,000-$193,000 for married
couples filing jointly, and to $116,000-$131,000 for singles and heads of
household.
 The annual benefit from a defined benefit
plan under § 415 is unchanged at $210,000.
 The limit for defined contribution plans is
increased (from $52,000) to $53,000.
 The amount of compensation that may be
taken into account for various plans is increased (from $260,000) to $265,000,
and increased (from $385,000) to $395,000 for government plans.
 The AGI limit for the retirement savings
contribution credit for low- and moderate-income workers is increased to
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$61,000 for married couples filing jointly, to $45,750 for heads of household, and
to $30,500 for singles and married individuals filing separately.
7.
A case involving revocation of a retirement plan’s
qualification is different than a case involving the continuing qualification
of a retirement plan. Go figure! RSW Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner,
143 T.C. No. 21 (11/26/14). The petitioning corporations had established
retirement plans and received a favorable determination letter from the IRS
that the plans were qualified under § 401(a). The IRS later revoked the plans’
qualified status on the grounds that each plan failed to (1) satisfy the coverage
requirements of §§ 401(a)(3) and 410(b), and (2) satisfy the § 401(a)(26)
minimum participation requirements. The corporations petitioned the Tax
Court under § 7476(a) for declaratory judgments that the plans’ qualified
status should not have been revoked. The IRS moved for summary judgment,
which the Tax Court (Judge Buch) denied because there were material factual
issues in dispute. Judge Buch held that the Tax Court is not limited to
considering solely the administrative record in a proceeding regarding
revocation of qualified plan status where the parties disagree as to whether the
administrative record contains all the relevant facts and as to whether those
facts are in dispute. He rejected the IRS’s argument that review was limited to
the administrative record under Stepnowski v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 198
(2005), aff’d, 456 F.3d 320 (3d Cir. 2006), which held that:
The legislative history of section 7476 makes clear that
Congress did not expect the Court to conduct a trial de novo
in declaratory judgment actions arising under that section, no
matter whether that action arose with respect to the initial
qualification or the continuing qualification of a retirement
plan. . . . Therefore, discovery or introduction of extrinsic
evidence in such cases is inconsistent with the legislative
intent that such cases be resolved without a trial based solely
on the materials contained in the administrative record.
Rather, under Tax Court Rule 217(a), “[i]n cases involving a revocation, [the
court is] limited to the administrative record ‘only where the parties agree that
such record contains all the relevant facts and that such facts are not in
dispute.’” Stepnowski did not involve a revocation.
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Nonqualified Deferred Compensation, Section 83, and
Stock Options

1.
The IRS says that it is clarifying the meaning of
“substantial risk of forfeiture.” T.D. 9659, Property Transferred in
Connection with the Performance of Services Under Section 83, 79 F.R. 10663
(2/26/14). The Treasury and IRS have finalized proposed amendments to Reg.
§ 1.83-3 (REG-141075-09, Property Transferred in Connection With the
Performance of Services Under Section 83, 77 F.R. 31783 (5/30/12)). The
final regulations provide that except as specifically provided in § 83(c)(3) and
Regs. §§ 1.83-3(j) and (k), a substantial risk of forfeiture may be established
only through a service condition or a condition related to the purpose of the
transfer. When determining whether a substantial risk of forfeiture exists based
on a condition related to the purpose of the transfer, both the likelihood that
the forfeiture event will occur and the likelihood that the forfeiture will be
enforced must be considered. In addition, the final regulations clarify that
except as specifically provided in § 83(c)(3) and Reg. § 1.83-3(j) and (k),
transfer restrictions do not create a substantial risk of forfeiture, even if
transfer restrictions carry the potential for forfeiture or disgorgement of some
or all of the property, or other penalties, if the restriction is violated. Two
additional examples have been added to Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(4), illustrating that a
substantial risk of forfeiture is not created solely as a result of potential liability
under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or a lock-up
agreement. (This change incorporates the holding of Rev. Rul. 2005-48, 20052 C.B. 259 (which has been obsoleted by the Treasury Decision), holding that
if an employee exercises a nonstatutory option more than six months after
grant, and thus outside the period covered by § 16 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, but is subject to restrictions on his ability to sell the stock obtained
through exercise of the option under Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and “lock-up” contractual provisions imposed by the employer in
connection with a public offering, the employee is required to recognize
income under § 83 at the time of the exercise of the option because full
enjoyment of the shares is not conditioned on any obligation to provide future
services.)
 The preamble states:
These regulations are intended to clarify the definition of a
substantial risk of forfeiture and are consistent with the
interpretation that the IRS historically has applied, and
therefore from the perspective of Treasury and the IRS they
do not constitute a narrowing of the requirements to establish
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a substantial risk of forfeiture. See Robinson v. Commissioner,
805 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1986).

 The final regulations apply to property
transferred on or after January 1, 2013.
2.
Nonstatutory stock options and stock-settled stock
appreciation rights with respect to stock of a nonqualified entity are not
subject to taxation under § 457A. Rev. Rul. 2014-18, 2014-26 I.R.B. 1104
(6/10/14), amplifying Notice 2009-8, 2009-4 I.R.B. 347. Neither a
nonstatutory stock option nor a stock-settled stock appreciation right with
respect to common stock of a nonqualified entity (e.g., a foreign corporation
which is a nonqualified entity for purposes of § 457A(b)) is a nonqualified
deferred compensation plan subject to taxation under § 457A.
D.

Individual Retirement Accounts

1.
Are non-spousal inherited IRAs exempt from
claims of creditors in bankruptcy? This decision created a conflict among
the circuits. In re Clark, 714 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 4/23/13), aff’d sub. nom. Clark
v. Rameker, 134 S. Ct. 2242 (6/12/14). In an opinion by Judge Easterbrook,
the Seventh Circuit held that an IRA inherited from someone other than the
recipient’s spouse was not exempt from claims of creditors in bankruptcy. The
debtors were a married couple. The wife, Heidi Heffron-Clark, was named as
beneficiary of her mother’s IRA and, following her mother’s death, transferred
the funds to a Beneficiary Individual Retirement Account, commonly known
as an inherited IRA. The debtors subsequently filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition and claimed an exemption for the funds in the inherited IRA under 11
U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(C), which exempts from the claims of creditors “retirement
funds to the extent that those funds are in a fund or account that is exempt from
taxation under” certain Code sections, including § 408. (A similar exemption
with identical language is found in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(12).) Judge Easterbrook
reasoned that the funds in an inherited IRA are not “retirement funds” within
the meaning of the statute: “an inherited IRA is a time-limited tax-deferral
vehicle, but not a place to hold wealth for use after the new owner’s
retirement.” He drew an analogy to the Bankruptcy Code’s homestead
exemption. A person who inherits a parent’s home and rents it out, he
reasoned, could not claim that the home is exempt from the claims of creditors
because it used to be their parent’s home. The Seventh Circuit’s decision
conflicts with several Bankruptcy Court and District Court decisions, as well
as the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re Chilton, 674 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 3/3/12).
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a.
The U.S. Supreme Court says the Seventh
Circuit got it right and the Fifth Circuit got it wrong—funds in an
inherited IRA are not exempt from claims of creditors in bankruptcy.
Clark v. Rameker, 134 S. Ct. 2242 (6/12/14). In the Supreme Court, all
members of the Court joined in an opinion by Justice Sotomayor in which the
Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit and concluded that funds in an inherited
IRA are not “retirement funds” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(b)(3)(C) and therefore are not exempt from claims of creditors in
bankruptcy. The Court stated that three legal characteristics of inherited IRAs
lead to the conclusion that “funds held in such accounts are not objectively set
aside for the purpose of retirement.” These characteristics are: (1) the holder
of an inherited IRA is not permitted to contribute additional funds to the
account; (2) the beneficiary of an inherited IRA is required to withdraw the
funds (either within five years after the year of the owner’s death or through
minimum annual distributions) regardless of how many years the beneficiary
is from retirement; and (3) the holder of an inherited IRA can withdraw funds
from the account at any time and for any purpose without penalty. The Court
also reasoned that its interpretation of the statutory language was “consistent
with the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code’s exemption provisions.” Permitting
the holder of an inherited IRA to exempt the funds from her bankruptcy estate
would “convert the Bankruptcy Code’s purposes of preserving debtors’ ability
to meet their basic needs and ensuring that they have a ‘fresh start,’ . . . into a
‘free pass.’”
 Justice Sotomayor stated, in dictum, with
respect to IRAs received by a decedent’s spouse:
An inherited IRA is a traditional or Roth IRA that has been
inherited
after
its
owner’s
death.
See
§§
408(d)(3)(C)(ii), 408A(a). If the heir is the owner’s spouse, as
is often the case, the spouse has a choice: He or she may “roll
over” the IRA funds into his or her own IRA, or he or she may
keep the IRA as an inherited IRA (subject to the rules
discussed below). See Internal Revenue Service, Publication
590: Individual Retirement Arrangements (IRAs), p. 18 (Jan.
5, 2014). When anyone other than the owner’s spouse inherits
the IRA, he or she may not roll over the funds; the only option
is to hold the IRA as an inherited account.
This statement appears to be contradicted in 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
¶ 522.09 (16th ed., 2010) (Categories of Exempt Property—Federal
Exemptions; § 522(d)), which reads:
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An IRA is treated differently under the Internal Revenue Code
if it is inherited by the owner’s surviving spouse. When a
married owner of an IRA dies, the owner’s surviving spouse
who inherits the account may treat the account as his or her
own account by designating himself or herself as the account
owner or by rolling it over into his or her own IRA account.
Unlike an IRA inherited by a non-spouse, if the surviving
spouse takes either of these actions, he or she cannot withdraw
any funds in the account until age 59½ without paying a
penalty, and must begin withdrawals when he or she reaches
age 70½. An IRA that is held or rolled over in this manner by
a surviving spouse retains the characteristics of retirement
funds within the meaning attributed to that term by the Court
in Clark v. Rameker and should be exempt under sections
522(d)(12) and 522(b)(3)(C). (footnote omitted)
When the married owner of a retirement account dies, the safest course of
action—from the standpoint of possible bankruptcy of the surviving spouse—
is to roll the account over into the surviving spouse’s IRA.
 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY also addresses
the alternative possibility of state bankruptcy law exemptions:
If an inherited IRA is exempt under state law, the debtor may
claim it as exempt in a bankruptcy case if the debtor’s state
has opted out of the federal exemption scheme or if the debtor
elects to use state law exemptions in a non-opt-out state. Some
state exemption statutes either define a covered retirement
fund or plan to include an inherited IRA, or more generally
apply the exemption to any interest in a retirement account
held by a beneficiary. Debtors seeking to exempt an inherited
IRA should consider whether an exemption can be claimed
under state law rather than under sections 522(d)(12) and
522(b)(3)(C). (footnotes omitted)
Id.
2.
The “one rollover per year rule” of § 408(d)(3)(B)
applies to all of a taxpayer’s IRAs, not to each one separately. Bobrow v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-21 (1/28/14). The taxpayers, a married
couple, maintained more than one IRA. During 2008, the husband, a tax
attorney, withdrew $65,064 from his traditional IRA on April 14 and withdrew
the same amount from his rollover IRA on June 6. He deposited $65,064 in
his traditional IRA on June 10 and deposited the same amount in his rollover
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IRA on August 4. The taxpayers took the position that they were eligible to
exclude both distributions from gross income under the 60-day rollover rule
of § 408(d)(3)(A) because the “one rollover per year” rule of § 408(d)(3)(B)
applies separately to each IRA maintained by a taxpayer. The Tax Court
(Judge Nega) held that the once-per-year limitation of § 408(d)(3)(B) “is not
specific to any single IRA maintained by an individual but instead applies to
all IRAs maintained by a taxpayer.” In doing so, the court relied on the plain
language of § 408(d)(3)(B) and its prior holdings in Martin v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1992-331 (6/8/92), aff’d, 987 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1993) and Martin
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-213 (5/12/94). Thus, according to the
court, a taxpayer who maintains multiple IRAs cannot make a tax-free rollover
from each IRA within the one-year period. As a result, the court concluded
that the husband’s June 6 withdrawal from his rollover IRA was includible in
gross income because, during the one-year period ending on that date, he had
made a tax-free rollover of funds (the April 14 withdrawal) from his traditional
IRA. The court also concluded that a withdrawal from the wife’s traditional
IRA was taxable and subject to the 10 percent penalty tax of § 72(t) because
the funds were rolled over one day outside the 60-day limitation period and
the wife was under age 59½.
 The court upheld a 20 percent § 6662(a)
accuracy-related penalty for substantial understatement of income tax. In doing
so, the court stated: “Petitioners cite no authority supporting their position that
the section 408(d)(3)(B) limitation applies separately to each IRA maintained by
a taxpayer and not, as respondent argues and we agree, that the limitation applies
across all IRAs maintained by a taxpayer.” The court did not discuss or cite Prop.
Reg. § 1.408-4(b)(4)(ii) or IRS Publication 590, Individual Retirement
Arrangements (IRAs), both of which provide that the one-rollover-per-year rule
applies separately to each IRA that a taxpayer maintains.
 The court noted that its ruling does not
affect trustee-to-trustee transfers of IRA funds because transferring funds directly
between trustees is not a distribution within the meaning of § 408(d)(3)(A).
a.
The IRS plans to withdraw its guidance
that conflicts with its victory in Bobrow. Announcement 2014-15, 2014-16
I.R.B. 973 (3/20/14). The IRS “anticipates that it will follow the interpretation
of § 408(d)(3)(B) in Bobrow and, accordingly, intends to withdraw the
proposed regulation and revise Publication 590 to the extent needed to follow
that interpretation.” To allow IRA trustees time to make changes in procedures
and IRA disclosure documents, “the IRS will not apply the Bobrow
interpretation of § 408(d)(3)(B) to any rollover that involves an IRA
distribution occurring before January 1, 2015.” The Announcement provides
that the IRS expects to issue a proposed regulation consistent with the Tax
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Court’s interpretation in Bobrow regardless of the ultimate resolution of that
case.
b.
“Taxpayers rely on IRS guidance at their
own peril.” Bobrow v. Commissioner, No. 7022-11 (U.S. Tax Court 4/14/14).
In a subsequent order dated 4/14/14 (available on the Tax Court’s web site),
Judge Nega dismissed the taxpayer’s motion for reconsideration as moot
because the parties had reached a settlement. In the order, Judge Nega
discussed an amicus curiae brief filed in support of the taxpayer’s motion by
the American College of Tax Counsel in which the College argued that the
court should conform its holding to IRS Publication 590 and that proposed
regulations serve as a source of substantial authority that mitigates or negates
an accuracy-related penalty. Judge Nega stated that he was aware of the
position reflected in IRS Publication 590 when he issued his opinion and that,
even if the taxpayers had relied on the publication in their briefs, “such an
argument would not have served as substantial authority for the position taken
on their tax returns.” He added: “taxpayers rely on IRS guidance at their own
peril.”
c.
And the IRS follows through on its plan to
withdraw the proposed regulation that supported the taxpayer’s position
in Bobrow. REG-209459-78, Individual Retirement Plans and Simplified
Employee Pensions; Partial Withdrawal, 79 F.R. 40031 (7/11/14). The
preamble states that “[t]he IRS intends to follow the opinion in Bobrow and,
accordingly, is withdrawing paragraph (b)(4)(ii) of § 1.408–4 of the proposed
regulations and will revise Publication 590.” The preamble confirms that
“[t]his interpretation of the rollover rules under section 408(d)(1)(B) does not
affect the ability of an IRA owner to transfer funds from one IRA trustee or
custodian directly to another, because such a transfer is not a rollover and,
therefore, is not subject to the one-rollover-per-year limitation of section
408(d)(3)(B).” See Rev. Rul. 78–406, 1978–2 C.B. 157.” It also states that,
“[c]onsistent with [Announcement 2014-15], the IRS will not apply the
Bobrow interpretation of section 408(d)(3)(B) to any rollover that involves a
distribution occurring before January 1, 2015.”
d.
Don’t roll me over (except sometimes).
Announcement 2014-32, 2014-48 I.R.B. 907 (11/10/14). The IRS will apply
the Bobrow interpretation of § 408(d)(3)(B) for distributions that occur on or
after January 1, 2015. Thus an individual receiving an IRA distribution on or
after January 1, 2015, cannot roll over any portion of the distribution into an
IRA if the individual has received a distribution from any IRA in the preceding
one-year period that was rolled over into an IRA. Under a transition rule, for
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distributions in 2015 a distribution occurring in 2014 that was rolled over is
disregarded for purposes of determining whether a 2015 distribution can be
rolled over under § 408(d)(3)(A)(i), provided that the 2015 distribution is from
a different IRA that neither made nor received the 2014 distribution. The
Bobrow aggregation rule, which takes into account all distributions and
rollovers among an individual’s IRAs, will apply to distributions from
different IRAs only if each of the distributions occurs after 2014.
 A rollover from a traditional IRA to a Roth
IRA is not subject to the one-rollover-per-year limitation, and such a rollover is
disregarded in applying the one-rollover-per-year limitation to other rollovers.
However, a rollover between an individual’s Roth IRAs would preclude a
separate rollover within the one-year period between the individual’s traditional
IRAs, and vice versa.
 The one-rollover-per-year limitation also
does not apply to a rollover to or from a qualified plan (and such a rollover is
disregarded in applying the one-rollover-per-year limitation to other rollovers),
nor does it apply to trustee-to-trustee transfers. See Rev. Rul. 78-406, 1978-2
C.B. 157.
3.
The “myRA”: President Obama directs Treasury
to create a new type of Roth IRA investment vehicle with a governmentguaranteed rate of return. On 1/29/14, President Obama signed an Executive
Memorandum directing Treasury to set up a new retirement account, called a
“myRA,” which will be offered by employers to employees. Obama Signs
Executive Order Setting Up ‘myRA’ Retirement Accounts, 2014 TAX NOTES
TODAY 20-6 (1/30/14). According to a fact sheet issued by the White House
(FACT SHEET Opportunity for All: Securing a Dignified Retirement for All
Americans, 2014 TAX NOTES TODAY 20-42 (1/29/2014)), the myRA, which
is to be based on the Roth IRA, will offer principal protection backed by the
U.S. government, will be portable, will require initial investments of only $25,
will permit contributions through payroll deductions as low as $5, and will
permit tax-free withdrawal of contributions at any time. The myRA will be
available to low- and middle-income households earning up to $191,000.
Participants will be able to save up to $15,000, or for a maximum duration of
30 years, in their accounts before transferring their balance to a private sector
Roth IRA. The Executive Memorandum directs Treasury to finalize the
development of the myRA by 12/31/14.
4.
The Eighth Circuit, “appalled” at the unfairness
of the government’s position and characterizing a government argument
as “downright silly,” finds a valid partial rollover of IRA funds. Haury v.
Commissioner, 751 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 5/12/14). During 2007, the taxpayer
made several withdrawals from his IRA in order to make loans to two
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corporations in which he held stock. The taxpayer served as a board member
and senior officer of each corporation and licensed to them certain technology
he had developed. The taxpayer withdrew a total of $434,964.38 from his IRA
during 2007 by making five separate withdrawals, including a withdrawal of
$120,000 on February 15. The taxpayer also deposited $120,000 in his IRA on
April 30. The Eighth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Loken, reversed the Tax
Court (Judge Foley) and concluded that the taxable IRA distributions were not
$434,964.38, but rather that amount reduced by the $120,000 the taxpayer
deposited on April 30. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the Tax Court
incorrectly concluded that the $120,000 deposit was a payment into the IRA
that occurred more than sixty days after the $120,000 withdrawal on February
15. The taxpayer made a subsequent withdrawal of $168,000 on April 9, and
the $120,000 deposit on April 30 qualified under § 408(d)(3)(D) as a partial
rollover of the subsequently withdrawn funds. Judge Loken stated that the
court was “appalled at the unfairness of” the government’s contention that the
taxpayer, who had proceeded pro se in the Tax Court, had waived the partial
rollover argument by not raising it below. Judge Loken also found “downright
silly” the government’s argument that the taxpayer had failed to prove that he
had not made another tax-free rollover within the one-year period ending on
April 30 because the government had access to all of the taxpayer’s IRA
transactions during that period and had failed to identify a disqualifying prior
rollover.
5.
Another sad self-directed IRA story. Dabney v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-108 (6/5/14). The taxpayer wanted to
purchase real property in his self-directed IRA at Charles Schwab, but the
trustee would not execute the transaction. To complete the transaction, he
directed the trustee to pay the purchase price out of the IRA and directed the
title company handling the transaction to title the property in the name of “Guy
M. Dabney Charles Schwab & Co. Inc. Cust. IRA Contributory.” Through a
bookkeeping error, the property was titled in the taxpayer’s name. Two years
later he sold the property at a profit and the sales proceeds were wired directly
into his Charles Schwab IRA. He treated the deposit as a rollover contribution,
and Charles Schwab accepted the deposit as such. Contemporaneously with
the sale, the taxpayer discovered that the property was incorrectly titled in his
own name, and he promptly sought and received a scrivener’s affidavit from
the title company in which it admitted fault for the error. The Tax Court (Judge
Vasquez) upheld the IRS’s determination that the 2009 distribution was a
taxable (premature, because the taxpayer was not 59½) withdrawal. The
taxpayer could not be treated as purchasing the property on behalf of the IRA
because Charles Schwab did not permit its IRAs to hold real property. The
withdrawal also was not a trustee-to-trustee transfer and was not rolled-over
within 60 days. “The flaw was not in Mr. Dabney’s intent but in his execution.
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Had Mr. Dabney initiated a rollover or a trustee-to-trustee transfer of funds
from his Charles Schwab IRA to a different IRA—one permitted to purchase
and hold real property—he would have achieved his goal without any
unintended tax consequences.” The court declined to impose accuracy-related
penalties.
6.
Yet another “the tax statute is unconstitutional”
argument falls on deaf ears. Shankar v. Commissioner, 143 T.C. No. 5
(8/26/14). Mr. Shankar and his wife, Ms. Trivedi, filed a joint return, reporting
an AGI of $243,729. Ms. Trivedi participated in an employer sponsored
qualified retirement plan. They claimed an $11,000 deduction for IRA
contributions, which the IRS disallowed under § 219(g) because the taxpayers’
combined AGI was in excess of the phase-out ceiling for IRA contributions
for both the participant in a qualified retirement plan and the spouse of the
participant in a qualified retirement plan. The taxpayers argued that § 219(g)
is unconstitutional because it discriminates against self-employed individuals
who contribute to IRAs by imposing restrictions on IRA contribution
deductions that do not apply to tax benefits afforded to participants in other
types of retirement plans. It was unclear whether the taxpayers were arguing
that § 219(g) is unconstitutional because it discriminates against Ms. Trivedi,
Mr. Shankar, or both. The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) held that if the argument
was that § 219(g) discriminated against Ms. Trivedi, an active participant in a
qualified retirement plan, that exact argument was rejected in Guest v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. 768 (1979). Guest held that, “because the classification
in section 219(b)(2) that differentiated between active participants in
retirement plans and nonparticipants in retirement plans did not involve a
fundamental right or a suspect category, it was constitutional if the
classification had a reasonable basis,” and an examination of the legislative
history revealed a reasonable basis for the classification. If the argument was
that § 219(g) discriminated against Mr. Shankar, the spouse of an active
participant in a qualified retirement plan, which was not directly addressed in
Guest, the framework for the analysis was the same. The classification was
reasonable because “[w]hether the individual or the spouse (or each) is an
active participant, the economic family unit has the ability to save in a taxfavored manner as much as Congress thinks proper through active
participation in an employer-sponsored plan (or plans) and to the extent IRA
contribution deductions are allowed.”
7.
“♬♪Roll me over . . . And do it again.♬♪” Or not!
Bohner v. Commissioner, 143 T.C. No. 11 (9/23/14). The taxpayer, a retired
federal employee who participated in the Civil Service Retirement System
(CSRS), was informed by the CSRS that he could increase his CSRS
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retirement annuity by paying an additional amount into the CSRS. He paid the
amount on April 27, 2010. To make this contribution, he withdrew funds from
his bank account and borrowed additional funds. He repaid the loan and
restored the balance of his bank account by making withdrawals from his
traditional IRA. He received a distribution of $5,000 on April 15, 2010, and a
distribution of $12,832 on May 3, 2010. The taxpayer did not report any of the
amounts he withdrew from his IRA as taxable income, taking the position that
he engaged in a tax-free rollover under § 408(d)(3). The IRS argued that
rollover contributions cannot be made to the CSRS. The Tax Court, in a
reviewed opinion (8-1-6) by Judge Kerrigan, held that because the CSRS did
not accept the taxpayer’s remittance as a rollover, he was required to include
his withdrawals in gross income. The linchpin of the majority’s reasoning
appeared to be that “[t]he statutory provisions governing CSRS do not include
a provision allowing pretax employee contributions.”
 Judge Buch (joined by Judges Holmes,
Halpern, Foley, Gustafson, and Morrison) dissented with respect to the
disallowance of rollover treatment for the $5,000 distribution made on April 15,
2010. The dissent reasoned that nothing in § 408 prohibited treatment of the
additional contribution to the CSRS as a rollover and that statute alone was
controlling. “The statutory scheme places no weight on whether CSRS has a
practice of accepting rollover contributions. Indeed, the statute places no weight
on a plan’s preferences regarding accepting rollovers when determining the
taxability of a rollover distribution.” The dissenting opinion added that the
second distribution “may fail to qualify as a rollover for reasons not addressed
here.”
 Judge Halpern (joined by Judges Holmes
and Buch) dissented from the reasoning, but would have reached the same result
with respect to the $12,832 distribution received on May 3, 2010. Judge Halpern
reasoned that a distribution cannot be rolled over before it is received.
V.

PERSONAL INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A.

Rates

1.
Same-sex spouses in valid marriages now get to
share in marriage penalties and marriage bonuses when filing income tax
returns because “the principal purpose and the necessary effect of
[DOMA] are to demean those persons who are in a lawful same-sex
marriage.” United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (6/26/13). The Defense
of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996),
defines “marriage” in any act of Congress, which (of course) includes the
Code, as a legal union “between one man and one woman” as husband and
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wife. DOMA also defines the word “spouse” to mean only a person of the
“opposite sex” who is a husband or wife. This case involved whether the
§ 2056 estate tax marital deduction was allowable with respect to a bequest to
a same-sex spouse whose marriage to the decedent was recognized under local
law. The Supreme Court held that § 3 of DOMA—the provision that limits the
meaning of the word “marriage” to “a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife,” and provides that “the word ‘spouse’ refers only
to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife”—was an
unconstitutional denial of equal protection in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As a result, the § 2056 estate tax marital
deduction was allowable. It follows that, for income tax purposes, same-sex
married couples whose marriages are recognized by local law are eligible to
file a joint return and if they do not file a joint return must file as married filing
separately.
 Whether this result applies to a same sex
married couple that has moved from a state that recognizes same sex marriage to
a state that does not recognize same sex marriage is not entirely clear. The
Windsor Court limited its holding to the definition of marriage in § 3 of DOMA
and did not address § 2, which allows states to refuse to recognize same-sex
marriages from other states. Section 2 was not challenged in Windsor. Some clue
to future guidance might be found in Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60, in which
the IRS ruled that taxpayers who entered into a common-law marriage in a state
that recognized common law marriage would be treated as married for tax
purposes even if they later moved to a state in which a ceremony is required to
initiate the marital relationship.
 Other questions for a future time include
whether same sex spouses can toggle into and out of marriages when they change
residence and whether domestic partnerships in some states that are not called
marriage will be treated as marriage under federal law.
a.
Shakespeare called it “The Merry Wives
of Windsor.” And the IRS interprets Windsor broadly—a same-sex
marriage celebrated under the laws of one state is a federal tax
“marriage” in every state. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201 (8/29/13).
In the wake of United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), the IRS ruled
that the marital status of individuals of the same-sex who are lawfully married
under the laws of a state that recognizes such marriages will be recognized for
all purposes. The ruling held that for Federal tax purposes (1) the terms
“spouse,” “husband and wife,” “husband,” and “wife” include an individual
married to a person of the same sex if the individuals are lawfully married
under state law, and the term “marriage” includes such a marriage between
individuals of the same sex; and (2) a marriage of same-sex individuals that
was validly entered into in a state whose laws authorize the marriage of two

176

Florida Tax Review

[Vol. 17:3

individuals of the same sex will be recognized even if the married couple is
domiciled in a state that does not recognize the validity of same-sex marriages.
However the terms “spouse,” “husband and wife,” “husband,” and “wife” do
not include individuals (whether of the opposite sex or the same sex) who have
entered into a registered domestic partnership, civil union, or other similar
formal relationship recognized under state law that is not denominated as a
marriage under the laws of that state, and the term “marriage” does not include
such formal relationships.
 Taxpayers may file amended returns,
adjusted returns, or claims for credit or refund for any overpayment of tax
resulting from this ruling if the statute of limitations is open. The ruling applies
retroactively with respect to any employee benefit plan or arrangement or any
benefit provided thereunder for purposes of filing original returns, amended
returns, adjusted returns, or claims for credit or refund of an overpayment of tax
concerning employment tax and income tax with respect to employer-provided
health coverage benefits or fringe benefits that were provided by the employer
and are excludable from income under §§ 106, 117(d), 119, 129, or 132 based on
an individual’s marital status.
b.
Correcting overpayments of FICA taxes
and income tax withholding resulting from the Windsor decision and Rev.
Rul. 2013-17 just got a little easier. Notice 2013-61, 2013-44 I.R.B. 432
(9/23/13). In the wake of United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013),
the IRS issued Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201 (8/29/13), in which it
ruled that same-sex couples who are lawfully married under the laws of a state
or foreign jurisdiction will be recognized as married for federal tax purposes.
Rev. Rul. 2013-17 permits taxpayers to file amended returns, adjusted returns,
or claims for credit or refund for any overpayment of tax resulting from the
ruling if the statute of limitations is open. The notice provides guidance for
employers and employees to make claims for refunds or adjustments of
overpayments of FICA taxes and federal income tax withholding with respect
to: (1) health coverage benefits or fringe benefits provided by an employer to
a same-sex spouse that are excludable from income under §§ 106, 117(d), 119,
129, or 132 based on an individual’s marital status; and (2) remuneration for
services performed in the employ of an individual’s spouse that are excepted
from FICA tax under § 3121(b)(3)(B). To correct overpayments of FICA
taxes, employers can use the regular procedures for doing so or special,
simplified administrative procedures provided in the notice for correcting
overpayments made in 2013 or in prior years. If an employer corrects
overpayments of FICA taxes for prior years, the usual requirements apply,
including the filing of Form W-2c, Corrected Wage and Tax Statement.
Employers cannot correct overpayments of withheld income tax after the end
of a calendar year unless the overpayment is attributable to administrative
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error. Accordingly, an employer can use the special administrative procedures
to correct overpayments of income tax withholding only for 2013 and only by
repaying or reimbursing the employee during 2013 for the over-collected
income tax.
c.
Same sex marriage fringe benefits. Notice
2014-1 2014-2 I.R.B. 270 (12/17/13). This notice provides guidance in Q&A
format regarding the application of § 125 cafeteria plans, including health and
dependent care flexible spending arrangements (FSAs), and § 223, relating to
health savings accounts (HSAs), to same-sex spouses following United States
v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), and Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B.
201.
d.
Guidance on the application of Windsor
and Rev. Rul. 2013-17 to qualified plans. Notice 2014-19, 2014-17 I.R.B.
979 (4/4/14). This notice provides guidance in Q&A format on the application
of the decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), and the
holdings of Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, to retirement plans
qualified under § 401(a). This guidance is necessary because there are many
special rules in the Code that apply to married participants in qualified
retirement plans, such as the requirement of § 401(a)(11) that certain qualified
retirement plans must provide a qualified joint and survivor annuity upon
retirement to married participants. The notice addresses whether, when, and
for what periods plans must be amended to reflect the outcome of the Windsor
decision and the guidance in Rev. Rul. 2013-17. The notice provides that
“[t]he deadline to adopt a plan amendment pursuant to this notice is the later
of (i) the otherwise applicable deadline under section 5.05 of Rev. Proc. 200744, or its successor, or (ii) December 31, 2014.”
e.
Section 401(k) and 401(m) safe harbor
plans can make mid-year amendments pursuant to Notice 2014-19 to
reflect Windsor and Rev. Rul. 2013-17. Notice 2014-37, 2014-24 I.R.B. 1100
(5/15/14). This notice resolves uncertainty concerning whether mid-year plan
amendments are permitted to § 401(k) and § 401(m) safe harbor plans by
specifying that sponsors of such plans can adopt mid-year amendments
pursuant to Notice 2014-19 to reflect the decision in United States v. Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), and the holdings of Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B.
201.
2.
And the IRS starts administering national health
care. T.D. 9632, Shared Responsibility Payment for Not Maintaining
Minimum Essential Coverage, 78 F.R. 53646 (8/30/13). The IRS and Treasury
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have promulgated Reg. §§ 1.5000A-0 through 1.5000A-5 providing
comprehensive guidance regarding the requirement to maintain minimum
essential coverage under § 5000A, which was enacted by the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act of 2010, as amended by the TRICARE Affirmation Act and Public Law
111–173. The regulations provide guidance to individual taxpayers on their
liability under § 5000A for the shared responsibility payment for not
maintaining minimum essential coverage. The T.D. largely finalizes the rules
in REG–148500–12, 78 F.R. 7314 (2/1/13). The regulations were effective on
8/30/13.
a. The IRS provides relief from the individual
mandate penalty for months in 2014 in which individuals have certain
limited-benefit health coverage available under Medicaid or to members
of the uniformed services. Notice 2014-10, 2014-9 I.R.B. 605 (2/24/14). The
final and proposed regulations regarding the requirement to maintain
minimum essential coverage under § 5000A specify that certain governmentsponsored, limited-benefit coverage available under Medicaid or to members
of the uniformed services is not minimum essential coverage. T.D. 9632,
Shared Responsibility Payment for Not Maintaining Minimum Essential
Coverage, 78 F.R. 53646 (8/30/13); REG-141036-13, Minimum Essential
Coverage and Other Rules Regarding the Shared Responsibility Payment for
Individuals, 79 F.R. 43021 (1/27/14) (subsequently finalized in T.D. 9705,
Minimum Essential Coverage and Other Rules Regarding the Shared
Responsibility Payment for Individuals, 79 F.R. 70464 (11/26/14)). The notice
announces that the penalty imposed by § 5000A on individuals who do not
maintain minimum essential coverage and do not qualify for an exemption
does not apply for months in 2014 when the individual has one of the types of
government-sponsored, limited benefit coverage identified in the final and
proposed regulations.
b. Final regulations provide guidance on issues
related to the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate. T.D. 9705,
Minimum Essential Coverage and Other Rules Regarding the Shared
Responsibility Payment for Individuals, 79 F.R. 70464 (11/26/14). The
Treasury and IRS have finalized proposed regulations that provide guidance
on issues related to the requirement of § 5000A that individuals maintain
minimum essential coverage (REG-141036-13, Minimum Essential Coverage
and Other Rules Regarding the Shared Responsibility Payment for
Individuals, 79 F.R. 4302 (1/27/14)). Under § 5000A, individuals who do not
maintain minimum essential coverage and do not qualify for an exemption are
subject to a penalty beginning in 2014. The Treasury Department and the IRS
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previously issued final regulations that (1) provide that coverage under the
Medicaid program is minimum essential coverage except for certain Medicaid
coverage that may provide limited benefits, and (2) state in the preamble that
future regulations may identify other government-sponsored programs that are
not minimum essential coverage. T.D. 9632, Shared Responsibility Payment
for Not Maintaining Minimum Essential Coverage, 78 F.R. 53646 (8/30/13).
 These final regulations address the
government-sponsored programs mentioned in the preamble to T.D. 9632 and
make clear that they do not provide minimum essential coverage. These are the
following government-sponsored programs that do not provide coverage for
comprehensive medical care: (1) experimental, pilot, or demonstration projects
that promote the objectives of the Medicaid program and are authorized under
§ 1115(a) of the Social Security Act; (2) programs adopted by some states to offer
benefits to the medically needy that are more limited than the benefits generally
provided to Medicaid beneficiaries; (3) care available only on a space-available
basis in a facility of the uniformed services; and (4) coverage provided for
individuals who are not on active duty and are entitled only to episodic care for
an injury, illness, or disease incurred or aggravated in the line of duty. The
preamble to the final regulations notes that the Secretary of Health and Human
Services may recognize certain coverage under a section 1115 demonstration
project or Medicaid coverage for medically needy individuals as minimum
essential coverage. The Department of Health and Human Services has issued
guidance on the considerations it intends to apply in recognizing these coverages
as minimum essential coverage. HHS Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, Minimum Essential Coverage (SHO #14–002) (Nov. 7, 2014)
(available at www.medicaid.gov/federal-policyguidance/downloads/sho-14002.pdf).
 The final regulations provide guidance on
the exemption for individuals who have no affordable coverage by specifying
how employer contributions to a § 125 cafeteria plan or a health reimbursement
arrangement and reductions in an employee’s premium pursuant to wellness
program incentives are taken into account in determining an employee’s required
contribution.
 The final regulations clarify the
calculation of the penalty for failing to maintain minimum essential coverage and
provide guidance on an individual’s ability to claim a hardship exemption
without obtaining a hardship exemption certification. Unlike the proposed
regulations, the final regulations do not identify specific hardship circumstances
that an individual can claim without a hardship exemption certification. Instead,
the final regulations provide that a taxpayer can claim a hardship exemption on a
federal income tax return without obtaining an exemption certification for any
month that includes a day on which the taxpayer satisfies the requirements of a
hardship for which the Department of Health and Human Services, the Treasury
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Department, and the IRS issue published guidance.
 The final regulations were effective on 11/26/14
and apply for months beginning after 12/31/13.
c. Guidance on the hardship exemptions an
individual can claim without obtaining a hardship exemption
certification. Notice 2014-76, 2014-50 I.R.B. 946 (11/21/14). This notice
provides a comprehensive list of hardship exemptions from the individual
shared responsibility payment that a taxpayer can claim on a federal tax return
without obtaining a hardship exemption certification from the Health
Insurance Marketplace. One of the specified exemptions is for months in 2014
prior to the effective date of an individual’s coverage if the individual enrolled
in a plan through an exchange during the open enrollment period for 2014. The
notice applies to tax years beginning after 12/31/14.
B.

Miscellaneous Income

1.
Atheists unite! Freedom From Religion Foundation,
Inc. v. Lew, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (W.D. Wisc. 11/21/13). The District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin (Judge Crabb) held that § 107(a)(2),
which excludes from gross income a minister’s “rental allowance paid to him
as part of his compensation,” violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. The court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the
constitutionality of § 107(a)(1), which excludes the rental value of a parsonage
provided in kind.
a.
The Seventh Circuit disappoints the
atheists. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Lew, 114 A.F.T.R.2d
2014-6570 (7th Cir. 11/13/14). In an opinion by Judge Flaum, the Seventh
Circuit reversed and vacated the District Court’s judgment on the basis that
the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge § 107(a)(2).
A person suffers no judicially cognizable injury merely
because others receive a tax benefit that is conditioned on
allegedly unconstitutional criteria, even if that person is
otherwise ‘similarly situated’ to those who do receive the
benefit. Only a person that has been denied such a benefit can
be deemed to have suffered a cognizable injury. The plaintiffs
here have never been denied the parsonage exemption
because they have never requested it; therefore, they have
suffered no injury.
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2.
National Mortgage Settlement payments to
homeowners who got screwed by their lender might or might not be
taxable. Rev. Rul. 2014-2, 2014-2 I.R.B. 255 (12/18/13). This revenue ruling
deals with the tax treatment of payments received by homeowners under the
National Mortgage Settlement (NMS) between the government and bank
mortgage servicers regarding mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure abuses.
It addresses several different situations. First, a taxpayer who receives an NMS
payment as a result of foreclosure on the taxpayer’s principal residence must
include the payment in the amount realized on the foreclosure, but the taxpayer
may exclude any resulting gain from gross income to the extent allowed under
§ 121. Second, if the property contained one or more additional dwelling units
that were not used as the taxpayer’s principal residence, the entire NMS
payment is allocable to the portion of the property that the taxpayer used as a
principal residence. Third, a taxpayer who receives any portion of a deceased
borrower’s NMS payment stands in the shoes of the borrower to determine the
taxable portion, if any, of the NMS payment. Any taxable amount is income
in respect of a decedent (IRD) under § 691(a).
3.
The IRS provides guidance on benefits provided
by Indian tribal governments that are excludable from gross income
under the general welfare exclusion. Rev. Proc. 2014-35, 2014-26 I.R.B.
1110 (6/3/14). Under the general welfare exclusion, certain payments made to,
or on behalf of, individuals by governmental units under governmentally
provided social benefit programs for the promotion of the general welfare are
excluded from gross income. This revenue procedure, which is a revised
version of the revenue procedure proposed in Notice 2012-75, 2012-51 I.R.B.
715 (12/5/12), provides guidance on benefits provided by Indian tribal
governments to tribal members and qualified nonmembers that are excludable
under the general welfare exclusion. These include certain benefits provided
under housing, educational, and elder or disabled programs, as well as certain
benefits that otherwise might be regarded as compensation for services, such
as benefits provided to religious or spiritual officials or leaders to recognize
their participation in cultural, religious, and social events. If the requirements
of the revenue procedure are met, the IRS will not assert that members of an
Indian tribe or qualified nonmembers must include the value of the applicable
benefits in gross income or that the benefits are subject to the information
reporting requirements of § 6041. The revenue procedure is effective for
benefits provided after 12/5/12.
4.
Airline tickets from your bank are treated just like
toasters were treated in the good old days. Shankar v. Commissioner, 143
T.C. No. 5 (8/26/14). The taxpayer banked at Citibank, which reported on a
2009 Form 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income, “Other income” of $668,
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which resulted from him redeeming 50,000 “thank you points,” issued to him
by Citibank by virtue of the customer relationship, to purchase an airline ticket
for travel. The taxpayer did not report the income, and the IRS asserted a
deficiency. (For the bigger dollar issue in the case, which got the case to the
Tax Court, see Part IV.D.) At trial, the IRS introduced evidence showing that
the Form 1099-MISC properly and accurately reported the income shown
thereon. The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) upheld the deficiency. “[T]he omitted
income was a noncash award for opening a bank account. . . . [It was] a
premium for making a deposit into, or maintaining a balance in, a bank
account. In other words, something given in exchange for the use (deposit) of
Mr. Shankar’s money; i.e., something in the nature of interest.” As such, it was
includable in gross income.
 Compare Rev. Proc. 2000-30, 2000-2 C.B.
113, which provides that a bank depositor who receives a de minimis premium
for opening a new account is not required to include the value of the premium in
gross income. For this purpose, a “de minimis premium” is a non-cash
inducement, provided by a financial institution to a depositor opening or adding
to an account, which does not have a cost to the institution in excess of $10 (for
a deposit of less than $5,000) or $20 (for a deposit of $5,000 or more).
 Employees who are awarded or redeem
for personal use frequent flyer miles earned on business travel for their employers
could, in theory, be required to include the value they receive in gross income,
but the IRS has adopted a policy not to pursue this issue. In Announcement 200218, 2002-1 C.B. 621, the IRS stated:
Consistent with prior practice, the IRS will not assert that any
taxpayer has understated his federal tax liability by reason of
the receipt or personal use of frequent flyer miles or other inkind promotional benefits attributable to the taxpayer’s
business or official travel. Any future guidance on the
taxability of these benefits will be applied prospectively.
This relief does not apply to travel or other promotional
benefits that are converted to cash, to compensation that is
paid in the form of travel or other promotional benefits, or in
other circumstances where these benefits are used for tax
avoidance purposes.
5.
When disappointed tax shelter investors win big
against their incompetent tax advisors, they also win against the IRS.
Cosentino v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-186 (9/11/14). The taxpayers
invested in a tax shelter scheme to shelter gains on the sale of real estate, and
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filed tax returns claiming the losses purportedly generated by the tax shelter
scheme. After they discovered that the tax shelter scheme was an abusive tax
shelter, they filed amended returns and paid a deficiency, interest, and
penalties. Subsequently, the taxpayers recovered $375,000 in settlement of a
suit against their tax advisors that alleged the advisors were negligent and
breached their fiduciary duties to the taxpayers by advising them to use what
after the fact was discovered to be an abusive tax shelter. The complaint
alleged damages totaling $640,749.80: (1) advisor fees of $45,000; (2) costs
and losses incurred in connection with executing the transaction of $9,151;
(3) federal and state income taxes paid (including lost opportunity to use
legitimate tax deferral methods under § 1031) in the total amount of $456,930;
(4) interest paid to the IRS of $18,783.59; (5) penalties payable to the IRS of
$89,925; (6) interest payable to the State of Oregon of $12,666.21;
(7) penalties payable to the State of Oregon of $8,294.00; plus (8) certain
interest and penalties yet to be determined. The settlement agreement did not
allocate the $375,000 among the various claimed losses. The taxpayers did not
report the $375,000 as includable in gross income and the IRS asserted a
deficiency. The Tax Court (Judge Chiechi) held that under the principles of
Clark v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 333 (1939), Concord Instruments Corp. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-248, and Rev. Rul. 57-47, 1957-1 C.B. 23,
the recovery was a recovery of capital that was not includable in gross income
except for amounts received for (1) damages claimed in the complaint for
which they were compensated but for which they had claimed deductions that
had been allowed and (2) certain damages that they claimed in the complaint
and for which they were compensated but which they in fact did not incur or
incurred in amounts that were less than the amounts of those damages that they
alleged in the complaint. The court went on to allocate the $375,000 ratably
among the various types of damages alleged in the complaint. Accordingly,
the following amounts were includable: (1) amounts allocable to costs and
losses incurred in connection with executing the transaction, which had been
allowed as a deduction; (2) amounts allocable to Oregon income taxes, for
which a deduction had been allowed; (3) amounts allocable to federal tax
penalties claimed in the complaint to have been paid that were conceded to
have exceeded the penalties actually ultimately paid; and (4) amounts
allocable to Oregon tax penalties claimed in the complaint to have been paid
that ultimately had been waived. The actual amounts were subject to a rule
155 computation.
6.
The Tax Court reasons that there can’t be COD
income without a prior tax benefit. Mylander v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2014-191 (9/17/14). The Tax Court (Judge Vasquez) held that the taxpayer did
not recognize COD income when he was released from a guarantee on which
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the principal obligor had defaulted. The facts were convoluted, but the
reasoning is clear and important.
Petitioners were initially secondary obligors on the
Murray debt, under the terms of the guaranty. They did not
receive any valuable consideration in exchange for the
guaranty. Upon the Ledbetters’ default, and the subsequent
State court judgment and covenant not to execute, petitioners
became primarily liable on the Murray debt. However, at no
point did they receive an untaxed accretion of assets with
respect to the guaranty. Accordingly, we find that, when the
remaining debt was forgiven by Mr. Murray in 2010,
petitioners did not have an accession to wealth and did not
realize any COD income.
(Emphasis added).
With respect to minor issues, the court applied the Cohan rule (Cohan v.
Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930)) to allow some but not all of the
taxpayer’s claimed professional continuing education expenses, but did not
allow a deduction for rental property expenses beyond the documented
expenses.
7.
Hallelujah! The government finally recognizes
that nonpayment of a debt still owed is not necessarily COD income. REG136676-13, Removal of the 36-Month Non-Payment Testing Period Rule, 79
F.R. 61791 (10/15/14). The IRS and Treasury have published proposed
amendments to Reg. § 1.6060P-1 that would eliminate the rule that a deemed
discharge of indebtedness for which a Form 1099-C, “Cancellation of Debt,”
must be filed occurs at the expiration of a 36-month non-payment testing
period. According to the Preamble:
[I]nformation reporting under section 6050P should generally
coincide with the actual discharge of a debt. Because
reporting under the 36-month rule may not reflect a discharge
of indebtedness, a debtor may conclude that the debtor has
taxable income even though the creditor has not discharged
the debt and continues to pursue collection.
8.
This may be one of the only sensible extenders.
TIPA retroactively extended through 12/31/14 the § 108(a)(1)(E) exclusion
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for up to $2 million ($1 million for married individuals filing separately) of
income from the cancellation of qualified principal residence indebtedness.
9.
Compassionate saving. New code § 529A, enacted
by the Achieving a Better Life Experience (ABLE) Act of 2014, provides yet
another tax-favored savings account—the ABLE account. Like 529 accounts
(used to save for college education), ABLE accounts must be established by a
state. Only beneficiaries who became disabled before reaching age 26 are
eligible. An eligible individual is an individual (1) for whom a disability
certification has been filed with the Secretary for the taxable year, or (2) who
is entitled to benefits based on blindness or disability under the Social Security
Disability Insurance program or the SSI program. A disability certification is
a certification to the satisfaction of the IRS made by the eligible individual or
the parent or guardian of the eligible individual, that the individual meets the
requirements relating to disability or blindness that includes a copy of the
individual’s diagnosis relating to the individual’s relevant impairment or
impairments, signed by a licensed physician. For the most part, ABLE
accounts are limited to beneficiaries who are blind or have developmental
disabilities, mental illness, and severe childhood conditions such as cerebral
palsy. The maximum contribution is $14,000 per year (adjusted for inflation
after 2015) in cash, but states could impose maximum limits on total
contributions. A beneficiary may have only one account. Contributions are not
deductible, but the income in the account is accumulated tax-free. A
contribution to an ABLE account is treated as a completed gift of a present
interest to the beneficiary of the account. Thus, the contribution qualifies for
the per-donee annual gift tax exclusion ($14,000 for 2014) and, to the extent
of the exclusion, is exempt from the generation skipping transfer tax.
Withdrawals are tax-free to the extent used for eligible services, including
education; housing; transportation; employment support; health, prevention,
and wellness costs; assistive technology and personal support services; and
other IRS-approved expenses. Distributions used for nonqualified expenses
are includable in income to the extent they represent a distribution of earnings
(generally determined in the manner provided for annuities in § 72) and subject
to a 10 percent penalty. (A distribution from an ABLE account generally is not
subject to gift tax or GST tax.) ABLE accounts can generally be rolled over
only into another ABLE account for the same individual or into an ABLE
account for a sibling who is also an eligible individual. Upon the death of the
beneficiary the balance in the account (after Medicaid reimbursements) is
distributable to the deceased beneficiary’s estate or to a designated
beneficiary; the distribution will be subject to income tax on investment
earnings, but not to a penalty. Generally, account assets are not included in
determining eligibility for SSI or Medicaid. However, SSI payments are
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suspended when an account balance exceeds $100,000, but Medicaid benefits
would continue.
C.

Hobby Losses and § 280A Home Office and Vacation
Homes

1.
Who’d a thunk that when hearing a small case the
Tax Court is a court of equity? Miller v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op.
2014-74 (7/28/14). The taxpayer claimed a home office deduction with respect
to space set aside in a studio apartment. The apartment was “divided” into
three equal sections: (1) an entryway, a bathroom, and a kitchen area; (2) office
space, including a desk, two shelving units, a bookcase, and a sofa; and (3) a
bedroom area including a platform bed and dressers. Only the bathroom was
a separate room. The taxpayer had to pass through the office space to get to
the bedroom area. The taxpayer had no office provided by her employer and
she frequently met with clients in the office space, and performed work for her
employer using a computer on the desk. Although she used the office space
primarily for business purposes, she occasionally used the space for personal
purposes. Notwithstanding that § 280A(c)(1) specifically limits an allowable
home office deduction only with respect to space used “exclusively” for
business, the court (Special Trial Judge Guy) allowed the deduction:
“Although petitioner admitted that she used portions of the office space for
nonbusiness purposes, we find that her personal use of the space was de
minimis and wholly attributable to the practicalities of living in a studio
apartment of such modest dimensions.”
2.
Did they park in the Wal-Mart parking lot?
Jackson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-160 (8/7/14). The taxpayers
owned an RV in which they attended RV rallies and from which they sold RV
insurance policies. The principal issue in the case was whether they could
deduct depreciation and interest with respect to the RV. The Tax Court (Judge
Wherry) found that the RV was used two-thirds for business purposes and onethird for personal purposes, so that unless otherwise barred by § 280A, twothirds of the interest and depreciation would be deductible. Although
§ 280A(c) allows apportionment of expenses for a dwelling unit “exclusively
used” on a regular basis ‘as a place of business which is used by patients,
clients, or customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal
course of his trade or business,’” allocation was not allowed on the facts of
this case because the taxpayers “did not use any portion of their RV
exclusively for business.”
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Section 280A casts a wide net in this regard and sometimes
catches taxpayers, like petitioners, who in addition to their
personal use had genuine business purposes. Thus, while
petitioners’ RV may be “appropriate and helpful” in their
business, they have failed to meet the stringent requirements
of section 280A.
To top it off, § 6662 accuracy related penalties were sustained.
3.
Too much fun and not enough work at the
vacation condo is taxing. Van Malssen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014236 (11/20/14). This case involved the computation of the allocation of
expenses under § 280A(e) between personal use days and rental days with
respect to a condominium that the taxpayer used personally for more than 14
days a year and for the years in question rented for various periods. Several of
the taxpayer’s trips to the condominium each year included both vacation
days—personal use days—and maintenance and repair days—days that are not
personal use days. The primary legal issue (as opposed to factual issue) with
respect to the mixed purpose trips was how to count the travel days on which
the taxpayer arrived and departed. After noting that “[p]roposed regulations
are not binding on this Court and are given no greater weight than a litigation
position, [but that] they can be useful guidelines where, as here, they closely
follow the legislative history of the statutory provision in question,” the court
(Judge Kerrigan) applied the principles of Prop. Reg. § 1.280A-1(e)(6) and
(7), Ex. (3). Prop. Reg. § 1.280A-1(e)(6) provides that “a dwelling unit shall
not be deemed to have been used by the taxpayer for personal purposes on any
day on which the principal purpose of the use of the unit is to perform repair
or maintenance work” and uses a “facts and circumstances” test to determine
the principal purpose of the taxpayer. Prop. Reg. § 1.280A-1(e)(7), Ex. (3)
provides the following example relevant to the case:
A owns a lakeside cottage which A rents during the summer.
A and B, A’s spouse, arrive late Thursday evening after a long
drive to prepare the cottage for the rental season. A and B
prepare dinner but do no work on the unit that evening. A
spends a normal work day working on the unit Friday and
Saturday; B helps for a few hours each day but spends most
of the time relaxing. By Saturday evening, the necessary
maintenance work is complete. Neither A nor B works on the
unit on Sunday; they depart shortly before noon. The principal
purpose of the use of the unit from Thursday evening through
Sunday morning is to perform maintenance work on the unit.
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Consequently, the use during this period will not be
considered personal use by A.
Relying on these provisions in the proposed regulations, the court found that
travel days to and from the condominium were personal use days for any visit
in which the majority of the taxpayer’s days were vacation days, and travel
days to and from the condominium were not personal use days for any visit in
which the majority of the taxpayer’s days were maintenance and repair days.
Trips on which the taxpayer devoted an equal number of days to vacation and
to maintenance and repair were found to be personal use days.
D.

Deductions and Credits for Personal Expenses

1.
Statutory plain language trumps the Tax Court’s
“as if” analysis where the plain language did not produce an absurd
result. Packard v. Commissioner, 746 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 3/27/14), rev’g
139 T.C. 390 (11/5/12). Before the taxpayers were married and began living
in the same residence on 12/1/09, the wife owned a principal residence where
she resided for more than five consecutive years during the eight years before
that date; husband, on the other hand, had no present ownership interest in a
principal residence during the three-year period ending on that date. The Tax
Court (Judge Wells) held that where wife would have qualified for the firsttime homebuyer credit under § 36(c)(6) (“long-time residents of same
principal residence”) and the husband would have qualified for that credit
under § 36(c)(1) (“first-time homebuyer”), the married couple is entitled to the
credit.
 The Eleventh Circuit reversed in a per
curiam opinion, because it found that the plain language of the statute required
that both spouses qualify under either § 36(c)(1) or § 36(c)(6), and the “Tax
Court’s observation that the Packards would have qualified for the tax credit
individually had they not been married ha[d] no bearing on the application of
section 36(c) to the facts of this case.”
2.
The IRS finally gets it Knight.3 T.D. 9664, Section
67 Limitations on Estates or Trusts, 79 F.R. 26616 (5/9/14). The Treasury and
3. Knight v. Commissioner, 552 U.S. 181 (2008), held that § 67 can apply to
limit the deduction by a trust of investment advisor’s fees. The clause of § 67(e)(1),
excepting from the floor costs that would not have been incurred if the property were
not held by a trust or estate, “excepts from the two-percent floor only those costs that
it would be uncommon (or unusual, or unlikely) for such a hypothetical individual to
incur.” At the time the Knight case was decided, Prop. Reg. § 1.67-4 would have
resolved the conflict in the case law that preceded the Knight decision by providing
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IRS have finalized proposed regulations under § 67 (REG-128224-06, Section
67 Limitations on Estates or Trusts, 76 F.R. 55322 (9/7/11)). Reg. § 1.67-4
provides comprehensive rules dealing with the application of the § 67(e) 2percent floor to administration expenses incurred by estates and non-grantor
trusts. In applying the 2-percent floor, the determinative factor is whether the
expense “commonly or customarily would be incurred by a hypothetical
individual owning the same property,” focusing on “the type of product or
service rendered to the estate or non-grantor trust in exchange for the cost,
rather than the description of the cost of that product or service.” Fees for
investment advice are covered by the 2-percent floor, but incremental costs of
investment advice incurred because the advice is rendered to a trust or estate
are not subject to the floor. Bundled fees, i.e., a single stated fee covering all
services, can be allocated by “[a]ny reasonable method.”
3.

The premium tax credit and federally facilitated

exchanges:
a.
“I’m so sorry, it’s the Moops.” Halbig v.
Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 7/22/14), vacated, 114 A.F.T.R.2d 20145868 (9/4/14) (en banc). The D.C. Circuit in an opinion (2-1) by Judge Griffith
held that Reg. § 1.36B-1(k),4 which makes the § 36B premium tax credits
under Obamacare available to qualifying individuals who purchase health
insurance on both state-run and federally-facilitated exchanges, was invalid.
The court concluded that the regulation contradicted the “plain meaning” of
§ 36B(b)(2), which states:
(2) Premium assistance amount. — The premium assistance
amount determined under this subsection with respect to any
coverage month is the amount equal to the lesser of—

that only expenses incurred by estates or non-grantor trusts that are unique to an estate
or trust are not subject to the § 67 two-percent floor. Knight expressly rejected the
government’s argument that § 67(e)(1) properly could be read to limit deductible trust
administration expenses only to those “unique” to a trust.
4. Specifically, the regulations provide that a taxpayer may receive a tax
credit if he “is enrolled in one or more qualified health plans through an Exchange.”
Reg. § 1.36B-2(a)(1). The regulations define an Exchange as “an Exchange serving
the individual market for qualified individuals . . . , regardless of whether the
Exchange is established and operated by a State (including a regional Exchange or
subsidiary Exchange) or by HHS.” 45 C.F.R. § 155.20 (emphasis added); Reg.
§ 1.36B-1(k) (incorporating the definition in 45 C.F.R. § 155.20 by reference).
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(A) the monthly premiums for such month for 1 or more
qualified health plans offered in the individual market within
a State which cover the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse, or
any dependent (as defined in section 152) of the taxpayer and
which were enrolled in through an Exchange established by
the State under 13111 of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act . . .
I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2) (Emphasis added). The majority did not find that the
legislative history of the Act, which is scant, rendered the statutory language
of § 36B(b)(2) ambiguous or indicated a legislative intent to allow credits to
taxpayers who purchased insurance through exchanges established by HHS.
 Judge Edwards vigorously dissented,
characterizing the plaintiff’s action as a “not-so-veiled attempt to gut the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act” and concluding that “[t]he majority opinion
ignores the obvious ambiguity in the statute and claims to rest on plain meaning
where there is none to be found.” His opinion emphasized that “[t]he plainness
or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language
itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context
of the statute as a whole,” quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341
(1997). Applying this standard, considering the ACA as a whole, he applied a
Chevron5 analysis that found the language of § 36B(b)(2) to be ambiguous and
the government’s interpretation of the regulation to be permissible and
reasonable.
 On 9/4/14, the D.C. Circuit granted the
government’s petition for rehearing en banc and vacated the judgment entered on
7/22/14. See http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/
6510F5166505E32985257D49004A7CCA/$file/14-5018-1510560.pdf.
b.
“That’s not Moops, you jerk, it’s Moors.”
King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 7/22/14), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 475
(11/7/14). In a unanimous decision by Judge Gregory (with an additional
concurring opinion by Judge Davis), the Fourth Circuit upheld the validity of
Reg. § 1.36B-1(k), which makes the § 36B premium tax credits under
Obamacare available to qualifying individuals who purchase health insurance
on both state-run and federally-facilitated exchanges. Applying a Chevron
analysis, in step one the Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s “plain language”
argument, instead concluding that:

5. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
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[W]hen conducting statutory analysis, “a reviewing court
should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory
provision in isolation. Rather, [t]he meaning – or ambiguity –
of certain words or phrases may only become evident when
placed in context.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007).
Applying this standard, at step one of the Chevron analysis, “[h]aving
examined the plain language and context of the most relevant statutory
sections, the context and structure of related provisions, and the legislative
history of the Act, [the court was] unable to say definitively that Congress
limited the premium tax credits to individuals living in states with state-run
Exchanges.” Turning to step two of the Chevron analysis, because the court
found that “[t]he relevant statutory sections appear to conflict with one
another, yielding different possible interpretations,” the court decided that “the
statute permits the IRS to decide whether the tax credits would be available on
federal Exchanges,” and that the regulation is a “permissible construction of
the statutory language.”
 Judge Davis, who joined the majority,
wrote a concurring opinion in which he opined that “even if one takes the view
that the Act is not ambiguous . . . the necessary outcome of this case is precisely
the same.” He would have held “that Congress has mandated in the Act that the
IRS provide tax credits to all consumers regardless of whether the Exchange on
which they purchased their health insurance coverage is a creature of the state or
the federal bureaucracy.” He reasoned that a holistic reading of the Act’s text and
proper attention to its structure led to the conclusion that the federally-run
exchanges were in essence state exchanges established by the federal government
on behalf of the states.
c.
The original Moops found friends in high
places to peer all over the Moors. The Supreme Court granted a petition for
a writ of certiorari to the Fourth Circuit in King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th
Cir. 7/22/14), and will consider the issue later this Term. 135 S. Ct. 475
(11/7/14).
4.
The IRS is undeterred by the Halbig decision.
Revenue Procedure 2014-37, 2014-33 I.R.B. 363 (7/25/14). This revenue
procedure provides indexing adjustments for certain provisions under §§ 36B
and 5000A. It updates the Applicable Percentage Table in § 36B(b)(3)(A)(i),
which is used to calculate an individual’s premium tax credit for taxable years
beginning after calendar year 2014. This revenue procedure also updates the
required contribution percentage in § 36B(c)(2)(C)(i)(II), which is used to
determine whether an individual is eligible for affordable employer-sponsored
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minimum essential coverage under § 36B for plan years beginning after
calendar year 2014. Additionally, this revenue procedure cross-references the
required contribution percentage under § 5000A(e)(1)(A) for plan years
beginning after calendar year 2014, as determined under guidance issued by
HHS. This percentage is used to determine whether an individual is eligible
for an exemption from the individual shared responsibility payment because
of a lack of affordable minimum essential coverage.
a.
A bit of credit, a bit of deduction. Will
TurboTax know the answer? Rev. Proc. 2014-41, 2014-33 I.R.B. 364
(7/25/14). Some taxpayers enrolled in a qualified health plan and eligible for
the premium tax credit may also be allowed a deduction under § 162(l). Reg.
§ 1.162(l)-1T provides rules for taxpayers who claim a § 162(l) deduction and
also may be eligible for a § 36B credit for the same qualified health plan or
plans. Under Reg. § 1.162(l)-1T(a)(1), a taxpayer is allowed a § 162(l)
deduction for specified premiums not to exceed an amount equal to the lesser
of (1) the specified premiums less the premium tax credit attributable to the
specified premiums, and (2) the sum of the specified premiums not paid
through advance credit payments and the additional tax imposed under
§ 36B(f)(2)(A) and Reg. § 1.36B-4(a)(1) with respect to the specified
premiums after the application of the limitation on additional tax in
§ 36B(f)(2)(B) and Reg. § 1.36B-4(a)(3). This revenue procedure provides
guidance for taxpayers to use in computing the § 162(l) deduction for health
insurance costs for self-employed individuals and the premium tax credit
allowed under § 36B. The method in the revenue procedure is optional.
5.
Every child deserves individual attention.
Lahmeyer v. United States, 114 A.F.T.R.2d 2014-5487 (S.D. Fla. 7/25/14).
The taxpayer claimed an adoption credit (provided in § 23 for the year in issue,
now in § 32) for adopting a child with “special needs.” The adoption credit for
a child with “special needs” is more generous than the general adoption credit.
The IRS disallowed the special needs credit. The statute provides that:
The term “child with special needs” means any child if—
(A) a State has determined that the child
cannot or should not be returned to the home
of his parents,
(B) such State has determined that there
exists with respect to the child a specific
factor or condition (such as his ethnic
background, age, or membership in a
minority or sibling group, or the presence of
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factors such as medical conditions or
physical, mental, or emotional handicaps)
because of which it is reasonable to conclude
that such child cannot be placed with
adoptive parents without providing adoption
assistance, and
(C) such child is a citizen or resident of the
United States (as defined in section
217(h)(3)).
(Emphasis added.) The question was what the word “determined” means.
Florida law provides a “special needs child” includes a “child who . . . is not
likely to be adopted because he or she is . . . [o]f black or racially mixed
parentage.” Fla. Stat. § 409.166(2)(a). The child the taxpayers adopted had
racially mixed parentage, and the taxpayers argued that a state determination
had been made by virtue of the Florida statute. The government argued that
notwithstanding the Florida statute, the fact that a child was of racially mixed
parentage, standing alone, was insufficient because the plain language of the
governing Code provision “requires not just a state determination that a
particular trait exists, but that due to that trait the child could not have been
placed with adoptive parents without a financial incentive to do so, i.e.,
‘adoption assistance.’” The District Court (Judge Altonaga) held for the
government, reasoning that “the only logical understanding of ‘determined’
implies an individualized decision about a specific child, because the statute
provides no other criteria by which it could be said a child cannot or should
not be returned to his or her parents’ home,” and no such specific
determination with respect to the child had been made by the State of Florida.
6.
Failure to file personal income tax returns is not a
business activity. Hall v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-171 (8/21/14).
Mr. Hall operated an ophthalmology practice through an S corporation; Mrs.
Hall had a legal practice as a sole proprietor; they also owned rental real estate.
Mr. and Mrs. Hall were convicted for willful failure to file tax returns. They
deducted the legal fees for their representation in the criminal case on Mrs.
Hall’s 2006 schedule C; they also deducted on her 2006 schedule C the fees
paid to a forensic accountant to determine their correct tax liabilities for the
years they failed to file a return. The IRS disallowed the deduction on schedule
C, allowing it only as a miscellaneous itemized deduction on Schedule A. The
Tax Court (Judge Ruwe) sustained the IRS’s position that the fees were
deductible only as itemized deductions. The payment arose from the Halls’
failure to file tax returns. They did not arise in connection with business
activities.
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7.
Generosity to one’s brother doesn’t reap a tax
deduction. Puentes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-224 (10/27/14). The
taxpayer lived in a house owned by her brother and made the mortgage
payments due while her brother was unemployed and she was living in the
house. She claimed deductions for the real estate taxes and mortgage interest.
The IRS disallowed the deductions and the Tax Court (Judge Lauber) upheld
the disallowance. The taxpayer was neither the legal nor the equitable owner
of the house and thus was not entitled to deduct the interest as “qualified
residence interest.” The mere fact that she paid the mortgage, home insurance,
and property taxes during the year in question alone was not sufficient to make
her an equitable owner of the property. (Note that the fact that she was not
legally obligated to pay the mortgage was not determinative because in
California, where the case arose, mortgages on a primary residence—her
brother’s home with respect to which he was the mortgagor—are nonrecourse.
Reg. § 1.163-1(b) provides that a taxpayer may deduct “[i]nterest paid by the
taxpayer on a mortgage upon real estate of which he is the legal or equitable
owner, even though the taxpayer is not directly liable upon the bond or note
secured by such mortgage.”)
8.
Standard deduction for 2015. Rev. Proc. 2014-61,
2014-47 I.R.B. 860 (10/30/14). The standard deduction for 2015 will be
$12,600 for joint returns and surviving spouses, $6,300 for unmarried
individuals, $6,300 for married individuals filing separately, and $9,250 for
heads of households.
9.
Home mortgage interest is deductible only if you
actually pay it. Copeland v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-226
(10/30/14). In connection with a modification of a mortgage loan on the
taxpayers’ principal residence, for the years in question they paid
approximately $9,000 of home mortgage interest and approximately $30,000
of past-due home mortgage interest was deferred and capitalized into the
principal amount. Although the statutory language of § 163(h)(3) allows a
deduction for qualified residence interest that is “paid or accrued” during the
taxable year, the Tax Court (Judge Lauber) upheld the denial of a deduction
for the accrued but unpaid interest, because the taxpayer was an individual on
the cash method—which is the method applicable to all individuals with
respect to personal expenses. Under well-established precedents, a cash
method taxpayer may deduct in any taxable year only interest actually paid
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during that taxable year. The accrued but unpaid qualified residence interest is
not deductible until actually paid.
 Accord Smoker v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2013-56 (2/21/13).
10.
This one’s really only for taxpayers in Texas and
Florida and a few other states that don’t have a state income tax. TIPA
retroactively extended through 12/31/14 the § 164(b)(5)(I) election to claim
an itemized deduction for state and local general sales and use taxes instead of
state and local income taxes.
11.
Of course there’s no chance the mortgage
insurance companies will increase their premiums to capture the benefit
of this deduction to the involuntary purchaser. TIPA retroactively extended
through 12/31/14 the § 163(h)(3)(E) deduction (subject to the pre-existing
limitations) for mortgage insurance premiums in connection with acquisition
indebtedness with respect to the taxpayer’s qualified residence.
12.
Why not just increase, rather than decrease, Pell
grants? TIPA retroactively extended through 12/31/14 the § 222 above-theline deduction for certain eligible individuals of a limited amount of qualified
higher education tuition and related expenses of the taxpayer, his spouse, or
dependents.
E.

Divorce Tax Issues

1.
If an ex-spouse disobeys a court order to sign
Form 8332, the noncustodial spouse still loses. What’s a guy gotta do?
Armstrong v. Commissioner, 139 T.C. 468 (12/19/12). The taxpayer and his
wife divorced, and his ex-wife had custody of their son. A state court order
provided that the taxpayer would be entitled to the dependency exemption and
explicitly required his ex-wife to execute in his favor a Form 8332, “Release
of Claim to Exemption for Child of Divorced or Separated Parents” provided
that the taxpayer met child support obligations. The taxpayer met his child
support obligations, but his ex-wife failed to provide the executed Form 8332.
The IRS disallowed the taxpayer’s claimed dependency exemption, even
though he appended to his tax return the court order and provided the IRS
evidence that he had met his support obligations. In a reviewed opinion (12-3)
by Judge Gustafson, the Tax Court upheld the denial of the exemption. The
state court order, even though countersigned by the taxpayer’s ex-wife, was
not a substitute for a Form 8332 because it failed to unconditionally declare
that the ex-wife “will not claim such child as a dependent” for the year at issue.
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That defect is not cured by the noncustodial parent’s proof that he has fulfilled
support conditions beyond those in the statute. Likewise, the child credit was
disallowed.
 Judge Holmes wrote a very, very lengthy
dissent, in which Judges Halpern and Vasquez joined. The essence of the dissent
was that the statutory requirement to “attach” the waiver to the tax return properly
requires only that it be “associated with” or “connected to by attribution” to the
return. Thus, all relevant documents should be considered to be “attached” to a
taxpayer’s return, without regard to the point in time those documents are
provided to the IRS.
a.
And the Eighth Circuit believes that the
majority got it right. Armstrong v. Commissioner, 745 F.3d. 890 (8th Cir.
3/13/14). In an opinion by Judge Loken, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court’s decision without even mentioning the dissenting opinion in the Tax
Court.
The documents submitted by the taxpayers merely told the
IRS that the custodial parents might not claim the exemptions
... in any particular tax year, not that they will not claim the
exemptions. . . . We sympathize with noncustodial parents
who are entitled to receive documents necessary to support
their claims for federal dependency exemptions and child tax
credits and their former spouses violate contractual or courtordered obligations to provide those documents. But
Congress in the 1984 amendment to § 152(e)(2) precluded
attempts to remedy such wrongs in federal income tax
proceedings.
 The opinion did note, however, that “if a
violation of a state court order wrongly deprives the intended beneficiary of a
federal tax advantage, the state court unquestionably retains authority to remedy
that violation.”
2.
Even before Form 8332 was required, state court
orders conditioning the surrender of dependency exemptions on meeting
child support obligations didn’t work. Swint v. Commissioner, 142 T.C. 131
(2/24/14). The Tax Court (Judge Ruwe) held that an agreed-entry state court
order awarding a noncustodial parent the dependency exemption on the
condition that he was current with his child support obligations was
insufficient to permit him to claim the dependency exemption (and child
credit) in a year before Form 8332 was required. Although a court order or
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decree or a separation agreement entered prior to July 2, 2008, can be a written
declaration if it satisfies certain requirements, the order in this case failed to
meet those requirements. The plain language of § 152(e)(2)(A) provides that
the noncustodial parent can claim the dependency exemption only if “the
custodial parent signs a written declaration (in such manner and form as the
Secretary may by regulations prescribe) that such custodial parent will not
claim such child as a dependent for any taxable year beginning in such
calendar year.” The taxpayer’s claim failed on two grounds: First, the custodial
parent did not sign “a written declaration” because the agreed entry was not
signed by her. Second, the language “will not claim” in § 152(e)(2)(A) is
unconditional. “As a result, in order for a written declaration to comply with
section 152(e)(2)(A) the declaration by the custodial parent that he or she ‘will
not claim such child as a dependent’ must also be unconditional.” A
conditional declaration cannot comply with § 152(e)(2)(A).
F.

Education
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2014.
G.

Alternative Minimum Tax
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2014.
VI.

CORPORATIONS
A.

Entity and Formation
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2014.
B.

Distributions and Redemptions

1.
If the IRS continues to choose cases with bad facts
to litigate the issue of whether it’s corporate or personal goodwill, the
IRS’s batting average on this issue will start to look like the taxpayers’
batting average in tax shelter cases. Bross Trucking, Inc. v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2014-107 (6/5/14). For many years, Mr. Bross had owned and
operated Bross Trucking, Inc., using leased vehicles. Bross Trucking’’s
principal customers were three businesses owned by other Bross family
members. Bross Trucking did not have any formal written service agreements
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with its customers, relying instead on Mr. Bross’s close personal relationships
with the owners of the customer businesses. Due to violations of state
regulatory law, Bross Trucking was in danger of losing its hauling authority.
As a result, Bross’s sons—who were owners of Bross Trucking’s customers—
formed a new trucking company, LWK Trucking, 98.2 percent of which was
owned by Bross’s sons’ self-directed IRAs and the remainder of which was
owned by an unrelated third party. Mr. Bross was not involved in managing
LWK Trucking. LWK Trucking hired several Bross Trucking employees and
leased trucks that formerly had been leased to Bross Trucking. Until the
vehicles were repainted (or magnetic signs installed) they bore the Bross
Trucking logo. The IRS asserted that Bross Trucking had distributed “its
operations,” including “(1) goodwill; (2) established revenue stream;
(3) developed customer base; (4) transparency of the continuing operations
between the entities; (5) established workforce including independent
contractors; and (6) continuing supplier relationships,” all of which the court
collectively described as “goodwill” to Mr. Bross, triggering gain to the
corporation (which did not liquidate until several years later) under § 311(b),
and that Mr. Bross in turn had made a taxable gift of that goodwill to his sons.
The Tax Court (Judge Paris), based on analogizing the facts in the instant case
to the differences in the facts and results in Martin Ice Cream Co. v.
Commissioner, 110 T.C. 189 (1998), and Solomon v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2008-102, concluded that except for workforce in place, Bross
Trucking had no goodwill at the time of the “alleged transfer.” Although it
“might have had elements of corporate goodwill at some point . . . through
various regulatory infractions Bross Trucking lost any corporate goodwill
because of an impending suspension and the negative attention brought by the
Bross Trucking name.” Judge Paris went on to find that: “The remaining
attributes assigned to Bross Trucking’s goodwill all stem from Mr. Bross’s
personal relationships. Bross Trucking’s established revenue stream, its
developed customer base, and the transparency of the continuing operations
were all spawned from Mr. Bross’s work in the road construction industry.”
A company does not have any corporate goodwill when all of
the goodwill is attributable solely to the personal ability of an
employee. See MacDonald v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 720, 727
(1944); Norwalk v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-279.
Unlike the taxpayer’s products in Solomon v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2008-102, Bross Trucking’s products did not
contribute to developing the goodwill.
Furthermore, “Mr. Bross did not transfer any goodwill to Bross Trucking
through an employment contract or a noncompete agreement.” No other Bross
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Trucking intangible assets were transferred because Bross Trucking’s prior
customers became LWK’s customers and no longer wanted to deal with Bross
Trucking due to its regulatory problems, and “LWK Trucking did not benefit
from any of Bross Trucking’s assets or relationships. LWK Trucking was
independently licensed and developed a wholly new trucking company.”
a.
♫The last time I saw [an opinion by Judge]
Paris♫, it also upheld the validity of Martin Ice Cream. Estate of Adell v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-155 (8/4/14). Decedent incorporated
STN.Com in 1999 as a C corporation and was STN.Com’s sole shareholder
until he transferred the stock to a trust; however, the value of the stock was
includible in his gross estate. His son, Kevin, served as STN.Com’s president,
but he never had an employment agreement or a noncompete agreement with
STN.Com. Kevin had approached several prominent religious leaders to
utilize the services of The Word, a nonprofit entity, to arrange all programming
content; he also arranged for DirecTV to extract the programs from the satellite
and broadcast them nationally. STN.Com’s sole business purpose was to
provide “uplinking” services in order to broadcast an urban religious program
channel that Kevin named “The Word Network.” The Word paid STN.Com at
least ninety-five percent of its net programming revenue for its management,
technical, and legal services in connection with uplinking services. In finding
that the value of STN.Com did not include Kevin’s personal goodwill, Judge
Paris stated:
Goodwill is often defined as the expectation of continued
patronage by existing customers. Network Morning Ledger
Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 572-573, 113 S. Ct. 1670,
123 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1993). A key employee may personally
create and own goodwill independent of the corporate
employer by developing client relationships. Martin Ice
Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 189, 207-208 (1998).
The corporation may benefit from using the personally
developed goodwill while the key employee works for the
entity, but the corporation does not own the goodwill and
therefore it is not considered a corporate asset. Id. at 208. The
employee may, however, transfer any personal goodwill to
the employer through a covenant not to compete or other
agreement that transfers the relationships to the employer. See
id. at 207; H&M, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012290. Absent such an agreement, the employer cannot freely
use the asset and the value of the goodwill should not be
attributed to the corporation.
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Kevin’s goodwill was personally owned independent of
STN.Com. STN.Com’s success was heavily dependent on
The Word because of their symbiotic relationship. To launch
The Word, it was Kevin who contacted religious leaders in
the Detroit area and Rev. Jackson in Chicago. Along with his
notable contacts and his father, he went to Los Angeles to
meet with DirecTV representatives about broadcasting The
Word. His meeting was successful and it eventually led to the
national broadcasting of The Word on cable television. Kevin
was the face of the operation because he was the individual
soliciting content and pursuing broadcast opportunities.
Kevin’s personal goodwill was further displayed when
ministers chose to contribute to The Word after learning that
The Word was a nonprofit organization. When contributing
ministers asked about ownership opportunities, Kevin
responded that The Word was a nonprofit organization and
could not be sold. It appeared to the contributing ministers
that there was not a corporation employing Kevin. The
ministers conducted business with Kevin because they trusted
him personally, not because he was a representative or
employee of STN.Com. In other words, STN.Com could not
own Kevin’s goodwill because the customers did not readily
realize that Kevin actually worked for STN.Com. Thus, he
cultivated personal goodwill with these professionals and he
independently owned the asset of personal goodwill, not
STN.Com.
Although Mr. Adell was a board member and officer of
both STN.Com and The Word, Kevin operated both
companies. Kevin had the education and background to
perform uplinking broadcast services. After graduating with a
communications degree, he built Mr. Adell’s first television
station, WADL, and on account of his experience with
WADL became interested in the uplinking business. Using
STN.Com’s predecessor, STN Satellite, Kevin learned about
the uplinking business by providing uplink services to various
customers, including Hughes Electronics Corp., a major
customer brought on by Kevin. Kevin, who continued to
explore business opportunities that would capitalize on his
background, decided to combine his success with religious
programming on WADL with his uplinking services from
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STN Satellite by creating The Word and its uplink service
provider, STN.Com.
Further, Kevin did not transfer his goodwill to STN.Com
through a covenant not to compete or other agreement. Kevin
was free to leave STN.Com and use his relationships to
directly compete against his previous employer. If Kevin quit,
STN.Com could not exclusively use the relationships that
Kevin cultivated; thus, the value of those relationships should
not be attributed to STN.Com.
C.

Liquidations
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2014.
D.

S Corporations

1.
Realized but unrecognized gain is not tax-exempt
income. Ball v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-39 (2/6/13). The taxpayers
owned stock of an S corporation that had a wholly-owned subsidiary for which
it made a QSub election. They argued that the basis of their S corporation stock
had been increased by the amount of built-in gain on the stock of the QSub
that went unrecognized pursuant to § 332 as a result of the QSub election, and
that the increased basis supported claimed passed-through loss. Their position
was based on the argument that the unrecognized gain was tax-exempt income
that resulted in a basis increase under § 1367(a)(1)(A). The Tax Court (Judge
Kerrigan) rejected the taxpayer’s argument, and held that unrecognized gain
resulting from a QSub election does not create an item of income or taxexempt income pursuant to § 1366(a)(1)(A). The court reasoned that
nonrecognition rules do not exempt income from taxation but merely defer
recognition through substituted basis rules.
a.
And the taxpayers’ invocation of a prayer
to the god Gitlitz falls on deaf ears in the Third Circuit. Ball v.
Commissioner, 742 F.3d 552 (3d Cir. 2/12/14). The Third Circuit (in an
opinion by Judge Van Antwerpen) affirmed the Tax Court’s decision. The
court reasoned that gains that are not recognized by virtue of a specific Code
provision are not items of gross income, citing Reg. § 1.61-6(b)(1), and § 332
specifically provides nonrecognition on the liquidation of a controlled
subsidiary. Thus, making the QSub election did not give rise to an item of
gross income. The court found Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 531 U.S. 206 (2001),
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to be inapposite, because Gitlitz addressed payments that explicitly were
included in gross income under § 61(a)(12) but excluded under § 108, whereas
in the instant case § 332 worked to exclude the gain from being included in
gross income under § 61(a)(3).
2.
The Treasury Department finalizes major surgery
on the rules for determining an S corporation shareholder’s basis
limitation for passed-through losses under § 1366(d). T.D. 9682, Basis of
Indebtedness of S Corporations to Their Shareholders, 79 F.R. 42675
(7/23/14). The Treasury Department has finalized amendments to Reg.
§ 1.1366-2 proposed in REG-134042-07, Basis of Indebtedness of S
Corporations to Their Shareholders, 77 F.R. 34884 (6/12/12), that deal with
determination of an S corporation shareholder’s basis in any debt of the S
corporation, which principally affects the limitation on the pass-through of
losses under § 1366(d). The amended regulations expressly provide that the
basis of any indebtedness of the S corporation to the shareholder means the
shareholder’s adjusted basis (as defined in Reg. § 1.1011-1 and as provided in
§ 1367(b)(2)) in any “bona fide indebtedness of the S corporation that runs
directly to the shareholder.” Whether indebtedness is “bona fide indebtedness”
to a shareholder is determined under general tax principles and depends on “all
of the facts and circumstances.” Reg. § 1.1366-2(a)(2)(i). Furthermore, Reg.
§ 1.1366-2(a)(2)(ii) expressly provides that:
A shareholder does not obtain basis of indebtedness in the S
corporation merely by guaranteeing a loan or acting as a
surety, accommodation party, or in any similar capacity
relating to a loan. When a shareholder makes a payment on
bona fide indebtedness of the S corporation for which the
shareholder has acted as guarantor or in a similar capacity,
then the shareholder may increase its basis of indebtedness to
the extent of that payment.
Reg. § 1.1366-2(a)(2)(iii), Ex. (4) illustrates that the basis increase from
satisfaction of a guarantee occurs pro tanto as serial payments on the guarantee
are made.
 The preamble to the proposed regulations
states that “[u]nder these proposed regulations, an incorporated pocketbook
transaction [see, e.g., Yates v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-280; Culnen v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-139] increases basis of indebtedness only
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where the transaction creates a bona fide creditor-debtor relationship between the
shareholder and the borrowing S corporation.”
 Reg. § 1.1366-2(a)(2)(iii), Ex. (2), blesses
a basis increase resulting from a back-to-back loan in which one S corporation
lends money to the shareholder who in turn lends the loan proceeds to a second
S corporation, if the loan to the second S corporation “constitutes bona fide
indebtedness” from the borrower S corporation to the shareholder. Example (3)
in the regulation blesses a basis increase resulting from a distribution to a
shareholder by one S corporation (S1) of a note evidencing the indebtedness of a
second S corporation (S2) if after the distribution S2 is indebted to the
shareholder and “the note constitutes bona fide indebtedness” from S2 to the
shareholder where under local law the distribution relieved S2 of its obligation to
S1 and S2 was liable only to the shareholder; however, whether S2 is indebted to
the shareholder rather than S1 is determined under general federal tax principles
and depends upon all of the facts and circumstances. Reg. § 1.1366-2(a)(2)(iii),
Ex. (1), provides that a bona fide indebtedness from an S corporation to a
disregarded entity (LLC) owned by the shareholder results in an increase in basis
of indebtedness for the shareholder.
 The regulations do not attempt to clarify
the meaning of “bona fide indebtedness,” or provide any examples of relevant
facts and circumstances, but rely on “general Federal tax principles.” This leaves
somewhat ambiguous what might replace the “actual economic outlay” by the
shareholder test for creating basis of indebtedness, applied in cases such as
Maloof v. Commissioner, 456 F.3d 645 (6th Cir. 2006); Spencer v.
Commissioner, 110 T.C. 62, 78-79 (1998), aff’d without published opinion, 194
F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 1999); Hitchins v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 711 (1994); and
Perry v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1293 (1970). The preamble to the proposed
regulations refers to Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) (disallowing
interest deductions for lack of actual indebtedness); Geftman v. Commissioner,
154 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 1998); Estate of Mixon v. U.S., 464 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1972);
and Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 367 (1973), as
relevant authorities. In the preamble to the final regulations, the Treasury
department expressly declined to accept a commentator’s suggestion that the
final “regulations provid[e] that actual economic outlay is no longer the standard
used to determine whether a shareholder obtains basis of indebtedness,” but
“[w]ith respect to guarantees, however, the final regulations retain the economic
outlay standard.”
 The amended regulations do not address
how to determine the basis of the shareholder’s stock in the S corporation.
Revenue Ruling 81-187, 1981-2 C.B. 167, provides that a shareholder of an S
corporation does not increase basis in stock for purposes of § 1366(d)(1)(A) by
contributing the shareholder’s own unsecured demand promissory note to the
corporation. In the preamble to the proposed regulations, the Treasury
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Department and the IRS requested comments concerning the propriety of basis
calculations in the S corporation and partnership context, similar to the one
currently in Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(d)(2), which provides that a partner’s capital
account is increased with respect to non-readily tradable partner notes only
(1) when there is a taxable disposition of such note by the partnership, or (2) when
the partner makes principal payments on such note. The preamble to the final
regulations states that “[t]he Treasury Department and the IRS continue to study
issues relating to stock basis and may address these issues in future guidance.”
 Amended Reg. § 1.1366-2(a)(2) applies to
indebtedness between an S corporation and its shareholder resulting from any
transaction occurring after 7/22/14. In addition, S corporations and their
shareholders may rely on Reg. § 1.1366-2(a)(2) with respect to indebtedness
between an S corporation and its shareholder that resulted from any transaction
that occurred in a year for which the period of limitations on the assessment of
tax has not expired before 7/23/14.
3.
The lifetime of built-in gain gets shorter every
year. The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 shortened the holding period under
§ 1374 for recognizing unrealized built-in gain on conversion from a C
corporation to an S corporation to five years preceding the corporation’s tax
year beginning in 2011. Before the change, the holding period was ten years
for sales or exchanges in tax years beginning before 2009, and seven years for
tax years beginning in 2009 or 2010.
a.
And again. The 2012 Taxpayer Relief Act,
§ 326(a)(2), extended the § 1374 five-year holding period reduction to
recognized built-in gain in 2012 and 2013.
b.
And yet again. TIPA retroactively extended
the § 1374 five-year holding period reduction to recognized built-in gain in
2014.
E.

Mergers, Acquisitions, and Reorganizations

1.
The Ninth Circuit finds basis in rights created
from the collapse of the savings and loan industry in the 1970s: the hell
with § 362(b). Washington Mutual, Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207 (9th
Cir. 3/3/11). The taxpayer, as the successor corporation to Home Savings of
America, filed a refund action claiming amortization deductions for certain
rights, and loss deductions for abandonment of branching rights, created in a
§ 368(a)(1)(G) reorganization by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC) in which Home Savings acquired three failed savings
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and loan associations. The District Court granted summary judgment to the
IRS, concluding that Home Savings had no basis in the rights. The Ninth
Circuit reversed and remanded, disagreeing with the District Court’s
conclusion regarding basis. As part of the acquisition of the three failed thrifts
in a supervisory merger transaction structured as a type G reorganization,
FSLIC entered into an “Assistance Agreement” with Home Savings that
included, among other things, approval for Home Savings to establish
branches in Florida and Missouri as if Home Savings maintained its home
office in those states, and approval of the purchase method of accounting under
which Home Savings was permitted to apply a percentage of acquired
intangible assets in its deposit base and for amortization of the remainder over
forty years. The Ninth Circuit accepted the taxpayer’s argument and concluded
that the excess of liabilities of the acquired thrifts over the value of assets
represented a cost that was consideration for the rights represented in the
Assistance Agreement in the integrated transaction, and concluded that
allowing the taxpayer a cost basis was not inconsistent with characterizing the
transaction as a § 368(a)(1)(G) reorganization, notwithstanding the transferred
basis rule of § 362(b). The Court rejected the IRS’s assertion that “recognizing
Home Savings a cost basis in the Rights based on the assumption of FSLIC’s
liabilities requires characterizing some of the acquired thrifts’ liabilities as
FSLIC’s liabilities, because Home Savings did not pay FSLIC or the Bank
Board separate consideration for the Rights.” The District Court concurred
with the IRS’s position, holding that the excess liabilities of the acquired thrifts
were the same as FSLIC’s insurance liabilities, which remained liabilities of
FSLIC. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Home Savings received a generous
incentive package, the cost of which was the excess of the failing thrifts’
liabilities over the value of their assets. A concurring opinion argued that the
acquired rights had a fair market value basis as acquired directly from FSLIC
in exchange for taking over the liabilities of the failed thrifts. The Ninth Circuit
remanded the case to the District Court to determine the proper amortization
amounts for the intangibles and the amount of abandonment loss for the branch
rights.
a.
On remand, the taxpayer fails to establish
the amount of its cost basis for the intangibles and fails to demonstrate
that it abandoned the branch rights. Washington Mutual, Inc. v. United
States, 996 F. Supp. 2d 1095 (D. Wash. 2/10/14). On remand from the Ninth
Circuit, the District Court determined that the taxpayer failed to establish its
cost basis in the rights that it acquired through the incentive package it
received from the FSLIC as part of the supervisory merger. For this reason,
the court concluded, the taxpayer could not take amortization or loss
deductions with respect to the rights. Under the approach dictated by the Ninth
Circuit, the amount the taxpayer paid for the rights was equal to the excess of
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the failing thrifts’ liabilities over the value of their assets. The taxpayer
conceded that the total fair market value of the rights it received was greater
than the amount the taxpayer paid for them. The District Court reasoned that,
in order to allocate the purchase price among the rights the taxpayer received,
the taxpayer had to establish the fair market value of each right the taxpayer
received. The court concluded that the taxpayer failed to establish, to a
reasonable degree of certainty, the value of one of the rights (the “Missouri
Branching Right”), which gave the taxpayer the right to open branches in
Missouri. The court agreed with the government that the discounted cash flow
valuation model used by the taxpayer’s expert was too flawed to form a
reliable basis for valuing the Missouri Branching Right.
 The court also concluded that the taxpayer
had not established that it abandoned the Missouri Branching Right.
Accordingly, even if it had established its cost basis, the taxpayer was not entitled
to a loss deduction with respect to this right. The taxpayer sold or exchanged its
Missouri deposit-taking branches, entered into covenants not to compete, and
notified stock analysts, shareholders, and the Office of Thrift Supervision that it
was closing its Missouri branches. Nevertheless, the court determined that the
taxpayer failed to demonstrate that it was permanently surrendering its right to
purchase and operate branches in Missouri.
2.
Just because it’s a tax-free merger for income tax
purposes doesn’t mean it’s free of gift taxes. Cavallaro v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2014-189 (9/17/14). The taxpayers owned a contract
manufacturing corporation (Knight) that made tools and machine parts. One
of their sons developed an automated liquid-dispensing machine they called
CAM/ALOT. Three of their sons (including the inventor) owned Camelot
Systems, Inc., a business dedicated to the sale of the CAM/ALOT machines,
which were manufactured by Knight. The two companies operated out of the
same building, shared payroll and accounting services, and collaborated in
further development of the CAM/ALOT product line. Knight funded the
operations of both companies and paid the salaries and overhead costs for both.
Pursuant to advice of an estate planning lawyer, the taxpayers and their sons
merged Knight, with Camelot as the surviving entity. Based on the values of
the two corporations, the taxpayers received a disproportionately low number
of shares in the new corporation and their sons received a disproportionately
high number of shares. The Tax Court (Judge Gustafson) held that the Camelot
shares that the taxpayers received in the merger in exchange for their shares of
Knight were not full and adequate consideration. Accordingly, they had made
a $29.6 million gift to their sons as a result of the merger. Accuracy and failure
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to file penalties were not upheld because the taxpayers relied in good faith on
the advice of tax professionals regarding the valuation of the two companies.
3.
The IRS eliminates the elective location of E&P in
tax-free reorganizations. T.D. 9700, Allocation of Earnings and Profits in
Tax-Free Transfers From One Corporation to Another; Acquiring Corporation
for Purposes of Section 38179 F.R. 66616 (11/10/14). The IRS and Treasury
have finalized proposed amendments to Reg. § 1.381-1(a), REG-131239-13,
Acquiring Corporation for Purposes of Section 381, 79 F.R. 26190 (5/7/14),
and to Reg. § 1.312-11, REG-141268-11, Allocation of Earnings and Profits
in Tax-Free Transfers From One Corporation to Another, 77 F.R. 22515
(4/16/12). As amended, Reg. § 1.381(a)-1(b)(2) provides that for purposes of
determining the corporation that succeeds to the target corporation’s tax
attributes in a tax-free reorganization, the acquiring corporation is the
corporation that, pursuant to the plan of reorganization, directly acquires the
assets transferred by the transferor corporation, even if that corporation
ultimately retains none of the assets so transferred. According to the Preamble
to the proposed regulations:
The [prior] regulations under section 381 yield an identical
result, except when a single controlled subsidiary of the direct
transferee corporation acquires all of the assets transferred by
the transferor corporation pursuant to a plan of reorganization.
In that case, the [prior] regulations treat the subsidiary as the
acquiring corporation, a result that effectively permits a
taxpayer to choose the location of a transferor corporation’s
attributes by causing the direct transferee corporation either
to retain or not to retain a single asset. The IRS and the
Treasury Department believe the [amended provision]
produces more appropriate results because it . . . eliminate[s]
the electivity.
As amended, Reg. § 1.312-11 merely cross-references the § 381 regulations.
4.
Tracking the basis of nonexistent stock ain’t easy.
T.D. 9702, Allocation of Basis in All Cash D Reorganizations, 79 F.R. 67059
(11/12/14). The Treasury Department has promulgated final regulations
replacing Temp. Reg. § 1.358-2T (T.D. 9558, Corporate Reorganizations;
Allocation of Basis in “All Cash D” Reorganizations, 76 F.R. 71878
(11/21/11)) with only nonsubstantive changes. Reg. § 1.358-2 deals with stock
basis in all cash type D reorganizations under Reg. § 1.368-2(l). If an actual
shareholder of the acquiring corporation is deemed to receive a nominal share
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of stock of the issuing corporation described in Reg. § 1.368-2(l), that
shareholder must, after allocating and adjusting the basis of the nominal share
in accordance with the rules of Reg. § 1.358-1, and after adjusting the basis in
the nominal share for any transfers described in Reg. § 1.358-1, designate the
share of stock of the acquiring corporation to which the basis, if any, of the
nominal share will attach. Under these rules, the ability to designate the share
of stock of the acquiring corporation to which the basis of the surrendered
stock or securities of the target will attach applies only to a shareholder that
actually owns shares in the issuing corporation. Thus, for example, if in an all
cash type-D reorganization, Y Corporation, a first tier subsidiary of P
Corporation, acquires the assets of T Corporation, a second tier subsidiary of
P Corporation, owned by X Corporation, a first tier subsidiary of P
Corporation, X Corporation cannot designate any share of Y Corporation stock
to which the basis, if any, of the nominal share of Y Corporation stock will
attach; and P Corporation cannot designate a share of Y Corporation stock to
which basis will attach because P Corporation’s basis in the nominal share of
Y Corporation stock (deemed to have been distributed to it by X Corporation)
is zero (its fair market value).
F.

Corporate Divisions

There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2014.
G.

Affiliated Corporations and Consolidated Returns

1.
The Eleventh Circuit interprets a tax-sharing
agreement. You don’t often see cases like this. Zucker v. FDIC, 727 F.3d
1100 (11th Cir. 8/15/13). This case involved the interpretation of a tax sharing
agreement (TSA) among members of a consolidated group. The TSA provided
that although the parent holding company would file the group’s tax return, a
bank subsidiary would pay all income taxes for the group and receive
contributions from other members of the group, and the bank would pay any
member of the group that member’s share of any refund. The day after the
bank was closed and the FDIC appointed its receiver, the holding company
filed for Bankruptcy Act Chapter 11 protection. Subsequently, the holding
company received a refund, which it treated as part of the bankruptcy estate
rather than paying it to the FDIC (as the bank’s successor) for distribution
pursuant to the TSA. The Eleventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Tjoflat,
reversed the Bankruptcy Court and held that the refund was not part of the
holding company’s bankruptcy estate; the refund was to be paid over to the
FDIC for distribution to the group’s members in accordance with the TSA.
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Interpreting the TSA contract under the controlling Delaware law, the court
found that although the TSA did not contain a provision expressly requiring
the holding company to forward the tax refunds to the bank, that was what the
parties intended. Thus, the court concluded:
The relationship between the Holding Company and the Bank
is not a debtor-creditor relationship. When the Holding
Company received the tax refunds, it held the funds intact—
as if in escrow—for the benefit of the Bank and thus the
remaining members of the Consolidated Group. The parties
intended that the Holding Company would promptly forward
the refunds to the Bank so that the Bank could, in turn,
forward them on to the Group’s members. In the Bank’s
hands, the tax refunds occupied the same status as they did in
the Holding Company’s hands—they were tax refunds for
distribution in accordance with the TSA.
a.
Well, well, maybe you do see these cases
more than we thought. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Amfin Financial
Corp., 757 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 7/8/14). Amfin Financial was the parent of a
consolidated group that included AmTrust Bank. Amfin Financial, which was
in bankruptcy, argued that the group’s tax-sharing agreement mandated that a
$170 million tax refund generated by AmTrust’s net losses belonged to Amfin
Financial’s bankruptcy estate, and that AmTrust was merely a creditor of the
estate. The district court agreed, holding that the tax-sharing agreement
unambiguously allocated the refund to Amfin Financial. The Sixth Circuit
reversed because it concluded that the tax-sharing agreement was silent on this
issue, and remanded the case with instructions that the district court consider
extrinsic evidence concerning the parties’ intent in light of Ohio agency and
trust law.
2.
Self-help for subsidiaries that fail to consent to the
consolidated return regulations by filing Form 1122. Rev. Proc. 2014-24,
2014-13 I.R.B. 879 (3/10/14). This revenue procedure provides guidance on
the conditions that must be satisfied to obtain an automatic determination that
a subsidiary member of an affiliated group will be treated as if it had filed
Form 1122, Authorization and Consent of Subsidiary Corporation to Be
Included in a Consolidated Income Tax Return, and thus joined in the group’s
making of a consolidated return, notwithstanding the subsidiary’s failure to
file Form 1122. An affiliated group of corporations can elect to file a
consolidated return only if each corporation that is a member of the affiliated
group for any portion of the group’s tax year consents to the consolidated
return regulations. Reg. § 1.1502-75(a)(1). For the first tax year in which the
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group files a consolidated return, each subsidiary group member must give this
consent by filing Form 1122. Reg. § 1.1502-75(b)(1), (h)(2). If a subsidiary
fails to file Form 1122, it is treated as if it had filed Form 1122 if the IRS
determines that the subsidiary joined in the consolidated return or that the
subsidiary was excluded due to a mistake of law or fact, or to inadvertence.
Reg. § 1.1502-75(b)(2)-(3). The IRS no longer issues private letter rulings (but
may issue determination letters) on whether a subsidiary group member will
be treated as if it had filed Form 1122. See Rev. Proc. 2014-3, § 3.01(73),
2014-1 I.R.B. 111 (12/30/13). To mitigate the inability of taxpayers to obtain
certainty through private letter rulings, the revenue procedure provides that, if
certain conditions are satisfied, “it is hereby determined by the Commissioner
that a subsidiary that actually failed to file a Form 1122 (non-filing subsidiary)
is treated as if it filed Form 1122 and thus joined in the making of a
consolidated return by the affiliated group.” The conditions are: (1) The
affiliated group timely filed what purported to be a consolidated return for the
year, including Form 851 (Affiliations Schedule) or provided some other clear
and unequivocal indication on the return that it was intended as a consolidated
return; (2) The non-filing subsidiary was not prevented from joining in the
filing of the consolidated return by any applicable rule of law, other than the
failure to file Form 1122; (3) With certain limited exceptions, the non-filing
subsidiary did not file a separate return for any period of time included in the
consolidated return, or any subsequent taxable year; and (4) One of three
specified conditions exists, which generally require that (a) the failure to file
Form 1122 was either due to a mistake of law or fact, or to inadvertence, or
caused by the group’s belief that the non-filing subsidiary was treated as a
partnership, and (b) the non-filing subsidiary’s income and deductions were
included in the consolidated return. An affiliated group that does not satisfy
the requirements for an automatic determination can seek a determination
letter. The revenue procedure was effective March 24, 2014.
H.

Miscellaneous Corporate Issues

1.
Tacking a farm or ranch subsidiary onto your
personal services corporation might enable you to beat the flat rate 35percent corporate tax. Applied Research Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner,
143 T.C. No. 17 (10/9/14). The taxpayers were an affiliated group that filed
consolidated returns. The group consisted of a parent that provided
professional engineering services, and thus was a qualified personal service
corporation, and a subsidiary that conducted a ranching business, and thus was
not a qualified personal service corporation. All of the group’s consolidated
taxable income for the years in question was attributable to the parent personal
service corporation. The taxpayer took the position that the group, as a single
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entity, was not a qualified personal service corporation and computed the tax
on its consolidated taxable income using the § 11(b)(1) graduated rates. The
IRS took the position that each group member’s status as a qualified personal
service corporation should be determined separately and calculated the tax on
the consolidated taxable income of the group under the § 11(b)(2) flat 35percent tax rate applicable to qualified personal service corporations. The Tax
Court (Judge Jacobs) held that the graduated rates schedule in § 11(b)(1)
applied to compute the tax owed by an affiliated group consisting of a qualified
personal service corporation and that an entity that is not a qualified personal
service corporation where the group, as a single entity, was not a personal
service corporation. The court rejected the IRS’s argument that “where one
member of an affiliated group is a qualified personal service corporation and
another is not, the consolidated taxable income of the affiliated group must be
broken up into two separate baskets”; “that section 448 requires that the
determination as to whether a corporation is a qualified personal service
corporation is to be made at the entity level, not at the level of the affiliated
group.” Rather, the court found “no authority to permit the breakup of an
affiliated group’s consolidated taxable income into separate baskets.” It
looked at “the affiliated group as a whole, i.e., the entity which generated the
consolidated taxable income, to determine the characterization of the
consolidated taxable income.” When viewed as a whole, the group was not a
qualified personal service corporation.
VII.

PARTNERSHIPS
A.

Formation and Taxable Years

1.
Section 47 historic rehabilitation credits were
allowed to an LLC (taxed as a partnership) in which Pitney Bowes was a
99.9 percent member despite an IRS challenge under the anti-abuse
provisions of Reg. § 1.701-2, but it was too late to keep the Miss America
Pageant in Atlantic City. Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC v. Commissioner,
136 T.C. 1 (1/3/11). The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that the ownership
interest on the historic East Hall of the Atlantic City Boardwalk Hall under a
35-year lease belonging to the New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority
could be transferred to Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC, in which Pitney Bowes
(through a subsidiary and an LLC) was the 99.9 percent member (and the
NJSEA was the 0.1 percent member). Along with ownership went the § 47
Federal tax credit of 20 percent of the qualified rehabilitation expenditures
incurred in transforming the run-down East Hall from a flat-floor convention
space to a “special events facility” that could host concerts, sporting events,
and other civic events. Pitney Bowes became the 99.9 percent member of
Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC, following an offering memorandum sent to
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nineteen large corporations, which described the transaction as a “sale” of tax
credits (although that description was not repeated in any of the subsequent
documents relating to the transaction). NJSEA lent about $57 million to
Historic Boardwalk Hall and Pitney Bowes made capital contributions of more
than $18 million to that LLC, as well as an investor loan of about $1.2 million.
In that offering memorandum, losses were projected over the first decade of
operation of East Hall. The IRS argued that the bulk of the Pitney Bowes
contributions were paid out to NJSEA as a “development fee” and that the
entire transaction was a sham because NJSEA was going to develop East Hall
regardless of whether Pitney Bowes made its capital contributions and loan.
 Judge Goeke held that one of the purposes
of § 47 was “to encourage taxpayers to participate in what would otherwise be
an unprofitable activity,” and the rehabilitation of East Hall was a success,
leading to the conclusion that Historic Boardwalk had objective economic
substance. He also held that “Pitney Bowes and NJSEA, in good faith and acting
with a business purpose, intended to join together in the present conduct of a
business enterprise” and that while the offering memorandum used the term
“sale,” “it was used in the context of describing an investment transaction.”
Finally, Judge Goeke used Reg. § 1.701-2(d), Ex. (6), involving two high-bracket
taxpayers who joined with a corporation to form a partnership to own and operate
a building that qualifies for § 42 low-income housing credits, to conclude that
Reg. § 1.701-2 did not apply to the Historic Boardwalk transaction because that
regulation “clearly contemplate[s] a situation in which a partnership is used to
transfer valuable tax attributes from an entity that cannot use them . . . to [a
taxpayer] who can . . . .”
 Query whether “economic substance”
requirements are applicable when the tax benefits take the form of tax credits
enacted to encourage specific types of investments?
a.
“‘[T]he sharp eyes of the law’ require
more from parties than just putting on the ‘habiliments of a partnership
whenever it advantages them to be treated as partners underneath.’ . . .
Indeed, Culbertson requires that a partner ‘really and truly intend[] to . . .
shar[e] in the profits and losses’ of the enterprise. . . . And, after looking
to the substance of the interests at play in this case, we conclude that,
because Pitney Bowes lacked a meaningful stake in either the success or
failure of Historic Boardwalk Hall, it was not a bona fide partner.”
Historic Boardwalk Hall LLC v. Commissioner, 694 F.3d 425 (3d Cir.
8/27/12), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2734 (5/28/13). In a unanimous opinion by
Judge Jordan, the Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held that Pitney
Bowes was not a bona fide partner in Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC. The
court’s reasoning was based on the Culbertson test [Commissioner v.
Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949)], as applied by the Second Circuit in TIFD
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III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220, 232 (2d Cir. 2006) (Castle Harbour
II), to find that the Dutch banks were not partners, and the reasoning of the
Fourth Circuit in Virginia Historic Tax Credit Fund 2001, LP v.
Commissioner, 639 F.3d 129 (4th Cir. 2011), to find that the investors who
acquired the Virginia Historic Rehabilitation credits through the partnership
bore no “true entrepreneurial risk,” which the Third Circuit concluded was a
characteristic of a true partner under the Culbertson test. The Third Circuit
concluded that Pitney Bowes was not a partner because, based on an analysis
of the facts, as the transaction was structured, (1) Pitney Bowes “had no
meaningful downside risk because it was, for all intents and purposes, certain
to recoup the contributions it had made to HBH and to receive the primary
benefit it sought — the HRTCs or their cash equivalent,” and (2) Pitney
Bowes’s “avoidance of all meaningful downside risk in HBH was
accompanied by a dearth of any meaningful upside potential.” The analysis
was highly factual and based on substance over form. As for downside risk,
the Court of Appeals reversed as clearly erroneous the Tax Court’s finding
that Pitney Bowes bore a risk because it might not receive an agreed upon 3
percent preferred return on its contributions to HBH. Referring to Virginia
Historic Tax Credit Fund, the Third Circuit treated the 3 percent preferred
return as a “return on investment” that was not a “share in partnership profits,”
which pointed to the conclusion that Pitney Bowes did not face any true
entrepreneurial risk. As for upside potential, applying the substance over form
doctrine, the court concluded that “although in form PB had the potential to
receive the fair market value of its interest . . . in reality, PB could never expect
to share in any upside.” The court noted that it was mindful “of Congress’s
goal of encouraging rehabilitation of historic buildings,” and that its holding
might “jeopardize the viability of future historic rehabilitation projects,” but
the court observed that it was not the tax credit provision itself that was under
attack, but rather the particular transaction transferring the benefits of the
credit in the manner that it had.
 The opinion makes it very clear that the
decision was based on applying the “substance over form” doctrine rather than
the “economic substance” doctrine to determine that Pitney Bowes was not a
partner.
b.
The IRS is gilding the lily of its Historic
Boardwalk victory. Historic Rehabilitation Partnership a Sham, IRS
Concludes, 2013 TAX NOTES TODAY 41-18 (10/5/12). This Field Attorney
Advice dealt with whether a taxpayer was a partner in a partnership that
generated § 47 historic rehabilitation tax credits. The FAA held that under the
Culbertson doctrine, as applied in Castle Harbour, the taxpayer was not a
partner. The taxpayer had no meaningful downside risk in that it was assured
of receiving the benefit of its bargain, and it had no upside potential. All it
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could receive was its specified priority return. Alternatively, the purported
partnership was a sham; it served no business purpose. Its only purpose was to
effect a sale of the rehabilitation tax credits to the taxpayer. Sacks v.
Commissioner, 69 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 1995), which held that a sale-leaseback
transaction involving solar energy equipment had economic substance even
though the investment had a negative rate of return before taking into account
tax benefits, was distinguished on the ground that the transaction at issue in
Sacks otherwise had economic substance in terms of risk and reward. In
reaching the conclusion, the FAA states as follows:
In any event, the notion that a court may consider tax benefits
in evaluating the economic substance of a transaction
involving — or of a purported partnership engaged in — taxfavored activity finds no support apart from Sacks. Two
circuits, in analyzing the economic substance of American
Depository Receipts (ADR) transactions, determined that it
was inappropriate to deduct the cost of foreseeable foreign
taxes imposed on the transaction in determining the expected
pre-tax profit of the transaction. See Compaq Computer Corp.
v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001) and IES
Industries, Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001).
These holdings address the calculation of pre-tax profit to be
used in determining whether transactions resulted in pre-tax
economic losses; they do not stand for the proposition that
United States tax credits may serve as a substitute for
economic profit. As such, these cases do not adopt the court’s
holding in Sacks that a court may consider tax benefits in
evaluating the economic substance of a transaction involving
— or of a purported partnership engaged in — tax-favored
activity.
 This position is absurd because the
purpose of tax credits is to encourage taxpayers to engage in otherwise
unprofitable activities. A holding that an activity that is unprofitable before taking
tax credits into consideration lacks economic substance defeats that purpose.
c.
The IRS now provides a Safe Harbor
under which it will not use its Historic Boardwalk victory to challenge
allocations of § 47 rehabilitation credits to investor partners. Rev. Proc.
2014-12, 2014-3 I.R.B. 415 (12/31/13). This revenue procedure specifies the
conditions under which the IRS will not challenge partnership allocations of
§ 47 rehabilitation credits. Section 4 of the revenue procedure contains the
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requirements for the Safe Harbor. It defines investors as partnership partners
(other than principals) (§4.01); provides for an investor’s minimum
partnership interest (§4.02); provides for an investor’s minimum unconditional
contribution of 20 percent of the investor’s total expected capital contribution
before the date the building is placed in service (§4.03); and requires that at
least 75 percent of the investor’s total expected capital contribution be fixed
in amount before the building is placed in service (§4.04).
 The fly in the ointment is that the
investor’s interest must be a “bona fide equity interest.”
2.
Even though living on credit is as American as
apple pie, there’s still no increase in the basis of a partnership interest
when the partner contributes his own promissory note to the partnership.
VisionMonitor Software, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-182
(9/3/14). The sole issue in this case was whether the contribution to a
partnership of a partner’s promissory note gave rise to an increase in the
partner’s basis in the partnership interest under § 722, which would allow
partnership level losses to pass through to the partners. Following prior Tax
Court precedent, Judge Holmes upheld the IRS’s long-standing position that
the contribution of a partner’s own note to the partnership isn’t the equivalent
of a contribution of cash, Revenue Ruling 80-235, 1980-2 C.B. 229, and
without more, it will not increase the partner’s basis in the partnership interest.
Dakotah Hills Offices Ltd. P’ship v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-134 (no
increased basis because not cash equivalent and not property in which partner
has basis); Gemini Twin Fund III v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-315
(partner’s outside basis not increased by contribution of promissory note),
aff’d without published opinion, 8 F.3d 26 (9th Cir. 1993); Oden v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1981-184 (partner has zero basis in own
promissory note), aff’d without published opinion, 679 F.2d 885 (4th Cir.
1982). The court rejected the taxpayer’s argument that Gefen v. Commissioner,
87 T.C. 1471 (1986), supported the argument that the contribution of a
partner’s own note to the partnership increases the partner’s basis in the
partnership interest. In Gefen, a partner acquired an interest in a limited
partnership and executed a limited guaranty under which the partner assumed
personal liability to the partnership’s existing creditor for her pro rata share of
the partnership’s recourse indebtedness to that creditor. Pursuant to Reg.
§ 1.752-1(e), the partner in Gefen was entitled to increase her basis in the
partnership by the specific amount of the partnership’s recourse debt that she
personally assumed under the terms of this guaranty. However, accuracyrelated penalties were not sustained; the taxpayer in good faith relied on an
experienced tax advisor that the court found to be competent.
 The court does not discuss contrary
authority in an analogous situation in the corporate context. Section 357(c)
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requires recognition of gain in an exchange that otherwise qualifies for
nonrecognition under § 351 or § 361 if the taxpayer transfers property and the
liabilities assumed in the exchange exceed the taxpayer’s adjusted basis in the
property. Some courts have held that a taxpayer who transfers encumbered
property to a corporation in exchange for stock can avoid recognizing gain under
§ 357(c) by contributing the taxpayer’s promissory note for an amount at least
equal to the amount by which the liabilities assumed exceed the taxpayer’s basis
in the property transferred. Peracchi v. Commissioner, 143 F.3d 487 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding that taxpayer has basis in his own promissory note); see also
Lessinger v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that
corporation had basis in the contributed promissory note, which was sufficient
for the taxpayer contributing the property and note to avoid gain under § 357(c)).
3.
No upside, no downside, no partnership. Chemtech
Royalty Associates, L.P. v. United States, 766 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 9/10/14). The
Fifth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Smith, affirmed a District Court decision
that disregarded two partnerships formed by Dow Chemical Company and a
number of foreign banks that generated over $1 billion of deductions for Dow.
The scheme was very similar to the Castle Harbour scheme, see TIFD III–E,
Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006). The District Court
disregarded the partnerships for tax purposes on three grounds: (1) the
partnerships were shams; (2) the transactions lacked economic substance; and
(3) the banks’ interests in Chemtech Royalty Associates, L.P. (“Chemtech”)
were debt, not equity. The Court of Appeals held that under the specific facts
of the case, the District Court’s finding that Dow lacked the intent to share
profits and losses with the foreign banks was not clearly erroneous. The court
reasoned that under Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 286 (1946),
Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949), and Southgate Master
Fund, L.L.C. ex rel. Montgomery Capital Advisors, LLC v. United States, 659
F.3d 466 (5th Cir. 2011):
[T]he parties, to form a valid tax partnership, must have two
separate intents: (1) the intent to act in good faith for some
genuine business purpose and (2) the intent to be partners,
demonstrated by an intent to share ‘the profits and losses.’ If
the parties lack either intent, then no valid tax partnership has
been formed.
The court rejected Dow’s argument that a determination of whether an interest
qualifies as debt or equity must precede addressing whether under Culbertson
the partnership is a sham, and that the foreign banks were partners rather than
creditors because they were “not legally entitled to repayment of their
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investment even if the banks could recover the value of their partnership share
when terminating the partnership.” Rather, the court expressed no opinion as
to whether the banks’ interest should be classified as debt, but limited its
“inquiry to whether Dow possessed the intent to be partners with the foreign
banks, focusing on whether Dow had the intent to share the profits and losses
with the foreign banks.” That intent did not exist. “First, the transactions were
structured to ensure that Dow paid the foreign banks a fixed annual return on
their investment ‘regardless of the success of the [Chemtech] venture.’” The
foreign banks were entitled to 99 percent of the profits until they had received
a priority return, but only 1 percent after that. Even if Chemtech did not
generate sufficient profits to pay the priority return, the banks were still
entitled to 97 percent of the priority return. Second, Dow agreed to bear all of
the non-insignificant risks arising from Chemtech’s transactions; thus, the
parties did not intend to share any possible losses. In addition, the agreement
included significant assurances to ensure that Dow would not misappropriate
or otherwise lose the banks’ initial investment. Finally, the foreign banks did
not meaningfully share in any potential upside. The possibility that the foreign
banks could possibly receive a fraction of certain “residual profits” did not
provide any meaningful upside because the likelihood of the venture earning
such “residual profits” was remote.
B.

Allocations of Distributive Share, Partnership Debt, and
Outside Basis

1.
Proposed regulations allocate liabilities among
multiple parties and among related parties. REG-136984-12, Section 752
and Related Party Rules, 78 F.R. 76092 (12/16/13). The IRS has proposed
regulations to address allocation of the risk of economic loss for purposes of
allocating partnership liabilities to a partner’s basis. Under Reg. § 1.752-2(a),
a partner is allocated a share of recourse liability to the extent that the partner
or a related person bears the economic risk of loss. A liability is nonrecourse
when no partner or related person bears an economic risk of loss.
 Multiple Parties. Under Prop. Reg. §
1.752-2(a)(2), where multiple partners bear the economic risk of loss with respect
to the same liability, the amount of the liability will be taken into account only
once, and if the total amount of liability borne by the partners exceeds the amount
of the liability, the economic risk of loss to be borne by each partner would be
determined by multiplying the amount of the liability by a fraction determined
by dividing the amount of the economic risk of loss of a partner over the sum of
the amount of loss borne by all partners. Thus, as illustrated by an example in the
proposed regulations, where partner A guarantees the full $1,000 of a bank loan
to the AB partnership and partner B guarantees $500 of the liability, the amount
of the liability allocable to A is $667 ($1,000 × $1,000/$1,500), and the amount
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of the liability allocable to B is $333 ($1,000 × $500/$1,500). Prop. Reg. § 1.7522(i) would be amended to provide that where a liability of a lower-tier partnership
is allocated both to the upper-tier partnership and to a partner who bears
economic risk of loss as a partner in both the upper-tier and lower-tier
partnerships, the basis resulting from such a liability will be allocated directly to
the partner of the lower-tier partnership rather than to the upper-tier partnership.
 Related Persons. Under Reg. § 1.7044(b)(1), an individual and a corporation are treated as related persons if the
individual is an 80 percent or greater shareholder. Where the corporation is a
lender to a partnership or has a payment obligation with respect to a partnership
liability, Prop. Reg. § 1.752-4(b)(1)(iv) would disregard the application of §
267(c)(1) that provides that stock owned by a partnership is treated as owned
proportionately by its partners. As a result, a partner in a partnership that owns
80 percent of the stock of the corporate lender will not be treated as related to the
corporation that bears the economic risk of loss. Prop. Reg. § 1.752-4(b)(2)
would provide that if a person who is a lender or has a payment obligation for a
partnership liability is related to more than one partner, the liability will be shared
equally among the related partners. This rule revises the existing provision that
allocates the liability to the partner with the highest percentage of related
ownership. In addition, the rule of Reg. § 1.752-4(b)(2)(iii), which provides that
persons owning interests in the same partnership are not treated as related persons
for purposes of determining economic risk for partnership liabilities would be
modified to apply only to persons who bear the economic risk for a liability as a
lender or have a payment obligation for the partnership liability.
 The proposed regulations are to be
effective on the date final regulations are published in the Federal Register.
2.
The shot at guarantees of partnership debt heard
‘round the world, a.k.a. bottom dollar guarantee regulations. Although
the proposed regulations are titled “Section 707 Regarding Disguised
Sales, Generally,” they should have been titled “Radically Changing
Partnership Debt Allocations Under Section 752 and Tweaking the
Section 707 Disguised Sales Rules.” REG–119305–11, Section 707
Regarding Disguised Sales, Generally, 79 F.R. 4826 (1/30/14). The Treasury
and IRS have published proposed amendments to the regulations under
§ 707(a)(2)(B), relating to disguised sales, and § 752, relating to the treatment
of partnership liabilities.
 Disguised Sales Rules: The proposed
regulations under § 707 provide a number of not particularly controversial
clarifications of the § 707 disguised sale rules. (1) An ordering rule would be
added in Reg. § 1.707-5 to provide that the treatment of a transfer should first be
determined under the debt-financed distribution exception, and any amount not

2015]

Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation

219

excluded from Reg. § 1.707–3 under the debt financed distribution exception
should be tested to see if such amount would be excluded from Reg. § 1.707–3
under a different exception in Reg. § 1.707–4. (2) The exception for preformation
capital expenditures in Reg. § 1.707-4 would be clarified to provide expressly
that the 20 percent of fair market value ceiling and the exception to the limitation
where the fair market value of the property does not exceed 120 percent of basis
apply property-by-property. In addition, for purposes of Reg. § 1.707-3, the term
‘‘capital expenditures’’ would have the same meaning as the term ‘‘capital
expenditures’’ generally does, except that it would include capital expenditures
taxpayers elect to deduct, and would not include deductible expenses taxpayers
elect to treat as capital expenditures. The proposed regulations also provide a rule
coordinating the exception for preformation capital expenditures and the rules
regarding liabilities traceable to capital expenditures. (3) The proposed
regulations add to the list of qualified liabilities that pursuant to Reg. § 1.707-5
may be assumed without triggering the disguised sale rules liabilities that were
not incurred in anticipation of the transfer of the property to a partnership, but
that were incurred in connection with a trade or business in which property
transferred to the partnership was used or held, but only if all the assets related to
that trade or business are transferred (other than assets that are not material to a
continuation of the trade or business). (4) The proposed regulations clarify the
anticipated reduction rule in Reg. § 1.707-5(a)(3) by providing that a reduction
that is subject to the entrepreneurial risks of partnership operations is not an
anticipated reduction. (5) The proposed regulations add additional rules
regarding tiered partnerships. (6) The proposed regulations extend the netting of
partners’ increases and decreases of liabilities principles of Reg. § 1.752–1(f) to
determine the effect of a partnership merger under the disguised sale rules.
 Partners’ Shares of Recourse Debt: For
purposes of allocating partnership liabilities generally, Reg. § 1.752–2 adopts an
ultimate liability test under a worst-case scenario. Under this test, an otherwise
nonrecourse liability of the partnership is allocated as a recourse liability to a
partner that guarantees the liability, even if the lender and the partnership
reasonably anticipate that the partnership will be able to satisfy the liability with
either partnership profits or capital. The IRS and the Treasury Department
consider that approach inappropriate due to the fact that in most cases, a
partnership will satisfy its liabilities with partnership profits, the partnership’s
assets do not become worthless, and the payment obligations of partners or
related persons are not called upon. The IRS and the Treasury Department
believe that some partners or related persons have entered into payment
obligations that are not commercial solely to achieve an allocation of a
partnership liability to such partner. Accordingly, the proposed amendments to
Reg. § 1.752-2 provide that obligations to make a payment with respect to a
partnership liability (excluding those imposed by state law) will not be
recognized for purposes of § 752 unless certain factors are present. These factors
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are intended to ensure that the terms of the payment obligation are not designed
solely to obtain tax benefits. First, a partner or related person must (a) maintain a
commercially reasonable net worth during the term of the payment obligation or
(b) be subject to commercially reasonable restrictions on asset transfers for
inadequate consideration. Second, the partner or related person must provide
commercially reasonable documentation regarding its financial condition. Third,
the payment obligation must not terminate prior to the term of the partnership
liability. Fourth, the primary obligor or any other obligor must not be required to
hold money or other liquid assets in an amount that exceeds the reasonable needs
of such obligor. Fifth, the partner or related person must receive arm’s length
consideration for assuming the payment obligation. Sixth, in the case of a
guarantee or similar arrangement, the partner or related person is or would be
liable up to the full amount of such partner’s or related person’s payment
obligation if, and to the extent that, any amount of the partnership liability is not
otherwise satisfied. Seventh, in the case of an indemnity, reimbursement
agreement, or similar arrangement, the partner or related person is, or would be,
liable up to the full amount of such partner’s or related person’s payment
obligation if, and to the extent that, any amount of the indemnitee’s or other
benefitted party’s payment obligation is satisfied. (The sixth and seventh rules do
not apply to a right of proportionate contribution running between partners or
related persons who are co-obligors with respect to a payment obligation for
which each of them is jointly and severally liable.) These rules would prevent
certain so-called ‘‘bottom dollar’’ guarantees from being recognized for purposes
of § 752. The proposed regulations relating to guarantees and indemnities draw
lines that, among other things, preclude recognition of a payment obligation for
a portion, rather than 100 percent, of each dollar of a partnership liability to which
the payment obligation relates. The proposed regulations provide the following
example with respect to top and bottom dollar guarantees:
A, B, and C are equal members of limited liability company,
ABC, that is treated as a partnership for federal tax purposes.
ABC borrows $1,000 from Bank. A guarantees payment of up
to $300 of the ABC liability if any amount of the full $1,000
liability is not recovered by Bank. B guarantees payment of
up to $200, but only if the Bank otherwise recovers less than
$200. Both A and B waive their rights of contribution against
each other. . . . Because A is obligated to pay up to $300 if,
and to the extent that, any amount of the $1,000 partnership
liability is not recovered by Bank, A’s guarantee satisfies the
requirement[s] . . . . Therefore, A’s payment obligation is
recognized . . . . The amount of A’s economic risk of loss . . .
is $300. However, because B is obligated to pay up to $200
only if and to the extent that the Bank otherwise recovers less
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than $200 of the $1,000 partnership liability, B’s guarantee
does not satisfy the requirement[s] . . . and B’s payment
obligation is not recognized. Therefore, B bears no economic
risk of loss . . . for ABC’s liability. As a result, $300 of the
liability is allocated to A . . . and the remaining $700 liability
is allocated to A, B, and C under § 1.752-3.
In addition to these seven factors that must be satisfied, if the partner or related
party is neither an individual nor a decedent’s estate, that partner or related
party’s payment obligation will be recognized only to the extent of the
partner’s or related person’s net value as of the allocation date. This rule
applies to a payment obligation of a partner or related person that is a
disregarded entity, e.g., a single-member LLC (even if the disregarded entity
is owned by an individual or a decedent’s estate), QSub, etc. In furtherance of
this rule, the proposed regulations require a partner or related person (other
than an individual or a decedent’s estate) to provide information to the
partnership regarding that person’s net value that is appropriately allocable to
the partnership’s liabilities. The proposed regulations revise the anti-abuse
rule under § 1.752–2(j) to address the use of intermediaries, tiered
partnerships, or similar arrangements to avoid the bottom-dollar guarantee
rules.
 Partners’ Shares of Nonrecourse Debt:
Proposed amendments to Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(3) would change the rule for
allocating nonrecourse debt not allocated per minimum gain or § 704(c) gain
according to partnership profits shares. Under the proposed regulations, the
designated profits interest must be in accordance with the partners’ liquidation
value percentages. That percentage, which is first determined when the
partnership is formed, but which must be redetermined from time to time, is “the
ratio (expressed as a percentage) of the liquidation value of the partner’s interest
in the partnership divided by the aggregate liquidation value of all of the partners’
interests in the partnership.”
 Effective Date: The proposed regulations
will be effective upon finalization. Taxpayers may not rely on them pending
finalization.
C.

Distributions and Transactions Between the Partnership
and Partners

1.
Transfer of state rehabilitation tax
credits is recognized as a partnership contribution and distribution rather
than a sale. Gateway Hotel Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2014-5 (1/9/14). Gateway Hotel Partners (GHP) was formed to renovate
historic hotel properties in St. Louis, Missouri. GHP’s members were WAHD,
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a Missouri LLC that was the operating partner and which contracted with GHP
as the developer, and HH, a Texas LLC, the passive investor. WAHD was
majority owned and managed by HRI, a New Orleans based real estate
developer organized as an S corporation. HRI obtained a bridge loan to finance
the project from the Missouri Development Finance Board, which was secured
by Missouri State Tax Credits that would be issued by the Finance Board on
completion of the hotel projects. The loan agreements with the Finance Board
and among the various entities required HRI to contribute the bridge loan
proceeds to WAHD, which in turn was contractually required to contribute the
proceeds to GHP. However, the money was actually paid directly to GHP. HRI
had also contracted to sell the tax credits to another party, ultimately using the
sales proceeds to repay the bridge loan. In the first two stages, upon
completion of the projects, GHP would distribute the tax credits to WAHD,
which in turn would distribute the tax credits to HRI for sale to the third party.
GHP’s financial statements did not reflect the receipt of a capital contribution
from WAHD, nor did WAHD’s or HRI’s financial statements reflect
distributions of the tax credits, which went straight to the ultimate purchaser.
The IRS asserted that the bridge loans were made directly to GHP so that
distributions to WAHD or HRI, or both, were not partnership distributions in
redemption of partnership capital interests, but represented sales of the tax
credits by GHP, which thereby recognized gain on the sales under the
substance over form doctrine, the step transaction doctrine, or under disguised
sale principles of § 707(a)(2)(B). The Court (Judge Goeke) agreed with the
taxpayer that the transfer of the bridge loan proceeds represented a
contribution to capital for a partnership interest in GHP by WAHD,
notwithstanding the direct payment from the Finance Board undertaken to
obviate the necessity of three separate transfers. Examining the whole
transaction, the court concluded that both the form and the substance of the
bridge loan established that HRI, not GHP, was the borrower. The court further
rejected the IRS’s assertion that making the bridge loan to HRI was a
meaningless step taken to avoid Federal income tax, in part because HRI’s
better risk profile permitted it to obtain the bridge loan on better terms than
would have been available to GHP. It therefore followed that the transfer of
the loan proceeds through WAHD represented a capital contribution to GHP.
The court further rejected the IRS’s assertion that GHP transferred the tax
credits directly to the purchaser as a sale under substance over form and step
transaction principles, finding instead that GHP’s transfer of the tax credits
flowed from WAHD’s capital contribution, which was not a meaningless or
unnecessary step in the transaction, and therefore constituted a distribution.
The court also rejected the IRS’s argument that the contribution of loan
proceeds by WAHD, followed by distribution of the tax credits, was a
disguised sale under § 707(a)(2)(B). Following the direction of Reg. § 1.7076, the court applied the facts and circumstances rules of Reg. § 1.707-3,

2015]

Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation

223

including the presumption that the contribution and distribution to WAHD,
which occurred more than two years apart, were not part of a disguised sale.
The court analyzed the multiple factors of Reg. § 1.707-3 as follows:
 The authority of the passive partner to
determine whether to use cash or property to satisfy WAHD’s preferences and
uncertainty of amount and timing of distributions meant that the timing and
amount of subsequent distributions were uncertain. Reg. § 1.707-3(b)(2)(i).
 The discretion of the passive partner
meant that WAHD did not have an enforceable right to the distribution of tax
credits. Reg. § 1.707-3(b)(2)(ii).
 The passive partner’s discretion to
distribute cash or property meant that the rights of WAHD to the money or
property were not secured. Reg. § 1.707-3(b)(2)(iii).
 An insurance policy against GHP’s receipt
of the tax credits did not represent a legal obligation to make contributions to the
partnership, which the court interpreted as requiring under Reg. § 1.7073(b)(2)(iv) an obligation to make a contribution that would provide an equity
interest in the partnership. The insurance policy represented an obligation to
make a payment in exchange for insurance premiums paid by the partnership.
 The absence of debt incurred or other
obligation to incur debt by a third party or the partnership to fund the distribution
weighed against disguised sale. Reg. § 1.707-3(b)(2)(v) and (vi).
 The partnership did not have excess liquid
assets to fund a distribution. Reg. § 1.707-3(b)(2)(vii).
 The agreements were not designed to
transfer ownership rights to the tax credit to WAHD. Reg. § 1.707-3(b)(2)(viii).
 The fact that WAHD had a 1 percent
profits interest but received 100 percent of the tax credits indicated that the
transfer of tax credits to WAHD bore no relationship to WAHD’s interest in GHP
profits and thus was a factor indicating disguised sale treatment. Reg. § 1.7073(b)(2)(ix).
 Also, the fact that WAHD was not
required to return the tax credits weighed in favor of disguised sale treatment,
Reg. § 1.707-3(b)(2)(x), notwithstanding WAHD’s obligation to fund operating
deficits, which the court viewed as independent of any requirement to return the
tax credits.
 The court was not persuaded that two out
of the ten factors indicated a disguised sale, particularly in light of the first two
factors, uncertainty about the amount and timing of the distribution, and the
absence of an enforceable right to the distribution, which the court found to be
the most compelling factors.
 The court found that a third transfer of tax
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credits directly from GHP to the purchaser, with the proceeds transferred directly
from the purchaser to the Finance Board, that was not documented in the year of
the transfer as a distribution, constituted a sale by the partnership.
 The court also held that development fees
paid to GHP by WAHD before commencement of operations were a return of
principal and therefore not includable in GHP’s income.
2.
The ground gave way under the feet of the
seismologist’s tax avoidance scheme. Seismic Support Services, LLC v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-78 (5/5/14). The individual taxpayer in this
case was employed as a seismic design consultant. He formulated a scheme to
alter his status as an employee to reduce his wage tax obligations. After his
employer refused to treat him as an independent contractor, he formed an LLC,
of which he owned 95 percent, through which he provided services as a
subcontractor. All of the LLC’s income was paid over to the individual
taxpayer. The LLC claimed a deduction, but did not file employment tax
returns; it described the payments as distributions. The Tax Court (Judge
Kroupa) held that the payments from the LLC to the taxpayer were § 707(c)
payments for services. The payments were made for services and were
determined without regard to the LLC’s income. The taxpayer performed all
services on behalf of the LLC. There was no basis in the record to conclude
the payments were for the use of capital. Because the record reflected that the
LLC mischaracterized the payments to enable the taxpayer to avoid partnerlevel self-employment taxes, and he admitted that he was trying to avoid
paying taxes, a § 6662 accuracy-related penalty was upheld.
3.
As if § 751(b) wasn’t already hard enough to
understand. REG-151416-06, Certain Distributions Treated as Sales or
Exchanges, 79 F.R. 65151 (11/3/14). The IRS and Treasury Department have
proposed amendments to the regulations under § 751(b) that would completely
change the mechanics of the application of § 751(b) in nonliquidating
distributions. Speaking generally, § 751(b), for example, creates a constructive
taxable exchange whenever a partner receives a current distribution that alters
the partners’ respective interests in unrealized receivables or substantially
appreciated inventory (§ 751 property). Section 751(b) generally is intended
to prevent partners from allocating among themselves the character of the gain
recognized from sales of partnership property. As implemented by the current
regulations, § 751(b) is deeply flawed because it measures disproportionality
by the value of substantially appreciated inventory and accounts receivable
rather than by the built-in gain or loss. Thus, it fails to fulfill completely its
stated purpose. These proposed regulations are intended to cure that flaw by
amending the § 751(b) regulations to operate similarly to the § 751(a)
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regulations, which provide generally that a partner’s interest in § 751 property
is the amount of income or loss from § 751 property that would be allocated
to the partner if the partnership had sold all of its property in a fully taxable
transaction for cash in an amount equal to the fair market value of such
property. Prop. Reg. § 1.751-1(a)(2). The hypothetical sale approach in the
proposed § 751(b) regulations, like the approach in the 1999 § 751(a)
regulations, shifts the focus away from gross value and to tax gain and loss.
Under the hypothetical sale approach, a partner’s interest in § 751 property is
determined by reference to the amount of ordinary income that would be
allocated to the partner if the partnership disposed of all of its property for fair
market value immediately before the distribution. The hypothetical sale
approach (applying § 704(c) principles) compares: (1) the amount of ordinary
income that each partner would recognize if the partnership sold all of its
property for fair market value immediately before the distribution, with (2) the
amount of ordinary income each partner would recognize if the partnership
sold all of its property (and the distributee partners sold the distributed assets)
for fair market value immediately after the distribution. Prop. Reg. § 1.7511(b)(2). If the distribution reduces the amount of ordinary income (or increases
the amount of ordinary loss) from § 751 property that would be allocated to,
or recognized by, a partner (thus reducing that partner’s interest in the
partnership’s § 751 property), the distribution triggers § 751(b). To make this
method work, Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f) would be amended to require
revaluations of partnership property if the partnership distributes money or
other property to a partner as consideration for an interest in the partnership
and the partnership owns § 751 property immediately after the distribution.
The preamble describes the recognition rules as follows:
If § 751(b) applies to a distribution, each partner must
generally recognize or take into account currently ordinary
income equal to its “§ 751(b) amount.” If a partner has net
§ 751 unrealized gain both before and after the distribution,
then the partner’s § 751(b) amount equals the partner’s net
§ 751 unrealized gain immediately before the distribution less
the partner’s net § 751 unrealized gain immediately after the
distribution. If a partner has net § 751 unrealized loss both
before and after the distribution, then the partner’s § 751(b)
amount equals the partner’s net § 751 unrealized loss
immediately after the distribution less the partner’s net §751
unrealized loss immediately before the distribution. If a
partner has net § 751 unrealized gain before the distribution
and net § 751 unrealized loss after the distribution, then the
partner’s § 751(b) amount equals the sum of the partner’s net
§ 751 unrealized gain immediately before the distribution and
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the partner’s net § 751 unrealized loss immediately after the
distribution.
However, this description of the “hot asset sale approach” belies the flexibility
and complexity provided by the proposed regulations. An alternative to the
“hot asset sale approach” is a “deemed gain” approach, described in the
preamble as an approach under which
a § 751(b) distribution results in: (1) the partnership
recognizing ordinary income in the aggregate amount of each
partner’s reduction in the partner’s interest in § 751 property,
(2) the partnership allocating ordinary income to the partner
or partners whose interest in § 751(b) property was reduced
by the distribution, and (3) the partnership making appropriate
basis adjustments to its assets to reflect its ordinary income
recognition.
The deemed gain approach can require recognition of capital gain in certain
cases. Rather than choosing between the alternatives, the IRS and Treasury
punted, and the proposed regulations do not require the use of a particular
approach for determining the tax consequences of a § 751(b) distribution.
Rather, the proposed regulations provide that if, under the hypothetical sale
approach, a distribution reduces a partner’s interest in the partnership’s § 751
property, giving rise to a § 751(b) amount, then the partnership must use a
reasonable approach that is consistent with the purpose of § 751(b) to
determine the tax consequences of the reduction. Generally, a partnership must
use one approach consistently (including after a termination of the partnership
under § 708(b)(1)(B)). Examples illustrate situations in which the approach
adopted is § 1.752-1(b)(2) of the proposed regulations for purposes of
determining partner’s interest in the partnership’s reasonable and in which it
is not reasonable. The proposed regulations include extensive provisions
dealing with the impact of §§ 734(b) and 743(b) basis adjustments, both those
that pre-exist the distribution that triggers § 751(b) as well as those that arise
from the distribution. The proposed regulations require a distributee partner to
recognize capital gain to the extent necessary to prevent the distribution from
triggering a basis adjustment under § 734(b) that would reduce other partners’
shares of net unrealized § 751 gain or loss. The proposed regulations also allow
distributee partners to elect to recognize capital gain in certain circumstances
to avoid § 732 decreases to the basis of distributed § 751 property. (We are not
masochistic enough to attempt to describe in detail all of those rules herein.)
The proposed regulations also contain complex anti-abuse rules that apply
when a partner engages in a transaction that relies on § 704(c) to eliminate or
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reduce ordinary income. All of the rules in the proposed regulations are
beyond comprehension without reference to the numerous examples.
 The proposed regulations apply to
distributions occurring in any taxable period ending on or after the date of
publication of final regulations. However, a partnership and its partners may rely
on Prop. Reg. § 1.751–1(b)(2) for purposes of determining a partner’s interest in
the partnership’s § 751 property on or after 11/3/14, provided the partnership and
its partners apply each of Prop. Regs. §§ 1.751–1(a)(2), 1.751–1(b)(2), and
1.751–1(b)(4) consistently for all partnership distributions and sales or exchanges
(including for any distributions and sales or exchanges the partnership makes
after a termination of the partnership under § 708(b)(1)(B)).
D.

Sales of Partnership Interests, Liquidations, and Mergers

1.
No bingo for Mingo! Former PwC consultant was
required to recognize ordinary income attributable to her interest in
partnership unrealized receivables on her receipt of convertible
promissory notes in connection with the sale of the PwC consulting
business to IBM. Mingo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-149 (6/12/13).
The taxpayer was a partner in the management consulting and technology
services business (consulting business) of PwC until PwC sold its consulting
business to IBM. The sale was structured by PwC transferring its consulting
business to a newly formed partnership, PwCC, the partners of which were
subsidiaries of PwC. Among the assets PwC transferred to PwCC were its
consulting business’ uncollected accounts receivable for services it had
previously rendered (unrealized receivables). PwC then transferred to each of
the 417 consulting partners an interest in PwCC and cash in exchange for the
partner’s interest in PwC. The taxpayer was one of the partners who received
a partnership interest in PwCC and cash from PwC in exchange for her
partnership interest in PwC. Then the PwC subsidiaries sold their interests in
PwCC to IBM, and the 417 consulting partners sold their interests in PwCC to
IBM in exchange for convertible promissory notes. The value of the taxpayer’s
partnership interest in PwCC was $832,090, of which $126,240 was
attributable to her interest in partnership unrealized receivables, which were
uncollected accounts receivable for services. The taxpayer reported her entire
gain on the sale under the § 453 installment method, but the IRS asserted a
deficiency on the ground that the gain on the § 751(c) unrealized receivables
was not eligible for installment reporting. The Tax Court (Judge Paris) held
that § 453 installment reporting is not available for gains attributable to
§ 751(c) unrealized receivables that represent uncollected cash-method
accounts receivable for services. The court relied on Sorensen v.
Commissioner, 22 T.C. 321 (1954), which held that installment reporting was
not available with respect to the sale of options to purchase stock that had been
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granted as compensation for the taxpayer’s services, because “[t]he provisions
of section [453] relate only to the reporting of income arising from the sale of
property on the installment basis. Those provisions do not in anywise purport
to relate to the reporting of income arising by way of compensation for
services.”
 Furthermore, the IRS’s determination that
the gain attributable to the unrealized receivables was not eligible for § 453
installment sale reporting, after the taxpayer had reported on the installment
method, was a change of accounting method subject to § 481(a). As a result the
court sustained the IRS’s adjustment for the year 2003, the year the IRS initiated
the change, even though the gain properly was reportable in 2002, the year of the
sale. The court cited Bosamia v. Commissioner, 661 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2011),
aff’g T.C. Memo. 2010-218, for the principle that a § 481(a) adjustment may
include amounts attributable to tax years outside the statute of limitations on
assessments.
 Finally, because the taxpayer was required
to recognize $126,240 of ordinary income relating to partnership unrealized
receivables in 2003, the taxpayer was entitled to increase the basis of the note by
that amount, which reduced the reported long-term capital gain for the year in
which the note was satisfied by conversion into IBM stock.
a.
The Fifth Circuit affirms—still no bingo
for Mingo. Mingo v, Commissioner, 114 A.F.T.R.2d 2014-6886 (5th Cir.
12/9/14). In an opinion by Judge Graves, the Fifth Circuit affirmed and ruled
in favor of the government on the same grounds as the Tax Court. The Fifth
Circuit relied on Sorensen v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 321 (1954) and held that
“the proceeds from the unrealized receivables, classified as ordinary income,
do not qualify for installment method reporting because they do not arise from
the sale of property.” Accordingly, the court held, the taxpayer should have
reported ordinary income of $126,240 in 2002, the year in which she sold her
partnership interest. The court also held that the IRS properly changed the
taxpayer’s method of accounting and made a § 481(a) adjustment with respect
to the unrealized receivables in 2003 despite the fact that the limitations period
on assessment of tax for 2002 had expired. The court cited its prior opinion in
Graff Chevrolet Co. v. Campbell, 343 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1965) for the
proposition that “[t]he Commissioner has ample power to change accounting
methods and reassess income for open years; section 481 would be virtually
useless if it did not affect closed years.”
2.
A partnership termination is only a termination
for some purposes. T.D. 9681, Partnerships; Start-up Expenditures;
Organization and Syndication Fees, 79 F.R. 42679 (7/23/14). The Treasury
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Department has finalized amendments to Regs. §§ 1.195-2(a), 1.708-1(b)(6),
and 1.709-1(b)(3), proposed in REG-126285-12, 78 F.R. 73753 (12/9/13),
providing that on a technical termination of a partnership under § 708(b)(1)(B)
caused by a sale or exchange of 50 percent or more of partnership interests
within a 12-month period, the new partnership deemed to be formed as a
continuation of the terminated partnership under Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(4), will
continue to amortize § 195 start-up expenses and § 709 organization expenses
using the same amortization period adopted by the terminated partnership. The
amended regulation clarifies that the terminated partnership may not claim a
§ 165 loss deduction for any unamortized start-up or organization expenses.
The IRS reasoned in the Preamble to the proposed regulations that the
technical termination of a partnership under § 708(b)(1)(B) is not a cessation
of the trade or business to which the start-up and organizational expenses
relate. The Preamble to the proposed regulations also points out that this
treatment is consistent with the amortization of § 197 intangibles to the extent
of the transferor’s adjusted basis, which continues in the new partnership over
the remainder of the transferor’s 15-year amortization period. The amended
regulations apply to technical terminations that occur after 12/9/13.
E.

Inside Basis Adjustments

1.
The IRS continues to strive to make partnership
allocations more certain and the rules regarding partnership allocations
simultaneously less readable. REG-144468-05, Disallowance of Partnership
Loss Transfers, Mandatory Basis Adjustments, Basis Reduction in Stock of a
Corporate Partner, Modification of Basis Allocation Rules for Substituted
Basis Transactions, Miscellaneous Provisions, 79 F.R. 3042 (1/16/14). The
Treasury Department and IRS have published proposed regulations under
§§ 704(c)(1)(C) (dealing with contributed built-in loss property), 734(b) and
(d) (dealing with required inside basis adjustments following a distribution by
a partnership with a substantial basis reduction), and 743(b) and (d) (dealing
with required inside basis adjustments following a transfer of an interest in a
partnership with a substantial built-in loss). The proposed regulations also
would (1) modify the § 755 basis allocation rules to prevent certain unintended
consequences of the current basis allocation rules for substituted basis
transactions, and (2) provide additional guidance on allocations resulting from
revaluations of partnership property.
 Section 704(c)(1)(C) provides that if
property contributed to a partnership has a built-in loss, (1) that built-in loss will
be taken into account only in determining the amount of items allocated to the
contributing partner, and (2) except as provided by regulations, in determining
the amount of items allocated to other partners, the basis of the contributed
property in the hands of the partnership equals its fair market value at the time of
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the contribution. The proposed regulations (amendments to Reg. § 1.704-3 and
Prop. Reg. § 1.704-3(f)) create a § 704(c)(1)(C) basis adjustment, which initially
is equal to the built-in loss associated with the § 704(c)(1)(C) property at the time
of contribution and is subsequently adjusted. Under this concept, which is
analogous to § 743(b) adjustments in Regs. §§ 1.743-1(j)(1) through (j)(3), the
partnership’s common basis in the built-in loss property is its fair market value
at the time of its contribution. The contributing partner then takes the basis
adjustment into account in adjusting, as appropriate, the partner’s distributive
share of gain, loss, depreciation, or amortization with respect to the property first
determined with respect to the common basis. If § 704(c)(1)(C) property is
subject to depreciation, § 197 amortization, or another cost recovery method, the
§ 704(c)(1)(C) basis adjustment associated with the property is recovered in
accordance with §§ 168(i)(7), 197(f)(2), or any other applicable provision. Under
the proposed regulations, a transferee of a contributing partner’s partnership
interest does not succeed to the § 704(c)(1)(C) basis adjustment; the share of the
§ 704(c)(1)(C) basis adjustment attributable to the interest transferred is
eliminated. The adjusted partnership basis of § 704(c)(1)(C) property distributed
to the contributing partner includes the § 704(c)(1)(C) basis adjustment for
purposes of determining any § 734(b) basis adjustment; but § 704(c)(1)(C) basis
adjustments are not taken into account in making allocations under Reg. § 1.7551(c). If § 704(c)(1)(C) property is distributed to another partner, the contributing
partner’s § 704(c)(1)(C) basis adjustment for the distributed property is
reallocated among the remaining items of partnership property under Reg.
§ 1.755-1(c) (similarly to the rule in Reg. § 1.743-1(g)(2)(ii) for reallocating
§ 743(b) adjustments). The proposed regulations provide complex rules dealing
with complete liquidation of the interest of a partner with respect to whom a
§ 704(c)(1)(C) adjustment is in effect that are designed to reallocate the basis
adjustment among distributed property of the same class if it can be done and to
create positive § 734(b) basis adjustments if that cannot be done. There are many
other rules dealing with specific transactions (e.g., nonrecognition transfers)
involving § 704(c)(1)(C) property. The proposed regulations do not extend any
of these rules to reverse § 704(c) allocations.
 The proposed regulations under § 734(b)
elaborate on the statute principally with respect to tiered partnerships and, in
Prop. Reg. § 1.734-2(c), with respect to basis adjustments after a distribution to
a contributing partner or a transferee partner.
 The proposed regulations under § 743(b)
elaborate on the application of the provision to tiered partnerships and substitute
basis provisions and provide detailed rules for the exception for electing
investment partnerships.
 Proposed amendments to Reg. § 1.7371(c) would provide that a § 708(b)(1)(B) technical termination of a partnership
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does not begin a new seven-year period for each partner with respect to built-in
gain and built-in loss property that the terminated partnership is deemed to
contribute to the new partnership under Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(4).
 All of the above proposed regulations
generally would be effective upon finalization.
 Proposed amendments to the regulations
under § 755 would provide that the transferee in a substituted basis transaction
succeeds to that portion of the transferor’s basis adjustment attributable to the
transferred partnership interest, and that the adjustment is taken into account in
determining the transferee’s share of the adjusted basis to the partnership for
purposes of §§ 1.743-1(b) and 1.755-1(b)(5). The proposed amendments (Prop.
Reg. § 1.755-1(b)(5)) also deal with allocating § 743(b) basis adjustments
resulting from exchanges in which the transferee’s basis in the partnership
interest is determined in whole or in part by reference to the transferor’s basis in
that interest and from exchanges in which the transferee’s basis in the partnership
interest is determined by reference to other property held at any time by the
transferee. The new rules would apply, for example, if a partnership interest is
contributed to a corporation in a transaction to which § 351 applies, if a
partnership interest is contributed to a partnership in a transaction to which
§ 721(a) applies, or if a partnership interest is distributed by a partnership in a
transaction to which § 731(a) applies. The proposed amendments to the § 755
regulations have varying retroactive effective dates, mostly reaching back to
12/15/99, but some retroactive to 6/9/03, and others effective 1/16/14.
F.

Partnership Audit Rules

1.
The IRS gets a second bite at this TEFRA apple
even if the in-house rules were not followed. NPR Investments, LLC v.
United States, 732 F. Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. Tex. 8/10/10). NPR was a partnership
formed to execute an R.J. Ruble, Sidley Austin, Son-of-Boss abusive tax
shelter deal. The three partners were partners in a plaintiff’s contingency fee
law firm, and two of them were the taxpayers in Klamath Strategic Investment
Fund, LLC v. United States, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 5/21/09). When the
partners withdrew from NPR, they transferred the inflated basis foreign
currency from NPR to their law firm partnership. On its tax return, NPR
indicated that it was not a partnership subject to TEFRA audit procedures,
when in fact it was a TEFRA partnership. In the initial audit of NPR’s returns,
the IRS applied normal partnership audit procedures and issued a final noadjustment notice to the partnership. Rather than proposing adjustments to the
NPR return, the IRS determined that it would deny loss deductions through
the issuance of notices of deficiency directly to the NPR partners. In a higherlevel review, the IRS determined that NPR was a TEFRA partnership and that
the deficiency action required issuance of an FPAA to the NPR partners
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adjusting NPR partnership items. Section 6223(f) provides that if the IRS
mails a notice of final partnership administrative adjustment, it may not mail
another notice in the absence of a showing of fraud, malfeasance, or
misrepresentation of a material fact. The taxpayers argued that the second
notice was invalid. The court (Judge Ward) found that the initial notice to NPR
met the statutory criteria for an FPPA, even though it was sent through the
normal audit process. The court indicated that there is nothing in statute or
case law that affects the validity of an FPPA by whether the IRS followed
proper internal procedures in issuing the notice. However, the court also found
that the taxpayer’s misrepresentation of the TEFRA audit status on NPR’s
partnership return by failing to check the box indicating it was subject to the
TEFRA provisions was a “misrepresentation of a material fact” invoking the
exception in § 6223(f) that allows a second notice.
 The court also held that the taxpayers
reasonably relied on their tax advisors and declined to impose accuracy-related
penalties for substantial understatement of income tax or negligence under
§§ 6662(b) and 6664(c)(1). In an earlier opinion, the court had concluded that,
under Fifth Circuit precedent, the 20 percent penalty for a substantial valuation
misstatement and 40 percent penalty for a gross valuation misstatement provided
in §§ 6662(b)(3) and 6662(h) did not apply because the taxpayers had conceded
the merits of the case on grounds unrelated to basis or value of property. NPR
Investments LLC v. United States, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-1082 (2/24/10).
a. The Fifth Circuit affirms, but concludes that
valuation misstatement and substantial understatement penalties apply.
NPR Investments, LLC v. United States, 740 F.3d 998 (5th Cir. 1/23/14). In
an opinion by Judge Owen, the Fifth Circuit affirmed without deciding that
the initial notice to NPR was an FPAA and concluded that, even if it was, the
District Court correctly ruled that a second FPAA was not barred by § 6223(f)
because NPR made a “misrepresentation of a material fact” on its partnership
return. The court reversed the District Court’s ruling that valuation
misstatement penalties could not apply based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision on this issue in United States v. Woods, 134 S. Ct. 557, (12/3/13).
Because the court concluded that there was no substantial authority for the tax
treatment of the transactions, the Fifth Circuit also held, contrary to the District
Court’s ruling, that the accuracy-related penalty for a substantial
understatement of income tax applied. The court further held that the District
Court had no jurisdiction to determine in this partnership-level proceeding
whether the individual partners had reasonable cause for the understatement
as provided in § 6662(c)(1) and therefore vacated the District Court’s ruling
on this issue.
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2.
Even some dim-witted law professors can
understand this TEFRA case. Greenwald v. Commissioner, 142 T.C. No. 18
(5/21/14). The taxpayers owned interests in partnerships that were subject to
the TEFRA partnership audit and litigation procedures. The partnerships
liquidated, and the partnership items for the year of liquidation were
determined in partnership-level proceedings. Following those proceedings, the
IRS asserted a deficiency with respect to the taxpayer-partners’ gain on the
liquidations. The taxpayers argued that outside basis is a partnership item that
should have been determined at the partnership level and that the deficiency
notices were invalid. The Tax Court (Judge Buch) held that gain or loss on the
disposition of an interest is an affected item that requires partner-level
determinations if the amount of that gain or loss could be affected by a partnerlevel determination in a TEFRA partnership proceeding. Accordingly, the
deficiency notices were valid and the Tax Court had jurisdiction.
3.
Jail, death, and taxes go hand in hand with
cemetery plots. McElroy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-163 (8/12/14).
The Petitioner invested in three partnerships, each lasting a single year, that
acquired cemetery plots costing $95,639, $169,167, and $252,373. Each
partnership contributed the plots to charitable organizations and passed
through claimed charitable contribution deductions for the appraised value of
the plots in the amounts of $1,864,850, $2,936,700, and $5,282,050,
respectively. Each partnership held the plots for less than one year. Each
partnership timely filed returns for its tax years, 1996, 1997, and 1998. The
Petitioner claimed charitable contribution deductions on his individual 1996,
1997, and 1998 returns and a carryover loss on his individual 1999 return. The
IRS mailed FPAAs to the respective partnerships on March 31, 2000, April
11, 2001, and March 29, 2002. The promoter and tax matters partner, Glenn
R. Johnston, refused to agree to an extension of the statute of limitations with
respect to the first partnership, indicating that he was then under criminal
investigation. Johnston filed timely petitions with the Tax Court regarding the
FPAAs in 2000, 2001, and 2002. In 2005, Johnston pleaded guilty to one count
of conspiracy to defraud the United States. On motion by the IRS, Johnston,
who was incarcerated, was replaced as the TMP by Petitioner, who served in
that capacity until Petitioner filed for bankruptcy in 2012. The partnership
proceeding was concluded in 2013, and Petitioner’s charitable contribution
deductions were substantially reduced to a portion of the partnership’s basis
in the cemetery plots. On March 31, 2011, the IRS mailed a notice of
deficiency to Petitioner. The court (Judge Nega) rejected Petitioner’s
argument that the notice of deficiency was barred by the statute of limitations.
The three-year limitations of § 6501(a) is suspended with respect to
partnership items subject to TEFRA under § 6229(a) until one year after the
decision in a partnership proceeding becomes final. Also, under § 6229(f), the
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three-year statute is extended if a partner is named as a debtor in a bankruptcy
proceeding, and partnership items are declared nonpartnership items as of the
day a bankruptcy petition is filed. In that case, the IRS has one year from the
date of the filing to assess tax attributable to the converted items. Petitioner
asserted that the partnership proceedings were invalid because on the dates the
FPAAs were issued, the then TMP, Johnston, was under criminal
investigation, was disqualified to serve as TMP, and could not properly
commence the partnership proceedings. Alternatively, Petitioner argued that
the partnership proceedings terminated earlier than the decision date because
the IRS knew that Johnston could not participate as TMP. The court held that
a challenge to the validity of an FPAA and the conduct of the proceeding were
“typically” matters to be raised in the partnership proceeding and noted that
the court in those proceedings did not find the FPAAs to be invalid, nor did
the court find improprieties in those proceedings. The court further indicated
that filing of petitions as to the FPAAs suspended the statute of limitations
regardless of the validity of the petitions under § 6229(d), requiring only that
petitions be filed to suspend the statute of limitations. In addition, even if Mr.
Johnston were not qualified to act as TMP, he could have filed the petitions as
a notice partner. The court also rejected the argument that the partnership
proceeding terminated earlier than the date of final decision, which is derived
from § 7459(c). When Petitioner filed his bankruptcy petition during the
pendency of the partnership proceedings, Petitioner’s partnership items
became nonpartnership items and the IRS had one year from the date of the
filing to mail the Notice of Deficiency, which it did.
 The court rejected Petitioner’s claim that
he should be able to deduct his initial $37,500 investment in the partnerships
under § 165 because the Petitioner entered into the partnerships without the
requisite profit motive. Increasing charitable contribution deductions is not a nontax profit motive.
4.
Tread lightly. Missteps by the IRS and taxpayer’s
representative deprive the Tax Court of jurisdiction. This case
demonstrates the problems created for TEFRA by abusive shelters.
Bedrosian v. Commissioner, 143 T.C. No. 4 (8/13/14). This long, convoluted
opinion (Judge Buch), reviewed by the court, examines an equally convoluted
procedural morass that was created by IRS examinations which issued both a
Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA) and a notice of
deficiency involving the same partnership items in a Son-of-Boss partnership.
At the outset, the taxpayers were advised that their 1999 return was selected
for audit and, at the request of the IRS, the taxpayers executed a Form 872
extending the statute of limitations and a Form 2848 appointing
representatives. No such forms were executed regarding Stone Canyon, the
partnership through which the Son-of-Boss transaction was executed. The
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parties agreed that the Form 872 did not extend the limitations period for
assessment of tax attributable to partnership items and affected items of Stone
Canyon for tax year 1999. The IRS also examined the taxpayers’ 2000 return,
which had a small carryover attributable to the partnership. In the 2000 case,
the taxpayers executed a Form 872-1 that extended the limitations period to
assess tax, including tax attributable to items of a partnership for 2000. The
revenue agent contacted the taxpayers’ representative and told her that the IRS
would soon issue a Notice of Beginning of Administrative Proceeding
(NBAP) with respect to Stone Canyon for 1999, then issued the NBAP by
mailing the notice to the taxpayers, but not their representative because no
power of attorney was submitted for Stone Canyon. In April 2005, the IRS
mailed the FPAA to the taxpayers, Stone Canyon, and the pass-through entities
designated as partners in Stone Canyon, sending the FPAA to fourteen
different addresses. The FPAA included a notice indicating that the FPAA was
untimely under § 6223(e) because it was issued only 61 days following the
NPAB and that the taxpayer could “elect” under § 6223(e) to opt out of the
partnership proceeding. Eleven days later, the IRS issued a notice of
deficiency to the taxpayers assessing tax for the same partnership items that
were the subject of the FPAA. The taxpayers filed a timely petition with the
Tax Court contesting the 2005 notice of deficiency, and also made a payment
of $4,269,819 to the IRS. Responding to a motion by the IRS, the Tax Court
held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the taxpayers’ petition because the 2005
notice of deficiency was invalid as addressing partnership items or affected
items subject to TEFRA actions. Bedrosian v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2007-375. The court suggested, however, that it retained continuing
jurisdiction to consider nonpartnership items. The IRS also issued in 2006 an
affected items notice of deficiency to the taxpayers. In response to the
taxpayers’ petition to the Tax Court, filed in response to the 2006 notice, the
court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the deficiencies because they
had been paid and assessed prior to the issuance of the 2006 notice. Bedrosian
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-376. In 2007, the taxpayers filed an
untimely petition in response to the FPAA. The Tax Court rejected the
taxpayers’ argument that the FPAA was invalid because it was sent to the
wrong address and dismissed the untimely petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Stone Canyon Partners v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-377. These
decisions collectively were affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Bedrosian v.
Commissioner, 358 F. App’x 868 (9th Cir. 2009). Finally, in the instant case,
after granting leave to amend, the Tax Court rejected the taxpayers’ motion
for summary judgment and held that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider
the partnership items. The taxpayers argued that the partnership items should
be considered nonpartnership items under § 6223(e), and at the request of the

236

Florida Tax Review

[Vol. 17:3

court, also argued that the court had jurisdiction to consider the partnership
items under § 6231(g)(2).
Section 6223(e)(2) provides where an FPAA is issued less than 120 days
after an NBAP, in the case of proceedings that are “concluded” by expiration
of the time for filing a petition for review or by a court action that has become
final, a partner may elect to accept the determination in the proceeding, or if
no election is filed, partnership items are treated as nonpartnership items, and
thus are not subject to TEFRA. Under § 6223(e)(3), where a proceeding is still
ongoing, the partner will be treated as a party to the proceeding unless the
partner affirmatively elects to treat partnership items as nonpartnership items.
The court held that expiration of the statute of limitations does not treat a
proceeding as concluded for purposes of § 6223(e)(2), reasoning that different
partners may be subject to different limitations periods. Second, the court held
that the taxpayers did not properly elect to treat the partnership items as
nonpartnership items for purposes of § 6223(e)(3) and rejected the taxpayers’
argument that their petition to the Tax Court should be treated as an election
under the substantial compliance doctrine. The court observed that even if the
FPAAs were sent to the wrong address, the taxpayers had ample notice of the
FPAA and opportunity to file the requisite election.
Section 6231(g)(2) provides that if the IRS reasonably, but erroneously,
“determines” based on a partnership return that TEFRA applies to a
partnership, then the TEFRA rules are extended to the partnership, and
conversely, that if the IRS reasonably, but erroneously, “determines” based on
partnership returns that a partnership is not subject to TEFRA, then TEFRA
does not apply to the partnership and the normal deficiency rules are
applicable. The court rejected the taxpayers’ argument that the initial audit
procedure of the taxpayers’ 1999 return was a determination that the
partnership was not subject to TEFRA, thereby providing the Tax Court with
jurisdiction to address the partnership items in the pending deficiency
procedure. The court held that the requisite determination is made, not in the
audit process, but only when the IRS determines to issue an FPAA. The court
also held that it would not have been reasonable in any event for the IRS to
conclude that the partnership was not subject to TEFRA. Although the
partnership’s return for 1999 checked a box that it was not a TEFRA
partnership, the court held that the fact that K-1’s filed by the partnership
showed entity partners clearly established that the partnership was not entitled
to the small partnership exception from TEFRA of § 6231(a)(1)(B) (less than
10 partners) because it had pass-through entity partners.
Finally, the court concluded that the law of the case reflected in the Court
of Appeals’ opinion precluded the Tax Court from asserting jurisdiction in the
taxpayers’ deficiency case. The court indicated that a finding in favor of the
taxpayers under §§ 6231(e) or (g) would assert jurisdiction where the prior
decisions held that none existed.

2015]

Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation

237

 In a concurring opinion, Judge Goeke
agreed with the result but took offense at the majority’s application of the law of
the case doctrine.
 In a dissent, Judge Vasquez stated:
The opinion of the Court departs from these deeply ingrained principles
by denying the Bedrosians their day in court. I believe the result reached
by the opinion of the Court is not only inconsistent with the interests of
justice but is also the product of an erroneous view of the governing law.
Judge Vasquez disagreed that the law of the case doctrine precluded the court
from asserting jurisdiction and asserted that the significant IRS determination
under § 6223(g) was the decision to proceed with an audit of the taxpayers’
individual returns at the outset, misleading the taxpayers into filing a petition for
review of the Notice of Deficiency, rather than pursuing review of the FPAA.
 In his concurring opinion, Judge Halpern
observed that the taxpayers had been sent copies of the FPAA as notice partners
and had an opportunity to file a petition in the partnership proceeding. Judge
Halpern pointed out that: “Petitioners have had their opportunity for a day in
court. Whether they actually received the FPAA is beside the point. All Congress
required is that it be mailed to them at a proper address.”
5.
The simplification of partnership audits enacted
in TEFRA continues to make partnership audits ever-more complex and
procedurally mysterious. JT USA, LP v. Commissioner, 771 F.3d 654 (9th
Cir. 11/14/14). The Ninth Circuit, in a 2-1 opinion by Judge Trott, reversed
the Tax Court’s holding (131 T.C. 59 (2008)) that a taxpayer holding both
direct and indirect interests in a partnership may elect under § 6223(e)(3)(B)
not to be bound by the results of a TEFRA partnership proceeding as to some,
but not all, of those interests held during the relevant taxable year. The
taxpayers had elected to opt out of the partnership proceeding with respect to
their indirect interests but to leave in that proceeding their alleged remaining
direct partnership interests. If the taxpayers’ elections to opt out only as
indirect partners were effective, the assessment of about $10 million of
deficiencies resulting from about $36.6 million in adjustments would have
been time-barred. The majority held that, unless a partner elects to have all of
his or her partnership items treated as nonpartnership items, the partner cannot
elect out of the TEFRA proceeding, reasoning that
[the TEFRA] provisions were enacted inter alia to prevent the waste
of time, effort, and resources occasioned by a multiply of proceedings
such as would occur if the Tax Court’s construction of §6223(e) were
to prevail. In a normal case the Tax Court’s ruling here would permit
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‘duplicative proceedings and the potential for inconsistent treatment
to partners in the same partnership,’ thus hindering the purpose and
policy justifications that produces TEFRA.
Furthermore, it upheld and applied Temp. Reg. § 301.6223(e)-2T(c)(1), which
provides that “the election shall apply to all partnership items for the
partnership taxable year to which the election relates.”
 Judge Callahan dissented. He concluded
that TEFRA allows one partner to make one election and another partner to make
a different election, and that a partner who has both direct and indirect interests
should have the same option, particularly where, as in this case, the IRS failed to
timely notify the taxpayer that a bifurcated election was ineffective.
G.

Miscellaneous
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2014.
VIII.

TAX SHELTERS
A.

Tax Shelter Cases and Rulings

1.
The Castle Harbour saga. Will it ever end? The
Second Circuit twice reverses a taxpayer victory in a self-liquidating
partnership note transaction, in which the lion’s share of income was
allocated to a tax-indifferent party, on the ground that the tax-indifferent
Dutch banks were not really equity partners. TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United
States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn. 11/1/04), rev’d, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir.
8/3/06), on remand, 660 F. Supp. 2d 367, as amended, 660 F. Supp. 2d 367
(D. Conn. 10/23/09), rev’d, 666 F.3d 836 (2d Cir. 1/24/12), on remand, 8 F.
Supp. 3d 142 (D. Conn. 3/28/14).
a.
Castle Harbour I: District Court holds for
the taxpayer. The court found that the creation of Castle Harbour, a Nevada
LLC, by General Electric Capital Corp. (GECC) subsidiaries was not designed
solely to avoid taxes, but to spread the risk of their investment in fullydepreciated commercial airplanes used in their leasing operations. GECC
subsidiaries put the following assets into Castle Harbour: $530 million worth
of fully-depreciated aircraft subject to a $258 million non-recourse debt; $22
million of rents receivable; $296 million of cash; and all the stock of another
GECC subsidiary that had a value of $0. Two tax-indifferent Dutch Banks
invested $117.5 million in Castle Harbour. Under the LLC agreement, the tax-
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indifferent partner was allocated 98 percent of the book income and 98 percent
of the tax income.
 The book income was net of depreciation
and the tax income did not take depreciation into account (because the airplanes
were fully depreciated for tax purposes). Depreciation deductions for book
purposes were on the order of 60 percent of the rental income for any given year.
 Scheduled distributions in excess of book
income would have resulted in the liquidation of the investment of the Dutch
banks in eight years, with the Dutch banks receiving a return of approximately
nine percent, with some “economically substantial” upside and some downside
risk. Castle Harbour was terminated after five years because of a threatened
change in U.S. tax law, but during that period about $310 million of income was
shifted to the Dutch banks for a tax saving to the GECC subsidiaries of about $62
million.
 Query whether § 704(b) was properly
applied to this transaction?
 This appears to be a lease-stripping
transaction in which the income from the lease was assigned to foreign entities,
while the benefits of ownership were left with a domestic entity.
 The court (Judge Underhill) held that
satisfaction of the mechanical rules of the regulations under § 704(b) transcended
both an intent to avoid tax and the avoidance of significant tax through agreed
upon partnership allocations. In this partnership, 2 percent of both operating and
taxable income was allocated to GECC, a United States partner, and 98 percent
of both book and taxable income was allocated to partners who were Dutch
banks. The Dutch banks were foreign partners who were not liable for United
States taxes and thus were indifferent to the U.S. tax consequences of their
participation in the partnership. Because the partnership had very large book
depreciation deductions and no tax depreciation, most of the partnership’s
taxable operating income, which was substantially in excess of book taxable
income, was allocated to the tax-indifferent foreign partners, even though a large
portion of the cash receipts reflected in that income was devoted to repaying the
principal of loans secured by property that GECC had contributed to the
partnership. The overall partnership transaction saved GECC approximately $62
million in income taxes, and the court found that “it appears likely that one of
GECC’s principal motivations in entering into this transaction – though certainly
not its only motivation – was to avoid that substantial tax burden.” The court
understood the effects of the allocations and concluded that “by allocating 98%
of the income from fully tax-depreciated aircraft to the Dutch Banks, GECC
avoided an enormous tax burden, while shifting very little book income.” Put
another way, by allocating income less depreciation to tax-neutral parties, GECC
was able to “re-depreciate” the assets for tax purposes. The tax-neutrals absorbed
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the tax consequences of all the income allocated to them, but actually received
only the income in excess of book depreciation. Nevertheless, the court upheld
the allocations.
The tax benefits of the . . . transaction were the result of the
allocation of large amounts of book income to a tax-neutral
entity, offset by a large depreciation expense, with a
corresponding allocation of a large amount of taxable income,
but no corresponding allocation of depreciation deductions.
This resulted in an enormous tax savings, but the simple
allocation of a large percentage of income violates no rule. The
government does not – and cannot – dispute that partners may
allocate their partnership’s income as they choose. Neither does
the government dispute that the taxable income allocated to the
Dutch Banks could not be offset by the allocation of nonexistent depreciation deductions to the banks. And . . . the bare
allocation of a large interest in income does not violate the
overall tax effect rule.


Judge Underhill concluded:

The government is understandably concerned that the
Castle Harbour transaction deprived the public fisc of some
$62 million in tax revenue. Moreover, it appears likely that
one of GECC’s principal motivations in entering into this
transaction—though certainly not its only motivation—was to
avoid that substantial tax burden. Nevertheless, the Castle
Harbour transaction was an economically real transaction,
undertaken, at least in part, for a non-tax business purpose;
the transaction resulted in the creation of a true partnership
with all participants holding valid partnership interests; and
the income was allocated among the partners in accordance
with the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations. In
short, the transaction, though it sheltered a great deal of
income from taxes, was legally permissible. Under such
circumstances, the I.R.S. should address its concerns to those
who write the tax laws.
b.
Castle Harbour II: Second Circuit
reverses. 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 8/3/06). The Second Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge Leval, held that the Dutch banks were not partners because their risks
and rewards were closer to those of creditors than of partners. He used the
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facts-and-circumstances test of Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733
(1949), to determine whether the banks’ interest was more in the nature of debt
or equity and found that their interest was overwhelmingly in the nature of a
secured lender’s interest, “which would neither be harmed by poor
performance of the partnership nor significantly enhanced by extraordinary
profits.”
 In ACM (Colgate), Judge Laro wrote a
100+ page analysis to find that there was no economic substance to the
arrangement. The next contingent payment installment sale case in the Tax Court
was ASA Investerings (Allied Signal), in which Judge Foley wrote a much shorter
opinion finding that the Dutch bank was not a partner; the D.C. Circuit affirmed
on Judge Foley’s holding that the Dutch bank was not a partner. The IRS began
to pick up this lack-of-partnership argument and began to use it on examinations.
Later, the Tax Court (Judge Nims) used the economic substance argument in
Saba (Brunswick), which the D.C. Circuit remanded, based on ASA Investerings,
to give taxpayer the opportunity to argue that there was a valid partnership, which
it could not do, as Judge Nims found on remand. Even later, the D.C. Circuit
reversed the District Court’s Boca (Wyeth or American Home Products) case
based upon this lack-of-partnership argument—even though Cravath planned
Boca carefully so that if the Dutch bank was knocked out, there would still be a
partnership—based upon its ASA Investerings and Saba findings on appeal that
there was no partnership. Now the Second Circuit has adopted the lack-ofpartnership argument.
c.
Castle Harbour III: Judge Underhill still
likes GE. On remand in Castle Harbour, the District Court found a valid
partnership to have existed under § 704(e) because the heading does not
alter the clear language of a statute. A valid family partnership is found
in the absence of a family. Additionally, in his contingent penalty findings,
Judge Underhill stated that his 2004 taxpayer-favorable decision ipso
facto means that the taxpayer’s reporting position was based upon
substantial authority. 660 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D. Conn. 10/7/09), as amended,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98884 (D. Conn. 10/23/09). In a carefully-written6
opinion, Judge Underhill held that, while the Second Circuit opinion decided
that the partnership did not meet the Culbertson totality-of-the-circumstances
test (“whether . . . the parties in good faith and acting with a business purpose
intended to join together in the present conduct of the enterprise”), it did not

6. We do not all share the opinion that the opinion is “carefully-written,” but
Ira thinks so. Ira’s college classmate, [Judge] Pierre Leval, characterized the District
Court’s analysis as “thorough and thoughtful.”
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address the § 704(e)(1) issue. He held that the Dutch banks did satisfy the
requirements of that paragraph, which reads:
(e) Family partnerships.
(1) Recognition of interest created by purchase or gift. –
A person shall be recognized as a partner for purposes of this
subtitle if he owns a capital interest in a partnership in which
capital is a material income-producing factor, whether or not
such interest was derived by purchase or gift from any other
person.
 In so holding, he relied upon well-settled
law that the title of a statute cannot limit the plain meaning of the text and that
the title is of use only when it sheds light on some ambiguous word or phrase.
See also I.R.C. § 7806(b).
 It is worth noting that although Evans v.
Commissioner, 447 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1971), aff’g 54 T.C. 40 (1970), which
Judge Underhill relied upon extensively to reach his conclusion, held that the
application of § 704(e)(1) was not limited to the context of family partnerships,
Evans involved the question who, between two different persons—the original
partner or an assignee of the original partner’s economic interest—was the
partner who should be taxed on a distributive share of the partnership’s income.
Although in the family context, § 704(e) frequently has been applied to determine
whether a partnership exists in the first place, Judge Underhill’s decision in
Castle Harbour III is the very first case ever to discover that § 704(e)(1) applies
to determine whether an arrangement between two (or more) otherwise unrelated
business entities or unrelated individuals constituted a partnership.
 It has sometimes been adduced that the
fact that a court of applicable jurisdiction subsequently upholds the tax treatment
of a transaction should be a strong argument for the proposition that such tax
treatment was based upon substantial authority. With respect to the applicability
of penalties should he be reversed on appeal, Judge Underhill stated:
To a large extent, my holding in Castle Harbour I in favor
of the taxpayer demonstrates the substantial authority for the
partnership’s tax treatment of the Dutch Banks, as does my
discussion above of the Dutch Banks’ interest in Castle
Harbour under section 704(e)(1). In addition, the
government’s arguments against the substantial authority
defense are unavailing.
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 Judge Underhill also sought to place the
application of the penalty provisions in a temporal context when he stated:
The government argues that Culbertson and Second Circuit
cases like Slifka and Dyer that interpreted Culbertson cannot
provide substantial authority for the partnership’s tax position
because the Second Circuit held in Castle Harbour II that the
Dutch Banks were not partners under Culbertson. The
government, however, has not pointed to any Second Circuit
case or other authority, prior to 1997 and 1998 when the
Castle Harbour partners took the tax positions at issue, where
the parties’ good faith intention or valid business purpose in
forming a partnership was not sufficient to support a
conclusion of partnership status for tax purposes.
 In the context of the previous two bullet
points, it is worth noting that Judge Underhill’s observations in the immediately
preceding bullet point appears to be consistent with Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iv)(C),
which provides that whether a position was supported by substantial authority
must be determined with reference to authorities in existence at the time. But,
Judge Underhill’s observations in the second preceding bullet point appear to be
inconsistent with both Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iv)(C) and observations in
the immediately preceding bullet. However, we are not all in agreement with
what Judge Underhill intended the observations in the second preceding bullet
point to mean.
d.
Castle Harbour IV: The Second Circuit
smacks down the District Court again in an opinion that leaves you
wondering why it ever remanded the case in the first place. 666 F.3d 836
(2d Cir. 1/24/12). In another opinion by Judge Leval, the Second Circuit again
reversed Judge Underhill and held that the enactment of § 704(e)(1), which
recognizes as a partner one who owns a “capital interest in a partnership,” did
not “change[] the law so that a holding of debt (or of an interest
overwhelmingly in the nature of debt) could qualify as a partnership interest.”
Notwithstanding that they tend to favor the government’s
position, the governing statute and regulation leave some
ambiguity as to whether the holder of partnership debt (or an
interest overwhelmingly in the nature of debt) shall be
recognized as a partner. Therefore, we may consult the
legislative history to see whether it sheds light on their
interpretation. . . . The reports of the House and the Senate
accompanying the passage of § 704(e) make clear that the
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provision did not intend to broaden the character of interests
in partnerships that qualify for treatment as a partnership
interest to include partnership debt.
The purpose of the statute was to address an altogether
different question. The concern of § 704(e)(1) was whether it
matters, for the determination of whether a person is a partner
for tax purposes, that the person’s purported partnership
interest arose through an intrafamily transfer. The section was
passed to reject court opinions that refused to recognize for
tax purposes transfers of partnership interests because the
transfers were effectuated by intrafamilial gift, as opposed to
arm’s length purchase. Its focus is not on the nature of the
investment in a partnership, but rather on who should be
recognized for tax purposes as the owner of the interest.
 The Second Circuit went on to describe
the District Court as having found that the banks incurred “real risk” that might
require them to restore negative capital accounts, and thus as having concluded
“that the banks’ interest was therefore an ‘interest in the assets of the partnership’
distributable to them upon liquidation.” The Second Circuit then described the
District Court’s finding that the banks’ interest qualified as a capital interest as
having been “premised entirely on the significance it accorded to the possibility
that the banks would be required to bear 1% of partnership losses exceeding $7
million, or 100% of partnership losses exceeding $541 million.” But the Second
Circuit disagreed, holding that there was a mere appearance of risk, rather than
any real risk, which did not justify treating the banks’ interest as a capital, or
equity, interest, noting that it had reached the same conclusion in its earlier
opinion. The Second Circuit then suggested that:
The district court was perhaps reading § 704(e)(1) to mean that
the addition to a debt interest of any possibility that the holder’s
ultimate entitlement will vary, based on the debtor’s
performance, from pure reimbursement plus a previously fixed
rate of return will qualify that interest as a partnership interest,
no matter how economically insignificant the potential
deviation and how improbable its occurrence.
The Second Circuit “disagree[d] with any such reading of the statute. No such
interpretation is compelled by the plain language of § 704(e)(1). And the fact that
the statute was intended to serve an altogether different purpose is confirmed by
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the legislative reports.” The Second Circuit continued:
In explaining our conclusion that the banks’ interest was
not a genuine equity interest, we repeatedly emphasized that,
as a practical matter, the structure of the partnership
agreement confined the banks’ return to the Applicable Rate
regardless of the performance of Castle Harbour. . . .
The banks’ interest was therefore necessarily not a
“capital interest” . . . . Because the banks’ interest was for all
practical purposes a fixed obligation, requiring
reimbursement of their investment at a set rate of return in all
but the most unlikely of scenarios, their interest rather
represented a liability of the partnership. . . . Accordingly, for
the same reasons that the evidence compels the conclusion
that the banks’ interest was not bona fide equity participation,
it also compels the conclusion that their interest was not a
capital interest within the meaning of § 704(e)(1).
 Turning to the § 6662 penalty issue, the
Second Circuit again trashed Judge Underhill’s opinion and reversed, reinstating
the penalties and stating that Judge Underhill had “mistakenly concluded that
several of our decisions supported treatment of the banks as partners in Castle
Harbour.”
e.
Castle Harbour V: On remand, Judge
Underhill rejects the imposition of a negligence penalty following the
inapplicability of the substantial understatement penalty. 8 F. Supp. 3d
142 (D. Conn. 3/28/14). On remand, Judge Underhill noted that the Second
Circuit had determined that the 20 percent substantial understatement penalty
could be imposed, but had not ruled on the imposition of the 20 percent
negligence penalty. However, the government had subsequently realized that
the substantial understatement penalty could not be assessed because the 10
percent substantial understatement threshold had not been satisfied,
presumably because the payments to the Dutch Banks [that the Second Circuit
held were interest payments] became deductible to the taxpayer.
 As to the negligence penalty issue, Judge
Underhill noted that the 1999 Joint Committee Study of Penalty and Interest
Provisions likened the “substantial authority” standard to a 40 percent chance of
success on the merits, while the “reasonable basis” standard will be satisfied [and
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a taxpayer cannot be found negligent] if its tax position has a 20 percent chance
of success on the merits. He refused to accept the government’s argument that:
TIFD must present evidence that it actually, subjectively
relied on those precedents when it determined its tax liability.
The government essentially asks me to draw an adverse
inference from the fact that TIFD did not waive the attorneyclient privilege with respect to the tax advice it received, but
instead attempted to win based on the state of the law alone.
But that interpretation defies both common sense and the
larger structure of the regulations governing penalties. In
general, a review for reasonableness is an objective
assessment, one that does not consider an individual’s actual
state of mind. Section 1.6662-3 reflects this accepted
standard, ascribing “reasonable basis” to the tax position, not
the taxpayer
 Moreover, Judge Underhill stated that his
earlier decision in the taxpayer’s favor mandates objective reasonableness of the
taxpayer’s position:
Simply put, the objective reasonableness of a tax position
becomes virtually unassailable when the taxpayer actually
prevails at trial before a district judge who was not
compromised by conflict, substance abuse, or senility. The
reasonableness of the tax position on which TIFD sustained
its burden of proof of correctness after a lengthy bench trial –
even if both taxpayer and judge ultimately were mistaken –
scarcely can be questioned. Indeed, I am aware of no case in
which a negligence penalty has been applied following
reversal of a taxpayer’s district court victory. To the contrary,
the Second Circuit has admonished the government for
attempting to impose a negligence penalty in a case where it
found that the district court had misinterpreted the law.
Holmes v. United States, 85 F.3d 956, 963 n.7 (2d Cir. 1996)
(“One may disagree, as we did, with the taxpayer [and the
district court] on whether or not § 280A applies to cooperative
stock, but the government’s bald claim that the taxpayer did
not exercise due care in making his argument is little short of
reprehensible. And its persistence in asserting the negligence
claim even after it lost below is mind boggling. . . . We
therefore not only reject the claim of negligence in this case,
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but caution the government against making like claims in
similar situations where the law is, at best, unclear.”).
(footnote omitted)
2.
District Court upholds BLIPS tax shelter on
taxpayer’s partial summary judgment motion. Klamath Strategic
Investment Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Tex.
7/20/06). The court (Judge Ward) held that the premium portion of the loans
received from the bank in connection with the funding of the instruments
contributed to a partnership was a contingent obligation and not a fixed and
determined liability for purposes of § 752. The transaction was entered into
prior to the release of Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255, which related to Sonof-Boss transactions. Judge Ward held that a regulation to the contrary, Reg.
§ 1.752-6 (see T.D. 9062), was not effective retroactively, and was therefore
invalid as applied to these transactions. Judge Ward held that there was clear
authority existing at the time of the transaction that the premium portion of the
loan did not reduce taxpayer’s basis in the partnership.
a.
Klamath on the merits: It does not work
because it lacks economic substance, but no penalties. The authorities
discussed in the Holland & Hart and Olson Lemons opinions provide
“substantial authority.” Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United
States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Tex. 1/31/07). The transactions lacked
economic substance because the loans would not be used to provide leverage
for foreign currency transactions, but no penalties were applicable because
taxpayers passed on a 1999 investment, they thought they were investing in
foreign currencies, and the tax opinions they received that relied on relevant
authorities set forth in the court’s earlier opinion provided “substantial
authority” for the taxpayers’ treatment of their basis in their partnerships.
b.
On government motions, Judge Ward
refuses to vacate partial summary judgment decision on the retroactivity
of the regulations under § 752, and he permits the deduction of
operational expenses—despite his earlier finding that the transactions
lacked economic substance—because the taxpayers had profit motives.
Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United States, 99 A.F.T.R.2d
2007-2001 (E.D. Tex. 4/3/07). First, Judge Ward held that even though the
loans lacked economic substance, they still existed, and thus the partial
summary judgment on the non-retroactivity of the regulations under § 752 was
not premised on invalid factual assumptions. Second, he held that the existence
of profit motive for deduction of operational expenses was based on the
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purposes of Nix and Patterson – and not on the motives of Presidio, the
managing partner of the partnership.
c.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded. Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United States, 568
F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 5/21/09). In ruling unfavorably on the taxpayers’ crossappeal of the holding that the transaction lacked economic substance, the Fifth
Circuit (Judge Garza) followed the majority rule, which “is that a lack of
economic substance is sufficient to invalidate the transaction regardless of
whether the taxpayer has motives other than tax avoidance.” He stated:
“[T]hus, if a transaction lacks economic substance compelled by business or
regulatory realities, the transaction must be disregarded even if the taxpayers
profess a genuine business purpose without tax-avoidance motivations.”
 In ruling unfavorably on the government’s
appeal of the non-imposition of penalties, Judge Garza stated:
The district court found that Patterson and Nix sought legal
advice from qualified accountants and tax attorneys
concerning the legal implications of their investments and the
resulting tax deductions. They hired attorneys to write a
detailed tax opinion, providing the attorneys with access to all
relevant transactional documents. This tax opinion concluded
that the tax treatment at issue complied with reasonable
interpretations of the tax laws. At trial, the Partnerships’ tax
expert [Stuart Smith] concluded that the opinion complied
with standards established by Treasury Circular 230, which
addresses conduct of practitioners who provide tax opinions.
Overall, the district court found that the Partnerships proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that they relied in good
faith on the advice of qualified accountants and tax lawyers.
d.
A small lagniappe to the taxpayers in a tax
shelter. Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United States, 110
A.F.T.R.2d 2012-6021 (E.D. Tex. 9/24/12). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals disallowed losses generated by a BLIPS tax shelter investment
which was held to lack economic substance. Klamath Strategic Investment
Fund, LLC v. United States, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009). The Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the District Court to determine whether
partnership operational expenses of $903,000 and fees for investment advice
to the partner investors were deductible under § 212. Based on findings by the
trial court, the Court of Appeals indicated that although the transaction lacked
economic substance, the profit motive of the individual investors would permit
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the deduction of their economic outlays if the investors effectively controlled
the partnership activities so that their profit motive would be attributable to
the partnership. (The managing partners were held to have lacked the
necessary profit motive to support the deductions.) The District Court (Judge
Gilstrap) found that the partnerships were formed to effect an investment
strategy selected by the investors, the managing partners were the managing
partners “only because [the investors] said so,” and the managing partners
were confined to the investment strategy directed by the investors “who could
shut down the whole process by withdrawing from the partnerships they had
created.” The court thus held that the investors were the parties having
effective control over the partnerships. The court also held that $250,000 of
investment fees paid to investment advisors who provided guidance with
respect to the partnership’s foreign currency investments were deductible. The
court concluded from its reading of the Court of Appeals remand that it had
jurisdiction to order the refund in the partnership proceeding, notwithstanding
the fact that the expenses were not paid or incurred by the partnerships.
e.
A second trip to the Fifth Circuit, which
affirms. Could this possibly be the end of the saga? Klamath Strategic
Investment Fund, LLC v. United States, 557 Fed. Appx. 368 (5th Cir. 3/3/14).
The government appealed the District Court’s rulings on remand, and the Fifth
Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed. The court rejected the government’s
argument that the District Court had erred in determining that the investors
(Nix and Patterson), rather than the managing partner (Presidio), controlled
the partnership, and therefore, the profit motive of Nix and Patterson should
be attributed to the partnership. The court also rejected the government’s
argument that the District Court lacked jurisdiction in this partnership-level
proceeding to determine that Nix and Patterson were entitled to deduct the
$250,000 fee they each paid to investment advisors. The court concluded that,
because the issue of the District Court’s jurisdiction had been raised and
argued in the first appeal and the Court of Appeals had included the $250,000
fee on the list of operating expenses to be addressed on remand, the District
Court had jurisdiction under the law-of-the-case doctrine.
3.
A Tax Court judge sees a MidCoast deal as
immune from transferee liability. Frank Sawyer Trust of May 1992 v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-298 (12/27/11). The Tax Court (Judge
Goeke) refused to uphold transferee liability against the shareholders of a
corporation who sold the stock of the corporation engaged to a midco
(Fortrend, which was brought into the deal by the infamous MidCoast to
provide financing) after an asset sale. He found that the shareholders knew
little about the mechanics of the transaction and exercised due diligence.

250

Florida Tax Review

[Vol. 17:3

The trust representatives believed Fortrend’s attorneys to be
from prestigious and reputable law firms. They assumed that
Fortrend must have had some method of offsetting the taxable
gains within the corporations. They performed due diligence
with respect to Fortrend to ensure that Fortrend was not a
scam operation and that Fortrend had the financial capacity to
purchase the stock. The trust representatives believed
Fortrend assumed the risk of overpaying for the Taxi
corporations if they did not have a legal way for offsetting or
reducing the tax liabilities.
 Judge Goeke applied state fraudulent
conveyance law to determine whether the transactions should be collapsed and
concluded that they should not, because the IRS, which has the burden of proof
in transferee liability cases, did not prove that “the purported transferee had either
actual or constructive knowledge of the entire scheme.” Because in this case the
transaction was structured in such a manner that the corporation never made any
payments to the shareholders, there was no actual or constructive fraudulent
transfer to the shareholders. Finally, turning to federal tax law, Judge Goeke held
that “substance over form and its related doctrines [were] not applicable,”
because the transaction was an arm’s length stock sale between the shareholders
and a purchaser in which the parties agreed that the purchaser would be
responsible for reporting and paying the corporation’s income taxes. “There was
no preconceived plan to avoid taxation . . . .” Judge Goeke distinguished Feldman
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-297 (2011), because in that case “[i]t was
‘absolutely clear’ that the taxpayer was aware the stock purchaser had no
intention of ever paying the tax liabilities [and] the taxpayer did not conduct
thorough due diligence of the stock purchaser . . . .”
a.
But the First Circuit says Judge Goeke
misunderstood Massachusetts law and tells him to try a different analysis.
Frank Sawyer Trust of May 1992 v. Commissioner, 712 F.3d 597 (1st Cir.
3/29/13). The First Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Lynch, vacated and
remanded the Tax Court’s decision. The Court of Appeals held that the Tax
Court correctly looked to Massachusetts law to determine whether the Trust
could be held liable for the corporations’ taxes and penalties, rejecting the
IRS’s argument that the Tax Court should have applied the federal tax
substance-over-form doctrine to determine whether the Trust should be
considered a “transferee” of the four corporations’ assets. However, the Court
of Appeals held that the Tax Court erred in construing Massachusetts
fraudulent transfer law (which is the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act) to
require, as a prerequisite for the Trust’s liability, either (1) that the Trust knew
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of the new shareholders’ scheme or (2) that the corporations transferred assets
directly to the Trust. The IRS had presented evidence of fraudulent transfers
from the four corporations to the midco entities, and the midco entities
purchased the four corporations from the Trust. The Court of Appeals
concluded that if on remand the Tax Court were to find that at the time of the
purchases, the assets of these midco entities were unreasonably small in light
of their liabilities and that the midco entities did not receive reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for the purchase prices, then the Trust could be
held liable for taxes and penalties assessed upon the four corporations
regardless of whether it had any knowledge of the new shareholders’ scheme.
b.
On remand, Judge Goeke imposes
transferee liability but limits the transferee’s liability to the excess value
it received. Frank Sawyer Trust of May 1992 v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2014-59 (4/3/14). On remand from the First Circuit, the Tax Court (Judge
Goeke) held that the Trust was liable as transferee of a transferee for unpaid
taxes, interest and penalties of the corporations whose stock the Trust sold, but
that the amount of the Trust’s liability was less than the amount asserted by
the IRS in its notices of liability. Under Massachusetts fraudulent transfer law
(which is the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act), as interpreted by the First
Circuit, the Trust received a fraudulent transfer from the Fortrend acquisition
vehicles if two criteria were satisfied:
(1) the corporation (i.e., Fortrend) did not receive a
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer and
(2) the corporation either (i) was engaged or was about to
engage in a business or transaction for which the remaining
assets were unreasonably small, or (ii) intended to incur,
believed, or reasonably should have believed that it would
incur, debts beyond its ability to pay as they became due.
Judge Goeke held that both criteria were satisfied. Fortrend did not receive
reasonably equivalent value because it paid the Trust more than the net book
value of the corporations. The corporations that Fortrend purchased possessed
only cash and liabilities for taxes. Judge Goeke concluded that the amount
Fortrend paid in excess of net book value was not attributable to synergy,
goodwill, or going concern value and that Fortrend “did not legitimately and
reasonably expect its tax avoidance strategy [to reduce the corporations’ tax
liabilities] to succeed.” Because Fortrend had no legitimate expectation that
its tax reduction strategy would work, it should have known that purchasing
the corporations would cause Fortrend to incur debts beyond its ability to pay
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as they became due. Accordingly, the Trust was liable for the unpaid taxes,
interest, and penalties as a transferee of a transferee.
 The notices of liability issued by the IRS
stated that the Trust owed over $20 million in federal taxes. Under Massachusetts
fraudulent transfer law, a good-faith transferee is entitled to a reduction in its
liability to the extent of the value it provided in the exchange. Judge Goeke
viewed the Trust as a good-faith transferee and limited the Trust’s liability to
$13,495,070, the amount the Trust received in excess of the corporations’ net
book value.
c.
Taxpayer’s motion for reconsideration
granted: Judge Goeke reduces the taxpayer’s liability as a transferee for
taxes and declines to hold it liable for accuracy-related penalties. Frank
Sawyer Trust of May 1992 v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-128 (6/25/14).
The Trust moved for reconsideration of the amount of its liability for taxes and
its liability for accuracy-related penalties. The Tax Court (Judge Goeke)
granted the motion. Until her death, Mildred Sawyer was the Trust’s sole
beneficiary. For estate tax purposes, her gross estate included all of the Trust’s
property, including the stock of the four corporations the Trust sold to
Fortrend. The estate overpaid its estate taxes because it valued the shares at
the inflated sale prices that Fortrend paid for them. The Trust also overpaid
income taxes on its sale of two of the corporations because it calculated its
gain with reference to the inflated sales price Fortrend paid. The IRS agreed
to reduce the Trust’s liability as a transferee for the corporations’ income tax
liability by the amount of income tax the Trust overpaid on the sale of the
corporations’ stock. The Trust also asserted that, under the doctrine of
equitable recoupment, it was entitled to reduce its transferee liability for the
corporations’ income tax liability by the overpayment of estate tax made by
the estate of its sole beneficiary, Mildred Sawyer. Judge Goeke agreed and
concluded that the taxpayer had proved that all elements necessary for
equitable recoupment were satisfied. Finally, Judge Goeke held that the Trust
was not liable as a transferee for the accuracy-related penalties assessed
against the four corporations. Relying on Stanko v. Commissioner, 209 F.3d
1082 (8th Cir. 2000), Judge Goeke held that, in order for the Trust to be liable
as a transferee for the accuracy-related penalties, which arose from the
corporations’ substantial understatement of income many months after the
Trust’s transfer of their stock, the IRS must prove that the transfer was made
with the intent to defraud future creditors. The IRS, Judge Goeke concluded,
had failed to make this showing.
4.
Uh oh, it’s midco! The Second Circuit says
taxpayers can’t act like the three monkeys. Diebold Foundation, Inc.
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Commissioner, 736 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 11/14/13), vacating and remanding
Salus Mundi Foundation v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-61. The Second
Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Pooler, vacated a Tax Court decision holding
that the shareholders of a corporation, and a transferee of a shareholder, who
sold stock in a midco transaction were subject to § 6901 transferee liability for
the corporate level taxes that were avoided. As an initial matter, the Second
Circuit overruled its holding in Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Commissioner, 933
F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1991), that mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed
under a clearly erroneous standard when reviewing a Tax Court decision, and
held that Tax Court fact findings are reviewed for clear error, “but that mixed
questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo, to the extent that the alleged
error is in the misunderstanding of a legal standard.” The Tax Court had held
that because there was no conveyance from the corporation to the
shareholders, under the relevant state fraudulent conveyance law (New York,
NYUFCA) there was no state law liability in law or equity, and thus the
successor foundations were not liable as transferees. The Tax Court did not
address federal law, but concluded that because there was no state law liability,
it was immaterial to the outcome of the case if the shareholder was a transferee
under the terms of § 6901. The Second Circuit concluded that the two prongs
of § 6901 are independent and that the Tax Court did not err by only addressing
the liability prong. Section 6901 liability exists only if: (1) the party is a
transferee under § 6901; and (2) the party is subject to liability at law or in
equity. Federal tax law controls the first prong, while the second prong is
determined by the applicable state law. If there was not a “conveyance” under
state law, it did not matter whether or not the selling shareholder was a
“transferee” as defined by § 6901(h). But then the Second Circuit differed with
the Tax Court and held that state law transferee liability might have existed.
Under the NYUFCA, “[i]t is well established that multilateral transactions
may under appropriate circumstances be ‘collapsed’ and treated as phases of
a single transaction for analysis.” Under New York law, a transaction can be
collapsed if the consideration received from the first transferee [is]
“reconveyed by the [party owing the liability] for less than fair consideration
or with an actual intent to defraud creditors,” and “the transferee in the leg of
the transaction sought to be voided [has] actual or constructive knowledge of
the entire scheme that renders her exchange with the debtor fraudulent.” The
Second Circuit found that it was clear that the first element had been met and
that the crucial issue was whether the shareholders had “actual or constructive
knowledge of the entire scheme that renders [the] exchange . . . fraudulent.”
In this respect the Second Circuit held that the shareholders had such
constructive knowledge.
[W]e must now assess whether the Shareholders had actual or
constructive knowledge of the entire scheme. The Tax Court
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concluded they did not. This assessment is a mixed question
of law and fact, assessing whether based upon the facts as
determined by the Tax Court, the Shareholders had
constructive or actual knowledge as a matter of law.
Therefore, we review de novo the Tax Court’s determination
that the Shareholders did not have constructive knowledge,
but review for clear error the factual findings that underpin
the determination.
Concluding that a party had constructive knowledge
does not require a showing that the party had actual
knowledge of a scheme; rather, it is sufficient if, based upon
the surrounding circumstances, they “should have known”
about the entire scheme. HBE Leasing, 48 F.3d at 636
(internal quotation marks omitted). Constructive knowledge
in this context also includes “inquiry knowledge”—that is,
where transferees “were aware of circumstances that should
have led them to inquire further into the circumstances of the
transaction, but . . . failed to make such inquiry. . . .
The Tax Court did not sufficiently address the totality of
the circumstances from all of the facts, which that court had
already laid out itself. . . . [i]t is of great import that the
Shareholders recognized the “problem” of the tax liability
arising from the built-in gains on the assets . . . . The
Shareholders specifically sought out parties that could help
them avoid the tax liability inherent in a C Corp holding
appreciated assets. . . . The parties to this transaction were
extremely sophisticated actors, deploying a stable of tax
attorneys from two different firms in order to limit their tax
liabilities. . . . Considering their sophistication, their
negotiations with multiple partners to structure the deal, their
recognition of the fact that the amount of money they would
ultimately receive for an asset or stock sale would be reduced
based on the need to pay the C Corp tax liability, and the huge
amount of money involved, among other things, it is obvious
that the parties knew, or at least should have known but for
active avoidance, that the entire scheme was fraudulent and
would have left Double D unable to pay its tax liability. . . .
To conclude that these circumstances did not constitute
constructive knowledge would do away with the distinction
between actual and constructive knowledge, and, at times, the
Tax Court’s opinion seems to directly make this mistake. The
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facts in this case strongly suggest that the parties actually
knew that tax liability would be illegitimately avoided, and in
any event, as a matter of law, plainly demonstrate that the
parties “should have known” that this was a fraudulent
scheme, designed to let both buyer of the assets and seller of
the stock avoid the tax liability inherent in a C Corp holding
appreciated assets and leave the former shell of the
corporation, now held by a Midco, without assets to satisfy
that liability.
 Because the Tax Court had determined
that there was no state law liability, it did not consider the other questions
determinative to the case. Accordingly, the Second Circuit remanded to the Tax
Court to determine whether the shareholders were transferees under § 6901 and
to resolve other procedural issues.
a.
And the Ninth Circuit sees it the same way.
Salus Mundi Foundation v. Commissioner, 114 A.F.T.R.2d 2014-6996 (9th
Cir. 12/22/14), rev’g Salus Mundi Foundation v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2012-61. In an opinion by Judge Noonan, the Ninth Circuit reversed the same
Tax Court decision that was reviewed in Diebold Foundation, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 736 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 11/14/13). In the transaction at issue, the
Diebold Foundation sold corporate stock in a midco transaction and made a
liquidating distribution of the sale proceeds to three separate foundations
organized by the Diebold children in Arizona, Connecticut, and South
Carolina. The Tax Court’s decision in favor of the foundations therefore was
appealable to the Ninth, Second, and Fourth Circuits. This decision addresses
the government’s appeal of the Tax Court’s decision in favor of the foundation
organized in Arizona, the Salus Mundi Foundation. Like the Second Circuit,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the two prongs of § 6901 are independent and
that “an alleged transferee’s substantive liability is determined solely with
reference to state law, without any threshold requirement that the disputed
transactions be recast under federal law.” The Ninth Circuit “adopt[ed] the
reasoning of [the Second Circuit’s Diebold] opinion and conclude[d] that the
shareholders had constructive knowledge of the tax avoidance scheme and
made a fraudulent conveyance under New York law.” The court concluded
that the state law liability prong of § 6901 was satisfied and remanded for a
determination of the Salus Mundi Foundation’s status as a transferee and
whether the IRS had assessed liability within the applicable limitations period.
5.
Son-of-Boss with a midco twist fails. Markell Co. v,
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-86 (5/13/14). The Tax Court (Judge
Holmes) held that a midco transaction combined with a digital option Son-of
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Boss transaction failed to create a loss to offset the gains on the sale of
taxpayer’s assets.
6.
Another midco deal is good enough to be true for
the target’s shareholders. Julia R. Swords Trust v. Commissioner, 142 T.C.
No. 19 (5/29/14). In yet another midco transaction, the Tax Court (Judge
Marvel) declined to impose § 6901 transferee liability on the shareholders of
the target corporation. In this case, the target corporation was a family holding
corporation (Davreyn) that held stock in Alcoa. To simplify the complex series
of transactions, a grantor trust, the owner of which was the midco, purchased
all of the Davreyn stock from the taxpayers. As described by the court:
With the benefit of hindsight, it now appears that Alrey Trust
and Alrey Acquisition were established to participate in a
preplanned series of interrelated transactions designed to
illegitimately avoid tax on Alrey Trust’s sale of Davreyn’s
Alcoa stock, which it had acquired as a liquidating
distribution. Alrey Trust sold the Alcoa stock incident to
receiving it and reported that the substantial gain on the sale
was offset by an artificial loss resulting from what appears to
have been a Son-of-Boss transaction by Alrey Acquisition,
the grantor of Alrey Trust.
Notwithstanding this description of the shenanigans (our terminology), Judge
Marvel declined “to reconfigure [the transaction] in a way that makes the
assets of petitioner trusts a source of collection for tax liabilities originally
imposed on Alrey Trust and Alrey Acquisition.” The reasoning, however,
turned entirely on the application of state law. As an initial proposition, the
opinion states:
We hereinafter assume (but do not decide) that Davreyn is
liable for the tax as determined in the notice of deficiency and
that petitioner trusts are ‘transferees’ within the meaning of
section 6901, and we confine our discussion to the parties’
dispute on whether applicable State law and/or State equity
principles hold petitioner trusts liable for Davreyn’s unpaid
Federal income tax.
The critical issue was whether the court would adopt the IRS’s “proposed twostep analysis to decide whether a transaction should be recast under the Federal
substance over form (or similar) doctrine when analyzing whether a transferee
is liable under section 6901.” Judge Marvel recounted that the Tax Court
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approach has been “to require that State law allow such a transaction to be
recast under a substance over form (or similar) doctrine before doing so.” The
opinion went on to find that:
[T]he record fails to establish that an independent basis exists
under applicable State law or State equity principles for
holding petitioner trusts liable for Davreyn’s unpaid tax and
that holding would remain the same even if we decided that
Davreyn is liable for the tax as determined in the notice of
deficiency.
Judge Marvel was “unpersuaded that the Supreme Court of Virginia would
apply a substance over form analysis to the present setting because, as
respondent asserts, petitioner trusts and/or their representatives had actual or
constructive knowledge of Alrey Trust’s plan to sell the Alcoa stock and to
illegitimately avoid any resulting tax liability.”
There is no credible evidence . . that either petitioner trusts
or their representatives knew about any plan on the part of the
buyer to illegitimately avoid the payment of tax on the sale of
Davreyn’s Alcoa stock, and the representatives’ knowledge
that an unrelated buyer planned to offset any gain from a sale
of the Alcoa stock with incurred or anticipated losses is
insufficient to show the existence of a preconceived plan by
petitioner trusts to illegitimately avoid tax.
7.
OPIS, Schmopis, taxpayers fighting denial of tax
shelter losses continue to be in denial. Reddam v. Commissioner, 755 F.3d
1051 (9th Cir. 6/13/14), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2012-106. In an unsurprising
opinion by Judge Hurwitz, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of deductions
claimed to have been generated in a KPMG OPIS tax shelter on the ground
that the transaction lacked economic substance. The record supported the Tax
Court’s factual conclusion that the taxpayer pursued the OPIS product solely
for its tax benefits. The taxpayer failed to investigate the transaction and
“KPMG’s marketing materials state[d] that the OPIS transaction ‘minimizes
gain, or maximizes loss,’ an anathema to a profit-seeking investor.”
Furthermore, “the evidence [was] so overwhelming that no objective investor
or taxpayer would enter into the OPIS transaction for its profit making
potential.”
[T]he small percentage chance that [the taxpayer’s] OPIS
transaction could have created a sizeable economic gain in
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return for his multi-million dollar investment pales in
comparison to the expectation that it would always create a
tax loss of $42,000,000 to $50,000,000. No matter how the
underlying Deutsche Bank stock performed, the OPIS
transaction was designed inevitably to produce a tax loss . . .
B.

Identified “Tax Avoidance Transactions”
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2014.
C.

Disclosure and Settlement
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2014.
D.

Tax Shelter Penalties

1.
Now let me get this straight. I followed the Code
and Regs. meticulously, claimed my loss deduction, but it was disallowed
because I really had no possibility of actually making money on the deal
and all I was looking for was a nice tax loss, and even though I’ve got this
letter from my lawyer saying the deduction is 100 percent legal, I’m still
looking at a 40 percent penalty on the deficiency. But my neighbor who
deducted the cost of his kid’s college education as a business expense,
which every kindergartner knows you can’t do, doesn’t have to pay any
penalty because he’s dumb and his dumb, but probably honest, CPA said
it was OK. Say What!? Well, we don’t have to “know it when we see it”
because Congress has defined it for us. The 2010 Health Care Reconciliation
Act added new Code § 7701(o), codifying the economic substance doctrine,
which has been applied by the courts for several decades as a judicial
interpretive doctrine to disallow tax benefits otherwise available under a literal
reading of the Code and regulations.
 Background — Codification of the
economic substance doctrine has been on the legislative agenda many times since
early in the first decade of this century, or for the past ten years (for those of us
still hung up on Y2K). The move for codification was motivated in part by the
insistence of not a few tax practitioners that the economic substance doctrine
simply was not actually a legitimate element of the tax doctrine, notwithstanding
its application by the courts in many cases over several decades. This argument
was based on the assertion that the Supreme Court had never actually applied the
economic substance doctrine to deny a taxpayer any tax benefits, ignoring the
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Supreme Court’s decision in Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960), and
instead focusing on the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions in Cottage
Savings Ass’n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991), and Frank Lyon Co. v.
United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978), in which a transaction that on the facts
showed the total lack of “economic substance” was upheld. Congressional
concern was intensified by the decision of the Court of Federal Claims in Coltec
Industries, Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716 (2004), vacated and remanded,
454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1261 (2007), which
questioned the continuing viability of the doctrine, stating that “the use of the
‘economic substance’ doctrine to trump ‘mere compliance with the Code’ would
violate the separation of powers.” See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON
TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE
“RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010,” AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION WITH THE
“PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT,” 144 (JCX-18-10
3/21/10). However, in that case, the trial court found that the particular
transaction at issue in the case did not lack economic substance, and thus the trial
court did not actually rule on its validity, and on appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit vacated the Court of Federal Claims’ decision and, reiterating
the validity of the economic substance doctrine and, in the opinion of some,
expanding it greatly, held that transaction in question lacked economic substance.
Although the economic substance doctrine has been articulated in a number of
different manners by different courts over the years, its purpose is aptly described
by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Coltec Industries v. United
States, supra.
The economic substance doctrine represents a judicial effort
to enforce the statutory purpose of the tax code. From its
inception, the economic substance doctrine has been used to
prevent taxpayers from subverting the legislative purpose of
the tax code by engaging in transactions that are fictitious or
lack economic reality simply to reap a tax benefit. In this
regard, the economic substance doctrine is not unlike other
canons of construction that are employed in circumstances
where the literal terms of a statute can undermine the ultimate
purpose of the statute.
 The modern articulation of the doctrine
traces its roots back to Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978),
where the Court upheld the taxpayer’s treatment of an early version of a SILO,
stating as follows:
[W]here, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party transaction
with economic substance which is compelled or encouraged
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by business or regulatory realities, is imbued with taxindependent considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax
avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached, the
Government should honor the allocation of rights and duties
effectuated by the parties.
 This passage—which sets forth a
statement as to what was sufficient for economic substance, but which was
subsequently interpreted to be a statement as to what was necessary for economic
substance7—has led courts to two different formulations of the economic
substance doctrine. One, the so-called “conjunctive test” requires that a
transaction have both (1) economic substance and (2) a non-tax business purpose
in order to be respected for tax purposes. See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund
v. United States, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009); Pasternak v. Commissioner, 990
F.2d 893, 898 (6th Cir. 1993); James v. Commissioner, 899 F.2d 905 (10th Cir.
1990); New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 9 (2009);
Coltec, supra. Under the other formulation, the so called “disjunctive test,”
represented principally by IES Industries v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 358 (8th
Cir. 2001), and Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir.
1985), a transaction would be respected for tax purposes if it had either
(1) economic substance or (2) a non-tax business purpose. Yet a third articulation
appeared in ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999), where the court concluded that “these distinct
aspects of the economic sham inquiry do not constitute discrete prongs of a ‘rigid
two-step analysis,’ but rather represent related factors both of which inform the
analysis of whether the transaction had sufficient substance, apart from its tax
consequences, to be respected for tax purposes.” The courts also have differed
with respect to the nature of the non-tax economic benefit a taxpayer is required
to establish to demonstrate that a transaction has economic substance. Some
courts required a potential economic profit. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States,
364 U.S. 361 (1960); Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967). Other courts have applied the economic
substance doctrine to disallow tax benefits where—even though the taxpayer was
exposed to risk and the transaction had a profit potential—compared to the tax
benefits, the economic risks and profit potential were insignificant. Sheldon v.
Commissioner, 94 T.C. 738 (1990); Goldstein, supra. Yet other courts have
7. Ira believes that the interpretation contains an error in logic which takes a
statement from the Frank Lyon case as to what is “sufficient” for economic substance
and construes it as a statement as to what is “necessary” for economic substance.
Marty does not so believe, or thinks that the alleged error is irrelevant. Bruce is too
young to have an opinion because he was still in high school when Frank Lyon was
decided.
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asked whether a stated business benefit—for example, cost reduction, as opposed
to profit-seeking—of a particular transaction was actually obtained through the
transaction in question. See Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1261 (2007). Finally,
notwithstanding that several courts have rejected the bootstrap argument that an
improved financial accounting result—derived from tax benefits increasing aftertax profitability—served the valid business purpose requirement, see, e.g.,
American Electric Power, Inc. v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 2d 762, aff’d, 326
F.3d.737 (6th Cir. 2003); Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 35
(2010), taxpayers continued to press such claims.
 The Codified Economic Substance
Doctrine — The codification of the economic substance doctrine in new
§ 7701(o) clarifies and standardizes some applications of the economic substance
doctrine when it is applied, but does not establish any rules for determining when
the doctrine should be applied. According to the legislative history, “the
provision [I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C)] does not change present law standards in
determining when to utilize an economic substance analysis.” See STAFF OF THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE
PROVISIONS OF THE “RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010,” AS AMENDED, IN
COMBINATION WITH THE “PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT,” 152 (JCX-18-10 3/21/10). Thus, “the fact that a transaction meets the
requirements for specific treatment under any provision of the Code is not
determinative of whether a transaction or series of transactions of which it is a
part has economic substance.” Id. at 153. Codification of the economic substance
doctrine was not intended to alter or supplant any other judicial interpretive
doctrines, such as the business purpose, substance over form, and step transaction
doctrines, or any similar rule in the Code, regulations, or guidance thereunder;
§ 7701(o) is intended merely (merely?) to supplement all the other rules. Id. at
155.
 Conjunctive analysis of objective and
subjective prongs — One of the most important aspects of new § 7701(o) is that
it requires a conjunctive analysis under which a transaction has economic
substance only if (1) the transaction changes the taxpayer’s economic position in
a meaningful way apart from Federal income tax effects and (2) the taxpayer has
a substantial business purpose, apart from Federal income tax effects, for entering
into such transaction. (The second prong of most versions of the codified
economic substance doctrine introduced in earlier Congresses added “and the
transaction is a reasonable means of accomplishing such purpose.” See, e.g., H.R.
2345, 110th Cong, 1st Sess. (2007); H.R. 2, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003). It is
not clear what difference in application was intended by adoption of the different
final statutory language.) This conjunctive test resolves the split between the
Circuits (and between the Tax Court and certain Circuits) by rejecting the view
of those courts that find the economic substance doctrine to have been satisfied
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if there is either (1) a change in taxpayer’s economic position or (2) a nontax
business purpose, see, e.g., Rice’s Toyota World v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89
(4th Cir. 1985); IES Industries, Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 353 (8th Cir.
2001). Section 7701(o)(5)(D) allows the economic substance doctrine to be
applied to a single transaction or to a series of transactions. The Staff of the Joint
Committee Report indicates that the provision “does not alter the court’s ability
to aggregate, disaggregate, or otherwise recharacterize a transaction when
applying the doctrine,” and gives as an example the courts’ ability “to bifurcate
a transaction in which independent activities with non-tax objectives are
combined with an unrelated item having only tax-avoidance objectives in order
to disallow those tax-motivated benefits.”
 Claim of Profit Potential — Section
7701(o)(2) does not require that the taxpayer establish profit potential in order to
prove that a transaction results in a meaningful change in the taxpayer’s
economic position or that the taxpayer has a substantial non-Federal-income-tax
purpose. Nor does it specify a threshold required return if the taxpayer relies on
the profit potential to try to establish economic substance. (In this respect the
enacted version differs from earlier proposals that would have required the
reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the transaction to exceed a risk-free rate
of return. See, e.g., H.R. 2345, 110th Cong, 1st Sess. (2007); H.R. 2, 108th Cong.,
1st Sess. (2003).) But if the taxpayer does rely on a profit potential claim, then
the profit potential requires a present value analysis:
The potential for profit of a transaction shall be taken into
account in determining whether the requirements of [the
§ 7701(o) test for economic substance] are met with respect
to the transaction only if the present value of the reasonably
expected pre-tax profit from the transaction is substantial in
relation to the present value of the expected net tax benefits
that would be allowed if the transaction were respected.
 Thus, the analysis of profit potential by the
Court of Federal Claims in Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. United
States, 90 Fed. Cl. 228 (2009), which appears not to have thoroughly taken into
account present value analysis, would not stand muster under the new provision.
In all events, transaction costs must be taken into account in determining pre-tax
profits, and the statute authorizes regulations requiring foreign taxes to be treated
as expenses in determining pre-tax profit in appropriate cases. Any state or local
income tax effect that is related to a Federal income tax effect is treated in the
same manner as a Federal income tax effect. Thus, state tax savings that piggyback on Federal income tax savings cannot provide either a profit potential or a
business purpose. Similarly, a financial accounting benefit cannot satisfy the
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business purpose requirement if the financial accounting benefit originates in a
reduction of Federal income tax.
 Don’t worry, be happy! [?] — Section
7701(o)(5)(B) specifically provides that the statutory modifications and
clarifications apply to an individual only with respect to “transactions entered
into in connection with a trade or business or an activity engaged in for the
production of income.” (We wonder what else anybody would have thought they
might apply to? The home mortgage interest deduction? Charitable contributions
of appreciated property? How about a Son-of-Boss transaction where there is no
possibility for profit?) More importantly, according to STAFF OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE
PROVISIONS OF THE “RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010,” AS AMENDED, IN
COMBINATION WITH THE “PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT,” 152-153 (JCX-18-10 3/21/10), “[t]he provision is not intended to alter the
tax treatment of certain basic business transactions that, under longstanding
judicial and administrative practice are respected, merely because the choice
between meaningful economic alternatives is largely or entirely based on
comparative tax advantages.” The list of transactions and decisions intended to
be immunized for the application of the economic substance doctrine includes:
(1) the choice between capitalizing a business enterprise with
debt or equity; (2) a U.S. person’s choice between utilizing a
foreign corporation or a domestic corporation to make a
foreign investment; (3) the choice to enter a transaction or
series of transactions that constitute a corporate organization
or reorganization under subchapter C; and (4) the choice to
utilize a related-party entity in a transaction, provided that the
arm’s length standard of section 482 and other applicable
concepts are satisfied.
 Leasing transactions will continue to be
scrutinized based on all of the facts and circumstances.
 Jettisoned along the way — Many earlier
versions of the codification of economic substance doctrine, some of which were
adopted by the House, also provided special rules for applying what was
essentially a per se lack of economic substance in transactions with tax indifferent
parties that involved financing, and artificial income and basis shifting. See, e.g.,
H.R. 2345, 110th Cong, 1st Sess. (2007); H.R. 2, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003).
These rules did not make it into the enacted version. Special statutory rules for
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determining the profitability of leasing transactions also did not find their way
into the final statutory enactment.
 Penalties, oh what penalties! — New
§ 6662(b)(6), in conjunction with new § 6664(c)(2), imposes a strict liability 20
percent penalty for an underpayment attributable to any disallowance of claimed
tax benefits by reason of a transaction lacking economic substance, within the
meaning of new § 7701(o), “or failing to meet the requirements of any similar
rule of law.” (Does that extend to substance versus form in a SILO? How about
business purpose in a purported tax-free reorganization?) The penalty is
increased to 40 percent if the taxpayer does not adequately disclose the relevant
facts on the original return, or an amended return filed before the taxpayer has
been contacted for audit—an amended return filed after the initial contact cannot
cure the original sin. I.R.C. § 6664(i). Because the § 6664(c) “reasonable cause”
exception is unavailable, outside (or in-house) analysis and opinions of counsel
or other tax advisors will not insulate a taxpayer from the penalty if a transaction
is found to lack economic substance. Likewise, new § 6664(d)(2) precludes a
reasonable cause defense to imposition of the § 6662A reportable transaction
understatement penalty for a transaction that lacks economic substance. (Section
6662A(e)(2) has been amended to provide that the § 6662A penalty with respect
to a reportable transaction understatement does not apply to a transaction that
lacks economic substance if a 40 percent penalty is imposed under § 6662(i)). A
similar no-fault penalty regime applies to excessive erroneous refund claims that
are denied on the ground that the transaction on which the refund claim was based
lacked economic substance. § 6676(c). However, under the “every dark cloud
has a silver lining” maxim, the §§ 6662(b)(6) and 6664(c)(2) penalty regime does
not apply to any portion of an underpayment on which the § 6663 fraud penalty
is imposed.
 Effective date — Section 7701(o) and the
revised penalty rules applied to transactions entered into after the date of
enactment and to underpayments, understatements, refunds, and credits
attributable to transactions entered into after 3/30/10.
a.
Better than a sharp stick in the eye, but not
much better. The IRS is catching conjunctivitis, weighing in on the
conjunctive test. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (9/13/10). The IRS
indicates that it will rely on relevant case law in applying the two-pronged
conjunctive test for economic substance. Thus, both in determining whether a
transactions meets both of the requirements of the conjunctive test, the IRS
will apply cases under the common law economic substance doctrine to
determine whether tax benefits are allowable because a transaction satisfies
the economic substance prong of the economic substance doctrine and to
determine whether a transaction has a sufficient nontax purpose to satisfy the
requirement that the tax benefits of a transaction are not allowable because the
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taxpayer lacks a business purpose. The IRS adds that it will challenge
taxpayers who seek to rely on case law that a transaction will be treated as
having economic substance merely because it satisfies either of the tests. The
IRS also indicated that it anticipates that the law of economic substance will
continue to evolve and that it “does not intend to issue general administrative
guidance regarding the types of transactions to which the economic substance
doctrine either applies or does not apply.”
 The notice also indicates that, except for
reportable transactions, disclosure for purposes of the additional penalty of
§ 6621(i) will be adequate if the taxpayer adequately discloses on a timely filed
original return, or on a qualified amended return, the relevant facts affecting the
tax treatment of the transaction. A disclosure that would be deemed adequate
under § 6662(d)(2)(B) will be treated as adequate for purposes of § 6662(i). The
disclosure should be made on a Form 8275 or 8275-R.
b.
In the absence of helpful IRS guidance,
LB&I steps up with something to lean on for the meanwhile. Taxpayers
must be notified at the outset of the process. LB&I-4-0711-015. Guidance
for Examiners and Managers on the Codified Economic Substance Doctrine
and Related Penalties (7/15/11). The Large Business and International
Division of the IRS has issued guidance regarding the process that an examiner
must follow in determining whether to seek approval of the Director of Field
Operations (DFO) to apply the § 7701(o) economic substance doctrine. “An
examiner should notify a taxpayer that the examiner is considering whether to
apply the economic substance doctrine to a particular transaction as soon as
possible, but not later than when the examiner begins the analysis in the steps
described below.” There are three steps in the analysis.
 Three-step analysis: First, an examiner
should evaluate whether the circumstances in the case are those under which
application of the economic substance doctrine to a transaction is likely not
appropriate. Second, an examiner should evaluate whether the circumstances in
the case are those under which application of the doctrine to the transaction may
be appropriate. Third, if an examiner determines that the application of the
doctrine may be appropriate, the examiner must make a series of inquiries before
seeking approval to apply the doctrine.
 Facts and circumstances indicating that
the economic substance doctrine should not be applied:
(1)
The transaction is not promoted/developed/administered by tax
department or outside advisors;
(2)
The transaction is not highly structured;
(3)
The transaction contains no unnecessary steps;
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The transaction that generates targeted tax incentives is, in form and
substance, consistent with congressional intent in providing the
incentives;
The transaction is at arm’s length with unrelated third parties;
The transaction creates a meaningful economic change on a present
value basis (pre-tax);
The taxpayer’s potential for gain or loss is not artificially limited;
The transaction does not accelerate a loss or duplicate a deduction;
The transaction does not generate a deduction that is not matched by
an equivalent economic loss or expense (including artificial creation
or increase in basis of an asset);
The taxpayer does not hold offsetting positions that largely reduce or
eliminate the economic risk of the transaction;
The transaction does not involve a tax-indifferent counter-party that
recognizes substantial income;
The transaction does not result in the separation of income recognition
from a related deduction either between different taxpayers or
between the same taxpayer in different tax years;
The transaction has credible business purpose apart from federal tax
benefits;
The transaction has meaningful potential for profit apart from tax
benefits;
The transaction has significant risk of loss;
Tax benefit is not artificially generated by the transaction;
The transaction is not pre-packaged; and
The transaction is not outside the taxpayer’s ordinary business
operations.

 Facts and circumstances indicating that
the economic substance doctrine should be applied:
(1)
The transaction is promoted/developed/administered by tax
department or outside advisors;
(2)
The transaction is highly structured;
(3)
The transaction includes unnecessary steps;
(4)
The transaction is not at arm’s length with unrelated third parties;
(5)
The transaction creates no meaningful economic change on a present
value basis (pre-tax);
(6)
The taxpayer’s potential for gain or loss is artificially limited;
(7)
The transaction accelerates a loss or duplicates a deduction;
(8)
The transaction generates a deduction that is not matched by an
equivalent economic loss or expense (including artificial creation or
increase in basis of an asset);
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The taxpayer holds offsetting positions that largely reduce or
eliminate the economic risk of the transaction;
The transaction involves a tax-indifferent counter-party that
recognizes substantial income;
The transaction results in separation of income recognition from a
related deduction either between different taxpayers or between the
same taxpayer in different tax years;
The transaction has no credible business purpose apart from federal
tax benefits;
The transaction has no meaningful potential for profit apart from tax
benefits;
The transaction has no significant risk of loss;
Tax benefit is artificially generated by the transaction;
The transaction is pre-packaged; and
The transaction is outside the taxpayer’s ordinary business operations.

 The seven required subsequent inquiries:
(1) Is the transaction a statutory or regulatory election? If so, then the
application of the doctrine should not be pursued without specific approval of
the examiner’s manager in consultation with local counsel.
(2) Is the transaction subject to a detailed statutory or regulatory scheme?
If so, and the transaction complies with this scheme, then the application of
the doctrine should not be pursued without specific approval of the examiner’s
manager in consultation with local counsel.
(3) Does precedent exist (judicial or administrative) that either rejects the
application of the economic substance doctrine to the type of transaction or a
substantially similar transaction or upholds the transaction and makes no
reference to the doctrine when considering the transaction? If so, then the
application of the doctrine should not be pursued without specific approval of
the examiner’s manager in consultation with local counsel.
(4) Does the transaction involve tax credits (e.g., low income housing and
alternative energy credits) that are designed by Congress to encourage certain
transactions that would not be undertaken but for the credits? If so, then the
application of the doctrine should not be pursued without specific approval of
the examiner’s manager in consultation with local counsel.
(5) Does another judicial doctrine (e.g., substance over form or step
transaction) more appropriately address the noncompliance that is being
examined? If so, those doctrines should be applied and not the economic
substance doctrine. To determine whether another judicial doctrine is more
appropriate to challenge a transaction, an examiner should seek the advice of
the examiner’s manager in consultation with local counsel.
(6) Does recharacterizing a transaction (e.g., recharacterizing debt as
equity, recharacterizing someone as an agent of another, recharacterizing a
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partnership interest as another kind of interest, or recharacterizing a collection
of financial products as another kind of interest) more appropriately address
the noncompliance that is being examined? If so, recharacterization should be
applied and not the economic substance doctrine. To determine whether
recharacterization is more appropriate to challenge a transaction, an examiner
should seek the advice of the examiner’s manager in consultation with local
counsel.
(7) In considering all the arguments available to challenge a claimed tax
result, is the application of the doctrine among the strongest arguments
available? If not, then the application of the doctrine should not be pursued
without specific approval of the examiner’s manager in consultation with local
counsel.
 Approval Process. If an examiner
completes the inquiries described above and concludes that it is appropriate to
seek approval for the application of the economic substance doctrine, the
examiner, in consultation with his or her manager and territory manager, should
describe the analysis in writing for the appropriate Director of Field Operations,
whose approval is required.
 Penalties Limitation. Until further
guidance is issued, the penalties provided in §§ 6662(b)(6), 6662(i), and 6676 are
limited to the application of the economic substance doctrine and may not be
imposed due to the application of any other “similar rule of law” or judicial
doctrine (e.g., step transaction doctrine, substance over form, or sham
transaction).
 Really!? The final sentence of the
directive reads as follows: “This LB&I Directive is not an official
pronouncement of law, and cannot be used, cited, or relied upon as such.”
c.
“I’m not sure how important it is to have
formal guidance — this is what’s supposed to be issued. It sets forth the
procedures that exam, counsel, [and] managers need to follow . . . who’s
the formal guidance supposed to benefit?” LB&I Directive Limits Strict
Liability Penalties Under Economic Substance Doctrine, 2011 TAX NOTES
TODAY 137-1 (7/18/11). Deborah Butler states that taxpayers may not rely on
this guidance.
d.
Can this notice be relied upon, or is this
just another example of “You [fouled] up—you trusted us”? Notice 201458, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (10/9/14), amplifying Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B.
411 (9/13/10). This notice provides that the term “transaction” generally
includes all the factual elements relevant to the expected tax treatment of any
plan, with facts and circumstances determining whether a plan’s steps are
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aggregated or disaggregated. The term “similar rule of law” (as described in
the § 6662(b)(6) penalty provision) means a rule or doctrine that disallows the
tax benefits related to a transaction by applying the same factors and analysis
that is required under § 7701(o) for an economic substance analysis even if a
different term (e.g., “sham transaction doctrine”) is used to describe the rule
or doctrine.
 Finally, the notice provides that the IRS
will not apply a penalty under § 6662(b)(6) or otherwise argue that a transaction
is not described in that paragraph, unless it also raises § 7701(o) to support the
underlying adjustments.
IX.

EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND CHARITABLE GIVING
A.

Exempt Organizations

1.
The ABA loses another tax case. ABA Retirement
Funds v. United States, 111 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-1815 (N.D. Ill. 4/25/13). The
District Court held that the ABA Retirement Funds (formerly known as the
American Bar Retirement Association), a not-for-profit corporation that
creates and maintains IRS-approved master tax-qualified retirement plans for
adoption by lawyers and law firms, does not qualify as a tax-exempt “business
league” under § 501(c)(6). To be a tax-exempt business league, Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(6)-1 requires that an organization be (1) of persons having a
common business interest; (2) whose purpose is to promote the common
business interest; (3) not organized for profit; (4) that does not engage in a
regular business of a kind ordinarily conducted for profit; (5) whose activities
are directed to the improvement of business conditions at one or more lines of
a business as distinguished from the performance of particular services for
individual persons; and (6) of the same general class as a chamber of
commerce or a board of trade. The court found that ABA Retirement Funds
was engaged in a business generally carried on for profit. It competed with
other retirement funds, and it “sought market share, not market welfare.” The
fees for its services were paid by individuals in proportion to the benefits they
derived from those services. Most significantly, the court found that its
activities were directed principally to individual lawyers and law firms rather
than to promoting the well-being of the legal profession generally: “The
requirement to promote the welfare of the general industry surely demands
more than offering goods or services that may enhance the individual practices
of the attorneys who purchase them.”
 Although the ABA lost in the Supreme
Court, United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986) (holding
that the American Bar Endowment’s income from life insurance policy dividends
retained represent profits from the insurance program rather than charitable
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donations from its members, but that if the members were given a choice between
allowing the American Bar Endowment to retain the dividends and having the
dividends refunded to them, then the dividends retained might constitute
charitable donations rather than unrelated business income), it changed its
insurance arrangements to achieve the same result by permitting cash refunds to
policyholders who claimed them in writing each year, P.L.R. 8725056 (3/25/87).
a.
The Seventh Circuit follows the Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(6)-1 definition of § 501(c)(6) “business league” in finding that
the ABA retirement program was not one. ABA Retirement Funds v.
United States, 759 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 7/21/14). Specifically, the Seventh
Circuit (Judge Wood) affirmed on the grounds that the non-profit ABA
Retirement Funds: (1) did not improve business conditions of the legal
profession but instead provided retirement plans to individual lawyers; and
(2) engaged in a business ordinarily conducted for profit.
 Note that § 501(c)(6) specifically provides
that professional football leagues are tax-exempt business leagues, “whether or
not administering a pension fund for football players.”
2.
Help(?) for those who missed filing required
annual returns or notices for three consecutive years, and also missed the
reinstatement procedures previously available. Rev. Proc. 2014-11, 20143 I.R.B. 411 (1/2/14). This revenue procedure provides procedures for
reinstating the tax-exempt status of organizations that have had their taxexempt status automatically revoked under § 6033(j) for failure to file required
annual returns or notices for three consecutive years. Generally, to obtain
retroactive reinstatement of the organization’s tax-exempt status, it must apply
not later than 15 months after the later of (1) the date of the revocation letter
or (2) the date on which the IRS posted the organization’s name on the
Revocation List. A streamlined process is available for an organization that
was eligible to file either Form 990-EZ or 990-N for each of the three
consecutive years that it failed to file, and that has not previously had its taxexempt status automatically revoked pursuant to § 6033(j). Additional
conditions apply if an organization seeks retroactive reinstatement of the
organization’s tax-exempt status, and if it applies more than 15 months after
the later of (1) the date of the revocation letter or (2) the date on which the IRS
posted the organization’s name on the Revocation List.
3.
The IRS continues to have problems with exempt
organization issues. Z Street, Inc. v. Koskinen, 113 A.F.T.R.2d 2014-2217
(D.D.C. 5/27/14). The District Court (Judge Jackson) refused to dismiss a
complaint filed by a pro-Israel nonprofit group seeking declaratory and
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injunctive relief with respect to the processing of its application for § 501(c)(3)
status. The complaint asserted that the IRS had a special policy of intense
scrutiny, which it applied to organizations whose activities relate to Israel “and
whose positions with respect to Israel contradict the current position of the
U.S. Government.” The court refused to dismiss this constitutional claim
based on the premise that the Israel Special Policy constituted “impermissible
viewpoint discrimination on the part of the federal government.” Judge
Jackson rejected the government’s assertions that the action should be
dismissed under (1) the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421; (2) the
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201; and (3) the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.
4.
The IRS introduces Form 1023-EZ, a shorter
application form to help small charities apply more easily for recognition
of tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3). T.D. 9764, Guidelines for the
Streamlined Process of Applying for Recognition of Section 501(c)(3) Status,
79 F.R. 37630 (7/2/14). The Treasury has issued proposed and temporary
regulations that permit the IRS to adopt a streamlined application process that
eligible organizations may use to apply for recognition of tax-exempt status
under § 501(c)(3). The temporary regulations, § 1.508-1T(a)(2)(i), provide
that eligible organizations may use Form 1023-EZ, ‘‘Streamlined Application
for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code,’’ to notify the IRS of their applications for tax-exempt status.
The regulations were effective on 7/1/14.
 According to an announcement issued by
the IRS, “[t]he change will allow the IRS to speed the approval process for
smaller groups and free up resources to review applications from larger, more
complex organizations while reducing the application backlog. Currently, the
IRS has more than 60,000 501(c)(3) applications in its backlog, with many of
them pending for nine months.” New 1023-EZ Form Makes Applying for
501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt Status Easier; Most Charities Qualify, 2014 TAX NOTES
TODAY 127-13 (7/1/14).
a.
The IRS provides guidance on the new
streamlined application process for recognition of tax-exempt status
under § 501(c)(3). Rev. Proc. 2014-40, 2014-30 I.R.B. 229 (7/1/14). This
revenue procedure sets forth the procedures for applying for recognition of
(and for issuing determination letters on) an organization’s tax-exempt status
under § 501(c)(3) using Form 1023-EZ. Generally, an organization can submit
Form 1023-EZ (rather than Form 1023) if it is a U.S. organization with both
assets valued at $250,000 or less and annual gross receipts of $50,000 or less.
The revenue procedure sets forth a lengthy list of organizations that cannot
submit Form 1023-EZ, including churches, schools, colleges, and hospitals.
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Form 1023-EZ must be submitted electronically and the user fee for doing so
is $400, as opposed to the $850 user fee charged to organizations submitting
Form 1023 that have actual or anticipated average annual gross receipts
exceeding $10,000. Organizations that submit Form 1023-EZ need not
separately request a determination that they need not file an annual return on
Form 990 or Form 990-EZ if they claim a filing exemption solely on the basis
that their gross receipts are normally $50,000 or less. The revenue procedure
was effective 7/1/14.
5.
An unsuccessful attempt to expedite discovery to
help uncover what happened to Lois Lerner’s missing emails. True the
Vote, Inc. v. IRS, 114 A.F.T.R.2d 2014-5663 (D.D.C. 8/7/14). Judge Walton
sided with the IRS in a conservative group’s lawsuit by denying the group’s
requests to (1) grant a preliminary injunction to require the IRS to preserve
Lois Lerner’s emails and (2) allow expedited discovery by an independent
expert to search for those of her emails that were missing. He further found no
obligation to preserve the emails relevant to this case by reason of the filing of
Z Street, Inc. v. Koskinen, 113 A.F.T.R.2d 2014-2217 (D.D.C. 5/27/14), in
December 2010 because the cases were “grounded on factually different
subjects.”
6.
Final regulations on the § 501(r) requirements for
charitable hospitals. T.D. 9708, Additional Requirements for Charitable
Hospitals; Community Health Needs Assessments for Charitable Hospitals;
Requirement of a Section 4959 Excise Tax Return and Time for Filing the
Return, 79 F.R. 78954 (12/31/14). Section 501(r), enacted as part of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, adds requirements for hospital
organizations to be recognized as exempt under § 501(c)(3). The Treasury
Department has finalized regulations proposed under § 501(r) in REG130266–11, Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals, 77 F.R. 38148
(7/26/12), and REG-106499-12, Community Health Needs Assessments for
Charitable Hospitals, 78 F.R. 20523 (4/5/13). The final regulations provide
detailed guidance to charitable hospital organizations on the requirements
imposed by § 501(r) and related excise tax and reporting obligations.
 Under § 501(r), each § 501(c)(3) hospital
organization is required to meet four general requirements on a facility-byfacility basis:
-establish written financial assistance and emergency medical care
policies;
-limit amounts charged for emergency or other medically necessary
care to individuals eligible for assistance under the hospital’s financial
assistance policy;
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-make reasonable efforts to determine whether an individual is eligible
for assistance under the hospital’s financial assistance policy before
engaging in extraordinary collection actions against the individual;
and
-conduct a community health needs assessment (CHNA) and adopt an
implementation strategy at least once every three years.
The 2012 proposed regulations addressed the first three requirements and the
2013 proposed regulations addressed the CHNA requirement.
 The Treasury Decision also provides
guidance—initially proposed in the 2013 proposed regulations—related to (1) the
$50,000 excise tax imposed by § 4959 on a hospital organization that fails to
meet the CHNA requirements, and (2) the requirement imposed by § 6033(b)(15)
that a hospital organization attach to its Form 990 both audited financial
statements and a description of the actions taken during the taxable year to
address the significant health needs identified through its most recently
conducted CHNA.
 The final regulations that address the four
general requirements imposed by § 501(r) apply to a hospital facility’s taxable
years beginning after 12/29/15. For taxable years beginning on or before
12/29/15, a hospital facility may rely on a reasonable, good faith interpretation
of § 501(r). A hospital facility will be deemed to have operated in accordance
with a reasonable, good faith interpretation of § 501(r) if it has complied with the
provisions of the 2012 or 2013, or both years’, proposed regulations or the final
regulations. The final regulations under § 4959 apply on and after 12/29/14 and
the final regulations under § 6033 apply to returns filed on or after 12/29/14.
B.

Charitable Giving

1.
No Mardi Gras beads from the Tax Court for this
taxpayer. Whitehouse Hotel Limited Partnership v. Commissioner, 131 T.C.
112 (10/30/08). The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) held that, as a precondition to
using the replacement cost approach to valuing real estate, the taxpayer must
show that the property is unusual in nature and other methods of valuation,
such as comparable sales or income capitalization, are not applicable. The
income approach to valuation is favored only where comparable market sales
are absent. On the facts, the $7,445,000 claimed value of the contribution of a
conservation facade easement for an historic structure on the edge of the
French Quarter in New Orleans overstated the value determined by Judge
Halpern ($1,792,301) by $5,652,699. The accuracy-related penalty for gross
overvaluation was proper because the claimed value was greater than 400
percent of the value determined, and the taxpayer was not relieved of the
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penalty based upon reasonable cause because there was no good faith
investigation into the value of the easement.
a.
Regardless of which valuation method is
used, it still must relate to the property’s “highest and best use.”
Whitehouse Hotel Limited Partnership v. Commissioner, 615 F.3d 321 (5th
Cir. 8/10/10). In an opinion by Judge Barksdale, the Fifth Circuit vacated the
Tax Court’s decision and remanded the case for a determination of the
easement’s value, although it rejected the taxpayer’s arguments that the IRS’s
expert was unqualified and that his report was unreliable and should not have
been admitted. But the Court of Appeals agreed with the taxpayers’ argument
that the Tax Court “miscomprehended the highest and best use” of the building
subjected to the conservation easement, and thereby undervalued the
easement.
In sum, the tax court erred in declining to consider the
Maison Blanche and Kress buildings’ highest and best use in
the light of both the reasonable and probable condominium
regime and the reasonable and probable combination of those
buildings into a single functional unit, both of which
foreclosed the realistic possibility, for valuation purposes, that
the Kress and Maison Blanche buildings could come under
separate ownership. This combination affected the buildings’
fair market value.
 As a result, the court did not reach the Tax
Court’s holding that the income and replacement-cost methods of valuation were
inapplicable, and directed the tax court to consider those methods in addition to
the comparable sales method on remand. Because the holding on the valuation
was vacated, the Tax Court’s holding that the gross overvaluation penalty also
was vacated.
b.
Judge Halpern reconsidered the whole
case in light of the Fifth Circuit decision and increased the allowable
deduction by only $65,415, from $1,792,301 to $1,857,716. Whitehouse
Hotel Limited Partnership v. Commissioner, 139 T.C. 304 (10/23/12). On
remand, Judge Halpern elaborated at length on the proper valuation method to
be used to value the building under the “before and after” method, and once
again accepted the IRS’s argument that the value of the property should be
determined using a comparable-sales method. The comparable-sales method
applied by Judge Halpern was based on the sales of buildings suitable for
conversion into hotels based primarily on local sales data, rejecting the
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taxpayer’s argument that non-local sales data should be taken into account. He
again rejected both the taxpayer’s reproduction-cost method and income
method to valuation. Judge Halpern explained that “[t]he reproduction cost of
an historic building usually bears little relationship to its present economic
value. Such cost is usually far in excess of the cost of construction of a
similarly sized modern structure, and may reflect the price of materials and
workmanship that are no longer readily available.” Because reconstruction of
the Maison Blanche Building, if destroyed, would not have been a reasonable
business venture, there was no probative correlation between the taxpayer’s
expert’s estimate of the reproduction cost of the Maison Blanche Building and
the fair market value of the property. Judge Halpern rejected the income
valuation method because in this case, where there was no ongoing business,
it was based on too many contingencies, was inadequately developed, and thus
was too speculative, particularly where the value could be established by
comparable sales. He did not reject the income method of valuation as a matter
of law. He stated: “We have no difficulty with the process. Where we have
difficulty is with petitioner’s call to trust on their face [the taxpayer’s expert’s]
judgments as to values to be input to his model.” Judge Halpern also again
found that the easement conveyance did not deprive the partnership or any
subsequent owner of the ability to add stories to the top of the Kress Building
or blocking views of the Maison Blanche facade. However, in light of the Fifth
Circuit’s directive, Judge Halpern determined the value of the facade
conservation easement based on the before- and after-restriction values of the
combined Maison Blanche and Kress Building property. He concluded that
the value of the easement was approximately $1.86 million, rather than $1.79
million as determined in his first opinion. Responding to the Fifth Circuit’s
determination that he had misapprehended the properties’ highest and best use,
Judge Halpern reasoned that:
although the highest and best use of property may determine
a ceiling on how much a willing buyer would pay for the
property, it does not necessarily determine a floor on how
little a willing seller would accept. . . . [T]he hypothetical
willing buyer and the hypothetical willing seller who populate
our standard definition of fair market value will not invariably
conclude their negotiation over price at a price reflecting the
value of the property at its highest and best use.
He turned to auction price theory to conclude that in determining the fair
market value of the property, which is the relevant benchmark:
[T]he equilibrium price at which the willing buyer and the
willing seller would meet would be somewhere between the
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value of the property taking into account its most productive
use (i.e., its highest and best use) and the value of the property
taking into account its second most profitable use.
Accordingly, he rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the valuation should be
based on the use of the buildings as the shell of a luxury hotel, there being no
scarcity of buildings in New Orleans suitable for development as luxury
hotels. “Only if there were sufficient scarcity would the partnership . . . capture
a piece of the economic return to luxury hotel development of the building’s
shell.” Finally, based on the $1.86 million value, the claimed value of the
easement exceeded 400 percent of the actual value (i.e., 401 percent) and the
§ 6662(h) gross valuation misstatement penalty applied. The § 6664(c)
reasonable cause and good-faith exceptions did not apply, because
Whitehouse failed to make a good-faith investigation of the value of the
easement and did not reasonably rely on an appraisal.
c.
In its second consideration, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed Judge Halpern on the amount of the deduction but
vacated the 40 percent gross overstatement penalty. Whitehouse Hotel
Limited Partnership v. Commissioner, 755 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 6/11/14), aff’g
in part and vacating in part, 615 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 8/10/10). The Fifth Circuit
(Judge Southwick) agreed with Judge Halpern’s determination of the amount
of the deduction on remand despite his near-insubordination to the earlier Fifth
Circuit opinion by saying, “Begrudging compliance with our mandate is
nevertheless compliance.” However, Judge Southwick’s opinion vacated the
gross valuation misstatement penalty because the taxpayer’s good faith
defense was valid, stating:
We are particularly persuaded by Whitehouse’s argument that
the Commissioner, the Commissioner’s expert, and the tax
court all reached different conclusions. The Commissioner
originally permitted only $1.15 million as a deduction. [The
Commissioner’s expert] valued the easement as worthless.
We share the tax court’s and the Commissioner’s skepticism
of the dramatic appreciation of value between the roughly
$8,000,000 purchase price of the Maison Blanche shell and
the [taxpayer’s expert’s] appraisal’s $96,000,000 valuation.
What the taxpayer reasonably considered, though, even if not
sustained by the tax court, is that its contract to transform the
building into a Ritz-Carlton hotel had value. As we were in
our 2010 opinion, we are skeptical of the tax court’s
conclusion that following the advice of accountants and tax
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professionals was insufficient to meet the requirements of the
good faith defense, especially in regard to such a complex task
that involves so many uncertainties. . . . for the general
reasonable cause exception, we review the “totality of the
facts and circumstances.” Whitehouse obtained a second
appraisal as a “check” against the first one. [A Whitehouse
partner] testified and presented the 1997 Form 1065
indicating it had been prepared by Whitehouse’s financial
auditors. Obtaining a qualified appraisal, analyzing that
appraisal, commissioning another appraisal, and submitting a
professionally-prepared tax return is sufficient to show a good
faith investigation as required by law. See I.R.C. §
6664(c)(3)(B). The tax court’s enforcement of the gross
undervaluation penalty was clearly erroneous.
(citations omitted)
2.
A “gotcha” for the IRS! The Tax Court just says
“no” to deductions for contributions of conservation easements on
mortgaged properties. Kaufman v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 182 (4/26/10).
The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) held that as a matter of law, no charitable
contribution deduction is allowable for an otherwise qualifying conveyance of
a facade conservation easement if the property is subject to a mortgage and the
mortgagee has a prior claim to condemnation and insurance proceeds. Because
the mortgage has priority over the easement, the easement is not protected in
perpetuity—which is required by § 170(h)(5)(A). The deduction cannot be
salvaged by proof that the taxpayer likely would satisfy the debt secured by
the mortgage.
a.
Plea for a mulligan is rejected! Kaufman v.
Commissioner, 136 T.C. 294 (4/4/11). On the taxpayers’ motion for
reconsideration, the Tax Court (Judge Halpern) in a lengthy and thorough
opinion reaffirmed its earlier decision that the conservation easement failed
the perpetuity requirement in Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6), because under the loan
documents, the bank that held the mortgage on the property expressly retained
a “‘prior claim’ to all insurance proceeds as a result of any casualty, hazard,
or accident occurring to or about the property and all proceeds of
condemnation,” and the agreement also provided that “the bank was entitled
to those proceeds ‘in preference’ to [the donee organization] until the
mortgage was satisfied and discharged.” The court also disallowed a deduction
in 2003, but allowed the deduction in 2004, for a cash contribution to the donee
of the conservation easement in 2003 because the amount of the cash payment
was subject to refund if the appraised value of the easement was zero, and the
appraisal was not determined until 2004. The court also rejected (1) the IRS’s
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argument that the taxpayers received a quid pro quo for the cash contribution
in the form of the donee organization accepting and processing their
application, (2) providing them with a form preservation restriction agreement,
(3) undertaking to obtain approvals from the necessary government
authorities, (4) securing the lender agreement from the bank, (5) giving the
taxpayers basic tax advice, and (6) providing them with a list of approved
appraisers. The facts in evidence did not demonstrate a quid pro quo, because,
among other things, many of the tasks had been undertaken by the organization
before the check was received.
 Finally, the court declined to uphold the
§ 6662 accuracy related penalties asserted by the IRS for the taxpayers’
overstatement of the amount of the contribution for the conservation easement,
but sustained the negligence penalty for the 2003 deduction for the cash payment.
Because the issue of whether any deduction was allowed for the easement,
regardless of its value, was a matter of law decided in the case as a matter of first
impression, the taxpayers were not negligent, had reasonable cause, and acted in
good faith.
b.
The taxpayer wins the battle in the Court
of Appeals with an excellent discussion of charitable contributions of
easements on mortgaged property, but still might lose the war. Kaufman
v. Shulman, 687 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 7/19/12). The First Circuit, however, in an
opinion by Judge Boudin, disagreed with the Tax Court, holding that a
mortgagee’s right to satisfy the mortgage lien before the donee of the
conservation easement is entitled to any amount from the sales or
condemnation proceeds from the property does not necessarily defeat the
charitable contribution deduction. Judge Boudin’s opinion noted that “the
Kaufmans had no power to make the mortgage-holding bank give up its own
protection against fire or condemnation and, more striking, no power to defeat
tax liens that the city might use to reach the same insurance proceeds—tax
liens being superior to most prior claims, 1 Powell on Real Property
§ 10B.06[6] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., Matthew Bender & Co. 2012), including
in Massachusetts the claims of the mortgage holder.”8 The opinion continued
by observing that:
[G]iven the ubiquity of super-priority for tax liens, the
IRS’s reading of its regulation would appear to doom
practically all donations of easements, which is surely
contrary to the purpose of Congress. We normally defer to an
8. We include the citation to Powell on Real Property in the quotation
because Michael Allan Wolf is a colleague of Professor McMahon, and the UF Law
Dean rewards faculty members based, in part, on their citation count.

2015]

Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation

279

agency’s reasonable reading of its own regulations, e.g.,
United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S.
200, 220 (2001), but cannot find reasonable an impromptu
reading that is not compelled and would defeat the purpose of
the statute, as we think is the case here.
 Thus, the First Circuit rejected the Tax
Court’s requirement that the donee of the conservation easement have “an
absolute right” (136 T.C. at 313), holding that a “grant that is absolute against the
owner-donor” is sufficient “and almost the same as an absolute one where thirdparty claims (here, the bank’s or the city’s) are contingent and unlikely.”
 The First Circuit went on to reject the
IRS’s argument that the contribution also failed to qualify for a charitable
contribution deduction because a provision in the agreement between the
Kaufmans and the donee trust stated that “nothing herein contained shall be
construed to limit the [Trust’s] right to give its consent (e.g., to changes in the
Façade) or to abandon some or all of its rights hereunder,” citing Commissioner
v. Simmons, 646 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011), which reasoned that such clauses
permitting consent and abandonment “‘have no discrete effect upon the
perpetuity of the easements: Any donee might fail to enforce a conservation
easement, with or without a clause stating it may consent to a change or abandon
its rights, and a tax-exempt organization would do so at its peril.’” (quoting 646
F.3d at 10).
 The court also rejected various scattershot
IRS arguments that the substantiation rules had not been met.
 However, the Court of Appeals did not
necessarily hand the taxpayers a final victory. It remanded the case to the Tax
Court on the valuation issue.
When the Kaufmans donated the easement, their home
was already subject to South End Landmark District rules that
severely restrict the alterations that property owners can make
to the exteriors of historic buildings in the neighborhood.
These rules provide that “[a]ll proposed changes or
alterations” to “all elements of [the] facade, . . . the front yard
. . . and the portions of roofs that are visible from public
streets” will be “subject to review” by the local landmark
district commission.
Under the Standards and Criteria, property owners of
South End buildings have an obligation to retain and repair
the original steps, stairs, railings, balustrades, balconies,
entryways, transoms, sidelights, exterior walls, windows,
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roofs, and front-yard fences (along with certain “other
features”); and, when the damaged elements are beyond
repair, property owners may only replace them with elements
that look like the originals. Given these pre-existing legal
obligations the Tax Court might well find on remand that the
Kaufmans’ easement was worth little or nothing.
 The court took note of the fact that in
persuading the Kaufmans to grant the easement, “a Trust representative told the
Kaufmans that experience showed that such easements did not reduce resale
value, and this could easily be the IRS’s opening argument in a valuation trial.”
c.
Despite winning a skirmish in the First
Circuit, the taxpayers ultimately lose the battle in the Tax Court—will the
taxpayer try to fight another battle in the First Circuit? Kaufman v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-52 (3/31/14). On remand, after evaluating
all of the evidence, including multiple appraisers’ reports, Judge Halpern held
that the facade easement had no fair market value. The deduction for the
contribution of the facade easement was disallowed. Because there was no
record of sales of comparable easements, the before-and-after valuation
method of Reg. § 170A-14(h)(3)(i) was applicable. He found that “the typical
buyer would find the restrictions of the preservation agreement no more
burdensome than the underlying South End Standards and Criteria [and] . . .
the postcontribution value of the property was equal to its precontribution
value . . . .” Negligence and substantial understatement accuracy related
penalties were sustained. The mere fact that the taxpayers obtained an
appraisal valuing the facade easement at $220,800 did not in and of itself
constitute a reasonable basis for claiming that the facade easement was worth
$220,800 when its value was in fact “nil.” The taxpayers failed to show a
reasonable basis for claiming the deduction.
3.
This throws buckets and buckets of ice water on
claims for charitable contribution deductions for façade easements in
historic districts. Scheidelman v. Commissioner, 755 F.3d 148 (2d Cir.
6/18/14), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2013-18. In a per curiam opinion by Judge
Newman, the Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision denying the
taxpayer’s claimed deduction for contribution of an historic facade
conservation easement to the National Architectural Trust on the ground that
the contribution did not result in any diminution in the value of the property.
The burdened property was in the Fort Greene Historic District, which is
designated (1) a “registered historic district” by the Secretary of the Interior
through the National Park Service, pursuant to § 47(c)(3)(B); and (2) an
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historic district by New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Commission
(LPC). In New York City, it is unlawful to alter, reconstruct, or demolish a
building in a historic district without the prior consent of the LPC. The Court
noted:
[N]either the Tax Court nor any Circuit Court of Appeals has
held that the grant of a conservation easement effects a per se
reduction in the fair market value. To the contrary, the
regulations provide that an easement that has no material
effect on the obligations of the property owner or the uses to
which the property may be put “may have no material effect
on the value of the property.” Treas. Reg. § 1.170A14(h)(3)(ii). And sometimes an easement “may in fact serve
to enhance, rather than reduce, the value of property. In such
instances no deduction would be allowable.”
 Substantial evidence supports the Tax
Court’s conclusion that the easement had no value for charitable contribution
purposes
4.
Mining is not the highest and best use for land that
no one actually wants to mine. Esgar Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2012-35 (2/6/12). The taxpayers granted conservation easements in certain
land that was zoned irrigated and agricultural, and which had historically been
used as irrigated and unirrigated farmland. The land was not permitted for any
mining, but absent the donations it was likely that the necessary permits to
mine (gravel) could have been obtained. The terms of the conservation
easements provided the donee organization with perpetual rights to preserve
the natural and open space conditions and protect the wildlife, ecological, and
environmental values and water quality characteristics of the property. The
conservation easements specifically prohibited the mining or extraction of
sand, gravel, rock, or any other mineral. The taxpayers valued the easement
donation under the “before and after method,” treating the highest and best use
before the donation as gravel mining. The Tax Court (Judge Wherry) held that
the before highest and best use was agricultural, not mining.
Where . . . an asserted highest and best use differs from
current use, the use must be reasonably probable and have real
market value. . . . “Any suggested use higher than current use
requires both ‘closeness in time’ and ‘reasonable
probability’”. Hilborn v. Commissioner, [85 T.C. 677, 689
(1985)]. Any proposed uses that “depend upon events or
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combinations of occurrences which, while within the realm of
possibility, are not fairly shown to be reasonably probable”
are to be excluded from consideration. Olson v. United States,
292 U.S. 246, 257 (1934).
Where the asserted highest and best use of property is the
extraction of minerals, the presence of the mineral in a
commercially exploitable amount and the existence of a
market “that would justify its extraction in the reasonably
foreseeable future” must be shown. United States v. 69.1
Acres of Land, [942 F.2d 290, 292 (4th Cir. 1991)]. “There
must be some objective support for the future demand,
including volume and duration. Mere physical adaptability to
a use does not establish a market.” United States v.
Whitehurst, 337 F.2d 765, 771–772 (4th Cir. 1964); see also
United States v. 494.10 Acres of Land, 592 F.2d 1130, 1132
(10th Cir. 1979).
Based on detailed examination of the facts and expert witness reports, the
evidence did not prove that a hypothetical willing buyer in the year of the
donation would have considered the land as the site for construction of a
gravel mine. “While it would have been physically possible to mine the
properties in 2004 (or in the future), there was no unfilled demand and there
was no unmet market.” Instead, Judge Wherry found that there were
comparable sales upon which a before valuation of the contribution could be
based. However, Judge Wherry declined to uphold the § 6662(b)(3)
substantial valuation penalty asserted by the IRS because he found that the
taxpayers relied in good faith on the appraisers and the accounting firm they
hired as advisors.
a.
Ditto says the Tenth Circuit. Esgar Corp. v.
Commissioner, 744 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 3/7/14). In an opinion by Judge Kelly,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision. The Court of Appeals
held that the Tax Court applied the correct highest and best use standard,
looking for the use that was most reasonably probable in the reasonably near
future, and it did not clearly err by concluding that use was agriculture.
5.
The old adage “better late than never” didn’t save
the taxpayer’s deduction for a conservation easement on mortgaged
property. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 324 (4/3/12). In 2003, the
taxpayer contributed a conservation easement on over 180 acres of
unimproved land to a qualified organization. The property was subject to a
mortgage, but the mortgagee did not subordinate the mortgage to the
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conservation easement deed until 2005. The taxpayer claimed a charitable
contribution deduction on her 2003 Federal income tax return, which the IRS
disallowed. The taxpayer argued that she had met the requirement of Reg.
§ 1.170A-14(g)(2) requiring subordination of a mortgage to the conservation
easement because Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(3) should apply to determine whether
the requirements of Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(2) had been satisfied. Reg. § 1.170A14(g)(3) provides that a deduction will not be disallowed merely because on
the date of the gift there is the possibility that the interest will be defeated, so
long as on that date the possibility of defeat is so remote as to be negligible.
The taxpayer argued that the probability of her defaulting on the mortgage was
so remote as to be negligible, and that the possibility should be disregarded
under the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard in determining whether the
conservation easement was enforceable in perpetuity. The Tax Court (Judge
Haines) held that the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard of Reg. § 1.170A14(g)(3) did not apply to determine whether the requirements of Reg.
§ 1.170A-14(g)(2), requiring subordination of a mortgage to the conservation
easement, had been satisfied, citing Kaufman v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 294
(2011), Kaufman v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 182 (2010), Carpenter v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-1, and distinguishing Simmons v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-208, aff’d, 646 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Thus, the taxpayer did not meet the requirements of Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(2),
and the deduction was denied. However, the taxpayer was not liable for a
§ 6662 accuracy related penalty. She “attempted to comply with the
requirements for making a charitable contribution of a conservation
easement,” she hired an accountant and an appraiser, but she “inadvertently
failed to obtain[] a subordination agreement,” and “upon being made aware of
the need for a subordination agreement she promptly obtained one.” She acted
with reasonable cause and in good faith.
a.
The Tax Court sticks by its guns on the
mortgaged property conservation easement issue. Minnick v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-345 (12/17/12). Once again, the Tax Court
(Judge Morrison) held that pursuant to Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(2), no charitable
contribution deduction is allowable for the donation of a conservation
easement where a mortgage encumbering the property has not been
subordinated to the interest of the donee of the easement. The court
emphasized its holding in Mitchell v Commissioner, 138 T.C. 324 (4/3/12),
that the unlikelihood of default is irrelevant.
b.
And the subsequent First Circuit decision
in Kaufman doesn’t change the result. Mitchell v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2013-204 (8/29/13). In a supplemental memorandum opinion, the Tax
Court (Judge Haines) denied the taxpayer’s motion for reconsideration. The
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taxpayer argued that the Tax Court erred in relying on Kaufman v.
Commissioner, 136 T.C. 294 (2011) (Kaufman II), which was affirmed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded in part by the First Circuit in Kaufman v.
Shulman, 687 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2012) (Kaufman III), because Kaufman III was
an intervening change in the law. In rejecting the taxpayer’s argument, Judge
Haines concluded that Kaufman III addressed different issues from Mitchell.
Kaufman III addressed the proper interpretation of the proceeds requirement
in Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6); in particular, the breadth of the donee
organization’s entitlement to proceeds from the sale, exchange, or involuntary
conversion of property following the judicial extinguishment of a perpetual
conservation restriction burdening the property. But Kaufman III did not state
a general rule that protecting the proceeds from an extinguishment of a
conservation easement would satisfy the in-perpetuity requirements of Reg.
§ 1.170A-14(g), which was the basis on which Mitchell was decided.
c.
The mortgage subordination provision is
“a bright line requirement.” “The remote future provision cannot be
reasonably read as modifying the strict mortgage subordination
requirement.” Mitchell v. Commissioner, 115 A.F.T.R.2d 2015-346 (10th
Cir. 1/6/15). In an opinion by Judge McHugh, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
Tax Court’s decision. First, the court held that Reg. § 1.170A-14(g), requiring
subordination of any mortgage as a condition of eligibility for a deduction,
was valid. Second, it held that the taxpayer’s arguments that she was entitled
to the deduction because (1) Reg. § 1.170A-14(g) does not impose an explicit
time-frame for compliance, and (2) despite the failure to subordinate the
mortgage at the time of conveyance, the deed contained sufficient safeguards
to protect the conservation purpose in perpetuity, both were contrary to the
“plain language” of Reg. § 1.170A-14(g). Finally, the court held that the IRS
“is entitled to demand strict compliance with the mortgage subordination
provision, irrespective of the likelihood of foreclosure.” The court rejected the
taxpayer’s argument that Reg. § 1.170.A-14(g)(3), which provides that a
deduction will not be disallowed “merely” because the interest that passes to
the donee organization may be defeated by the happening of some future event
“if on the date of the gift it appears that the possibility that such . . . event will
occur is so remote as to be negligible,” acts as an exception to the mortgage
subordination provision. Finally, citing Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 562
U.S. 195 (2011), the court reasoned as follows.
[E]ven if the regulations were unclear with respect to the
interplay between these provisions, Ms. Mitchell would not
prevail. We are required to defer to the Commissioner’s
interpretation to resolve any ambiguity on this point unless it
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is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations” or
there is any other “reason to suspect the interpretation does
not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the
matter.” . . . [R]ather than being plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulations, the Commissioner’s
interpretation—that the mortgage subordination is
unmodified by the remote future event provision—is
consistent with the regulation’s plain meaning.
6.
The North Dakota legislature helps out North
Dakotans by passing a law that prevents any conservation easement from
ever qualifying for a charitable deduction. Wachter v. Commissioner, 142
T.C. No. 7 (3/11/14). The taxpayers were the members of an LLC taxed as a
partnership and partners in a partnership that sold to the North Dakota Natural
Resource Trust at a bargain price conservation easements on agricultural land
and claimed charitable contribution deductions for the bargain element. The
IRS disallowed the deductions on the ground that a unique North Dakota state
law (N.D. Cent. Code sec. 47-05-02.1 (1999 & Supp. 2013)) restricted
easements to a duration of not more than 99 years, thus preventing the
conservation easements from being qualified real property interests and from
being exclusively for conservation purposes, as required by § 170(h). The
opinion quoted the statutory language: “The duration of the easement * * * on
the use of real property must be specifically set out, and in no case may the
duration of any interest in real property regulated by this section exceed
ninety-nine years;” but it did not reveal whether the conveyance specifically
stated that it was limited to 99 years. However, the taxpayers conceded that
“the easements at issue will expire 99 years after they were conveyed.” Based
on these facts, the Tax Court (Judge Buch) granted summary judgment for the
IRS on the ground that “the State law restriction prevents the easements from
being granted in perpetuity, which in turn prevents them from being both
qualified real property interests under section 170(h)(2) and contributions
exclusively for conservation purposes under section 170(h)(5).” Judge Buch
rejected the taxpayers’ argument that “the 99-year limitation should be
considered the equivalent of a remote future event or the retention of a
negligible interest because at present the remainder is ‘essentially valueless.’”
They argued that the possibility that the land would revert back to them or
their successors in interest was the equivalent of a remote future event that
pursuant to Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(3) will not prevent the easements from being
perpetual. Based on 885 Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 156, 161 (1990),
in which the Tax Court construed “‘so remote as to be negligible’ as ‘a chance
which persons generally would disregard as so highly improbable that it might
be ignored with reasonable safety in undertaking a serious business
transaction,’” and other similar precedents, Judge Buch concluded that the
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possibility that the donee would be divested of the conservation easements
reversion not only was “not remote,” but was inevitable.
7.
What does retroactive mean? Chandler v.
Commissioner, 142 T.C. No. 16 (5/14/14). The taxpayers donated
conservation easements on two residences in Boston’s South End historic
district to the National Architectural Trust and claimed charitable contribution
deductions of $191,400 and $371,250. Because of relevant limitations, the
values of the easements were deducted in varying amounts from 2004 through
2006. The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) disallowed the deduction even though the
conservation easements were more restrictive than local law with respect to
architectural changes. Applying the reasoning of Kaufman v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2014-52, which held that an NAT easement on a property in the
South End Historic District did not reduce the value of a residence, the court
disallowed the deduction entirely. The differences between the NAT
restrictions and local law “do not affect property values, because buyers do
not perceive any difference between the competing sets of restrictions.” Under
§ 6662(h), the valuation misstatements were gross valuation misstatements
triggering a 40 percent penalty. However, a novel issue regarding the
taxpayers’ right to raise a reasonable cause defense for their 2006
underpayment was presented because a portion of the 2006 underpayment
resulted from the carryover of charitable contribution deductions they first
claimed on their 2004 return, which was filed before the Pension Protection
Act of 2006 eliminated the § 6664(c) good faith and reasonable cause defense
for gross valuation misstatements of charitable contribution property (unless
certain conditions, which were not met in this case, were met). The court
rejected the taxpayer’s argument that denying their right to raise a reasonable
cause defense with respect to the 2006 understatement attributable to
deductions carried forward from 2004 would amount to retroactively applying
the Pension Protection Act of 2006 amendment to § 6664(c). “When taxpayers
file a return that includes carryforward information, they essentially reaffirm
that information. The amended reasonable cause rules were in effect when
petitioners filed their 2006 return, which reaffirmed the Claremont easement’s
grossly misstated value. Applying those rules does not amount to retroactive
application.” Ironically, however, with respect to the 2004 and 2005
deductions, the taxpayers did establish a reasonable cause defense. They had
“followed the NPS’s suggestion for choosing an appraiser and relied on his
report. The report was not so deficient on its face that petitioners should have
reasonably discounted it. They obtained their accountant’s assurances before
they claimed the easement deductions.”
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a.
Ditto! Reisner v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2014-230 (11/6/14). The Tax Court (Judge Gale) followed Chandler
regarding the elimination (by § 6664(c)(3)) of the “reasonable cause”
exception to a 40 percent gross valuation misstatement penalty (§ 6662(h)(1))
for a claimed carried-over charitable contribution deduction to 2006 with
respect to a contribution of a valueless facade easement in 2004. According to
Reg. § 1.6662-5(c):
[T]he gross valuation misstatement penalty applies to any
portion of an underpayment for a year to which a deduction is
carried that is attributable to a gross valuation misstatement
for the year in which the carryback or carryover of the
deduction arises. Thus, by its terms, the regulation
characterizes the penalty-bearing portion of the
underpayment in the carryover or carryback year as
‘attributable to’ the gross valuation misstatement in the
originating year.
8.
Contribution of facade conservation easements to
facilitate zoning changes and development approval reduces the value of
the contribution—and if you claim you got nothing in return, you get no
deduction whatsoever. Seventeen Seventy Sherman Street, LLC v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-124 (6/19/14). The taxpayer contributed
both exterior and interior facade conservation easements restricting the use of
the burdened historic property, which was listed on a National Register of
Historic Properties, to a qualified donee. Because the property was a
designated landmark, proposed structural changes or material renovations to
its exterior were subject to the approval of the Denver Landmark Preservation
Commission. However, designation as a landmark did not obligate property
owners to rehabilitate deteriorating structures, did not prohibit building
demolition, and did not protect the interior of the building. Thus, the
conservation easement provided stronger protections, such as building
monitoring and prohibition of demolition, than designation as a landmark. The
Tax Court (Judge Marvel) found that the conservation easements were granted
in consideration of the City of Denver granting zoning changes and variances
and approving a development plan for the property, and denied the deduction
in its entirety—even though the IRS would have allowed a $400,000
deduction, not the $7,150,000 deduction claimed by the taxpayer. The
taxpayer had not reported the receipt of any consideration for the contribution
and did not treat it as a bargain sale. Accordingly, Judge Marvel reasoned that:
[W]hen a taxpayer grants a conservation easement as part of
a quid pro quo transaction and fails to identify or value all of
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the consideration received in the transaction, the taxpayer is
not entitled to any charitable contribution deduction with
respect to the grant of the conservation easement because he
has failed to comply with section 170 and the regulations
thereunder.
Because the taxpayer “failed to value all of the consideration . . . received in
the quid pro quo exchange,” the court did not reach a conclusion on the value
of the interior and exterior easements. Although the § 6662(h) gross valuation
misstatement penalty asserted by the IRS was not upheld, because the IRS
failed to establish that the value of the conservation easements claimed on the
return (i.e., $7,150,000) exceeded 400 percent of the correct value of the
easements, a § 6662 negligence penalty was sustained, because the taxpayer
did not follow its advisor’s advice to reduce the amount of the contribution to
reflect the value of the consideration it received.
9.
Sometimes you see the disregarded entity,
sometimes you don’t. RERI Holdings I, LLC v. Commissioner, 143 T.C. No.
3 (8/11/14). RERI Holdings I, LLC contributed a successor membership
interest in a single member LLC—a disregarded entity under the “check-thebox” regulations—to a university under a condition that the University not sell
the property for two years but would sell it after two years. RERI Holdings
valued the contribution based on an appraisal of the value of a hypothetical
remainder interest in the disregarded LLC’s sole asset, real property subject to
a triple net lease. The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) denied the IRS’s motion for
summary judgment that: (1) the § 7520 tables for valuing remainder interests
were not applied correctly to the valuation of the contribution and (2) the
appraisal was not a “qualified appraisal” as defined in Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(3).
The IRS argued that it was improper to appraise a hypothetical remainder
interest in the underlying real property rather than the LLC interest that was,
in fact, donated to the university, taking the position that, assuming the § 7520
tables were applicable, the § 7520 remainder interest factor should have been
applied to the fair market value of the contributed LLC interest. The court
agreed with IRS that under the rationale of Pierre v. Commissioner, 133 T.C.
24 (2009), a disregarded entity is not disregarded in determining value of the
contributed property, but denied the IRS’s motion for summary judgment on
the ground that the value of the sole asset of an LLC might serve as an
acceptable substitute for the LLC’s value, which was an issue that could not
be resolved on summary judgment. The IRS also argued that Reg. § 1.75203(b)(2)(iii) precluded application of the § 7520 tables to determine the value
of the LLC, because the holder of the LLC interest did not “enjoy the same
protections as would be afforded . . . to a trust remainderman.” The IRS
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asserted that the LLC interest could be devalued by depreciation of the real
property, its sale, or additional or unpaid mortgage indebtedness, and thus the
preservation and protection requirements of Reg. § 1.7520-3(b)(2)(iii)
precluded application of the § 7520 tables. The IRS also argued that because
of the two-year hold-sell requirement, the property was a restricted beneficial
interest within the meaning of Reg. § 1.7520-3(b)(1)(ii) to which the § 7520
tables cannot be applied. The court again held that there were disputed material
facts that affected whether the “preservation and protection” requirements in
the § 7520 regulations had been met or whether the two-year hold-sell
restriction was a “meaningful restriction” that would disqualify use of the
§ 7520 tables. Regarding the qualified appraisal issue, the court held that the
appraisal of the remainder interest in the real property instead of the LLC did
not automatically disqualify the appraisal. Although the appraisal did not
include the hold-sell requirement, it did not omit any restriction that could
have adversely impacted the value of the contributed property. While other
aspects of the lease may have affected the accuracy of the appraisal, it was still
“qualified.” Finally, failure to discuss mortgages, depreciation of the property,
or a lessee’s rights to remove its property, while possibly resulting in an
erroneous valuation of the donated property, are not items that would result in
the appraisal not constituting a qualified appraisal under the regulations.
10.
A semi-secret conservation easement doesn’t
harvest a deduction. Zarlengo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-161
(8/11/14). The taxpayers executed a conservation easement deed to the
National Architectural Trust in 2004, but the deed was not recorded until 2005.
They claimed a charitable contribution deduction for 2004. The Tax Court
(Judge Vasquez) held that the deduction was not allowed in 2004 because the
conservation easement was not protected in perpetuity, as required by
§ 170(h)(2), until January 26, 2005, when the deed was recorded. Under the
relevant state law (New York), an instrument purporting to create, convey,
modify, or terminate a conservation easement is not effective unless recorded.
The court went on to determine the value of the contribution, which was
deductible in 2005, after evaluating the ubiquitous battle of the appraisers, and,
because as usually happens the deduction allowed was much, much less than
that claimed, § 6662 accuracy related penalties were sustained.
11.
Encouraging geriatrics to give away their
retirement savings—does that make sense to you? TIPA retroactively
extended through 12/31/14 § 408(d)(8)(F), which allows taxpayers who are
age 70-1/2 or older to make tax-free distributions to a charity from an IRA of
up to $100,000 per year. These distributions are not subject to the charitable
contribution percentage limits.
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12.
Let’s go green for a few more years; contributions
of conservation easements. TIPA retroactively extended through 12/31/14
the provisions of § 170 allowing a deduction for a qualified conservation
contribution made by an individual or corporate farmer or rancher in tax years
beginning after 12/31/05. Generally, under § 170(b), a corporation’s charitable
contribution deductions cannot exceed 10 percent of taxable income. An
individual’s deduction for qualified conservation easements cannot exceed 50
percent of the taxpayer’s contribution base over other allowable charitable
contribution deductions. For 2014, the limits under § 170(b) for deduction of
qualified conservation easements by a farmer or rancher are 100 percent of the
taxpayer’s contribution base (in the case of an individual) or taxable income
(in the case of a corporation) over other allowable charitable contributions,
with a fifteen year carryforward.
13.
What part of “perpetuity” don’t you understand?!
Belk v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. 1 (1/28/13). The taxpayers claimed a
charitable contribution deduction for the grant of a conservation easement on
184.627 acres of a golf course to a qualified organization. Specifically, they
agreed not to develop the golf course. However, the conservation easement
agreement permitted the taxpayers, with the donee’s consent, to remove
portions of the golf course from the easement and replace them with property
not theretofore subject to the conservation easement. The IRS disallowed the
deduction, and the Tax Court (Judge Vasquez) upheld the IRS’s disallowance
of the deduction. Section 170(h)(1)(A) requires the contribution of a
“qualified” real property interest, and to be a “qualified” real property interest,
§ 170(h)(2)(C) requires that the conservation easement limit in perpetuity the
use that may be made of the property. Section 170(h)(2)(C) precluded the
deduction because the taxpayers did not donate an interest in real property
subject to a use restriction granted in perpetuity. Because the conservation
easement agreement allowed the parties to change the property subject to the
conservation easement, it did not meet the perpetuity requirement. The court
rejected the taxpayers’ argument the deduction nevertheless should be allowed
because the substitution clause permitted only substitutions that would not
harm the conservation purposes of the conservation easement. The court
reasoned that the § 170(h)(5) requirement that the conservation purpose be
protected in perpetuity is separate and distinct from the § 170(h)(2)(C)
requirement that there be real property subject to a use restriction in perpetuity,
and the taxpayers’ conveyance failed to satisfy § 170(h)(2)(C). Satisfying
§ 170(h)(5) does not necessarily affect whether there is a qualified real
property interest. Furthermore, it was argued that any substitution required the
donee’s consent: “There is nothing in the Code, the regulations, or the
legislative history to suggest that section 170(h)(2)(C) is to be read to require
that the interest in property donated be a restriction on the use of the real
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property granted in perpetuity unless the parties agree otherwise. The
requirements of section 170(h) apply even if taxpayers and qualified
organizations wish to agree otherwise.”
 The IRS was represented in this case by
one of Professor McMahon’s former research assistants. The Tax Court judge
was one of Professor Shepard’s former research assistants. [So there, Marty!]
a.
Reconsideration
denied.
Belk
v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-154 (6/19/13). Judge Vasquez denied the
taxpayer’s motion for reconsideration. First, the taxpayer argued that the
original opinion misinterpreted § 170(h)(2)(C), arguing that the Code and
regulations do “not require the donation of an interest in ‘an identifiable,
unchanging, static piece of real property.’” The taxpayer argued that as long
as it “agree[d] not to develop 184.627 acres of land, the Court (and the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS)) should not be concerned with what land actually
comprises those 184.627 acres.” Judge Vasquez reiterated that the court had
“rejected the notion of such ‘floating easements’ ... and found that section
170(h)(2)(C) requires that taxpayers donate an interest in an identifiable,
specific piece of real property.” Not being bound by any rule that arguments
had to be consistent, the taxpayer’s second argument was that because the
taxpayer had intended to obtain a deduction for granting the conservation
easement the court had misinterpreted the conveyance and applicable state law
as permitting a substitution. This argument also fell on deaf ears: “Our
interpretation of the parties’ intention is governed by what the parties actually
included in the conservation easement agreement. It is well settled that a
taxpayer’s expectations and hopes as to the tax treatment of his conduct in
themselves are not determinative.” Finally, the taxpayer argued that the
original opinion “fail[ed] to consider that an element of trust and confidence
is placed in a qualified organization that it will continue to carry out its mission
to protect and conserve property.” Judge Vasquez responded, “Because the
parties have agreed petitioners are able to substitute land, there is no restriction
on the golf course in perpetuity that we can trust SMNLT to enforce.”
b.
The “plain language of the Code” sinks the
taxpayers’ deduction, and a “savings clause” isn’t a life preserver. Belk
v. Commissioner, 114 A.F.T.R.2d 2014-6952 (4th Cir. 12/16/14). In an
opinion by Judge Motz, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s
disallowance of the deduction. The court held that the plain language of §
170(h)(2)(C), which “provides that a ‘qualified property interest’ includes ‘a
restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the real
property,’” “makes clear that a perpetual use restriction must attach to a
defined parcel of real property rather than simply some or any (or
interchangeable parcels of) real property.” (emphasis supplied by the court)
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Because the taxpayers had the right to remove land from that defined parcel
and substitute other land, the easement failed to qualify because the real
property was not subject to a use restriction in perpetuity. Furthermore,
allowing a deduction in these circumstances, where the borders of an easement
could shift, would enable the taxpayers to bypass the requirement of Reg. §
1.170A-14(g)(5)(i) that the donor of a conservation easement make available
to the donee “documentation sufficient to establish the condition of the
property.” Finally, the court rejected the taxpayers’ argument that the
deduction was preserved by a savings clause in the deed that the donee “shall
have no right or power to agree to any amendments . . . that would result in
this Conservation Easement failing to qualify . . . as a qualified conservation
contribution under Section 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code and
applicable regulations.” Relying on Commissioner v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824
(4th Cir. 1944), the court held the savings clause to be ineffective: “If every
taxpayer could rely on a savings clause to void, after the fact, a disqualifying
deduction (or credit), enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code would grind
to a halt.” Thus, the court declined to use the savings clause to rewrite the
easement in response to its holding.
X.

TAX PROCEDURE
A.

Interest, Penalties, and Prosecutions

1.
The Tax Court refused to accept an accrualmethod taxpayer’s year 2000 net operating loss, which the Justice
Department had accepted for sentencing purposes in a tax fraud criminal
prosecution that resulted in probation for a taxpayer with a prior bank
fraud conviction for which he spent 20 months in prison. Seiffert v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-4 (1/9/14). The taxpayer used the accrual
method of accounting to offset wage income with purported bad debts, but the
only “proof” of the bad debts was a purported NOL which the Justice
Department accepted for criminal sentencing purposes. In addition, the
taxpayer failed to report 1099 income for the years in question. The Tax Court
(Judge Kroupa) held that the criminal plea agreement did not establish the
NOL for civil tax purposes, and that no collateral estoppel resulted from the
government’s acceptance of the plea agreement. Judge Kroupa concluded that
the statute of limitations had not expired for the 1996-2001 years in question
because the taxpayer filed fraudulent returns for each of those years based
upon her finding several badges of fraud (including understatement of income,
inadequate and incomplete records, failure to cooperate, and inconsistent
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explanations and incredible testimony), and upheld the Commissioner’s
determinations including the fraud penalty under § 6653.
a.
Motion for reconsideration denied. Seiffert
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-61 (4/7/14). The Tax Court (Judge
Kroupa) denied motions for reconsideration and for revision of the decision at
T.C. Memo. 2014-4 because she concluded that (1) collateral estoppel did not
establish the NOL “because it was not an essential element of the criminal
conviction to which the plea agreement related”; and (2) the plea agreement
[with respect to the NOL] did not constitute “a factual admission” by the
government.
2.
Is this circuit split worth a look by the Supremes,
or is it just not political enough to grab their attention? Carlson v. United
States, 754 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 6/13/14). The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that the government’s burden of proof in asserting a
§ 6701 penalty for aiding and abetting understatement of tax liability is “clear
and convincing evidence,” not merely a “preponderance of the evidence.”
Both the Second and Eighth Circuits have held that the government’s burden
of proof in asserting a § 6701 penalty is a “preponderance of the evidence.”
Barr v. United States, 67 F.3d 469 (2d Cir. 1995); Mattingly v. United States,
924 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1991).
3.
Instructions on how to rat yourself out. Rev. Proc.
2014-15, 2014-5 I.R.B. 456 (1/23/14). This revenue procedure updates Rev.
Proc. 2012-51, 2012-51 I.R.B. 719, and identifies circumstances under which
the disclosure on a taxpayer’s income tax return with respect to an item or a
position is adequate for the purpose of reducing the understatement of income
tax under § 6662(d), relating to the substantial understatement aspect of the
accuracy-related penalty, and for the purpose of avoiding the tax return
preparer penalty under § 6694(a), relating to understatements due to
unreasonable positions. There have been no substantive changes. The revenue
procedure does not apply with respect to any other penalty provisions,
including § 6662(b)(1) accuracy-related penalties. If this revenue procedure
does not include an item, disclosure is adequate with respect to that item only
if made on a properly completed Form 8275 or 8275–R, as appropriate,
attached to the return for the year or to a qualified amended return. A
corporation’s complete and accurate disclosure of a tax position on the
appropriate year’s Schedule UTP, Uncertain Tax Position Statement, is treated
as if the corporation had filed a Form 8275 or Form 8275-R regarding the tax
position.
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4.
Does the Tax Court think it has jurisdiction? As
long as the statute doesn’t make clear that it doesn’t, it sure does. Corbalis
v. Commissioner, 142 T.C. 46 (1/27/14). Judge Cohen held that the IRS’s
denial of a request to suspend interest under § 6404(g) is subject to review by
the Tax Court under § 6404(h). Furthermore, Letters 3477 sent to the taxpayer
by the IRS were final determinations for purposes of § 6404(h) even though
the taxpayer’s concurrent claims for abatement of interest under § 6404(e)
were still pending.
5.
The Commissioner “♬♪gets Wherry and sick of
tryin’♬♪” because he could not prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the taxpayer’s underpayments were attributable to fraud because he
counted more factors weighing against fraud than factors weighing in
favor of fraud. Carreon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-6 (1/9/14). As
the result of an “agent-principal” scheme, the taxpayer underreported income
for 2005 and 2006 by $355,000 and $101,000, respectively, by transferring
those amounts to various so-called “trusts.” The Tax Court (Judge Wherry)
held that the taxpayer’s reliance on the promoter of this scheme, while not
reasonable, mitigated “slightly against a finding of civil fraud.” On the other
hand, inadequate maintenance of records weighed slightly in favor of a finding
of fraud. Judge Wherry found three factors in favor of fraud, one neutral, and
six factors against fraud, so the Commissioner failed to carry “his substantial
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that [taxpayer] committed
fraud.” Therefore, the 75 percent civil fraud penalty under § 6663 was not
upheld.
6.
To collect § 6672 trust fund penalty taxes, the IRS
must prove that it provided notice to the taxpayer as required by
§ 6672(b); it cannot rely on the presumption of regularity. United States v.
Thomas, 113 A.F.T.R.2d 2014-1459 (N.D. Fla. 3/20/14). Section 6672(b)
provides that, before the IRS can impose a § 6672 trust fund recovery penalty,
it must notify the taxpayer in writing by mail or in person that the taxpayer
will be subject to an assessment of the penalty. According to the Internal
Revenue Manual, the IRS complies with this requirement by hand delivering
or sending by certified mail a Letter 1153 to the taxpayer. In this case, the
government claimed to have mailed a Letter 1153 to the taxpayer on October
15, 2012. To prove this, the government submitted “a copy of the
electronically-maintained Form 1153 letter and a printout of the history log
from the IRS’ Automated Trust Fund Recovery . . . system.” The government
also submitted a declaration from a Revenue Officer “stating it is the IRS’
standard practice to send a 1153 letter to a taxpayer by certified mail before
assessing trust fund recovery penalties against him.” The court agreed with the
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taxpayer that, because the government was able to produce only an unsigned,
undated copy of the Letter 1153 and produced no receipt demonstrating that it
had been sent by certified mail, the government had failed to meet its burden
of proving that the required notice had been sent. The court noted that a sister
court had not applied the presumption of regularity in a prior decision
involving nearly identical facts and that its decision had been affirmed by the
Eleventh Circuit. See Bonaventura v. United States, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 20101039 (N.D. Ga. 2009), aff’d per curiam, 428 F. App’x 916 (11th Cir. 2011).
Accordingly, the court granted the taxpayer’s motion for summary judgment.
The court observed that the period of limitations on assessment of the tax
penalty had expired.
7.
A Knight’s estate might be able to avoid late
payment penalties by establishing reasonable cause based on erroneous
advice from an attorney. Estate of John R.H. Thouron v. United States, 752
F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 5/13/14). John R.H. Thouron, KBE,9 the widower of Esther
du Pont Thouron, died leaving a substantial estate. The estate tax return was
due on 11/6/07. The estate timely filed a request for an automatic 6-month
extension of time to file and made a payment of $6.5 million, less than the $20
million ultimately owed. The estate did not request an extension of time to
pay, allegedly because of advice from its tax attorney concerning the estate’s
ability to elect under § 6166 to pay a portion of its estate tax liability in
installments over several years. The estate filed its return in May 2008 and at
that time requested an extension of time to pay. The estate did not make the
election under § 6166 because it had concluded that it did not qualify. The IRS
denied as untimely the request for an extension of time to pay and imposed a
late payment penalty under § 6651(a)(2) of $999,072 plus interest. The estate
contested the penalty on the basis that § 6651(a)(2) grants relief from the
penalty when the failure to pay is “due to reasonable cause and not due to
willful neglect.” The District Court granted summary judgment to the
government, but the Third Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Ambro, reversed
and remanded. The court relied on Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(1) for the proposition
that a taxpayer demonstrates reasonable cause by establishing that “he
exercised ordinary business care and prudence in providing for payment of his
tax liability and was nevertheless either unable to pay the tax or would suffer
an undue hardship . . . if he paid on the due date.” Judge Ambro examined the
Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985), and
concluded that, although Boyle addresses establishing reasonable cause for
failure to timely file a return, its holding also applies to establishing reasonable
9. The letters KBE are used to designate a person’s status as Knight
Commander, Order of the British Empire.
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cause for failure to timely pay tax. In Boyle, Judge Ambro stated, the Supreme
Court identified three distinct categories of cases: (1) those in which “a
taxpayer relies on an agent for the ministerial task of filing or paying”;
(2) those in which “in reliance on the advice of his accountant or attorney, the
taxpayer files a return after the actual due date but within the time the adviser
erroneously told him was available”; and (3) those in which “an accountant or
attorney advises a taxpayer on a matter of tax law.” Judge Ambro concluded
that the facts of Boyle fell into the first category and that the Supreme Court
had not addressed the remaining two categories. Thus, according to Judge
Ambro, a taxpayer cannot establish reasonable cause by relying on an agent
for the ministerial act of filing or paying, as in Boyle, but “a taxpayer’s reliance
on the advice of a tax expert may be reasonable cause for failure to pay by the
deadline if the taxpayer can also show either an inability to pay or undue
hardship from paying at the deadline.” Because there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to the estate’s reliance on a tax expert’s advice, the Third
Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
 The estate has brought legal action against
its tax advisers. Estate of John R.H. Thouron v. Cecil Smith & Associates, PC,
2013 WL 56090 (E.D. Pa. 1/3/13).
8.
Well, well; a “marriage” of corporations isn’t the
same as a marriage between individual “persons” for purposes of this
Code section, it’s better. Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl.
30 (6/27/14). Section 6621(d) allows “global netting” on interest rates for tax
overpayments and tax underpayments by the “same taxpayer” to address the
disparity between the higher interest rate imposed on tax underpayments and
the lower interest rate applied when the government pays a refund on tax
overpayments. On a motion for summary judgment, the Court of Federal
Claims (Judge Firestone) held that the term “same taxpayer” includes both
predecessors of the surviving corporation in a statutory merger. Section
6621(d) allows interest netting regardless of whether the overlapping
overpayments and underpayments involve corporations that were separate
prior to the merger; following a merger, the entities become one and the same
as a matter of law and thus become the “same” for purposes of interest netting.
The court rejected the government’s argument that § 6621(d) netting applies
only when the overpayment and underpayment were made by the taxpayer
with the same TIN at the time of the payments.
9.
To establish a good faith reliance penalty defense,
you have to prove that your tax advisor knew what he was doing. Wright
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-175 (8/28/14). The taxpayers, through a
partnership, claimed a $3,000,000 loss generated through transactions
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involving a series of euro put and call options, with two of the put options
being donated to a charity. The loss depended on the options being markedto-market under § 1256(c) as a foreign currency contract as defined in
§ 1256(g)(2). In an earlier proceeding, Wright v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2011-292, the Tax Court determined that the options were not foreign currency
contracts. The issue in the instant proceeding was whether to sustain a
§ 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty. The taxpayers argued that they relied
reasonably and in good faith on a tax-advisor law firm’s tax opinion stating
that the loss was “‘more likely than not’ to be ‘upheld by a court if challenged
by the IRS and fully litigated on the merits.’” The court (Judge Foley) rejected
their good faith reliance defense on two grounds. First, the opinion stated that
the law firm relied upon certain “representations and advice” provided to it by
the partnership and that the opinion could not be relied on if such
representations and advice were “inaccurate in any material respect, or prove
not to be authentic,” and a letter to the partnership transmitting the tax opinion
stated that “[w]hile we are furnishing you the opinion letter, please be advised
that the opinion letter may not be relied upon (and is not otherwise released)
unless and until we have the Investor Representations fully executed by you.”
Although the law firm reviewed a copy of unsigned investor representations,
the executed investor representations were never delivered. Second, the law
firm did not have significant experience relating to the taxation of foreign
currency options. The lawyer who prepared the opinion “lacked the requisite
tax expertise to justify petitioners’ reliance.” The “law firm based its opinion
that a foreign currency option constitutes a foreign currency contract primarily
on its interpretation of section 1256. This interpretation, however, was not well
reasoned and ignored the plain language of the statute.” Thus, their reliance
was “unreasonable.”
B.

Discovery: Summonses and FOIA

1.
You can’t hide your foreign bank account records
behind the Fifth Amendment. M.H. v. United States, 648 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir.
8/19/11), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 26 (6/25/12). M.H. was the target of a grand
jury investigation seeking to determine whether he used secret Swiss bank
accounts to evade paying federal taxes. The District Court granted a motion to
compel his compliance with a grand jury subpoena duces tecum demanding
that he produce certain records related to his foreign bank accounts. The
District Court declined to condition its order compelling production upon a
grant of limited immunity and, pursuant to the recalcitrant witness statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1826, held him in contempt for refusing to comply. The Ninth Circuit
upheld the District Court order. The Court of Appeals held that “[b]ecause the
records sought through the subpoena fall under the Required Records
Doctrine, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
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inapplicable, and M.H. may not invoke it to resist compliance with the
subpoena’s command.” The records were required to be kept pursuant to the
predecessor of 31 C.F.R. § 1010.420.


The opinion stated:

There is nothing inherently illegal about having or being a
beneficiary of an offshore foreign banking account.
According to the Government, § 1010.420 applies to
“hundreds of thousands of foreign bank accounts—over half
a million in 2009.” Nothing about having a foreign bank
account on its own suggests a person is engaged in illegal
activity. That fact distinguishes this case from Marchetti and
Grosso, where the activity being regulated—gambling—was
almost universally illegal, so that paying a tax on gambling
wagers necessarily implicated a person in criminal activity.
Admitting to having a foreign bank account carries no such
risk. That the information contained in the required record
may ultimately lead to criminal charges does not convert an
essentially regulatory regulation into a criminal one.
a.
When the government asks, ya gotta pony
up the name(s) on your foreign bank accounts, the account numbers, the
name and address of the banks, the type of account, and the maximum
value of each such account during each year. In re: Special February 20111 Grand Jury Subpoena Dated September 12, 2011, 691 F.3d 903 (7th Cir.
8/27/12), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2338 (5/13/13). In an opinion by Judge
Bauer, the Seventh Circuit held that the compulsory production of foreign
bank account records required to be maintained under the Bank Secrecy Act
of 1970 did not violate a taxpayer’s Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. The required records doctrine overrode any act of production
privilege. A grand jury subpoena seeking the taxpayer’s bank records issued
in connection with an investigation into whether he used secret offshore bank
accounts to evade his federal income taxes was enforced.
b.
A third decision going the same way. In re:
Grand Jury Subpoena, 696 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 9/21/12). The Fifth Circuit
(Judge Dennis), in reversing a district court, declined to create a circuit split
and held that the required records doctrine applied; the individual was required
to produce foreign bank records subpoenaed in the IRS’s investigation into
whether he used secret Swiss bank accounts [with UBS] to evade his federal
income taxes. The court’s reasoning was that the Bank Secrecy Act’s (BSA)
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record-keeping requirement is “essentially regulatory,” the records sought are
of a kind “customarily kept” by account holders, and the records have assumed
“public aspects”; this is so even though one purpose of the BSA was to aid law
enforcement officials in pursuing criminal investigations.
c.
The Second Circuit held that owners of
secret offshore foreign bank accounts are not “inherently suspect” of tax
evasion or of anything else illegal. In re: Grand Jury Subpoena Dated
February 2, 2012, 741 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 12/19/13). The Second Circuit (Judge
Wesley) held that the required records exception to the Fifth Amendment
applied, and that production of foreign bank records was required. Judge
Wesley stated:
The record keeping regulation at issue here, 31 C.F.R.
section 1010.420, targets those engaged in the lawful activity
of owning a foreign bank account. “There is nothing
inherently illegal about having or being a beneficiary of an
offshore foreign bank account.” M.H., 648 F.3d at 1074.
Doe’s protestations notwithstanding, owners of these
accounts are not “inherently suspect” and the statute is
“essentially regulatory.”
Doe’s argument that the statute is criminally focused has
some force. The BSA [Bank Secrecy Act] declares that its
purpose is “to require certain reports or records where they
have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory
investigations or proceedings, or in the conduct of intelligence
or counterintelligence activities, including analysis, to protect
against international terrorism.” 31 U.S.C. section 5311. It
does list “criminal investigations” first, but this multifaceted
statute clearly contributes to civil and intelligence efforts
wholly unrelated to any criminal purpose.
Although portions of the statute’s legislative history
support Doe’s characterization of the BSA as focused on
criminal activity, “[t]he Supreme Court has already
considered and rejected these arguments as they relate to the
BSA generally.” M.H., 648 F.3d at 1074 (citing Cal. Bankers’
Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 76-77 (1974)). Moreover, “the
question is not whether Congress was subjectively concerned
about crime when enacting the BSA’s recordkeeping and
reporting provisions, but rather whether these requirements
apply exclusively or almost exclusively to people engaged in
criminal activity.” Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 4-10, 707
F.3d at 1271; accord Grand Jury Subpoena, 696 F.3d at 434.
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Looking beyond “Congressional subjective intent”—if there
could be such a thing—the BSA has considerable regulatory
utility outside of the criminal justice context.
The question becomes whether a statute with mixed criminal
and civil purposes can be “essentially regulatory” with respect
to the required records exception. We agree with our sister
circuits: the fact “[t]hat a statute relates both to criminal law
and to civil regulatory matters does not strip the statute of its
status as ‘essentially regulatory.’” Grand Jury Proceedings,
No. 4-10, 707 F.3d at 1270. Because people owning foreign
bank accounts are not inherently guilty of criminal activity,
the BSA’s applicable recordkeeping requirement, designed to
facilitate “criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or
proceedings, or [] the conduct of intelligence or
counterintelligence activities,” 31 U.S.C. section 5311, is still
essentially regulatory. (footnote omitted)
 These were records that were routinely
maintained and made available to government agents upon request by those
German Jews who held secret accounts in Swiss banks during the 1930s and
1940s.
d.
No circuit conflicts yet; the fifth case was
from the Fourth Circuit. United States v. Under Seal, 737 F.3d 330 (4th Cir.
12/13/13). The Fourth Circuit (Judge Agee) agreed with the other circuits that
have dealt with this issue, and held that the required records doctrine overrode
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination of a couple who held
an account (successively) in two Swiss private banks.
2.
Will the Supreme Court tell us how a witness can
meet his burden in demonstrating that an IRS subpoena was issued for
an improper purpose when the district court permitted him neither
discovery nor an evidentiary hearing? United States v. Clarke, 517 F. App’x
689 (11th Cir. 4/18/13), vacating and remanding per curiam 111 A.F.T.R.2d
2013-1697 (S.D. Fla. 4/16/12), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 895 (1/10/14).
Michael Clarke, the Chief Financial Officer of Beekman Vista, Inc., was
issued an IRS summons with respect to the examination of Dynamo Holdings
Limited Partnership (“DHLP”) for its 2005, 2006, and 2007 years. The
summons was issued on 10/28/10, which was prior to the issuance to DHLP
by the IRS of a Notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment
(“FPAA”) on 12/28/10, and prior to the filing by DHLP of a Tax Court petition
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on 2/1/11. The district court heard argument on Clarke’s motion to dismiss the
summons but declined to grant discovery or an evidentiary hearing. The
district court enforced the summons when it found Clarke’s answer to the
summons to be inadequate to overcome the apparent regularity of the
summons proceeding under the holding in United States v. Powell, 379 U.S.
48 (1964). That answer contained the allegation that the summons was issued
because the government was “displeased that DHLP declined to extend its
statute of limitations period,” which the district court dismissed as “mere
conjecture unsupported by evidence.” The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the
district court that the Powell requirements had been met by the IRS with its
prima facie showing of the four required elements:
To obtain enforcement of a summons, the IRS must make
a four-part prima facie showing that (1) ”the investigation will
be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose,” (2) ”the
inquiry may be relevant to the purpose,” (3) ”the information
sought is not already within the Commissioner’s possession,”
and (4) ”the administrative steps required by the Code have
been followed.” United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58,
85 S. Ct. 248, 13 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1964); see also Nero Trading,
LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, IRS, 570 F.3d 1244, 1248
(11th Cir. 2009).
However, the Eleventh Circuit held that Clarke’s allegation of improper
purpose entitled him to an evidentiary hearing during which he could question
IRS officials concerning the reasons for issuing the summons:
Under our precedents, Appellants were entitled to a
hearing to explore their allegation of an improper purpose.3
As we have explained, in situations such as this, requiring the
taxpayer to provide factual support for an allegation of an
improper purpose, without giving the taxpayer a meaningful
opportunity to obtain such facts, saddles the taxpayer with an
unreasonable circular burden, creating an impermissible
“Catch 22.” See Nero, 570 F.3d at 1250; S.E. First Nat’l Bank,
655 F.2d at 667. While “the scope of any adversarial hearing
in this area is left to the discretion of the district court,”
binding Circuit authority requires that Appellants be given an
opportunity “to ascertain whether the Service issued a given
summons for an improper purpose.” Nero, 570 F.3d at 1249.
As required by Southeast First National Bank, on remand
Appellants should be permitted to “question IRS officials
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the



Appellants, however, are not entitled to
discovery. We have held that the full
“panoply of expensive and time-consuming
pretrial discovery devices may not be
resorted to as a matter of course and on a
mere allegation of improper purpose.” Nero,
570 F.3d at 1249 (internal quotation and
emphasis omitted).
 There has been some speculation that
certiorari to the Eleventh Circuit was granted in order that the Supreme Court
might re-examine its holding in United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), in
which the Court (Mr. Justice Harlan) stated:
Reading the statutes as we do, the Commissioner need not
meet any standard of probable cause to obtain enforcement of
his summons, either before or after the three-year statute of
limitations on ordinary tax liabilities has expired. He must
show that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a
legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the
purpose, that the information sought is not already within the
Commissioner’s possession, and that the administrative steps
required by the Code have been followed—in particular, that
the “Secretary or his delegate,” after investigation, has
determined the further examination to be necessary and has
notified the taxpayer in writing to that effect. This does not
make meaningless the adversary hearing to which the
taxpayer is entitled before enforcement is ordered. At the
hearing he “may challenge the summons on any appropriate
ground,” Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, at 449, 84 S. Ct.
at 513. Nor does our reading of the statutes mean that under
no circumstances may the court inquire into the underlying
reasons for the examination. It is the court’s process which is
invoked to enforce the administrative summons and a court
may not permit its process to be abused. Such an abuse would
take place if the summons had been issued for an improper
purpose, such as to harass the taxpayer or to put pressure on
him to settle a collateral dispute, or for any other purpose
reflecting on the good faith of the particular investigation. The
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burden of showing an abuse of the court’s process is on the
taxpayer, and it is not met by a mere showing, as was made in
this case, that the statute of limitations for ordinary
deficiencies has run or that the records in question have
already been once examined.
379 U.S. at 57–58 (footnotes omitted).
a.
Turnabout is fair play. Summonsed
individuals might have the right to grill IRS agents regarding their
motives in issuing the summons. United States v. Clarke, 134 S. Ct. 2361
(6/19/14). In the course of a partnership audit, the IRS issued a summons to
four individuals associated with the partnership whom the IRS believed had
information and records relevant to the audit. The individuals refused to
comply and the IRS sought enforcement of the summons. In the enforcement
proceedings, the summonsed individuals asserted that the IRS had issued the
summons for an improper purpose, namely to punish the partnership for
refusing to extend the statute of limitations, and sought enforcement for an
improper purpose; specifically, that the IRS decided to enforce the
summonses, subsequent to the partnership filing suit in Tax Court, to “evad[e]
the Tax Court[‘s] limitations on discovery” and thus gain an unfair advantage
in that litigation. In support of their request for an opportunity to question the
IRS agents about their motives, the summonsed individuals submitted an
affidavit from the attorney of another partnership associate, who had complied
with a summons issued at the same time, which reported that only the IRS
attorneys handling the Tax Court case, and not the original investigating
agents, were present at the interview of his client. The District Court denied
the request and ordered compliance, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, 517
Fed. App’x 689 (11th Cir. 4/18/13), finding that the District Court’s refusal to
allow the summonsed individuals to examine IRS agents constituted an abuse
of discretion. In support of that ruling, the Court of Appeals cited Fifth Circuit
precedent holding that a simple “allegation of improper purpose,” even if
lacking any “factual support,” entitles a taxpayer to “question IRS officials
concerning the Service’s reasons for issuing the summons.” The Supreme
Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Kagan, vacated the Court of Appeals
decision and remanded the case. After initially repeating that under United
States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 862 (1981), and its progeny, “summons
enforcement proceedings are to be ‘summary in nature,’” and “that courts may
ask only whether the IRS issued a summons in good faith, and must eschew
any broader role of ‘oversee[ing] the [IRS’s] determinations to investigate,’”
and “absent contrary evidence, the IRS can satisfy that standard by submitting
a simple affidavit from the investigating agent,” the Court went on to hold as
follows:
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As part of the adversarial process concerning a summons’s
validity the taxpayer is entitled to examine an IRS agent when
he can point to specific facts or circumstances plausibly
raising an inference of bad faith. Naked allegations of
improper purpose are not enough: The taxpayer must offer
some credible evidence supporting his charge. But
circumstantial evidence can suffice to meet that burden; after
all, direct evidence of another person’s bad faith, at this
threshold stage, will rarely if ever be available. And although
bare assertion or conjecture is not enough, neither is a fleshed
out case demanded: The taxpayer need only make a showing
of facts that give rise to a plausible inference of improper
motive. That standard will ensure inquiry where the facts and
circumstances make inquiry appropriate, without turning
every summons dispute into a fishing expedition for official
wrongdoing. And the rule is little different from the one that
both the respondents and the Government have recommended
to us.
The Court went on to remind that (1) the appellate court review of the District
Court’s decision is for abuse of discretion, but that the “District Court’s
decision is entitled to deference only if based on the correct legal standard,”
and (2) the District Court’s latitude does not extend to legal issues about what
counts as an illicit motive. Finally, the Court specifically declined to opine on
whether either of the asserted improper motives for issuance of the summons
actually were improper.
 While the taxpayer got a partial victory in
Clarke, perhaps the most important aspect of the decision is the reaffirmation of
the breadth of the IRS’s summons power under Powell and its progeny.
3.
Did the Tax Court just say that anytime the
taxpayer raises a § 6664(c)(1) penalty defense attorney client privilege has
been waived? AD Investment 2000 Fund LLC v. Commissioner, 142 T.C.
No. 13 (4/16/14). In a Son-of-Boss Tax Shelter case, the IRS, in anticipation
of the taxpayers raising reasonable cause and good faith affirmative defenses
to § 6662 accuracy-related penalties, moved to compel production of the
taxpayers’ attorneys’ opinion letters regarding whether it was more likely than
not that anticipated tax benefits from the transactions in question would be
upheld. The taxpayers claimed attorney-client privilege. But the IRS argued
that the taxpayers impliedly waived privilege by asserting: “Any
underpayment of tax was due to reasonable cause and with respect to which
the Partnership and its partners acted in good faith.” (I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1)).
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However, the taxpayers denied that these averments brought “professional
advice (i.e., the opinions) into question.” The IRS conceded that the taxpayers
raised only self-determination, and not reliance on professional advice, to
show that they satisfied the good-faith belief requirement, but argued, that the
taxpayers had “placed the opinions into controversy by relying on a reasonable
cause, good-faith defense and by putting the partnerships’ beliefs into issue.”
The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) agreed with the IRS, stating:
When a person puts into issue his subjective intent in deciding
how to comply with the law, he may forfeit the privilege
afforded attorney-client communications. . . . “[A] client
waives his attorney privilege when he brings suit or raises an
affirmative defense that makes his intent and knowledge of
the law relevant.”
The opinion continued:
Petitioners’ averments that the partnerships satisfied the belief
requirement by the first method put into dispute the
partnerships’ knowledge of the pertinent legal authorities.
Petitioners’ averments also put into contention the
partnerships’ understanding of those legal authorities and
their application of the legal authorities (i.e., the law) to the
facts. Finally, the averments put into contention the basis for
the partnerships’ belief that, if challenged, their tax positions
would more likely than not succeed in the courts. Petitioners
have thus placed the partnerships’ legal knowledge,
understanding, and beliefs into contention, and those are
topics upon which the opinions may bear. If petitioners are to
rely on the legal knowledge and understanding of someone
acting for the partnerships to establish that the partnerships
reasonably and in good faith believed that their claimed tax
treatment of the items in question was more likely than not
the proper treatment, it is only fair that respondent be allowed
to inquire into the bases of that person’s knowledge,
understanding, and beliefs including the opinions (if
considered).
Thus, the taxpayers had “forfeited the privilege that would otherwise apply to
the opinions.” Judge Halpern ordered the opinions to be produced and warned
that in the event of noncompliance, he would consider prohibiting the
taxpayers from introducing evidence that they met the good-faith “belief
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requirement by self-determination or that someone acting for the partnerships
had a good-faith and honest misunderstanding of law.”
4.
While many of us are still undecided on the postClintonian meaning of “is,” the Tenth Circuit in a 2-1 decision held that
“shall” means “shall.” Jewell v. United States, 749 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir.
4/28/14). This appeal from decisions in the Eastern and Western Districts of
Oklahoma, which quashed and upheld, respectively, four IRS summonses to
banks for records involving nursing homes owned by Mr. Jewell in light of the
admitted failure of the IRS to give him the 23-day notice period required by
the third-party summons provision of § 7609(a)(1) and United States v.
Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964), resulted in the quashing of all fours
summonses on the ground that the word “shall” in the statute made such notice
mandatory. (The district court that upheld the summonses “not[ed]” that
taxpayer received the summonses in time to file his petition, while the district
court that quashed the summonses “reason[ed]” that the IRS failed to comply
with the notice requirement.) The Tenth Circuit (Judge Bacharach) stated that
it was upholding “the age-old precept that ‘shall’ means ‘shall,’ while being
‘mindful of the fact that five other circuit courts have declined to apply Powell
in this manner.’”
 Judge Tymkovick dissented on the ground
that he did “not believe that Powell imposes a per se bar on enforcement in the
event the IRS commits a technical breach of an administrative provision” of the
Code, but would “consider whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a
court should decline to enforce a summons.”
5.
An incredible opinion in which NYC Magistrate
Judge refused to quash a summons issued to E&Y related to a corporate
acquisition and restructuring, finding that (1) the attorney-client and tax
practitioner privileges had been waived, and (2) the work product
doctrine did not apply because the E&Y Tax Memo would have been
drafted in exactly the same way if litigation had not been anticipated.
Schaeffler v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 3d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 5/28/14). The
District Court for the Southern District of New York (Magistrate Judge
Gorenstein) refused to quash a summons issued to Ernst & Young on attorneyclient and tax practitioner privilege grounds because privilege was waived by
sharing the document with a bank consortium that financed an acquisition,
which consortium did not share a predominantly legal interest with Schaeffler
but merely had a common economic interest.
 The work product claim was based on the
so-called “EY Tax Memo,” which was a 321 page document that was provided
to the court for in camera review. It “expounds on the transactional steps that
[E&Y] provided” and “contains numerous appendices that provide detailed
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analysis of the federal tax issues implicated by each step.” Magistrate Judge
Gorenstein continued:
This legal analysis makes reference to statutes, IRS
regulations, IRS private letter rulings, other administrative
materials, and case law. In many instances, the memorandum
asserts that there is no law clearly on point and thus uses
language such as “although not free from doubt,” “the better
view is that,” “it may be argued,” and “it is not inconceivable
that the IRS could assert.” Additionally, in explaining its
recommendations for handling particular aspects of the
restructuring and refinancing measures, the memorandum
considers at great length the arguments and counterarguments that could be made by Schaeffler and the IRS with
regard to the appropriate tax treatment of these measures.
While there is copious citation to relevant legal authority, the
memorandum does not specifically refer to litigation—for
example, by discussing what actions peculiar to the litigation
process Schaeffler or the IRS might take or what settlement
strategies might be considered. Rather, the memorandum
contains detailed and thorough legal analysis as to the
propriety of the planned measures and advocates what
specific transactional steps should be taken. . . .
We will also accept that Schaeffler believed that litigation
was highly probable in light of the significant and difficult tax
issues that were raised by the planned refinancing and
restructuring. Accordingly, the Court is called upon to make
the factual determination required by Adlman [United States
v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir. 1998)]: whether this
memorandum and the related documents “would have been
created in essentially similar form” had litigation not been
anticipated. 134 F.3d at 1202. While we have described this
as a factual determination, in reality it is a counterfactual
determination because it requires the Court to imagine what
“would have” happened in a world where Schaeffler did not
anticipate litigation as to the restructuring and refinancing
transactions but everything else was exactly the same—in
other words, Schaeffler still found himself acquiring the
unexpectedly large share of Conti stock and still needed to
engage in a refinancing and restructuring arrangement that
would comply with federal tax laws. . . .
Accordingly, given our assumption that Schaeffler is a
rational businessperson who routinely makes efforts to
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comply with the law, we find that, even had he not anticipated
an audit or litigation with the IRS, he still would have had to
obtain the type of legal assistance provided by Ernst & Young
to carry out the refinancing and restructuring transactions in
an appropriate manner. . . .
As to whether Ernst & Young’s advice would have been
different in content or form had it known that no audit or
litigation would ensue, petitioners have presented no facts
suggesting that Ernst & Young would have acted any
differently. To the contrary, as petitioners recognize, see
Letter from M. Todd Welty, dated May 2, 2014 (Docket #52)
(“Welty Letter”), there exists legal authority demanding
that tax practitioners not allow the possibility that a tax
return will remain unaudited to affect the advice they
give. Treasury Department Circular 230 states:
In evaluating the significant Federal tax
issues addressed in [a tax opinion], the
practitioner must not take into account the
possibility that a tax return will not be
audited, that an issue will not be raised on
audit, or that an issue will be resolved
through settlement if raised.
[Former] Circular 230, § 10.35(c)(3)(iii). Similarly, a
Treasury regulation regarding tax shelters states that in
reaching conclusions regarding whether a particular tax
position would more likely than not be sustained on its merits,
the possibility that the position will not be
challenged by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) (for example, because the taxpayer’s
return may not be audited or because the
issue may not be raised on audit) is not to be
taken into account.
26 C.F.R. § 1.6694-2(b). In other words, when tax
practitioners give advice to clients, they must ignore the
actual possibility of an audit—and, by extension, litigation—
in opining on the tax implications of a transaction. Thus, when
providing legal advice on the tax treatment of the
restructuring and refinancing transactions, the Ernst & Young
advisors had a responsibility to consider in full the relevant
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legal issues regardless of whether they anticipated an audit
and ensuing litigation with the IRS.
 Magistrate Judge Gorenstein concluded
on the work product issue:
Thus, we conclude that had Schaeffler’s tax advisors been
asked to opine on the legal implications of the transactions
with the knowledge that an audit or litigation would not occur,
they “would have” used the same methodology to render tax
advice: that is, a close analysis of the relevant legal authorities
to determine how various tax positions would be tested in the
crucible of litigation.
For these reasons, we find that the EY Tax Memo, as well
as the related responsive documents, would have been
produced in the same form irrespective of any concern about
litigation. Accordingly, these documents are not protected
from disclosure under the work product doctrine.
6.
Who will be looking at the information your client
provided in response to a summons and asking your client questions
during the summons interview? It might not be an IRS employee. T.D.
9669, Participation of a Person Described in Section 6103(n) in a Summons
Interview Under Section 7602(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, 79 F.R.
34625 (6/18/14). Section 6103(n) and Reg. § 301.6103(n)-1(a) permit the
disclosure of returns and return information to any person for purposes of tax
administration to the extent necessary in connection with the acquisition of
property or certain services (such as processing, storage, and reproduction)
related to returns or return information. The Treasury has issued proposed and
temporary regulations clarifying that such persons with whom the IRS or Chief
Counsel contracts for services:
may receive and examine books, papers, records, or other data
produced in compliance with [a] summons [issued by the IRS]
and, in the presence and under the guidance of an IRS officer
or employee, participate fully in the interview of the witness
summoned by the IRS to provide testimony under oath.
The proposed and temporary regulations state that full participation in an
interview includes “being present during summons interviews; questioning the
person providing testimony under oath; and asking a summoned person’s
representative to clarify an objection or assertion of privilege.” The temporary
regulations apply to summons interviews conducted on or after 6/18/14.
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 The Tax Section of the State Bar of Texas
has submitted comments on the proposed regulations in which the Tax Section
recommends that the Treasury remove the provision that permits persons
providing services to question a witness under oath or ask the witness’s
representative to clarify an objection or assertion of privilege. Removing this
provision, the Tax Section states, would “result in a more orderly proceeding and
a cleaner, more comprehensible transcript of the interview” and also “avoid the
unsettled question of whether a private contractor has the legal authority to
examine a witness.” Texas Bar Suggests Amendment to Proposed Summons
Interview Regs, 2014 TAX NOTES TODAY 180-24 (9/16/14).
7.
High tech discovery response is approved by the
Tax Court. Dynamo Holdings Limited Partnership v. Commissioner, 143
T.C. No. 9 (9/17/14). The IRS sought to have the taxpayer produce
electronically stored information contained on two backup storage tapes or,
alternatively, the tapes themselves (or copies thereof). The taxpayer
acknowledged that the tapes contained tax-related information but asserted
that it would take many months and cost at least $450,000 to fulfill the request
because it would need to review each document on the tapes to identify what
is responsive and then withhold privileged or confidential information. The
taxpayer also requested the court to deny the IRS’s motion as a “fishing
expedition” in search of new issues that could be raised in this or other cases.
Alternatively, the taxpayer requested that it be allowed to use predictive
coding, a technique prevalent in the technological industry but not yet formally
sanctioned by the Tax Court, to efficiently and economically identify the
nonprivileged information responsive to the IRS’s discovery request. The Tax
Court (Judge Buch) granted the IRS’s motion requiring the taxpayer to
respond to the discovery request but allowed the taxpayer to use predictive
coding in doing so.
C.

Litigation Costs

1.
“[U]nder the ‘narrow statutory language of
section 7430(c)(7)’, as well as the Commissioner’s interpretive regulations
taxpayers *** who do a good job at the administrative level of resolving
issues and getting respondent to realize the error of his ways are
precluded from recovering administrative costs incurred in achieving
those favorable results.” Purciello v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-50
(3/24/14). The IRS abated its claim against the taxpayer for § 6672 penalty
taxes at the Appeals Office and the taxpayer sought to recover administrative
costs. Although the taxpayer clearly had substantially prevailed in the
administrative proceeding, the Tax Court (Judge Jacobs) denied the request
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for costs. Even if a taxpayer substantially prevails, the taxpayer is not treated
as the prevailing party if the IRS establishes that the
position of the United States” was substantially justified.
Section 7430(c)(7)(B) provides “the ‘position of the United
States’ taken in an administrative proceeding is the position
the IRS takes as of the earlier of (i) the date of the receipt by
the taxpayer of the notice of the decision of the Internal
Revenue Service Office of Appeals or (ii) the date of the
notice of deficiency.
Judge Jacobs agreed with the IRS’s argument that the taxpayer was not a
prevailing party because the IRS Appeals Office conceded the case and agreed
that the taxpayer did not owe any money to the IRS, and for purposes of
§ 7430, this position was the first time the United States took a position in the
case and, “inasmuch as respondent agreed with petitioner’s contention, the
position taken by the United States was substantially justified.”
2.
It’s hard for the government to deny that the
taxpayer is entitled to costs as a prevailing party when it concedes that its
assessment was invalid and that its collection action should not be
sustained. Swiggart v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-172 (8/25/14). On
his individual return for 2010, the taxpayer claimed head of household status
and paid with the return $2,149 less than the tax liability shown on the return.
The IRS issued a notice of summary assessment of the unpaid $2,149 and an
additional $2,205 (including tax, a late payment penalty under § 6651(a)(2),
and interest) on account of a mathematical error. The notice stated that the
additional amount assessed resulted from the IRS changing the taxpayer’s
filing status to single because the name of the dependent who qualified him
for head of household filing status was not reported on the tax return. The IRS
soon followed with a Final Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right
to a Hearing, in which it sought to collect the amount allegedly due plus
penalties and interest. Forty-six days after the IRS issued the notice of
summary assessment, the taxpayer’s attorney mailed by certified mail both a
request for abatement and a Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process
or Equivalent Hearing. The attorney included with the Form 12153 a detailed
supporting statement. The IRS responded with a letter stating that it was
unable to process the claim for abatement because the taxpayer’s supporting
information was not complete and the additional information the taxpayer
provided did not give the IRS a basis to change the assessment. During the
CDP hearing, the taxpayer provided an affidavit in which he identified his
child by name and Social Security number and stated that, although he had an
agreement with the child’s mother to waive the dependency exemption
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deduction for certain years, including 2010, his child had spent the greater
number of nights in 2010 with him. Although the settlement officer agreed that
claiming the child as a dependent was not required to qualify as a head of
household, the settlement officer concluded that he could not abate the tax
attributable to the change in filing status until the taxpayer provided additional
documents showing that the child had lived with him for more than half of the
year. The IRS then issued a notice of determination sustaining the proposed
levy because the taxpayer had not proven that he was entitled to head of
household filing status. The taxpayer challenged the notice of determination
by filing a petition in the Tax Court. The taxpayer moved for summary
judgment, asking the court to conclude that the portion of the assessment
attributable to the change in filing status was void and that the IRS could not
levy to collect that portion. The IRS conceded that the taxpayer’s motion for
summary judgment should be granted as to the portion of the assessment
attributable to the change in filing status and entered into a stipulation of
settled issues in which the parties agreed that the IRS had abated $2,142 of the
assessment (without prejudice to the IRS’s right to reassess the amount using
deficiency procedures). After trial, the taxpayer moved for reasonable
administrative and litigation costs pursuant to § 7430, which permits the award
of such costs to a prevailing party. The IRS conceded that the taxpayer had
exhausted administrative remedies and had not unreasonably protracted the
proceedings, and therefore the only issue was whether the taxpayer was a
prevailing party. To be a prevailing party, a taxpayer must substantially prevail
with respect to either the amount in controversy or the most significant issue
or set of issues presented and also meet certain timing and net worth
requirements. The IRS conceded, and the court (Judge Buch) concluded, that
the taxpayer met the timing and net worth requirement. The court also
concluded that the taxpayer had substantially prevailed. The court noted that
the taxpayer had consistently disputed the portion of the assessment
attributable to the unilateral change in filing status, that the only issues
presented were the validity of that portion of the assessment and the attempts
to collect based on that assessment, and that the IRS had conceded these issues.
The government argued that, under § 7430(c)(4)(B), the taxpayer could not be
treated as the prevailing party because the government’s position was
substantially justified. The court rejected this argument. It noted that the
taxpayer had requested abatement within 60 days of the issuance of the math
error notice and therefore, under § 6213(b)(2)(A), the IRS was required to
abate the assessment, which it had failed to do. Instead, the court observed, the
IRS had taken the position both by letter and in the CDP hearing that it would
not abate the assessment because the taxpayer had failed to prove he was
entitled to head of household filing status. “By statute, the IRS was required
to abate the assessment, and requiring [the taxpayer] to prove entitlement to
head of household status before abating the assessment was not substantially
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justified.” The court awarded administrative costs and attorneys’ fees, but
reduced the hourly rate for the attorneys’ fees from the requested $250 per
hour to the statutory rate ($180 or $190 per hour for the years involved).
D.

Statutory Notice of Deficiency
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2014.
E.

Statute of Limitations

1.
Only part of the § 6501(e) regulations was
invalidated in Home Concrete & Supply. Barkett v. Commissioner, 143 T.C.
No. 6 (8/28/14). The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that gains, as argued by
the IRS, and not the total amount realized on a sale of investment assets, as
argued by the taxpayer, are used to determine whether there was an omission
from gross income that triggered the six-year limitations period in § 6501(e).
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Home Concrete & Supply,
LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012), invalidating in part Reg. § 301.6501(e)-1, did
not change the result in Insulglass Corp. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 203 (1985),
in which the Tax Court held that
capital gains, and not the gross proceeds, are to be treated as
the “amount of gross income stated in the return” for purposes
of section 6501(e) . . . on the basis of section 61(a), which
defines gross income as “all income from whatever source
derived,” including “[g]ains derived from dealings in
property.”
F.

Liens and Collections

1.
BLIPS and bankruptcy: hiding assets after
learning losses may be disallowed can make the subsequent tax liability
non-dischargeable. Vaughn v. United States, 111 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-1481 (D.
Colo. 3/29/13). The taxpayer used losses from a KPMG BLIPS tax shelter to
offset gain from the 1999 sale of his interest in a cable company. After being
informed by KPMG of the release of Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255, which
identified losses in BLIPS-type tax shelters as nondeductible, and learning that
the IRS was auditing the cable company’s former CFO, who also had used
BLIPS losses to offset gain, the taxpayer purchased a $1.7 million home titled
in his fiancée’s name. After KPMG advised the taxpayer to disclose his BLIPS
investment, but before he disclosed it, the taxpayer funded a $1.5 million trust
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for his stepdaughter. He also spent significant amounts on jewelry and home
furnishings. The taxpayer later filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition and the
IRS filed a proof of claim in that proceeding in the amount of $14,359,592.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C), a tax debt is not dischargeable in bankruptcy
if the debtor either made a fraudulent return or willfully attempted to evade or
defeat the tax. The Bankruptcy Court held that the taxpayer’s tax liability was
non-dischargeable on both grounds. The District Court affirmed the
Bankruptcy Court’s determination solely on the ground that the taxpayer had
willfully attempted to evade or defeat tax. The District Court rejected the
taxpayer’s contention that he could not have willfully attempted to evade or
defeat tax because there had been no assessment or quantification of his tax
liability when he depleted his assets.
a.
Best not squander those tax shelter savings
before audit and assessment. In re Vaughn, 765 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir.
8/26/14). The Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge McKay, affirmed the
lower court’s holdings. Vaughn “‘must have been aware’ of the circumstances
demonstrating the invalidity of his BLIPS losses, and [he] chose to claim those
losses on his tax returns and to deplete his remaining assets, ‘knowing, as he
must have, the BLIPS investment constituted an improper abusive tax
shelter.’”
2.
The government successfully detains taxpayers
for failing to return a fraudulent tax refund. United States v. Barrett, 113
A.F.T.R.2d 2014-749 (D. Colo. 1/29/14). The taxpayers, a married couple,
filed a fraudulent tax return for the 2007 tax year that resulted in a $217,615
tax refund to which they were not entitled. The government brought this action
in which it alleged that the taxpayers had removed funds from the United
States and sought an order requiring the funds to be repatriated and applied to
their tax debt.
In an effort to identify assets available for application to the
debt, and to collect such assets, the United States . . . filed an
ex parte sealed motion for the issuance of a writ of ne exeat
republica against the Barretts. . . . A writ of ne exeat republica
is a form of injunctive relief ordering the person to whom it is
addressed not to leave the jurisdiction of the court or the state,
for example, to aid the sovereign to compel a citizen to pay
his taxes.
At an evidentiary hearing, the government introduced evidence of assets held
by the taxpayers outside the United States. The court characterized these
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assets—which included a bank account with a balance of $60, used office
furniture, and a horse with unknown value—as “dribs and drabs.”
Nevertheless, because the assets identified by the government would allow the
debt to be reduced by $16,000 and also included a 50 percent interest in real
property in Ecuador that was purchased for $64,000, the court declined to
discharge the writ until the taxpayers pay $16,000 and either sell the real
property and provide the proceeds to the government or prove, with credible
evidence, that they cannot sell it. The taxpayers had been living with relatives
in Colorado since they were detained.
 Jurisdiction is given to district courts to
issue this writ in § 7402(a).
3.
The government’s discharge from federal tax liens
of real property taken by the state by eminent domain does not release its
claim to damages the property owner later receives as additional
compensation for the taking. Hannon v. City of Newton, 744 F.3d 759 (1st
Cir. 2/28/14). In addressing what it described as an issue of first impression,
the First Circuit (Judge Lynch) held that the IRS’s discharge from federal tax
liens (in exchange for a payment) of a parcel of real property taken by the state
by eminent domain did not release any claim the IRS had on damages the
former property owner later received for undercompensation. The IRS held
tax liens for over $4 million against property owned by Patrick Hannon,
including a parcel of land with a residence he owned in Newton,
Massachusetts. The City of Newton asked the IRS to discharge this parcel
from its tax lien to facilitate the city’s taking of the property by eminent
domain. The IRS did so upon receiving from the city $57,214.55, which was
an estimate of what would remain of the $2.3 million paid by the city as
compensation for the property after the mortgagee, a senior creditor, was paid.
After the city took the property, Hannon brought an action in state court
claiming that he had not been adequately compensated for the property. He
was awarded $420,000 in damages. The government and a lower-priority
creditor intervened in the state court action and asserted priority to receive the
damages. The government removed the case to federal court. The District
Court granted summary judgment to the lower-priority creditor on the basis
that the IRS’s discharge of the property from federal tax liens in exchange for
a payment meant that the government had relinquished any claim on the
subsequent damages. The First Circuit reversed and directed the District Court
to enter summary judgment in favor of the government. The Court of Appeals
rejected the lower-priority creditor’s argument that, “because § 6325(b)(3) sets
forth a specific mechanism for maintaining liens on proceeds from the sale of
discharged property, the government’s failure to use that mechanism
surrendered its liens on proceeds resulting from the post-taking suit for
undercompensation.” The Court of Appeals analyzed § 6325(b)(2), which
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authorizes the IRS to discharge property from federal tax liens upon receiving
a payment at least equal to the value of the United States’ interest in the
property to be discharged, and concluded that the language in the Certificate
of Discharge in this case was precise and released only the parcel of land that
the city was taking. It did not release, the Court of Appeals concluded, property
that Hannon later acquired, including the $420,000 in undercompensation
damages. The Court of Appeals also held that, because federal law, rather than
state law, controlled the attachment of federal tax liens and the scope of the
IRS’s discharge, the state law doctrine of equitable conversion did not remove
the federal tax lien from the undercompensation damages.
4.
What part of “impartial” does the IRS not
understand? Moosally v. Commissioner, 142 T.C. No. 10 (3/27/14). The key
issue in this CDP case was whether the IRS Appeals Office settlement officer
to whom the taxpayer’s case and hearing were assigned was an impartial
officer as required by § 6320(b)(3). The facts, in brief, are that the IRS rejected
the taxpayer’s offer-in-compromise (OIC) for trust fund recovery penalties for
two quarters in 2000, and her income tax liability for 2008. She appealed and
the IRS assigned Appeals Officer Smeck to review the OIC. The IRS also had
filed a Notice of Federal Tax Lien (NFTL) and issued a Letter 3172. The
taxpayer requested a CDP hearing and the IRS assigned Appeals Officer Kane
to conduct the CDP hearing. After Smeck had begun review of the OIC, the
IRS transferred the taxpayer’s CDP case from Kane to Smeck, who sustained
the rejection of the taxpayer’s OIC and sustained the filing of the NFTL. The
taxpayer petitioned for Tax Court review of the CDP determination sustaining
the NFTL, on the ground that Smeck was not impartial. The Tax Court (Judge
Wells) sustained the taxpayer’s appeal. Section 6320(b) requires that a CDP
hearing must be conducted by an impartial officer or employee of Appeals. An
impartial officer or employee is one who has had no prior involvement with
respect to the unpaid tax specified in § 6320(a)(3)(A) before the first hearing
under § 6320 or § 6330. The taxpayer’s argument was that Smeck was not an
impartial officer because Smeck had reviewed the appeal of the rejected OIC
before conducting the CDP hearing for the same periods. The IRS argued that
Smeck “was an impartial officer because she had not yet issued a
determination and that there is no ‘prior’ involvement when a reviewing
officer has not made any determination with respect to the previously rejected
OIC” and that § 6320 “contemplates simultaneous review of all issues related
to collections during the CDP hearing and that a simultaneous review benefits
taxpayers.” Judge Wells held that Smeck was not impartial because she “had
prior involvement with [the taxpayer’s] unpaid tax liabilities for the periods in
issue before she was assigned to handle petitioner’s CDP hearing for the same
taxes and periods in issue.” Smeck had reviewed the taxpayer’s appeal of her
rejected OIC for nearly three months before the CDP hearing was transferred
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to her, and in that period had obtained and evaluated various documents,
forms, and other financial information to calculate the taxpayer’s reasonable
collection potential and evaluate the rejected OIC. Judge Wells also rejected
the IRS’s argument that § 6320 “contemplates simultaneous review of all
issues related to collections during the CDP hearing and that all collection
matters may be handled by the same officer.” Such consolidation, he held, is
limited to situations involving a lien CDP hearing pursuant to § 6320 and a
pre-levy CDP hearing pursuant to § 6330 regarding the same unpaid liability.
Reg. § 301.6320-1(d)(1) does not allow “the combination of CDP hearings
with non-CDP matters, such as the OIC rejection appeal involved in the instant
case.” Judge Wells also rejected the IRS’s argument that the purpose of
§ 6320(b)(3) is limited to preventing “an Appeals officer from examining a
taxpayer’s underlying liability during the examination function and then
handling a CDP hearing involving the same liability during the enforcement
function.” He concluded that § 6320(b)(3) “does not contemplate a permissive
interpretation excepting all matters concerning the taxpayer’s ability to pay.”
Accordingly, the case was remanded for a new CDP hearing before an
impartial Appeals officer.
5.
The IRS takes on the Puyallup Tribe of Indians
and loses: tribal per capita payments authorized after the IRS issues a
notice of levy are not subject to levy. United States v. Puyallup Tribe of
Indians, 113 A.F.T.R.2d 2014-1749 (W.D. Wash. 4/9/14). The IRS issued a
notice of levy to the Puyallup Tribe of Indians to collect unpaid taxes owed by
a member of the tribe. Despite the levy, the tribe made distributions of tribal
revenue, known as per capita payments, to the individual who owed the unpaid
taxes. The government brought this action asserting a claim for the tribe’s
failure to honor the levy. The District Court (Judge Settle) noted that there is
conflicting authority on the question whether per capita payments are
“property” or “rights to property” within the meaning of § 6331, the provision
that authorizes IRS levies. The court found it unnecessary to address this issue
because a second issue, which it characterized as a matter of first impression,
was dispositive. Under Reg. § 301.6331-1(a), “a levy extends only to property
possessed and obligations which exist at the time of the levy. Obligations exist
when the liability of the obligor is fixed and determinable although the right
to receive payment thereof may be deferred until a later date.” The court
concluded that the per capita payments were not fixed and determinable
because they are made at the discretion of the Tribal Council. Therefore, “a
levy may attach to a tribal member’s currently authorized per capita payment,
but may not reach subsequently authorized per capita payments.” The court
granted the tribe’s motion for summary judgment.
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6.
The “statutory and regulatory framework does
not immunize the IRS from using common sense.” The IRS failed to
exercise reasonable diligence in ascertaining the taxpayer’s last known
address when it sent a notice of levy to an address from which previous
correspondence had been returned undelivered. Music v. United States, 17
F. Supp. 3d 1327 (N.D. Ga. 4/17/14). The taxpayer was a schoolteacher who
failed to file tax returns for fifteen or more years and had a history of moving
without leaving a forwarding address with the Postal Service. The last tax
return she filed listed her address as Summerfield, Florida. The IRS sent
subsequent correspondence to her address in Georgia, which the IRS obtained
from the taxpayer’s W-2 or from correspondence that the taxpayer submitted.
One IRS letter sent to her Summerfield, Florida address was returned
undelivered, and the IRS readdressed it to her Georgia address. After
successfully corresponding with the taxpayer at her Georgia address, the IRS
sent a notice of deficiency, notice and demand for payment, and notices of
intent to levy, all to her Summerfield, Florida address. When the taxpayer
failed to respond, the IRS issued a notice of levy to her employer in Georgia.
The day after she received her levied paycheck, she quit her job. The taxpayer
brought this action under § 7433, which allows a taxpayer to recover damages
incurred due to the intentional, reckless, or negligent disregard of any
provision of Title 26 by an IRS officer or employee in connection with
collecting the taxpayer’s federal tax. The District Court (Judge O’Kelley)
agreed with the taxpayer that the IRS had negligently violated § 6331(d),
which requires the IRS to notify the taxpayer in writing of the intent to levy
by doing one of the following at least 30 days before the levy: giving the notice
in person, leaving it at the taxpayer’s dwelling or usual place of business, or
sending it by certified or registered mail to the taxpayer’s last known address.
The IRS violated § 6331(d), the court said, “by sending notices of intent to
levy to an address when previous letters sent to that address were returned
undeliverable.” However, the court characterized the taxpayer’s victory as
“somewhat pyrrhic” because it concluded that “the entirety of her requested
damages were not proximately caused by the IRS’ negligence and even if they
were, she could have reasonably mitigated the damages.” The court allowed
the taxpayer to recover costs of the action—the $350 fee to file her
complaint—and acknowledged
that its interpretation of the statute [as allowing the taxpayer
to recover costs when the taxpayer has not suffered any actual,
direct economic damages] conflicts with a significant number
of courts that have dismissed section 7433 claims by holding
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that the plaintiff did not suffer any actual, direct economic
damages.
7.
You can’t order the IRS to levy on particular
assets—it gets to choose what to take. Kraft v. Commissioner, 142 T.C. No.
14 (4/23/14). In review of a levy CDP proceeding, the Tax Court (Judge
Wherry) held that the IRS did not abuse its discretion in deciding to collect a
tax liability from the taxpayer’s personal assets rather than by levying on a
trust of which the taxpayer was a beneficiary. The IRS is not required to grant
a taxpayer’s request to collect a tax liability from a particular source.
8.
Constructive receipt of a deficiency notice for
someone who played two of the three monkeys. Onyango v. Commissioner,
142 T.C. No. 24 (6/24/14). Section 6330(c)(2)(B) allows a taxpayer to contest
the underlying tax liability in a CDP hearing only if he did not actually receive
a deficiency notice or otherwise have an opportunity to dispute the liability. In
this case, on several occasions the Postal Service attempted unsuccessfully to
deliver a deficiency notice that had been mailed to the taxpayer at his legal
residence by certified mail, return receipt requested. On at least two occasions
the Postal Service left notices of attempted delivery of the certified mail which
contained the notice of deficiency at the address of the taxpayer’s legal
residence, and informed the taxpayer that it had certified mail to deliver to him
and that he had to sign a receipt for that mail before the Postal Service would
deliver it to him. The taxpayer declined to check on a regular basis his mailbox
at his legal residence and to retrieve on a regular basis any Postal Service mail
items delivered there. After several unsuccessful attempts to deliver the
certified mail, the Postal Service returned it to the IRS. The Tax Court (Judge
Chiechi) held that a taxpayer who is reasonably able and had multiple
opportunities to check his mail and intentionally fails to do so for the purpose
of avoiding receipt of the deficiency notice cannot contend that for purposes
of § 6330 that he did not receive the deficiency notice. Accordingly, the
taxpayer was not permitted to contest his liability in the CDP hearing.
9.
A Notice of Intent to Levy is not a levy. Eichler v.
Commissioner, 143 T.C. No. 2 (7/23/14). The taxpayer requested a partial pay
installment agreement of assessed taxes. Before the request was acted upon,
the IRS mailed Letters CP 90, Final Notice—Notice of Intent to Levy and
Notice of Your Right to a Hearing. The taxpayer timely requested a CDP
hearing, renewing his request for an installment agreement and asserting that
the Letters CP 90 should be withdrawn as invalid pursuant to § 6331(k)(2),
which prohibits the IRS from making a levy while an offer for an installment
agreement is pending. During the CDP, hearing the settlement officer
conditioned acceptance of an installment agreement on the taxpayer making
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an $8,520 down payment. The taxpayer declined to make the payment
claiming economic hardship, and the settlement officer’s final determination
rejected the taxpayer’s request that the Letters CP 90 be withdrawn as invalid
and sustained the proposed levy on the ground that the taxpayer had declined
the proposed installment agreement. The Tax Court (Judge Thornton) held that
§ 6331(k)(2) did not preclude the IRS from issuing the Letters CP 90 after the
taxpayer submitted his offer for an installment agreement—§ 6331(k)(2) bars
the IRS from making a levy while a taxpayer’s offer for an agreement request
is pending, but does not bar the IRS from issuing notices of intent to levy—
and that the determination not to rescind the Letters CP 90 was not an abuse
of discretion under relevant provisions of the IRM. But because the record did
not allow for meaningful review of the determination regarding the
appropriateness of the $8,520 downpayment as a condition of an installment
agreement, the case was remanded for further proceedings.
10.
No pre-levy remedy for you; if you’re unhappy, go
to District Court after the levy. Greenoak Holdings Ltd. v. Commissioner,
143 T.C. No. 8 (9/16/14). The IRS issued a final notice of intent to levy to an
estate to collect unpaid estate taxes. The estate requested a § 6330 CDP
hearing. Following the hearing, the appeals officer issued a notice of
determination sustaining the proposed levy as to nonprobate assets. Among
the nonprobate assets reported on the estate tax return was an offshore trust
that owned certain entities. The estate did not seek Tax Court review but the
entities owned by the offshore trusts petitioned the Tax Court for review of the
notice of determination. The IRS moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
The Tax Court (Judge Ruwe) held that the “person entitled to the rights and
protections under § 6330 is the taxpayer liable for unpaid Federal tax.” The
Tax Court lacked jurisdiction over a petition filed by a party who is neither the
taxpayer nor an authorized representative of the taxpayer. The remedy for
persons other than taxpayers who claim ownership rights in property subject
to levy lies in the right to make a wrongful levy claim under § 7426(a)(1).
11.
The taxpayer won the initial skirmish, but lost the
big battle and thus the war. Buczek v. Commissioner, 143 T.C. No. 16
(10/6/14). The taxpayer filed a timely request for a CDP hearing in response
to a final notice of intent to levy to collect an unpaid income tax liability. The
request did not raise any issues specified in § 6330(c)(2) or make any
allegations that reasonably indicated he was raising such an issue. The Appeals
Office sent the taxpayer a letter stating that, pursuant to § 6330(g), it was
disregarding the hearing request because it was frivolous and that the IRS
would proceed with collection. The taxpayer filed a timely petition for review.
The Tax Court (Judge Dawson) held that it had jurisdiction to review the IRS’s
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determination as to whether a taxpayer who sought judicial review under
§ 6330(d)(1) had raised an issue other than issues that had been identified by
the IRS as frivolous or that reflected a desire to delay or impede the
administration of Federal tax laws. However, because the taxpayer did not
raise any issues specified in § 6330(c)(2) that could be considered in a CDP
hearing, no portion of the taxpayer’s request for a hearing was excluded from
the IRS’s determination to disregard the entire request and § 6330(g)
prohibited further judicial review of that determination. Thus, because the
determination that the IRS could proceed with collection was not made in
response to a proper request for a hearing, the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to
review that determination.
G.

Innocent Spouse
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2014.
H.

Miscellaneous

1.
The Tax Court is an Article I court. Freytag v.
Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (6/27/91). Justice Blackmun, speaking for the
five-judge majority, held that the assignment of a complex tax shelter case by
Tax Court chief judge to a special trial judge (1) is permitted under
§ 7443A(b)(4) where the actual decision is rendered by a Tax Court judge, and
(2) does not violate the Appointments Clause (U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2)
because the special trial judge is an “inferior Officer” and the Tax Court is an
Article I “Court of Law.”
 Four concurring justices, in an opinion
written by Justice Scalia, thought that the Tax Court was a “Department” and its
chief judge was a “Head of Department,” so the Tax Court exercised executive
power. Justice Scalia wrote:
When the Tax Court was statutorily denominated an “Article
I Court” in 1969, its judges did not magically acquire the
judicial power. They still lack life tenure; their salaries may
still be diminished; they are still removable by the President
for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”
26 U. S. C. § 7443(f). . . . How anyone with these
characteristics can exercise judicial power “independent . . .
[of] the Executive Branch” is a complete mystery. It seems to
me entirely obvious that the Tax Court, like the Internal
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Revenue Service, the FCC, and the NLRB, exercises
executive power.
a.
The presidential power to remove Tax
Court judges for cause does not infringe on the constitutional separation
of powers with respect to adjudications of “pre-collection tax disputes.”
Kuretski v. Commissioner, 755 F.3d 929 (D.C. Cir. 6/20/14). In this collection
due process case, the District of Columbia Circuit (Judge Srinivasan) held that
the power in the U.S. President to remove Tax Court judges on grounds of
“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” under § 7443(f) did
not infringe on the constitutional separation of powers and result in Tax Court
judges not being “free from alleged bias in favor of the Executive Branch.”
The taxpayers asked that § 7443(f) be struck down, the Tax Court’s decision
against them vacated, and the case remanded “for re-decision by a Tax Court
judge free from the threat of presidential removal and hence free from alleged
bias in favor of the Executive Branch.” The D.C. Circuit held that it has been
established that Congress can constitutionally assign to non-article III
tribunals a category of cases involving “public rights” (including matters of
taxation at the pre-collection stage); the Tax Court is an Article I court and,
while its judges do exercise judicial power, they do not exercise the “‘judicial
power of the United States’ under Article III.” Even though Freytag v.
Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), held that the Tax Court is a “Court of
Law,” Judge Srinivasan held that “the judicial power of the United States is
not limited to the judicial power defined under Article III.” He further held
that the Tax Court, as a legislative court, is nevertheless part of the Executive
Branch of government. Judge Srinivasan concluded that the “Tax Court’s
status as a ‘Court of Law’—and its exercise of ‘judicial power’—for
Appointments Clause purposes under Freytag casts no doubt on the
constitutionality of the President’s authority to remove Tax Court judges.”
 Judge Srinivasan also rejected taxpayers’
challenge to the 25 percent late-payment penalties under § 6651(a)(2) on the
ground that they failed to submit to the service center where their return was filed
“an affirmative showing of all facts alleged as a reasonable cause for [their]
failure to . . . pay such tax on time in the form of a written statement containing
a declaration that it is made under penalties of perjury,” as required by Reg.
§ 301.6651-1(c)(1).
2.
This case is just like Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967), except that, instead of freeing interracial couples from
discriminatory marriage laws, it is about freeing marginal tax return
preparers from discriminatory competence testing. Loving v. IRS, 917 F.
Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 1/18/13). The District Court (Judge Boasberg) enjoined
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the IRS from regulating otherwise unregulated “tax-return preparers” because
they are not “representatives” and do not “practice” before the IRS and are not
covered under 31 U.S.C. § 330(a) (authorizing the regulation of “the practice
of representatives of persons before the [IRS]”). The regulation of tax-return
preparers under Circular 230, including registration, payment of fees, passing
a qualifying exam, and completing continuing education courses annually,
fails the Chevron step one test because preparation of tax returns does not
require that a “representative demonstrate . . . (D) competency to advise and
assist persons in presenting their cases,” 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(2)(D), on the
ground that “[a]t the time of filing, the taxpayer has no dispute with the IRS;
there is no ‘case’ to present.” Judge Boasberg also noted that the “unstructured
independence by the IRS [under Circular 230] would trample the specific and
tightly controlled penalty scheme in Title 26” (emphasis added).
 Note that there is neither privilege nor
work product protection for communications to a tax return preparer, which
arises only when there is a realistic possibility of “controversy.”
a.
The injunction is modified, but not stayed.
Loving v. IRS, 920 F. Supp. 2d 108 (D.D.C. 2/1/13). On the IRS’s motion to
stay the injunction, Judge Boasberg—while refusing to stay the injunction—
modified it to make clear that its requirements were less burdensome than the
IRS claimed. The requirement that each tax return preparer obtain a PTIN (and
pay related fees) is authorized under § 6109(a)(4), so it may continue, except
that the “IRS may no longer condition PTIN eligibility on being ‘authorized
to practice’ under 31 U.S.C. section 330.” Therefore, “the requirements that
tax return preparers (who are not attorneys, CPAs, enrolled agents, or enrolled
actuaries) must pay fees unrelated to the PTIN, pass a qualifying exam, and
complete annual continuing-education requirements” continue to be enjoined.
b.
Government’s motion for a stay pending
appeal was denied summarily. Loving v. IRS, 111 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-1384
(D.C. Cir. 3/27/13) (Rogers, Tatel, and Brown, JJ, per curiam) (unpublished).
The IRS appealed these two opinions and orders to the Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia Circuit, 2/20/13. That court refused to stay the District
Court’s injunction on the ground that the IRS failed to satisfy “the stringent
requirements for a stay pending appeal.”
c.
The D.C. Circuit found that registered (?)
tax return preparers were entitled to be unqualified. The IRS had the gall
to require character, competence, and continuing education for
“independent” tax return preparers who only needed PTINs to continue
preparing error-laden tax returns for their unsophisticated clientele.
Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2/11/14), aff’g 920 F. Supp. 2d 108
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(D.D.C. 2/1/13). The D.C. Circuit (Judge Kavanaugh) held that regulations
issued in 2011 under 31 U.S.C. § 330 that imposed new character, competence,
and continuing education requirements on tax return preparers were
“foreclose[d] and render[ed] unreasonable” by the statute, and thus failed at
the Chevron step one standard. They would have also failed at the Chevron
step two standard because they were “unreasonable in light of the statute’s
text, history, structure, and context.”
 Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion found six
problems with the 2011 regulations: (1) tax return preparers were not
“representatives” because they are not “agents” and, thus, lack “legal authority
to act on the taxpayer’s behalf”; (2) the preparation and filing of a tax return did
not constitute “practice . . . before the Department of the Treasury” because that
term implies “an investigation, adversarial hearing, or other adjudicative
proceeding”; (3) the history of the statutory language originally enacted in 1884
“indicated that the statute contemplated representation in a contested
proceeding”; (4) the regulation was inconsistent with the “broader statutory
framework,” (?!) in which Congress had enacted a number of statutes specifically
directed at tax-return preparers and imposing civil penalties, which would not
have been necessary if the IRS had authority to regulate tax-return preparers;
(5) the statute would have been clearer had it granted power “for the first time to
regulate hundreds of thousands of individuals in the multi-billion dollar taxpreparation industry” (“the enacting Congress did not intend to grow such a large
elephant in such a small mousehole”); and (6) the IRS’s past approach showed
that until 2011 it never maintained that it had authority to regulate tax return
preparers.
 Judge Kavanaugh concluded: “The IRS
may not unilaterally expand its authority through such an expansive, atextual,
and ahistorical reading of Section 330.”
 It appears that the DOJ did not seek en
banc review.
d.
Does this mean that all tax return
preparers can now charge contingent fees for tax return preparation, e.g.,
a percentage of the tax refund? Ridgely v. Lew, 114 A.F.T.R.2d 2014-5249
(D.D.C. 7/16/14). A practicing CPA brought suit to challenge Circular 230,
§ 10.27, which prohibited tax practitioners from charging contingent fees for
certain services relating to preparing or filing tax returns or refund claims. He
argued that the IRS exceeded the scope of its statutory authority in regulating
the preparation of “Ordinary Refund Claims,” i.e., refund claims that
practitioners file after a taxpayer has filed his original tax return but before the
IRS has initiated an audit of the return. On motion for summary judgment,
District Judge Cooper granted the CPA’s motion and enjoined the IRS from
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enforcing § 10.27. He noted that “[t]his Court, however, is not the first to
venture down this particular rabbit hole,” and that Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d
1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014), “is controlling precedent that must guide [his]
examination of [31 U.S.C. § 330’s] text, context, and history with respect to
the claims at issue . . . .” He rejected the IRS’s argument that it has the power
to regulate plaintiff’s practice as a CPA before it, because that power does not
extend regulation of those of his activities which do not constitute practice,
i.e., preparation and filing of refund claims.
e.
There is life after suspension for CPAs to
prepare tax returns. “Some Suspended or Disbarred Tax Practitioners Are
Now Permitted To Obtain PTINs and Prepare Tax Returns,” IRS
announcement dated 8/26/14, found at www.irs.gov/Tax-Professionals/TaxPro-News-and-Events (last viewed 9/13/14). This announcement is based on
Loving v. IRS, which held that tax return preparation, without more, does not
constitute representation within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. § 330, and the IRS
may not include a restriction on return preparation for compensation. It applies
to individuals who were suspended or disbarred, with PTIN access blocked
between 8/2/11 and 2/11/14; individuals sanctioned before or after these dates
did not have their PTIN access blocked.
 Circular 230, § 10.24 provides with
respect to disbarred or suspended persons:
§ 10.24 Assistance from or to disbarred or suspended persons
and former Internal Revenue Service employees.
A practitioner may not, knowingly and directly or indirectly:
(a) Accept assistance from or assist any person who is under
disbarment or suspension from practice before the Internal
Revenue Service if the assistance relates to a matter or matters
constituting practice before the Internal Revenue Service.
3.
In light of the IRS loss in Loving v. IRS, a new,
voluntary Annual Filing Season Program to give tax return preparers the
ability to claim they hold “a valid Annual Filing Season Program Record
of Completion” and that they have “complied with the IRS requirements for
receiving the Record of Completion.” Rev. Proc. 2014-42, 2014-29 I.R.B. 192
(6/30/14). In order to encourage unenrolled tax return preparers, i.e., those who
are not attorneys, CPAs or EAs, to complete continuing education courses in
order to get a better understanding of federal tax law, the carrot of being able
to claim superiority to the ordinary run-of-the-mill slob tax return preparers is
offered. The requirements for this voluntary program include a six-hour
refresher course, with a 100-question test at the end, plus other continuing
education of two hours of ethics and ten hours of federal tax law topics.
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Holders of the Record of Completion may not use the terms “certified,”
“enrolled,” or “licensed” to describe the designation.
4.
Not having access to a cooperating witness’s
returns does not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
confront witnesses in a prosecution for preparing and filing false tax
returns. United States v. Love, 553 F. App’x 548 (6th Cir. 1/29/14). The
defendant worked as a tax return preparer at an H&R Block branch located in
a Wal-Mart in Toledo, Ohio. A jury found her guilty on one count of
conspiring to prepare false tax returns and fifty-nine counts of aiding the
preparation and filing of false tax returns. According to the evidence at trial,
the defendant prepared false returns that resulted in refunds for people referred
to her by her cousin, Sonya Moses. Moses cooperated with the government in
the defendant’s prosecution. The defendant argued on appeal that not having
access to Moses’s tax returns violated her Sixth Amendment right to confront
the witnesses against her because the returns would have aided in her crossexamination of Moses. In an opinion by Judge Donald, the Sixth Circuit
rejected the defendant’s argument and concluded that the district court did not
abuse its discretion or impermissibly impede the defendant’s right to confront
and cross-examine Moses. The court also rejected her argument that the
government did not present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that she knew that the incomes reported in the returns of certain persons
were false.
5.
Whistleblowers’ motions to proceed anonymously
to obtain judicial review of awards were granted in light of risk of severe
physical harm if their identities were to be revealed. Whistleblower 1133213W v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-92 (5/20/14); Whistleblower 1094913W v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-94 (5/20/14). In these two cases, the
Tax Court (Judge Kroupa) granted motions to seal and proceed anonymously
by two whistleblowers, each of whom had been intimidated with physical
force and armed men on behalf of their employer and related entities
(“targets”)—which paid more than $30 million in taxes, penalties, and interest.
The Commissioner did not object to these motions and the targets did not
participate in these proceedings. Judge Kroupa stated that the general
presumption of openness of judicial proceedings was outweighed by the
“demonstrated risk of physical harm to [the whistleblower] or [the
whistleblower’s] family.” The motions were based upon a recently-adopted
Tax Court Rule 345, which created a mechanism to preserve the anonymity of
whistleblowers and non-party taxpayers.
 It seems that these two whistleblowers
worked for the same employer, although the opinions did not so state. Reading
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between the lines of these opinions, it appears that the targets were well aware of
the identities of the whistleblowers. In light of this, what was gained by granting
anonymity? One possibility is that sealing the cases did protect the identities of
the lawyers involved.
a.
Whistleblower’s motion to proceed
anonymously was granted in light of whistleblower being retired and
receiving retirement benefits from his former employer. Whistleblower
13412-12W v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-93 (5/20/14). The Tax Court
(Judge Kroupa) granted whistleblower’s motion to proceed anonymously
seeking review of Commissioner’s determination and to have the record
sealed. The whistleblower reported the nature of tax violations by his former
employer and provided legal analysis and reasoning for Commissioner to
proceed against the target, but Commissioner “issued the whistleblower a
letter indicating that he was unable to collect any amounts on the
whistleblower’s claim.” The whistleblower is retired and receives retirement
benefits from his former employer, the target. While no threat of physical harm
was alleged, the whistleblower alleged the possibility of “suffer[ing]
professional ostracism, harm and job-related harassment because other
potential employers will unlikely want to hire or employ a known
whistleblower.” Judge Kroupa decided to “err on the side of caution” despite
her belief “that distributions from an employer’s retirement plans are governed
by the plan’s provisions and an independent trustee that has fiduciary
obligations.”
b.
Tax Court has jurisdiction to review a
whistleblower claim and award determination where the claim is based
on information provided both before and after 12/20/06, which was the
effective date of § 7623(b). Whistleblower 11332-13W v. Commissioner, 142
T.C. No. 21 (6/4/14). The Tax Court (Judge Kroupa) decided that it had
jurisdiction to review a whistleblower claim award determination where the
claim was based on information provided both before and after the 12/20/06
effective date of § 7623, which was added by the Tax Relief and Health Care
Act of 2006.
 To the same effect is Whistleblower
10949-13W v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-106 (6/4/14), also decided by
Judge Kroupa.
6.
The IRS didn’t get to collect a concededly
duplicate refund because it took a wrong turn at the fork in the road. YRC
Regional Transport, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-112 (6/10/14).
The IRS issued a duplicate refund to the taxpayer through a clerical error and
attempted to recover it through a deficiency proceeding. The Tax Court (Judge
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Kerrigan) held that the IRS could not recover the refund—a nonrebate
refund—pursuant to a deficiency procedure because there had been no
redetermination of the taxpayer’s tax liability. The government could recover
the erroneous refund only pursuant to suit under § 7405 or under any available
administrative collection procedures.
7.
Those proposed Circular 230 regulations are now
final, so you can—but need not—remove those mindless disclaimers from
your emails. But if they remain, they cannot refer to the IRS or Circular
230. T.D. 9668, Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue
Service, 79 F.R. 33685 (6/12/14). The final Circular 230 regulations include
the following:
 The rigid covered opinion rules in former
§ 10.35 (which required that the written opinion contain a description of the
relevant facts, the application of the law to those facts, and the practitioner’s
conclusion with respect to the law and the facts) are removed; these rules are
replaced with a single standard for all written tax advice under final § 10.37. This
standard requires that the practitioner must: (i) base the written advice on
reasonable factual and legal assumptions; (ii) reasonably consider all the relevant
facts that the practitioner knows or “reasonably should know” (emphasis added);
(iii) use reasonable efforts to identify and ascertain the facts relevant on each
Federal tax matter; (iv) not rely upon representations, statements, findings, or
agreements (including projections, financial forecasts, or appraisals) if reliance
on them would be unreasonable; (v) ”[r]elate applicable law and authorities to
facts” (emphasis added); and (vi) not take into account the possibility that a tax
return will not be audited or that a matter will not be raised on audit. The
determination of whether a practitioner has failed to comply with these
requirements is based on all the facts and circumstances, not on whether each
requirement is addressed in the written advice. Note: Material new in the final
regulations is in boldface. The preamble makes clear that practitioners may
consider the “the existence or nonexistence of legitimate hazards that may make
settlement more or less likely.”
 As to disclaimers, the preamble states that
“Treasury and the IRS expect that these amendments will eliminate the use of a
Circular 230 disclaimer in e-mail and other writings,” but they “do not, however,
prohibit the use of an appropriate statement describing any reasonable and
accurate limitations of the advice rendered to the client.” While continuing
education presentations are not considered written advice on a Federal tax matter
for purposes of § 10.37, “Treasury and the IRS nonetheless expect that
practitioners will follow the generally applicable diligence and competence
standards under §§ 10.22 and 10.35 when engaged in those activities.” The
authors of this outline, therefore, use the following statement to describe the
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limitations with respect to any of the information contained in the outline, “Please
read this outline at your own risk; we take no responsibility for any
misinformation in it, whether occasioned by our advancing ages or our increasing
indifference as to whether we get any particular item right.”
 Final § 10.35 provides that a practitioner
must exercise competence when engaged in practice before the IRS (including
providing written opinions), which includes the required knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, and preparation necessary for the matter for which he is engaged.
This complements the provision in § 10.51 that a practitioner can be sanctioned
for incompetent conduct.
 Final § 10.36 conforms the “procedures to
ensure compliance” with the removal of the covered opinion rules in former
§ 10.35, but expands these “procedures to ensure compliance” to include the
provisions of subparts A, B, and C of Circular 230.
 Final § 10.1 provides that the Office of
Professional Responsibility—as opposed to the IRS Return Preparer Office—
will have exclusive responsibility for matters related to practitioner discipline.
 Final § 10.82 extends the expedited
disciplinary procedures for immediate suspension, but limits it to practitioners
who have engaged in a pattern of willful disreputable conduct by failing to make
an annual Federal tax return during four of five tax years immediately before the
institution of the expedited suspension proceeding, provided that the practitioner
is also noncompliant at the time the notice of suspension is served.
 Final § 10.31 forbids practitioners from
negotiating any taxpayer refunds, which specifically adds manipulation of any
electronic refund process.
 The effective date of the provisions added
or amended by the final regulations is 6/12/14.
8.
“Final” means “final”; mulligans not allowed.
Snow v. Commissioner, 142 T.C. No. 23 (6/17/14). In an earlier decision, T.C.
Memo. 1996-457, the Tax Court held that deficiency notices mailed to the
taxpayer were valid. The 1996 final order reached the opposite result from the
Special Trial Judge’s initial report, which would have held the deficiency
notices were invalid. The taxpayer filed a motion to vacate the original
decision, apparently relying on Ballard v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40 (2005),
and the resulting revisions to Tax Court Rule 183, which require that the initial
report of the Special Trial Judge be provided to the parties and allow them to
submit written objections before the report is reviewed by a regular Judge. The
Tax Court (Judge Ruwe) denied the motion, which was filed almost eight years
after taxpayer first learned of the Special Trial Judge’s initial report and over
16 years after the decision had become final. Generally, once a Tax Court
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decision becomes final, the court lacks jurisdiction to vacate that decision.
There are three possible exceptions: (1) when the Tax Court may have
originally lacked jurisdiction to enter a final decision; (2) when there is a fraud
upon the court; and (3) mutual mistake, where the Tax Court decision was
predicated on the parties’ stipulation, and both the government and the
taxpayer concede they mistakenly entered into the stipulation. None of them
were present in this case.
9.
“Where a statute is capable of various
interpretations, we are inclined to adopt a construction which will permit
the Court to retain jurisdiction without doing violence to the statutory
language.” Comparini v. Commissioner, 143 T.C. No. 14 (10/2/14). The
petitioners filed a claim for a whistleblower award under § 7623(b). In 2012,
the Whistleblower Office sent four essentially identical letters to the
petitioners stating that they were not eligible for an award and inviting them
to contact the Whistleblower Office with any questions. Subsequently, the
petitioners submitted additional information in support of their claim. In 2013,
the Whistleblower Office sent the petitioners a letter stating that it had
“determined your claim still does not meet our criteria for an award,” “[o]ur
determination remains the same,” and “we are closing this claim.” The
petitioners filed a petition for Tax Court review under § 7623(b)(4) within 30
days after receiving the 2013 letter. The IRS moved to dismiss on the ground
that the petition filed in response to the 2013 letter was untimely because it
had not been filed within 30 days after the determination in the 2012 letters.
In a reviewed opinion by Judge Colvin (in which eight judges joined and with
a number of concurring opinions), the Tax Court held that the 2013 letter
constituted a determination for purposes of § 7623(b)(4) and denied the IRS’s
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The 2013 letter from the
Whistleblower Office was a “determination regarding an award” within the
meaning of § 7623(b)(4) and because the petitioners filed a petition within 30
days of that letter, the court had jurisdiction. “[T]he 2013 letter constitutes a
determination and . . . its status as a determination is not negated . . . by the
fact that the Whistleblower Office sent the 2012 letters.” It is “possible for the
Whistleblower Office to issue, as to a given claim, more than one
‘determination’ on which [Tax Court] jurisdiction might be based.”
 A joint concurring opinion by Judges
Halpern and Lauber (in which four other judges joined) agreed that the
Whistleblower Office “can make more than one ‘determination’ with respect to
a claimant’s claim or universe of claims.” But the concurring opinion would have
expressly limited the holding to cases where the subsequent claim differs from
the earlier claim; “if the claim is not different and the determination is the same,
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and if the petition is filed more than 30 days after the original determination, the
Court should hold that it lacks jurisdiction . . . .”
10.
Once Tax Court jurisdiction is properly invoked,
the IRS can’t undo it by saying “sorry, we sent the letter by mistake.”
Ringo v. Commissioner, 143 T.C. No. 15 (10/6/14). The petitioner filed a
claim for a whistleblower award under § 7623(b). On November 7, 2012, the
Whistleblower Office mailed to him a letter stating that he was ineligible for
an award because he had not provided the IRS with information that resulted
in the collection of any tax from the target. The petitioners filed a timely
petition for Tax Court review under § 7623(b)(4). On June 11, 2013, the
Whistleblower Office notified the petitioner that it was still considering the
application and that it had mailed the November 7, 2012, letter in error. The
IRS then moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Tax Court
(Judge Colvin) held that the November 7, 2012, letter was a determination and
that the Tax Court had jurisdiction with respect to the matter. Furthermore, the
fact that the IRS continued to consider the petitioner’s claim after sending the
November 7, 2012, letter did not terminate the Tax Court’s jurisdiction.
11.
Bad guys finish last. Rader v. Commissioner, 143
T.C. No. 19 (10/29/14). The taxpayer worked and earned income but failed to
file returns for several years. The IRS prepared substitute returns for those
years and issued deficiency notices. The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) rejected
the taxpayer’s argument that the substitute returns were not valid because they
did not include a Form 1040. Furthermore, the IRS had the right to elect to
treat the taxpayer as married filing separately in properly filed amendments to
its answer, which resulted in increased deficiencies. The court sustained the
deficiencies determined by the IRS. The court also rejected the taxpayer’s
claim that he was entitled to an offset against the deficiency for one year equal
to the amounts withheld under § 1445 from the proceeds from two real estate
sales in that year. Although § 1445 applies to payments made to foreign
persons for the disposition of U.S. real property, and the taxpayer was a U.S.
citizen, the withholding resulted from the taxpayer’s failure to provide a tax
identification number to the escrow agent. The improper withholding did not
give rise to a § 31 credit (wage withholding), but rather to a credit under § 33
(withholding on nonresident aliens), and under § 6211(b)(1), a § 33 credit
expressly is disregarded for purposes of computing a deficiency. The court
also held that the taxpayer’s wife was not entitled to a refund of the
overpayment because a refund claim would not have been timely. Penalties
for failure to timely file returns, failure to pay taxes shown on the return, and
failure to pay estimated taxes were upheld. On its own motion, the court
imposed a $10,000 frivolous argument penalty under § 6673 because of the
taxpayer’s groundless arguments and unwarranted attempt to assert his Fifth
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Amendment privilege (“In order for an individual to validly claim the privilege
against self-incrimination, there must be a ‘real and appreciable danger’ from
‘substantial hazards of self incrimination,’ and the individual must have
‘reasonable cause to apprehend (such) danger from a direct answer to
questions posed to him.’”), finding that he acted with the intent to delay
collection of the taxes owed.
12.
The whistleblower won the first skirmish but is
likely to be left whistling in the dark when the battle’s over. Lippolis v.
Commissioner, 143 T.C. No. 20 (11/20/14). A whistleblower sought Tax
Court review of a § 7623(a) 15 percent discretionary award with respect to
$844,746 of tax collected as a result of an audit performed in response to his
whistleblower claim. He argued that he was entitled to a greater (mandatory)
award under § 7623(b). The IRS moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on
the ground that § 7623(b)(5)(B) provides that a mandatory award is not
required unless the tax, penalties, and interest involved in the underlying audit
exceeded $2 million. The Tax Court (Judge Colvin) held that the $2 million
requirement is an affirmative defense and is not jurisdictional. Accordingly,
the IRS’s motion was denied. But the IRS was given 60 days to file a motion
for leave to amend the answer to raise the § 7623(b)(5)(B) affirmative defense
and to include allegations of fact supporting the amendment to the answer.
13.
The Tenth Circuit stirs the previously muddied
water on whether a late-filed return is a “return” that will permit tax debt
to be discharged in bankruptcy proceedings. In re Mallo, 114 A.F.T.R.2d
2014-7022 (10th Cir. 12/29/14). In an opinion by Judge McHugh, the Tenth
Circuit held, with respect to taxpayers in two consolidated appeals, that a late
return filed after the IRS had assessed tax for the year in question was not a
“return” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) and, consequently, the
taxpayers’ federal tax liabilities were not dischargeable in bankruptcy. The
facts in each appeal were substantially the same. The taxpayers failed to file
returns for the years 2000 and 2001. The IRS issued notices of deficiency,
which the taxpayers did not challenge, and assessed tax for those years. The
taxpayers subsequently filed returns, based on which the IRS partially abated
the tax liabilities. The taxpayers then received general discharge orders in
chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings and filed adversary proceedings against the
IRS seeking a determination that their income tax liabilities for 2000 and 2001
had been discharged. Section 523(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code excludes from
discharge any debt for a tax or customs duty:
(B) with respect to which a return, or equivalent report or
notice, if required—
(i) was not filed or given; or
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(ii) was filed or given after the date on which
such return, report, or notice was last due,
under applicable law or under any extension,
and after two years before the date of filing
of the petition;
An unnumbered paragraph at the end of Bankruptcy Code § 523(a), added by
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
provides that, for purposes of § 523(a):
the term ‘return’ means a return that satisfies the requirements
of applicable nonbankruptcy law (including applicable filing
requirements). Such term includes a return prepared under
section 6020(a) of the Internal Revenue Code … but does not
include a return made pursuant to section 6020(b) of the
Internal Revenue Code ….
The court examined a line of conflicting cases in which the courts had applied
a four-factor test, commonly known as the Beard test (Beard v. Commissioner,
793 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1986)), to determine whether a late-filed return
constitutes a “return” for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) and concluded that it
did not need to resolve that issue. Instead, the court concluded that, unless it
is prepared by the IRS with the assistance of the taxpayer under § 6020(a), a
late return is not a “return” because it does not satisfy “the requirements of
applicable nonbankruptcy law (including applicable filing requirements)”
within the meaning of the language added to the statute in 2005.
 In reaching its conclusion, the Tenth
Circuit agreed with the analysis of the Fifth Circuit in In re McCoy, 666 F.3d 924
(5th Cir. 2012), in which the Fifth Circuit concluded that a late-filed Mississippi
state tax return was not a “return” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
 The Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of 11
U.S.C. § 523(a) is contrary to the IRS’s interpretation, which the IRS made clear
to the court during the appeal. The IRS’s interpretation, reflected in Chief
Counsel Notice CC-2010-016 (9/2/10), is that “section 523(a) does not provide
that every tax for which a return was filed late is nondischargeable.” However,
according to the Chief Counsel Notice, a debt for tax assessed before the late
return is filed (as in the situations before the Tenth Circuit in In re Mallo) “is not
dischargeable because a debt assessed prior to the filing of a Form 1040 is a debt
for which is return was not ‘filed’ within the meaning of section 523(a)(1)(B)(i).”
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WITHHOLDING AND EXCISE TAXES
A.

Employment Taxes

1.
The story line is just a rerun: NOLs do not reduce
self-employment income. DeCrescenzo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 201251 (2/27/12). The taxpayer was assessed deficiencies when he failed to file a
return of income from self-employment as an accountant. The Tax Court
(Judge Marvel) held—yet again—that § 1402(a)(4) prohibits a taxpayer from
offsetting net earnings from self-employment with an NOL carryforward or
carryback.
a.
And the Second Circuit sees it the same
way. DeCrescenzo v. Commissioner, 563 F. App’x 858 (2d Cir. 4/30/14). In
a summary order, the Second Circuit affirmed and held that § 1402(a)(4)
“expressly excludes net operating loss carryovers from the calculation of selfemployment income.”
2.
Tax refunds in a bad economy set up another
deference conflict among the circuits. In re Quality Stores, Inc., 693 F.3d
605 (6th Cir. 9/7/12), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 49 (10/1/13). In November
2001, Quality Stores closed 63 stores and nine distribution centers and
terminated the employment of all employees in the course of Chapter 11
bankruptcy cases. Quality Stores adopted plans providing severance pay to
terminated employees. The company reported the severance pay as wages for
withholding and employment tax purposes, then filed claims for refund of
FICA and FUTA taxes claiming that the severance pay represented
supplemental unemployment compensation benefits (SUBs) that are not
wages for employment tax purposes. Disagreeing with the contrary holding by
the Federal Circuit in CSX Corp. v. United States, 518 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir.
2008), the Sixth Circuit held that the SUBs were exempt from employment
taxes. The court examined the language and legislative history of § 3402(o)(1),
which provides that SUB payments “shall be treated as if it were a payment of
wages” for withholding purposes, to conclude that by treating SUB payments
as wages for withholding, Congress recognized that SUB payments were not
otherwise subject to withholding because they did not constitute “wages.”
Then, under Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 255 (1981), the court
concluded that the term “wages” must carry the same meaning for withholding
and employment tax purposes. Thus, if SUBs are not wages under the
withholding provision (because they must be treated as wages by statutory
directive), the SUBs are not wages for employment tax purposes. The court
also rejected the IRS’s position in Rev. Rul. 90-72, 1990-2 C.B. 211, that to
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be excluded from employment taxes, SUBs must be part of a plan that is
designed to supplement the receipt of state unemployment compensation. The
court declined to follow the Federal Circuit’s holding in CSX Corp., which
adopted the eight part test of Rev. Rul. 90-72, stating that: “We decline to
imbue the IRS revenue rulings and private letter rulings with greater
significance than the congressional intent expressed in the applicable statutes
and legislative histories.” The court also stated that it could not conclude that
the opinion in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011), eroded the holding of Rowan Cos. v. United
States, which compelled the court to interpret the meaning of “wages” the
same for withholding and employment tax purposes.
a.
The U.S. Supreme Court says the Sixth
Circuit got it wrong—the severance payments made by Quality Stores are
wages for employment tax purposes. United States v. Quality Stores, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 1395 (3/25/14). In the U.S. Supreme Court, all members of the Court
other than Justice Kagan (who took no part in the consideration or decision of
the case) joined in an opinion by Justice Kennedy in which the Court reversed
the Sixth Circuit and concluded that the severance payments made by Quality
Stores were taxable wages for FICA purposes. The Court emphasized that the
term “wages” is defined broadly for FICA purposes in § 3121(a) as “all
remuneration for employment,” and concluded that the severance payments
paid by Quality Stores, which varied according to the employee’s function and
seniority, fit this broad definition. The Court reasoned that § 3121(a)(13)(A),
which excludes from taxable wages severance payments made “because of . .
. retirement for disability,” would be unnecessary if severance payments did
not fall within the FICA definition of wages. The Court rejected the Sixth
Circuit’s reasoning that § 3402(o)(1), which provides that any SUB payment
“shall be treated as if it were a payment of wages” for income tax withholding
purposes, implies that such payments are not wages for FICA purposes. The
regulatory background of § 3402(o)(1), the Court reasoned, demonstrates that
Congress enacted the provision to address a specific problem. In the 1950s and
1960s, the IRS, in a series of revenue rulings, had exempted certain SUBs from
the definition of wages for both FICA and income tax withholding purposes.
Because such payments were nevertheless includible in income, taxpayers
receiving the benefits faced large tax bills. To alleviate this problem, Congress
enacted § 3402(o)(1) to make all severance payments subject to income tax
withholding, including both SUBs that the IRS had exempted from the
definition of wages for FICA and income tax withholding purposes, and
severance payments that the IRS considered to be wages. Read against this
background, the Court stated, § 3402(o)(1) cannot be interpreted as creating a
negative implication that SUBs are not wages for FICA purposes.
 The Court expressly did not address the
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question of whether the IRS’s position, expressed in rulings such as Rev. Rul.
90-72, 1990-2 C.B. 211, that severance payments tied to the receipt of state
unemployment benefits are exempt from both income tax withholding and FICA
taxation, is consistent with the broad definition of wages under FICA.
3.
Final regulations define employment tax liabilities
of payors designated by an employer to pay employment taxes. T.D. 9662,
Designation of Payor to Perform Acts Required of an Employer, 79 F.R. 17860
(3/31/14). The Treasury and IRS have finalized, with minor changes, proposed
amendments to regulations under § 3504 (REG-102966-10, Designation of
Payor as Agent to Perform Acts Required of an Employer, 78 F.R. 6056
(1/29/13)). The final regulations provide that a person that pays wages or
compensation to individuals who perform services for an employer pursuant
to a service agreement “is designated [under § 3504] to perform the acts
required of an employer with respect to the wages or compensation paid.” The
regulations refer to the employer under a service agreement as the “client.”
The payor and the employer both are subject to all provisions of law, including
penalties, that apply to employers. The preamble to the proposed regulations
indicated that consistent with the IRS position on administering the § 6672
trust fund penalty, the employment tax liability of an employer will be
collected only once whether from the payor or the employer. A service
agreement is an agreement pursuant to which the payor (1) asserts explicitly
or implicitly that it is the employer of the individuals performing services for
the client, (2) pays wages or compensation to the individuals for services they
perform for the client, and (3) assumes responsibility to collect, report, and
pay employment taxes with respect to the wages or compensation paid. A
payor is not considered designated to perform the acts required of an employer
under the regulations if the payor (1) reports employment taxes under the
client’s EIN, (2) is a common paymaster under §§ 3121(s) or 3231(i), (3) is
itself the employer of a person performing services for a client (including both
a common law employer and a statutory employer who has legal control over
the payment of wages under § 3401(d)(1)), or (4) is treated as an employer
under § 3121(a)(2)(A), which addresses, among other things, payments for
sickness or accident disability. Like the proposed regulations, the final
regulations contain several examples to illustrate their application. The “final
regulations are effective for wages or compensation paid by a payor in quarters
beginning on or after March 31, 2014.”
4.
The IRS’s failure to send a determination by
certified or registered mail gives the taxpayer an extended period of time
to file for Tax Court review of worker classification. SECC Corp. v.
Commissioner, 142 T.C. No. 12 (4/3/14). The taxpayer filed a petition under
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§ 7436 seeking a determination of the proper classification of its workers for
employment tax purposes. On April 15, 2011, the IRS mailed to the taxpayer
a letter stating that the taxpayer’s employment tax liabilities as determined by
Appeals would be assessed. The letter was not sent by certified or registered
mail. The taxpayer’s petition was filed more than 90 days after the IRS sent
the April 15, 2011, letter. The Tax Court (Judge Colvin) held that the Tax
Court had jurisdiction and the petition was timely. He reasoned as follows.
First, the April 15, 2011 letter was a determination by the IRS relating to the
classification of workers for employment tax purposes. Thus, the Tax Court
had jurisdiction. Second, because the IRS did not send the determination by
certified or registered mail, the 90-day period for filing an action in the Tax
Court provided in § 7436(b)(2) was inapplicable; the petition was timely. Both
the IRS’s and taxpayer’s motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction were
denied.
5.
Bankrupt employer? Little chance the promised
retirement benefits will be paid? It doesn’t matter. This United Airlines
pilot still owed FICA taxes on the present value of future retirement
benefits he will never receive. Balestra v. United States, 113 A.F.T.R.2d
2014-2301 (Fed. Cl. 5/31/14). In 2004, the taxpayer retired from his position
as a pilot with United Airlines and, pursuant to § 3121(v)(2), the present value
of his future retirement benefits ($289,601) was included in his FICA base for
the year of his retirement. Section 3121(v)(2) provides that amounts deferred
under a nonqualified deferred compensation plan must be taken into account
for FICA purposes as of the later of the time the services are performed or the
time when there is no substantial risk of forfeiture of the right to such amounts.
United Airlines entered bankruptcy proceedings in 2002 and its liability for
the taxpayer’s retirement benefits was ultimately discharged. The taxpayer
received only $63,032 of the promised benefits. The taxpayer brought this
action seeking a refund of the FICA taxes he paid (at the 1.45% rate for the
Medicare portion of FICA) on the $226,569 of retirement benefits that he
never received. The regulations issued under § 3121(v)(2), Reg.
§ 31.3121(v)(2)-(1)(c)(2)(ii), prescribe the method of determining present
value and provide that the present value of future retirement benefits
cannot be discounted for the probability that payments will
not be made (or will be reduced) because of the unfunded
status of the plan, the risk associated with any deemed or
actual investment of amounts deferred under the plan, the risk
that the employer, the trustee, or another party will be
unwilling or unable to pay, the possibility of future plan
amendments, the possibility of a future change in the law, or
similar risks or contingencies.
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Among other arguments, the taxpayer asserted that, by requiring inclusion of
future retirement benefits in the FICA base, Congress meant to employ an
accrual accounting basis that implicitly requires an adjustment when it can be
determined that the benefits will never be received, and that the failure of the
regulations to incorporate such an adjustment is arbitrary and irrational. The
Court of Federal Claims (Judge Wolski) rejected the taxpayer’s arguments.
The court concluded that the statute is silent on how the amount deferred is to
be calculated. “The decision of the Treasury Department to avoid the
complicated and strategic-behavior-enabling use of risk-adjusted discount
rates cannot be said to be unreasonable. Under the deference due the
regulations per Chevron, as applied to plaintiff they must stand.”
6.
Disregarded entities are regarded for employment
tax purposes, except when they are disregarded. T.D. 9670, Disregarded
Entities; Religious and Family Member FICA and FUTA Exceptions; Indoor
Tanning Services Excise Tax, 79 F.R. 36204 (6/26/14). The Treasury has
finalized, without substantive change, temporary and proposed regulations
issued in 2011 that extend the exemptions from FICA and FUTA taxes for
members of certain religious faiths and for certain services performed for
family members to services performed in the employ of disregarded entities.
Several cases, sustaining the check-the-box regulations under Chevron
deference, held that the sole owner of a disregarded entity was liable for the
disregarded entity’s employment taxes. See, e.g., Littriello v. United States,
484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007); McNamee v. Dept. of the Treasury, 488 F.3d
100 (2d Cir. 2007). In the face of these litigation successes, the Treasury
adopted Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2)(iv) to provide that a disregarded entity is
treated as a corporation for employment tax purposes and related reporting
requirements, thereby shifting the liability away from the owner. However,
treating the entity as a corporate employer would eviscerate provisions that
exempt certain employment among family members and employment among
religious persons who believe that Social Security taxes are contrary to the
teachings of the religion or sect. Thus, the final regulations, Regs.
§§ 31.3121(b)(3)-1(d) and 31.3306(c)(5)-1(d), provide that a disregarded
entity treated as a corporation for employment tax purposes will not be treated
as the employer for purposes of §§ 3121(b)(3) and 3306(c)(5), which provide
an exemption from employment taxes for certain services performed by and
for parents, children, and spouses. Final regulation § 31.3127-1(b) provides
that a disregarded entity will not be treated as the employer for purposes of
§ 3127, which provides an exception from FICA taxes where both the
employer and employee are members of a religion that opposes participation
in Social Security. Under each of these provisions, for purposes of applying
the exemptions only, the owner of the disregarded entity will be treated as the
employer. Further, final regulation § 301.7701-2T(c)(2)(iv)(C)(1) provides
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that the owner of a disregarded entity remains subject to the backup
withholding requirements of § 3406. The changes are effective for wages paid
after 11/1/11, but taxpayers may apply the rules to wages paid on or after
1/1/09.
B.

Self-Employment Taxes

1.
According to the Tax Court, “The selfemployment tax provisions are construed broadly in favor of treating
income as earnings from self-employment.” Old McDonald had a farm
and on his farm he collected federal subsidies that were self-employment
income. Morehouse v. Commissioner¸ 140 T.C. No. 350 (6/18/13). In a
reviewed opinion (15-0-0), the Tax Court (Judge Marvel) overruled its prior
decision in Wuebker v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 431 (1998), rev’d, 205 F.3d
897 (6th Cir. 2000), and held that payments under the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) are selfemployment income subject to self-employment taxes. The taxpayer owned
farm land in South Dakota, which he had rented to tenant farmers. The
taxpayer entered into a CRP contract with the USDA under which in exchange
for annual payments, the taxpayer agreed to (1) maintain already established
grass and legume cover for the life of the contract; (2) ”[e]stablish perennial
vegetative cover on land temporarily removed from agricultural production,”
including pubescent or intermediate wheatgrass, alfalfa, and sweet clover; and
(3) engage in “pest control and pesticide management” for the life of the
contract. The taxpayer hired a former tenant farmer to carry out most of the
work, but the taxpayer supervised the operation, purchased materials needed
to implement the conservation plans, gathered documentation necessary to the
CRP payments, arranged for individuals to hunt on some of the properties, and
visited the properties several times during the tax years involved. The court
held that these activities were sufficient to constitute a trade or business carried
on by the taxpayer the income from which was subject to self-employment
taxes under § 1402(a)(1). The court indicated that regardless of whether the
taxpayer’s activities qualified as farming, the taxpayer was directly and
through his agent “engaged in the business of participating in the CRP and that
he enrolled, maintained, and managed multiple properties subject to CRP
contracts with the primary intent of making a profit.”
a.
But according to the Eighth Circuit, “we
embrace the agency’s longstanding position that land conservation
payments made to non-farmers constitute rentals from real estate and are
excluded from the self-employment tax.” Morehouse v. Commissioner, 769
F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 10/10/14). In an opinion by Judge Beam (2-1), the Eighth
Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s decision and held that “land conservation
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payments made to non-farmers constitute rentals from real estate and are
excluded from the self-employment tax.” The court relied on Rev. Rul. 60-32,
1960-1 C.B. 23, in which the IRS concluded that soil bank payments made to
persons who did not operate or materially participate in a farming operation
were “not to be included in determining net earnings from self-employment,”
although soil bank payments to farmers were to be treated as self-employment
income derived from their farming business. The court noted that “[a]lthough
Revenue Ruling 60-32 did not explain why the IRS differentiated between
farmers and non-farmers, [Rev. Rul. 65-149, 1965-1 C.B. 434] indicated the
IRS viewed soil bank payments to non-farmers as rental income.” The court
accorded no deference to the proposed revenue ruling in Notice 2006-108, and
it distinguished Wuebker v. Commissioner, 205 F.3d 897 (6th Cir. 2000), rev’g
110 T.C. 431 (1998), as “seem[ing] to rest on its conclusion that, because the
taxpayers’ maintenance obligations under their CRP contracts were
intrinsically similar to activities performed in their active farming operation—
’tilling, seeding, fertilizing, and weed control’—these obligations did not rise
to the level of ‘occupancy or use’ by the government.”
While CRP contracts may require farmers to conduct a small
subset of activities similar to those used in a portion of their
general farming operations, Wuebker, 205 F.3d at 903, the
same cannot be said for non-farmers. The only reason they
even indirectly engage in or arrange for any “tilling, seeding,
fertilizing, and weed control” activities on their CRP land is
because the agreement with the government requires them to
do so. Id.
 Judge Gruender dissented. Even if he gave
no deference to Notice 2006-108—particularly in light of the IRS’s inconsistent
positions—he agreed with its interpretation of the rentals-from-real-estate
exclusion.
[E]ven according no deference to Notice 2006-108, I agree with
its interpretation of the rentals-from-real-estate exclusion.
Because the term “rentals from real estate” is not defined in the
Internal Revenue Code, it must be interpreted “in accordance
with its ordinary or normal meaning,” . . . with the qualification
that, as an exclusion from net earnings from self-employment,
the rentals-from-real-estate exclusion must be narrowly
construed.
The CRP payments were not “rent,” because “Morehouse enjoyed uninterrupted
and unfettered access to his property. Under these circumstances, it cannot be
said that Morehouse’s checklist of tasks along with the government’s sporadic

2015]

Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation

341

entries onto his property somehow translated into ‘use’ of Morehouse’s property
by the government.”
C.

Excise Taxes

1.
Telephone excise tax trouble for the government
ahead. Cohen v. United States, 578 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 8/7/09) (2-1). In this
telephone excise case, Judge Janice Rogers Brown’s majority opinion held that
the telephone excise tax challenge litigation violated neither (1) the AntiInjunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), which provides that “no suit for the
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be
maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the
person against whom such tax was assessed” nor (2) the Declaratory Judgment
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), which allows for declaratory relief but specifically
excludes federal taxes from its reach, because (a) the standalone
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, claim in the instant case is “the
anomalous case where the wrongful assessment is not disputed and the
litigants do not seek a refund,” and (b) the Declaratory Judgment Act is
coextensive with the Anti-Injunction Act (citing circuit precedent). Judge
Brown began her opinion:
Comic-strip writer Bob Thaves [creator of Frank and
Ernest (1972)] famously quipped, “A fool and his money are
soon parted. It takes creative tax laws for the rest.” In this case
it took the Internal Revenue Service’s (“IRS” or “the
Service”) aggressive interpretation of the tax code to part
millions of Americans with billions of dollars in excise tax
collections. Even this remarkable feat did not end the IRS’s
creativity. When it finally conceded defeat on the legal front,
the IRS got really inventive and developed a refund scheme
under which almost half the funds remained unclaimed. Now
the IRS seeks to avoid judicial review by insisting the notice
[Notice 2006-50] it issued, acknowledging its error and
announcing the refund process, is not a binding rule but only
a general policy statement.
 Judge Brown stated that the IRS position
was “just mean,” and that it “places taxpayers in a virtual house of mirrors.” She
continued, “Despite the obvious infirmities of [the IRS position], the IRS still has
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the chutzpah to chide taxpayers for failing to intuit that neither the agency’s
express instructions nor the warning on its forms should be taken seriously.”
 Judge Brown concluded, however, that
“[a]ppellant Neiland Cohen filed his refund claim prematurely and, [we] thus,
affirm the District Court’s dismissal of his refund claim.” The case was remanded
to the District Court for its consideration of the merits.
 Judge Kavanaugh dissented, stating that
the appellant could simply have followed the procedures of Notice 2006-50.
 The D.C. Circuit granted rehearing en
banc, 3/11/10.
a.
A case warning that tax professionals
continue to ignore administrative law at their (clients’(?)) peril. The panel
holding was upheld on rehearing en banc. Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d
717 (D.C. Cir. 7/1/11) (6-3). In upholding its original panel decision to remand
the case to the District Court for its consideration of the merits, Judge Brown
wrote the majority opinion that held the suit was not precluded by either the
Anti-Injunction Act or the Declaratory Judgment Act. Judge Kavanaugh’s
dissent emphasized that this suit was merely a prelude to a class action suit
seeking monetary relief from the government, and that there was an adequate
remedy in individual refund suits following claims for refund under the
procedures of Notice 2006-50 in which all claims under the Administrative
Procedure Act could be asserted.
 “Enough, already!” The IRS cries,
“Uncle.” Notice 2006-50, 2006-1 C.B. 1141 (5/26/06), revoking Notice 200579, 2005-2 C.B. 952. The IRS announced that it will stop assessing the § 4251
telephone excise tax on long distance services, and that it will provide for refunds
of taxes paid on services billed after 2/28/03 and before 8/1/06. These refunds are
to be requested on 2006 Federal income tax returns, the right to which will be
preserved by the IRS scheduling overassessments under § 6407. Individuals are
eligible to receive a safe harbor amount, which has not yet been determined.
Interest received on the refunds will have to be reported as 2007 income.
b.
On remand, the district court granted
prospective vacatur of Notice 2006-50. In re Long-Distance Telephone
Service Federal Excise Tax Refund Litigation, 853 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D. D.C.
4/10/12). The District Court (Judge Urbina) found Notice 2006-50 to have
been improperly promulgated in violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act, i.e., that it was a binding rule promulgated without notice and hearing.
However, he dismissed two of the three complaints [Cohen and Gurrola
plaintiffs] consolidated for pre-trial proceedings that failed to raise that
ground, and permitted only one complaint [Sloan plaintiffs] to go forward.
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Judge Urbina granted relief on that third complaint by merely vacating that
notice prospectively, i.e., he issued a prospective vacatur.
c.
The district court entered final judgment.
In re Long-Distance Telephone Service Federal Excise Tax Refund Litigation,
901 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 10/29/12). The District Court (Chief Judge
Lamberth, following Judge Urbina’s retirement) entered final judgment in
favor of the Sloan plaintiffs on their procedural APA claim and in favor of the
government on all other claims of the three plaintiffs.
d.
In its divided panel decision following
remand, the D.C. Circuit upheld the district court decision anticipatorily
vacating Notice 2006-50, but approved of the IRS’s failure to offer any
further relief. Judge Brown dissented in a vehement opinion blasting the
IRS and the horse it rode in on. In re Long-Distance Telephone Service
Federal Excise Tax Refund Litigation, 751 F.3d 629 (D.C. Cir. 5/9/14),
petition for rehearing en banc denied, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12636 (7/2/14),
cert. denied, 2015 WL 133496 (1/12/15). The D.C. Circuit (Judge Randolph)
affirmed the district court judgment, holding that the remand order to the IRS
to permit it to correct mistakes in the issuance of Notice 2006-50 was an
appealable decision.
 Judge Janice Rogers Brown dissented,
stating:
This is a complicated and frustrating case. It has lasted five
years and accomplished nothing. In this litigation, the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) has lost every round, but, as the
court’s opinion confirms, the odds are always with the house.
Round one was Cohen I, 578 F.3d 1, 388 U.S. App. D.C.
80 (D.C. Cir. 2009), where we determined the taxpayers could
move forward with a challenge to Notice 2006-50. The
Service, rocked but undaunted, tried again with a larger group
of judges in Cohen II, 650 F.3d 717, 397 U.S. App. D.C. 33
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc), arguing it was immune to suit
outside the narrow confines of the refund process. Again, it
failed—by split decision, the taxpayers won. On remand—
round three—the district court found the IRS had violated the
APA and vacated the offending notice, but it declined to set
any timetable for further action.
The Service announced the demise of the refund notice
and resolutely refused to take any other remedial action.
Though there is no dispute about the unauthorized nature of
the exaction, it intends to keep the unrefunded portions of its
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ill-gotten gains—a few billion dollars. Indeed, the Service
fares better than the Las Vegas casinos: even when they lose,
they win. Since no law “unequivocally” requires the IRS to
do the right thing, they have the discretion to do wrong. The
taxpayers are out of luck. It was not always thus. . . .
The Service’s recalcitrance is disconcerting, and I do not
share my colleagues’ confidence that no law imposes a duty
upon the Service to create a workable refund scheme. . . .
 She concluded:
Once upon a time, public law concerned itself with notions of
what was morally right, not just what was minimally required.
But, as counsel for the Service has repeatedly reminded us
throughout this litigation, those days are part of the dim (and
not to be recaptured) past. See Appellee’s Br. at 37 (“After
making the concession that limited the scope of ‘toll
telephone service’ to which I.R.C. § 4252(b)(1) applied, the
IRS was by no means required to notify every taxpayer
potentially entitled to a refund, or even to publicize the
availability of refunds.”). These days, no matter how
unwarranted its exactions, whether the Service returns
anything to the taxpayers—when circumstances do not fit the
usual paradigm—is a decision within its sole discretion.
Following the Service’s reasoning to its logical conclusion,
the more larcenously it behaves, the lighter its obligations to
plundered taxpayers become. No doubt this is a sign of the
times, but it seems more an artifact of an administrative state
gone deeply awry.
2.
The price of skin cancer is increased by the excise
tax on tanning services. T.D. 9621, Indoor Tanning Services; Excise Tax, 78
F.R. 34874 (6/11/13). Final Regulations § 49.5000B-1 are promulgated for
collection of the 10 percent excise tax on indoor tanning facilities under
§ 5000B enacted as part of the Affordable Health Care Act. The tax is imposed
on amounts paid for indoor tanning services. The final regulations generally
adopt provisions in the proposed and temporary regulations. The regulations
include an exemption for Qualified Physical Fitness Facilities, the
predominant business or activity of which is to serve as a physical fitness
facility that does not charge separately for indoor tanning services available at
the facility. For other purveyors of indoor tanning, the tax applies to amounts
actually paid for indoor tanning services that are provided at a reduced rate.
The tax does not apply to services that are obtained by redemption of points
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through a loyalty program. Where tanning services are bundled with other
goods and services, the final regulations set out a formula to determine the
amount reasonably attributable to indoor tanning services. With respect to gift
cards, the tax is imposed when the card is redeemed specifically to pay for
indoor tanning services and not when the card is purchased. The tax is also
imposed on prepaid monthly membership and enrollment fees regardless of
the services actually provided.
a.
The price of a tan goes up even in
disregard of the hazard from which the owner is protected. T.D. 9670,
Disregarded Entities; Religious and Family Member FICA and FUTA
Exceptions; Indoor Tanning Services Excise Tax, 79 F.R. 36204 (6/26/14).
The Treasury has finalized, without substantive change, temporary and
proposed regulations issued in 2012 that add the 10 percent excise tax on
indoor tanning services of § 5000B to the list of excise taxes for which
disregarded entities (QSub or single owner business entity) are treated as
separate entities. These changes apply to taxes imposed on amounts paid on or
after 7/1/12.
3.
The government prevails on the substantive issue
whether an excise tax is due on S corporation shares held by an ESOP,
but is barred from assessing the tax by the applicable period of
limitations. Law Office of John H. Eggersten P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 T.C.
110 (2/12/14). An ESOP owned all of the stock of the taxpayer, a subchapter
S corporation. Under the ESOP, 100 percent of the stock of the taxpayer was
allocated to John H. Eggersten, the individual who formerly owned the stock.
The government and the taxpayer agreed that Mr. Eggersten was a
“disqualified person” within the meaning of § 409(p)(4). Because the ESOP
allocated all the stock of the S corporation to Mr. Eggersten, the shares were
deemed-owned shares with respect to him under § 409(p)(4)(C) and he was
treated as owning them for purposes of § 409(p) and the related excise tax
imposed by § 4979A. The government argued that, because disqualified
persons owned 50 percent or more of the number of shares of employer
securities consisting of stock of an S corporation, a non-allocation year had
occurred in 2005 within the meaning of § 409(p)(3). Accordingly, the
government argued, under § 4979A(a), an excise tax was imposed on the S
corporation equal to 50 percent of the “amount involved.” The government
relied on a special rule in § 4979A(e)(2)(C), which provides that “the amount
involved for the first nonallocation year of any employee stock ownership plan
shall be determined by taking into account the total value of all the deemedowned shares of all disqualified persons with respect to such plan.” Thus, the
government sought to impose a tax equal to 50 percent of the value of the S
corporation’s shares. The Tax Court (Judge Chiechi) agreed with the
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government that § 4979A(a) imposed the tax for tax year 2005, but concluded
that the period of limitations in § 4979A(e)(2)(D) for assessing the tax had
expired before the government issued its notice of deficiency. In its analysis
of the imposition of the tax, the court rejected the taxpayer’s argument that
§ 4979A(a) does not impose an excise tax when a non-allocation year occurs.
The court also rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the “first nonallocation
year” specified by § 4979A(e)(2)(C) was 1999, the year in which Mr.
Eggerston transferred the S corporation shares to the ESOP, rather than 2005.
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the effective date of the relevant
provisions, which apply to plan years beginning after 12/31/04. Under
§ 4979A(e)(2)(D), the period of limitations for assessing the excise tax is three
years from the later of the allocation or ownership giving rise to the tax or the
date on which the Secretary is notified of the allocation or ownership. Section
4979A(e)(2)(D) does not define the term “notified.” Relying on its approach
to a similar issue in Stovall v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 140 (1993), the court
looked for guidance to the regulations issued under § 1033(a), which specify
that a notification must contain “all of the details.” The court concluded that
the S corporation’s 2005 return on Form 1120S and the employee benefit plan
2005 return on Form 5500, both filed in 2006, provided the requisite
notification. The period of limitations on assessment therefore expired in
2009. Because the IRS did not issue the notice of deficiency until 4/14/11,
assessment of the tax was precluded.
XII.

Tax Legislation
A.

Enacted

1.
Would this Act be better called the Political
Cowardice Tax Act of 2014? The Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014, Pub.
L. No. 113-295, colloquially called the “Extenders Bill,” was signed by the
President on 12/19/14. The Tax Increase Prevention Act retroactively
extended through 12/31/14 a myriad of deductions, credits, and special benefit
provisions that had expired at the end of 2013. It did not address extension of
these provisions, or any other expired provisions, to 2015.

